Advisor\u27s guide to multistate income taxation : compliance and planning opportunities by Nelson, Bruce M.
University of Mississippi 
eGrove 
Guides, Handbooks and Manuals American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Historical Collection 
2011 
Advisor's guide to multistate income taxation : compliance and 
planning opportunities 
Bruce M. Nelson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_guides 
 Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons 
Bruce M. Nelson, MA, CPAaicpa.org  |  cpa2biz.com
Bruce M. Nelson, MA, CPA, has over 25 years’ experience in state and local 
tax and is currently employed at Ehrhardt Keefe Steiner Hottman, P.C. (EKS&H) 
in Colorado. Prior to joining EKS&H, Bruce was with a law firm specializing in 
state tax audit defense and litigation, was manager of tax policy for the 
State of Colorado, and was a senior tax manager in a Big Four accounting 
firm. Bruce earned his BA from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln and an MA 
from Colorado State University. He is on the adjunct faculty of Regis University 
and is a frequent seminar speaker. He teaches continuing education classes in 
state and local tax for the University of Denver’s Graduate Tax Program, the Colorado Society of CPAs, and 
the AICPA. Bruce has published more than 40 tax articles in various publications, is a coauthor of the Sales 
and Use Tax Answer Book, and is a former columnist for the Journal of State Taxation. Bruce is a member 
of the AICPA and the Colorado Society of Certified Public Accountants.
Multistate Income Taxation in an E-Commerce World  
With rapid technological changes in e-commerce, more and more businesses find themselves doing 
business in a multistate environment. The rise of internet sales has affected the age-old nexus issue 
in unprecedented ways. 
If you have clients doing business in the multistate arena, you need to be aware of the issues, liabilities, 
and opportunities arising from doing business in more than one state. To keep up with your clients’ 
growing businesses—whatever their size—you need to be up to speed on multistate tax issues. 
In this guide—and the included CD—you will learn about the tax-saving opportunities and alternatives 
available to your clients and how to advise your clients in complying with the various federal, state, 
and local requirements. 
Topics covered in this book include the following:
The included CD features an informative 124-slide PowerPoint  
presentation that you can use to educate your clients and potential  
clients on multistate tax issues. It helps you illustrate situations that  
raise potential tax issues and reviews the rules and regulations  
that present tax-saving opportunities.
The Adviser’s Guide to M
ultistate Incom
e Taxation      – Com















11429-359_Advisor's Guide to Multistate Income Taxation_Spread.indd   1 10/6/11   2:09 PM
Bruce M. Nelson, MA, CPA
11429-359
11429-359_Advisor's Guide to Multistate Income Taxation_Title Page.indd   1 10/6/11   2:09 PM
 Notice to Readers
The Adviser’s Guide to Multistate Income Taxation: Compliance and Planning Opportunities does 
not represent an official position of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 
and it is distributed with the understanding that the author and publisher are not rendering, 
legal, accounting, or other professional services in the publication. This book is intended 
to be an overview of the topics discussed within, and the author has made every attempt 
to verify the completeness and accuracy of the information herein. However, neither the 
author nor publisher can guarantee the applicability of the information found herein. If legal 
advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should 
be sought.
Copyright © 2011 by
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc.
New York, NY 10036-8775
All rights reserved. For information about the procedure for requesting permission to make copies of any 
part of this work, please email copyright@aicpa.org with your request. Otherwise, requests should be writ-
ten and mailed to the Permissions Department, AICPA, 220 Leigh Farm Road, Durham, NC 27707-8110.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 PIP 1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
ISBN: 978-1-93735-003-1 
Publisher: Amy M. Plent
Senior Managing Editor: Amy Krasnyanskaya
Acquisitions Editor: Martin Censor
00-Front Matter.indd   2 10/5/11   9:52 AM
 iii
About the Author
Bruce M. Nelson, MA, is a CPA with over 25 years’ ex-
perience in state and local tax, and is employed at Ehrhardt 
Keefe Steiner Hottman, P.C. (EKS&H). Prior to joining 
EKS&H, Bruce spent three years with a law firm special-
izing in state tax audit defense and litigation; two years as 
the Manager of Tax Policy at the State of Colorado; and 
before that, he was a Senior Tax Manager for several years 
in a “Big Four” accounting firm, where he ran the state and 
local tax desk. Bruce earned a Bachelor of Arts degree from 
the University of Nebraska-Lincoln and a Master’s degree 
from Colorado State University, and he is a certified pub-
lic accountant in the state of Colorado. He is also on the 
adjunct faculty for Regis University where he teaches courses in individual, partnership, 
and corporate taxation. He is a frequent seminar speaker and teaches continuing educa-
tion classes in state and local tax for the University of Denver’s Graduate Tax Program, the 
Colorado Society of CPAs, and the AICPA. Bruce has published more than forty tax articles 
in many publications including the Journal of Accountancy, Tax Executive, Controller Magazine, 
the Journal of Multistate Taxation, State Tax Notes, and Colorado Lawyer. He is a co-author 
of the Sales and Use Tax Answer Book, co-editor of the Guidebook to Colorado Taxes, and a 
former columnist for the Journal of State Taxation. Bruce is a member of the AICPA and the 
Colorado Society of Certified Public Accountants.
00-Front Matter.indd   3 10/5/11   9:52 AM
00-Front Matter.indd   4 10/5/11   9:52 AM
 v
Preface
Why a National Multistate Income Tax Book?
Multistate corporate income tax books are not widely available in colleges or other insti-
tutions of higher learning. It is only recently that undergraduate textbooks have begun to 
include chapters on multistate taxation. In addition, multistate income tax books continue 
to be difficult to find at the local level. So, many practitioners enter the field ill-equipped 
to handle multistate issues. As the Internet now allows even small businesses to conduct 
and transact business more easily in the national—and even international—arena, this in-
formation has become more important for most advisers, including advisers to small- and 
medium-sized businesses.
Although no two states are identical in their treatment of corporations doing business in 
a multistate tax environment, a general multistate income tax sourcebook seems appropriate 
for a variety of reasons.
First, states rely on a limited number of concepts in applying their corporate income tax 
laws. For instance, most states distinguish between business and nonbusiness income and 
use some variation of the traditional three-factor (sales, property, and payroll) method for 
apportioning business income.
Second, given the rapid technological changes in e-commerce, more and more small 
businesses find themselves doing business in a multistate environment. State tax administra-
tors, for example, continue to press for authority to tax any out-of-state business that does 
only online sales in their state. In some states, simple participation in a trade show by an 
out-of-state business will create a filing obligation with the state. A simple misstep by even 
the smallest of mom-and-pop businesses can result in thousands of dollars of tax, penalties, 
and interest.
After reading this book, you should be alerted to situations when potential multistate 
income tax saving opportunities exist. In each situation, you will need to review the ap-
propriate rules, regulations, and practices of the particular jurisdiction to see what options 
and alternatives may be available.
In summary, this book is intended to make you aware of the pertinent issues, potential 
liabilities, and opportunities in doing business in more than one state.
Who Needs This Information?
This book is intended to be an introduction to the basic concepts of multistate cor- 
porate income tax. CPAs, CFOs, attorneys, and other professionals will benefit from this 
information.
This book addresses issues pertinent to public practitioners as well as accountants in in-
dustry or other nonpublic positions. The examples at the end of the chapters illustrate issues 
and principles that apply to companies in a variety of industries and recur time and again in 
multistate taxation.
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 How Will Your Business or Practice Benefit?
In light of the competitive business environment that includes not only public accounting, 
but virtually all businesses, this book should assist you or your business in reducing costs, 
generating additional revenues, and creating goodwill with clients or superiors.
As mentioned previously, many businesses unwittingly incur significant state income tax 
liabilities. This book will help you become familiar with the basic concepts of multistate 
corporate income so that you can identify potential liabilities and tax savings.
The basic information included in this book can assist you whether you are dealing with 
a state department of revenue, or even when negotiating a fee with an outside expert. For 
example, the ability to negotiate a settlement has its obvious benefits. Having a basic knowl-
edge of the multistate income tax will enable you to approach, discuss, and perhaps even 
negotiate more effectively and with more confidence.
Federal taxes have always been the mainstay for tax advisers. The focus has been so heavy 
on federal taxes that, until recently, state tax planners have had little competition. This is 
changing quickly, making the state and local tax arena an exciting and competitive field.
An expertise in multistate tax can offer both employees and practitioners a higher profile 
in their company or community. Obviously, these taxes can have a drastic effect on a com-
pany’s bottom line, and the field is rich with planning opportunities.
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Forty-five states and the District of Columbia impose some type of income tax on corpora-
tions. (Nevada, Ohio, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming do not impose corporate 
income taxes.) Most of these states “piggyback” off federal taxable income. Unfortunately, 
while the concepts of dividing a company’s taxable income among the states in which it is 
doing business are few in number, the application and methods of applying those concepts 
are various and often contradictory.
The state approach to taxing multinational corporations differs from the federal approach. 
The latter generally uses a “separate accounting” approach that requires that income be al-
located to a specific jurisdiction based on complex transfer pricing and sourcing rules. States 
apportion a multistate or multinational corporation’s income based upon a formula intended 
to reflect the company’s presence and income in each state. The formula traditionally has 
relied on factors such as sales, property, and payroll.
The basic outline of state income tax begins with federal taxable income, adds and sub-
tracts certain state modifications and allocable nonbusiness income, and then multiplies the 
apportionable income based on some combination of sales, property, and payroll factors. 
The following tax formula illustrates the basic computation.
Tax Formula for Multistate Corporate 
Taxpayers
Federal taxable income (IRS Form 1120, line 28 or 30) $
Plus or minus State modifications $
Equals State tax base $
Minus Allocable nonbusiness income $
Equals State apportionable income or (loss) $
Times State’s apportionment percentage %
Equals State apportioned income or (loss) $
Plus State’s allocable nonbusiness income $
Equals State taxable income (loss) $
Times State tax rate %
Equals Tax liability before credits $
Less State tax credits $
Equals Net state income tax liability $
1
Introduction
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The following simplified example illustrates the basic multistate calculation.
The Rocky Mountain Corporation does business in two states, North Dakota and Ala-
bama. Its federal taxable income for the year was $1,900,000, which included interest on 
U.S. obligations of $26,000. During the year the company made estimated tax payments 
of $50,000 to North Dakota and $20,000 to Alabama. The company’s sales, property, and 
payroll by state were as follows:
North Dakota Alabama Total
Sales $38,000,000 $12,000,000 $50,000,000
Property   6,000,000   3,000,000   9,000,000
Payroll   1,200,000     800,000   2,000,000
Rocky Mountain’s modified state taxable income is $1,874,000 ($1,900,000 − $26,000).
Its North Dakota apportionment factor is 67.56 percent, making its North Dakota taxable 
income $1,266,074 ($1,874,000 x 0.6756).
($38,000,000/$50,000,000 + $6,000,000/$9,000,000 + $1,200,000/$2,000,000)
3
Using the North Dakota figures, our tax formula for North Dakota looks like this:
Federal taxable income (IRS Form 1120, line 28 or 30) $1,900,000
Plus or minus State modifications 26,000
Equals State tax base $1,874,000
Minus Allocable nonbusiness income -0-
Equals State apportionable income or (loss) $1,874,000
Times State’s apportionment percentage 67.56%
Equals State apportioned income or (loss) $1,266,074
Plus State’s allocable nonbusiness income -0- 
Equals State taxable income (loss) $1,266,074
Times State tax rate 5.00%
Equals Tax liability before credits 63,304
Less State tax credits (50,000)
Equals Net state income tax liability $  13,304
The company’s Alabama apportionment factor is 32.44 percent, making its Alabama tax-
able income $607,926 ($1,874,000 x 0.3244).
($12,000,000/$50,000,000 + $3,000,000/$9,000,000 + $800,000/$2,000,000)
3
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Using our tax formula, the Alabama numbers look like this:
Federal taxable income (IRS Form 1120, line 28 or 30) $1,900,000
Plus or minus State modifications 26,000
Equals State tax base $1,874,000
Minus Allocable nonbusiness income -0-
Equals State apportionable income or (loss) $1,874,000
Times State’s apportionment percentage 32.44%
Equals State apportioned income or (loss) $  607,926
Plus State’s allocable nonbusiness income -0- 
Equals State taxable income (loss) $  607,926
Times State tax rate 4.00*
Equals Tax liability before credits 24,317
Less State tax credits (20,000)
Equals Net state income tax liability $   4,317
* For purposes of this example, flat rates of 5 and 4 percent, respectively, have been used.
Please note that the apportioned income comes out to exactly 100 percent (67.56 per-
cent for North Dakota and 32.44 percent for Alabama). The chances of this happening in 
the real world are highly unlikely. For example, let us say that North Dakota decided to 
adopt single sales factor apportionment. Then, its apportionment factor would be 76 percent 
(38,000,000/$50,000,000), and Rocky Mountain would be apportioning more than 100 
percent of its income—108.44 percent (0.76 + 0.3244). This is not good. However, just 
the opposite could happen as well. Suppose Alabama, instead of North Dakota, adopted a 
single sales factor. Alabama’s factor would then be 24 percent (12,000,000/50,000,000), and 
Rocky Mountain would now be apportioning only 91.56 percent of its income (0.24 + 
0.6756). The fact is that given the differences among the states in how they define the tax 
base and the apportionment factors, it would be downright miraculous if a company ever 
ended apportioning exactly 100 percent of its income.
In this book, we will analyze the elements of this formula in detail. The topics we will 
cover will include the required and allowable modifications to federal taxable income, what 
constitutes business and nonbusiness income, and a detailed examination of the factors 
(property, payroll, and sales) of the apportionment formula and the different weight that is 
often given to the sales factor.
This book is designed to be a permanent reference tool. Nevertheless, it is no substitute 
for researching a state’s specific tax statutes, regulations, and case law. We hope your reading 
of this guide enriches your professional learning experience.
Author’s Note: On Personal Pronouns
We use the terms he and she alternately throughout the book (except when 
a particular person is mentioned), because both genders are well represented 
throughout the profession.
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 Irregular Corporate Tax Structures
A handful of states have unique tax structures that are beyond the scope of this book. They 
include the new (soon to be replaced) Michigan Business Tax (MBT), Ohio’s commercial 
activity tax (CAT), the new Texas Margin Tax (TMT), and Washington’s business and oc-
cupation tax (B&O). The following is a snapshot of those taxes.
Michigan
Michigan’s single business tax (SBT) was repealed effective December 31, 2007, and re-
placed with the MBT. Applicable to almost all business entities including C corporations, 
S corporations, limited liability companies, partnerships, and sole proprietorships, the new 
tax is composed of two parts. The first part, the business income tax (BIT), is imposed on 
“business income” at a rate of 4.95 percent. The second part, the modified gross receipts tax 
(GRT), is imposed at the rate of 0.8 percent. Most taxpayers will pay both taxes. Certain 
industries, specifically insurance companies and financial institutions, pay special taxes rather 
than the MBT. Insurance companies will pay a premiums tax of 1.25 percent on gross di-
rect premiums, and financial institutions will pay a franchise tax on the net capital at a rate 
of 0.235 percent. Businesses with gross receipts of less than $350,000 are exempt from the 
MBT, and a credit phase-in is available to businesses with gross receipts between $350,000 
and $700,000.
The nexus standards for the two elements of the MBT are different. The BIT applies to 
any taxpayer whose activity in the state exceeds the safe harbor provisions of Public Law 
86-272 (see chapter 1 for a discussion of nexus and Public Law 86-272). The gross GRT ap-
plies to any taxpayer that (1) has physical presence in the state for more than one day during 
a tax year or (2) “actively solicits” sales in Michigan and who has gross receipts sourced to 
the state of more than $350,000. The state defined “active solicitation” in Revenue Admin-
istrative Bulletin (RAB) 2007-6, “Michigan Business Tax—‘Actively Solicits’ Defined,” 
approved December 28, 2007, to mean solicitation through
1. the use of mail, telephone, and e-mail;
2. advertising, including print, radio, Internet, television, and other media; and
3. maintenance of an Internet site over or through which sales transactions occur with per-
sons in Michigan.
Examples of active solicitation provided by RAB 2007-6 include “sending mail order 
catalogs; sending credit applications; maintaining an internet site offering online shopping, 
services, or subscriptions; and soliciting through media advertising, including internet ad-
vertisements.” It is clear from these examples that the nexus standard for the GRT is really 
more of an “economic presence” rather than a “physical presence” test.
Unlike Michigan’s previous SBT, both taxes will be applied on a unitary basis (see chap-
ter 3 for a discussion of the unitary concept) using a single sales factor (see chapter 5 for a 
discussion of the sales factor).
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A unitary group is defined as
•  a group of United States persons, other than a foreign operating entity, one of which 
owns or controls, directly or indirectly, more than 50 percent of the ownership inter-
est with voting rights of the other U.S. persons and
•  whose business activities has a flow of value between or among persons included in 
the unitary group that are integrated with, are dependent upon, or contribute to each 
other.1
A foreign operating entity is a United States person who has substantial operations outside 
the United States and has at least 80 percent of its income characterized as active foreign 
business income as that is defined in Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 861(c)(1)(b).
The Michigan Department of Revenue recently released guidance on the first part of 
the unitary definition, the control test, but not the relationship test. See Michigan RAB 
2010-1, “Michigan Business Tax Unitary Business Group Control Test,” approved Febru-
ary 5, 2010, which provides examples and details of how to apply the control test to parent-
subsidiary, brother-sister, and combined controlled entity groups.
Business Income Tax 
The business income tax base for the BIT begins with federal taxable income followed by 
several modifications, including
•  Adding back federally exempt interest and dividends from non-Michigan sources, net 
of any expenses to generate that income.
•  Adding back any net income taxes deducted in arriving at federal taxable income.
•  Adding back any net operating losses deducted to arrive at federal taxable income. 
•  To the extent included in federal taxable income, adding back any loss attributable to 
another entity subject to the BIT.
•  Adding back any royalty, interest, or other expenses paid to a related person for the 
use of an intangible asset, if that person is not included in the unitary group. 
•  To the extent included in federal taxable income, subtracting interest income from 
U.S. obligations.
•  Subtracting any deduction taken for net earnings from self-employment of the tax-
payer, partner, or member of a limited liability company. (This provision will put sole 
proprietors, for example, on a level playing field with corporations.)
•  Subtracting any net operating loss, after allocation and apportionment, incurred after 
2007. (Business losses may be carried forward 10 years.)
Please note also that effective January 1, 2008, Michigan decoupled from the federal tax-
able income by excluding any bonus depreciation (IRC § 168[k]) and the domestic produc-
tion activities deduction (IRC § 199).
1 See S.B. 94 § 117(6), 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2007).
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 The taxable base, after the preceding modifications, is then apportioned or allocated based 
on a single sales factor. The sales factor is the percentage derived from dividing total sales in 
Michigan by total sales everywhere. For a unitary group, Michigan sales will include sales 
in Michigan by each member of the unitary group regardless of whether that member has 
nexus with Michigan. (See the discussion of the “Finnigan rule” under the sales factor in 
chapter 5.)
Sales of tangible personal property are based on ultimate destination, while sales of ser-
vices rely on the market approach. Service sales under the prior SBT were sourced based 
upon cost of performance coupled with an all-or-nothing approach to services provided 
in more than one state. Service sales under the new MBT will not only be included in the 
jurisdiction of the recipient of the services, but will be prorated to the extent the service is 
provided in more than one state. The MBT also provides extensive guidance for sourcing 
sales for various industries such as investment, brokerage, oil and gas, and telecommunica-
tion companies.
Modified Gross Receipts Tax
The GRT is assessed on the taxpayer’s “modified gross receipts tax base,” which is defined 
as “gross receipts less purchases from other firms before apportionment.” Gross receipts is 
defined much like it was under the prior SBT as “the entire amount received by the tax-
payer from any activity whether in intrastate, interstate, or foreign commerce carried on for 
direct or indirect gain, benefit, or advantage to the taxpayer or to others.”2 The rate for the 
modified GRT is 0.8 percent.
“Purchases from other firms” includes inventory, materials, supplies, assets, and compen-
sation costs paid to staffing firms and construction companies.
Michigan Surcharge
On December 4, 2007, Michigan Governor Jennifer M. Granholm signed Public Act 145 
of 2007, amending the MBT. The primary purpose of Public Act 145 was to institute an 
MBT surcharge of 21.99 percent of the taxpayer’s MBT liability after allocation and ap-
portionment, but before any tax credit. The surcharge is capped at $6 million for all taxpay-
ers, except for financial institutions. For a financial institution, the MBT surcharge is 27.7 
percent for tax years ending in 2008 and 23.4 percent for tax years ending in 2009 and later. 
The MBT surcharge will be eliminated on January 1, 2017, assuming Michigan’s personal 
income growth exceeds zero percent in 2014 through 2016. Insurance companies are not 
subject to the surcharge, nor are taxpayers that qualify for the state’s Small Business Alter-
native Credit. Taxpayers must factor in the surcharge in their calculation of estimated tax 
credits. Although the surcharge was the key element of Public Act 145, the provision made 
additional changes that are beyond the scope of this text, but it included such items as reduc-
tions and caps on various credits and changes in taxpayer refund opportunities.
As of September 1, 2011, the Michigan Department of Revenue had helpfully issued 
more than 400 frequently asked questions (FAQs) covering administrative matters and 
2 See S.B. 94 § 111(1), 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2007).
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questions regarding nexus, apportionment, unitary groups, and many other topics. These 
FAQs can be found at www.michigan.gov/taxes/0,1607,7-238-47449---F,00.html.
Okay, so just as you start getting the proverbial “handle” on the new MBT, Michigan 
has changed its tax structure once again. Effective January 1, 2012, the MBT is repealed 
and replaced with a new corporate income tax (CIT) imposed at a 6 percent rate. The new 
CIT will apply only to regular C corporations; pass-through entities, such as partnerships, S 
corporations, and limited liability companies taxed as partnerships will not be subject to the 
tax. Instead, the owners of the pass-through entities will pay tax on their respective shares 
of income at a 4.35 percent rate. Because the new law becomes effective for all taxpayers 
January 1, 2011, fiscal year taxpayers will be required to file two short-year returns for 2011. 
The nexus standard for the new CIT is the same as that of the MBT: income will con-
tinue to be apportioned using a single sales factor, and unitary filing will still be mandatory. 
The tax treatment of financial institutions and insurance companies will remain largely 
unchanged.
The CIT decouples from bonus depreciation and the “domestic production activities de-
duction” (IRC §§ 168(k) and 199), and most tax credits are eliminated. However, taxpayers 
with “certified credits” earned under the MBT may elect to continue to file under the MBT 
rules until they have exhausted their credits. Finally, the CIT begins with a taxpayer’s federal 
taxable income and makes certain modifications including adding back state and local taxes, 
federal net operating losses, interest and dividend income earned from other state obliga-
tions, and certain expenses paid to related parties for using intangible assets. Subtractions 
include foreign royalties and dividend income and interest income from U.S. obligations to 
the extent it was included in federal taxable income. 
While the first returns will not be due until 2013, prudent taxpayers and their advisers 
should begin planning their Michigan activities accordingly. 
Ohio
In June 2005, Ohio enacted a new CAT that is intended to replace the state’s corporate 
income tax as well as personal property tax. The corporate income tax will be phased out 
over five years.
The CAT is a tax on the privilege of doing business in Ohio and is not measured by net 
income, but by “taxable gross receipts.” As a privilege tax, the tax is on the person receiv-
ing the gross receipts, that is, the vendor, not the purchaser. “Person” is widely defined and 
includes individuals, corporations, partnerships, limited liability companies, trusts, indeed, 
almost any combination of individuals in any form.
The tax base, gross receipts, includes amounts received from sales, services, and exchanges 
including “the total amount realized by a person, without deduction for the cost of goods 
sold or other expenses incurred … the fair market value of any property and services re-
ceived, and any debt transferred or forgiven as consideration.” Excluded items include in-
terest, dividend, and capital gain income; repayment of principal; contributions to exempt 
organizations; life insurance proceeds; tax refunds; damage awards; gifts; and certain excise 
taxes.
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 Nexus for the CAT exists if a taxpayer owns or uses capital in Ohio, holds a certificate of 
compliance to do business, or has a “bright-line presence” in the state. A bright-line pres-
ence is established if a taxpayer meets any of the following tests:
•  Has more than $50,000 in property in the state
•  Has more than $50,000 in payroll in the state
•  Has gross receipts of $500,000 or more in the state
•  Has 25 percent or more of its total property, payroll, or sales in the state
•  Is domiciled in Ohio for any other business purpose 
Under these nexus standards, a taxpayer who has no presence or connection with the state 
other than online sales will have a filing obligation if the sales into Ohio exceed $500,000. 
The Ohio legislature specifically stated that the CAT was not an income tax and, thus, the 
safe harbor provisions of Public Law 86-272 (see chapter 1) do not apply. In addition, the 
state taxation department does not believe that the physical presence test for sales tax nexus 
applies to the CAT.
There have already been constitutional challenges to the CAT. The Ohio Court of Ap-
peals ruled that the CAT, when applied to certain food sales, was an unconstitutional excise 
tax on food. See Ohio Grocers Ass’n v. Ohio, 178 Ohio App. 3d, 897 N.E.2d 188 (Ohio 
2008). The case was appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, which reversed the appeals 
court decision on September 17, 2009.3 The Ohio Supreme Court held that the CAT was 
a permissible tax on the privilege of doing business and not a tax triggered by the sale of 
food. Although the CAT falls upon sellers of food, it is not the case that it necessarily falls 
upon the sale or purchase of food. Given the state’s nexus provisions, there will, no doubt, 
be other constitutional challenges.
The tax rate for the CAT is 0.26 percent of taxable gross receipts and is being phased in 
over the next few years. For the period April 1, 2006, through March 31, 2007, 40 percent 
of the CAT is due, and for the period April 1, 2007, through March 31, 2008, 60 percent of 
the CAT is due. Beginning after March 31, 2009, the tax will be fully phased in.
The CAT’s reporting period is quarterly (annually for taxpayers with gross receipts of less 
than $1 million).
The Ohio Department of Taxation is regularly releasing new guidance on the CAT. 
Nonetheless, there are many unanswered questions, and the CAT imposed some difficult 
problems during the transition period with respect to various issues with net operating 
losses, consolidated and combined filing, and Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
Statement No. 109, Accounting for Income Taxes.
Texas
Through 2006, Texas’ taxpayers calculated their corporate franchise tax based on “net tax-
able earned surplus” and “net taxable capital” and paid the greater of the two. Texas’ net 
taxable earned surplus was basically a corporation’s federal taxable income plus an add back 
3 Ohio Grocers Ass’n. v. Levin, 916 N.E.2d 446 (Ohio 2009).
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of compensation paid to officers and directors. Net taxable capital was the corporation’s stat-
ed capital plus surplus. Surplus was the net assets of the corporation minus its stated capital. 
S corporations and limited liability companies were also subject to the Texas franchise tax.
Texas has replaced the state’s franchise tax with a modified GRT called the Texas Margin 
Tax (TMT) or the Revised Texas Franchise Tax (RTFT). The margin tax was effective for 
periods beginning on or after January 1, 2007, and the first returns were due May 15, 2008. 
The formula for the margin tax is as follows:
Start with: Total revenue from combined business entity of group
Less: The greater of:
1. Cost of goods sold
2. Compensation
Equals: Margin tax base (but not to exceed 70 percent of total revenue)
Times: Texas apportionment percentage
Equals: Margin tax base apportioned to Texas
Less: Other deductions
Equals: Taxable margin
Times: Tax rate of 1 percent (or 0.5 percent for wholesalers or retailers)
Equals: Texas tax liability
Less: Tax credits
Equals: Texas tax due
Businesses that must pay the margin tax include partnerships, limited liability companies, 
business trusts, corporations, banks, savings and loans, joint ventures, and other professional 
and business associations. General partnerships having only individuals as partners and sole 
proprietorships are not subject to the margin tax.
Total revenue is taken from an entity’s federal tax return. For example, a corporation will 
start with the amount from line 1c of its IRS Form 1120 and add the amounts from lines 
4 through 10. A partnership will start with line 1c of IRS Form 1065 and add the amounts 
from lines 4 through 7.
Exclusions from revenue include dividends and interest from federal obligations, Schedule 
C dividends, foreign royalties, and dividends under IRC § 78 and IRC §§ 951–64.
The margin tax also has specific definitions for cost of goods sold and compensation. For 
example, cost of goods sold has a separate calculation different from the federal calculation 
for cost of goods sold. Compensation will include wages, tips, health care contributions, 
retirement benefits, and stock options deductible for federal taxable income but is capped 
at $300,000 per individual per year. The cap is adjusted for each even-numbered year be-
ginning January 2010, based on the percentage increase or decrease in the consumer price 
index. This adjustment raises the limit on the compensation deduction for 2010 and 2011 
to $320,000.
After the calculation of total revenue, cost of goods sold, and compensation, the tax base 
is apportioned based on gross receipts. The apportionment calculation is similar to the cal-
culation made previously under the state’s franchise tax. There are differences, however. For 
example, there are no throwback sales under the margin tax.
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 A taxable entity with total revenue of $10 million or less may elect to pay the franchise tax 
by multiplying total revenue times its apportionment factor times 0.575 percent (0.00575). 
Taxable entities with revenue of $300,000 or less do not owe any tax but must still file a 
return.
One of the biggest changes is that Texas is now a combined reporting state. (See chapter 
3.) Taxable entities that are part of an affiliated group engaged in a unitary business must 
file a combined report. An affiliated group is a group of taxable entities in which a control-
ling interest is owned by a common owner or by one or more of the member entities. A 
combined group must include eligible entities even if those entities do not have nexus with 
the state. And unlike most other combined reporting states, partnerships and other flow-
through entities are taxable entities for purposes of combined filing. (Most states use the 
federal definition of an affiliated group under IRC § 1504(a), generally 80 percent or more 
common ownership, which excludes noncorporate entities from being part of an affiliated 
group.) In short, partnerships, limited liability companies taxed as partnerships, S corpora-
tions, and disregarded entities are all taxable entities subject to combined filing. Because 
the state frequently issues new rulings and policies on the application of the tax, filing the 
margin return is still somewhat like shooting at a moving target.
Since the margin tax was passed in May 2006, the state has issued a series of explanations, 
clarifications, and rulings. These can be found on the state’s website at www.window.state.
tx.us/taxes/
Since its inception, there has been controversy regarding whether the TMT was a gross 
receipts tax or an income tax. Because the Texas constitution prohibits an income tax on 
natural persons, it is a critical question. Former Texas Comptroller Carole Keeton Strayhorn 
concluded it was an income tax, but former Comptroller John Sharp concluded that it was 
not. FASB has ruled that for financial statement purposes, it is an income tax. In addition, 
several states including California, Kansas, Missouri, South Carolina, and Wisconsin have 
ruled that it is an income tax for purposes of deduction against state income taxes. Never-
theless, many believe that because the tax must be paid whether a company is profitable or 
not, it is not an income tax. On July 29, 2011, a partner in the Allcat Claims Services, L.P., 
filed a petition with the Texas Supreme Court seeking a declaratory judgment on the ques-
tion, so perhaps we will find out. The court must rule on the issue within 120 days of the 
petition, which is after this book goes to print. Stay tuned.
Washington
The state of Washington does not have an individual or corporate income tax. Instead, it 
has a gross receipts tax called the business and occupation (B&O) tax that is levied for the 
privilege of doing business in the state. Gross receipts include proceeds from the sale of ser-
vices and goods largely to Washington customers. As a gross receipts tax, generally there are 
no deductions for wages, materials, or other costs of doing business. Other than returns and 
allowances, bad debts, advances, and casual sales, there are few exemptions or deductions. 
The law also provides a few credits against the tax for rural county employment, high tech-
nology investment, and small businesses and, most importantly, a multiple activities credit 
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that mitigates paying the B&O tax twice on the same product or transaction under differ-
ent categories. Finally, unlike a sales tax, a sale does not have to occur to be subject to the 
B&O tax. For example, if you manufacture items for your own use, those items are subject 
to the B&O tax. Like a sales tax, however, returns are filed monthly, quarterly, or annually 
depending on your annual tax liability.
Washington adopted new rules regarding nexus in 2010, and the state is particularly ag-
gressive in asserting nexus.
A taxpayer is deemed to have nexus if the taxpayer is a nonresident individual or busi-
ness entity that is organized or commercially domiciled outside Washington and in any 
calendar year has (a) more than $50,000 of payroll or property in Washington, (b) more 
than $250,000 of receipts from Washington, or (c) at least 25 percent of its total property, 
total payroll, or total receipts in Washington. For a recent decision in Washington regard-
ing nexus see Lamtec Corp. v. Washington, No. 83579-9 (Wash. Jan. 20, 2011). The B&O 
tax applies to all types of businesses including corporations, partnerships, limited liability 
companies, and sole proprietorships. The B&O tax rate varies depending upon the business 







A business may be subject to tax under more than one classification. For example, selling 
building materials to a homeowner is a retail sale while the same transaction to a custom 
builder could be a wholesale sale. Nonretail businesses making less than $28,000 per year 
are not required to file returns.
The following material is a brief description of the major B&O tax classifications adapted 
from the state’s publication on its B&O tax.
Retailing




•  Certain personal services, including
 —  Turkish and steam baths,
 —  dating and escort services, and
 —  tattooing
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 •  Specialized activities, including
 —  lawn mowing and tree and shrub pruning and trimming,
 —  insect spraying,
 —  guided tours, and
 —  renting equipment with operators
Wholesaling
Wholesalers sell goods and services to persons who will resell them to others. The B&O 
tax is calculated on the wholesale selling price. If you are a wholesaler, you must keep a 
resale certificate on file from each buyer to document that the transaction was not a retail 
sale. Retail sales tax is not collected on wholesale transactions. Blanket resale certificates for 
frequent wholesale customers must be renewed every four years.
Manufacturing
The manufacturing B&O tax classification is used by firms that produce items in Washing-
ton, regardless of where that item is sold. Thus, products sold and delivered out-of-state 
are still subject to the manufacturing B&O tax. Manufactured products which are used by 
the manufacturer, but are not sold (or are used prior to sale), are also subject to tax under 
the manufacturing classification. The manufacturing B&O tax is based on the value of the 
products. In cases when there is no sale, the value is the selling price of similar products.
Selected Business Services
Businesses that provide these services to customers are required to pay the B&O tax under 
the selected business services B&O tax classification:
•  Secretarial and clerical services
•  Computer and data processing services
•  Information services (financial or legal research)
•  Legal services (including attorneys)
•  Accounting, auditing, bookkeeping, and tax preparation
•  Engineering and architectural services
•  Business and management consulting
•  Public relations and advertising services (excluding media advertising—radio, televi-
sion, newspapers, and magazines)
•  Surveying and real estate appraisal
Financial Services
Businesses that provide financial services including banking, securities or investment man-
agement, investment advising, and similar activities are subject to the B&O tax under this 
classification.
Service and Other Activities
Businesses that provide personal and professional services (such as doctors, beauticians, and 
teachers) are generally subject to B&O tax under this classification. This classification in-
cludes services that are not subject to the retailing, selected business services, or financial 
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services B&O tax classifications. Also, any business which is not described under a particular 
classification of the B&O tax must report under this “catch-all” category. For example, 
garbage collection services and janitorial services are taxed under this classification. Com-
mission income is also subject to tax under this classification.
In addition to the major B&O tax classifications, the state provides many specialized classi-
fications. Some of these include rates for insurance agents, printers, publishers, warehousing, 
radio and television broadcasters, and government contractors (0.00484); manufacturing 
and selling aircraft (0.002904); extraction and manufacturing of timber (0.002956); travel 
agents, tour operators, manufacturers of computer chips (0.00275); processors of meat, soy-
beans, wheat, seafood, fruit, vegetables, and dairy products (0.00138); and gambling contests 
(0.015 or 0.0163 depending on the amounts).
One of the principal problems with Washington’s B&O tax is its application to sellers 
who are performing more than one activity. In short, the tax rate is dependent upon the 
nature of the taxpayer’s business activities. But what if this is not clear? For example, if 
a business makes both retail and service sales in a mixed transaction, which is the proper 
rate to apply—the retail 0.471 percent or the services 1.80 percent rate. The Washington 
Supreme Court recently addressed this problem in a case that included elements of both a 
telecommunication and information service. 
Qualcomm sold its OmniTRACS system to trucking companies that used it to track 
and gather “detailed information about its trucks and drivers while they are away from the 
company’s place of business.” The system was made up of three components: (1) mobile 
telecom terminals (hardware) in the trucks used to collect data, (2) a relay system (service) 
that transmitted the data to Qualcomm’s network facility where the data was processed, 
and (3) software located at the customer’s dispatch facility that gathered and used the data 
provided. Each of the components, hardware, service, and software, were interdependent, 
but Qualcomm separately invoiced the customer for them for sales tax purposes. Qualcomm 
paid B&O taxes on its revenue from OmniTRACS at the 1.5 percent rate for services. 
Upon audit, the Washington Department of Revenue held that the service element was a 
network telephone service and subject to the 0.471 B&O retailing rate. Thus, the question 
before the Washington Supreme Court was whether Qualcomm was selling a “network 
telephone service” or an “information service.”
The decision depended in part upon whether the “primary purpose” test used by the 
court in its determination should be applied to the OmniTRACS system as a whole or to 
the separate components. The court held that the “primary purpose,” the “true object,” of 
the transaction was the system as a whole and that system was provision of a service that was 
appropriately taxed at 1.5 percent.4 The decision provides a helpful guide to taxpayers and 
tax practitioners alike in the application of the state’s “primary purpose” test for taxpayers 
with business operations that cross the state’s traditional B&O categories. 
Farming, federal credit unions, governments, sales of real estate, and certain nonprofit 
activities are not subject to the B&O tax. Cities and towns may also have a local B&O tax 
not to exceed 0.02 percent. However, keep in mind that there is no necessary connection 
between the state and local B&O taxes.
4 Qualcomm Inc. v. Washington, 249 P.3d 167 (Wash. 2011).
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 Other Gross Receipts Taxes
In addition to the gross receipts taxes of Ohio, Texas, and Washington, several smaller levies 
are traps for the unwary taxpayer. Watch out for some of the following:
•  Hawaii Gross Receipts tax
 —  This tax looks like a traditional sales tax except that it is imposed on the gross re-
ceipts of the seller, not on the buyer, and is literally assessed on almost all business 
activity including purchases by governments and nonprofit entities. 
•  Kentucky Limited Liability Entity tax (LLET)
 —  A replacement for the state’s former alternative minimum tax calculation, it is 
imposed at a rate of $0.095 per $100.00 of Kentucky gross receipts, or 0.75 per 
$100 of Kentucky gross profits, with a minimum tax of $175.00. The tax serves as 
a “minimum floor” for the state’s corporate income tax because taxpayers subject 
to both taxes can take the LLET as a credit against their corporate income tax.
•  New Mexico Gross Receipts and Compensation tax
 —  This tax is also very similar to a sales tax except that it is imposed on the seller’s 
gross receipts for the privilege of doing business in New Mexico and is assessed on 
all gross proceeds. 
•  Pennsylvania Gross Receipts tax
 —  This is a special industry levy imposed on select industries such as telecommunica-
tions, transportation, private banking, and electronic companies. The rate ranges 
from 5 percent to 5.9 percent for most taxpayers.
 —  Local business and occupation taxes in both Washington and West Virginia
Capital Stock and Franchise Taxes
Several states have more than one element to their corporate income tax. For example, New 
York and Pennsylvania each have a capital stock calculation.
New York corporations calculate their tax using four different measures: a tax measured 
by net income, a tax measured by the company’s capital base, a tax measured by the mini-
mum taxable income tax, and a fixed dollar minimum base. (To calculate the tax on capital, 
a company must divide its capital into several components: investment capital, business 
capital, and subsidiary capital.) The corporation must pay the highest of the four taxes. In 
addition, the state imposes a tax on subsidiary capital allocated to New York.
Pennsylvania has a capital stock and franchise tax in addition to its corporate net income 
tax. The capital stock tax is a property tax imposed on the capital stock value of domestic 
corporations. The franchise tax is imposed on the capital stock value of foreign corporations 
doing business in the state. Both taxes are to be phased out by 2010.
Obviously, this brief thumbnail sketch cannot do justice to the exclusions, exemptions, 
modifications, and other complexities of these unusual or irregular tax structures. This book, 
instead, will focus on the key themes of nexus, state modifications, allocable and apportion-
able income, and the makeup of the sales, property, and payroll factors common to the 
majority of states.
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Nexus is the beginning issue in any multistate activity. Unless you are doing business in, 
that is, have nexus with a political jurisdiction, no obligation exists to file a return with that 
jurisdiction.
The word “nexus” comes from the Latin word “nexum” referring to obligations be-
tween contracting parties. More simply, in the state and local tax context it refers to both 
the quantity and quality of contacts, links, or connections between a taxpayer and a political 
jurisdiction sufficient enough to subject the taxpayer to the jurisdiction of the state. Or to 
put it even more simply, are you doing business in our ________ (fill in the blank: town, 
county, or state)?
The nexus issue is becoming increasingly volatile and complex in light of the states’ at-
tempts to broaden their tax bases and increase their tax collections. States are pressing out-
of-state companies, with the most slender of connections to the state, to file returns and 
pay sales tax and income tax. The rapid growth of e-commerce and the Internet has added 
to this complexity, making proper tax planning in this area more critical than ever. Even 
though this is a guide on multistate corporate income tax, in this chapter we discuss both 
sales tax nexus and income tax nexus. The principles behind nexus for both taxes overlap 
and, as a consequence, much confusion exists over the distinction between sales tax and 
income tax nexus. It is critical to understand both and the differences between the two. 
Nexus Defined
Nexus is the contact that must be established with a taxing jurisdiction before that jurisdic-
tion can require a business to collect its tax, or otherwise subject it to its taxing authority.
Generally, states extend their taxing authority as far as constitutionally possible. Conse-
quently, it is with the U.S. Constitution that we must begin our discussion of nexus.
Please note, however, that nexus may be different for different taxes. In analyzing income 
tax issues, be careful not to confuse nexus for sales and use tax purposes with nexus for in-
come tax purposes. For instance, most businesses are concerned with three types of nexus 
15
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when doing business in surrounding states or states outside their domicile’s taxing jurisdic-
tion. Most common are nexus for sales and use tax purposes, nexus for income and franchise 
tax purchases (if this tax applies in a state), and nexus for purposes of registering or qualifying 
to do business in a state. Nexus conditions for all three of these are generally different.
The two clauses of most importance in the U.S. Constitution for defining the taxing 
jurisdiction of states are the due process and commerce clauses.
Author’s Note: On Nexus
Nexus is a term of art in state and local tax that refers to the quantity and 
quality of links between a taxpayer and a political jurisdiction before that 
jurisdiction can impose a tax filing obligation on the taxpayer.
Due Process Clause
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits states from denying any person 
“life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Because taxation is regarded as de-
priving someone of their property, a state cannot exact such tolls without due process of 
law.
Due process relates essentially to questions of fundamental fairness, to “traditional notions 
of fair play and substantial justice.” “That test is whether property was taken without due 
process of law, or if we must paraphrase, whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears 
fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state. The simple but 
controlling question is whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return.”1
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes two hurdles a state must 
overcome before it can impose a tax.
1. There must be a minimum connection between the taxpayer and the state. There must 
be “some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, 
property, or transaction it seeks to tax.”2
2. There must be some rational relationship requirement. The “income attributed to the 
State for tax purposes must be rationally related to ‘values connected with the taxing 
State.’ ”3 If property is taken, or responsibilities are imposed on the taxpayer, the govern-
ment must have sufficient jurisdiction over the taxpayer or due process is not served.4 
(The decision in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), seemed to 
combine both the commerce clause and the due process clause analyses.)
1 Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435.
2 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992), citing Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 
344–45 (1954).
3 Quill at 306, citing Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978).
4 Wisconsin v. J.C Penney, 311 U.S. 435 (1940); National Bellas Hess v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 386 U.S. 
753 (1967).
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Some commentators have recently questioned whether or not due process is really a seri-
ous hurdle. Why? Because the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the due process hurdle is 
cleared whenever a company “purposefully directs” its business activity or solicitation to-
ward a state’s residents. The “minimum connection” for a company need be no more than 
“purposefully avail[ing] itself of the benefits of an economic market in the forum State,” or 
engaging “in continuous and widespread solicitation of business within a State.” In other 
words, the due process clause does not require physical presence. Thus, a mail-order com-
pany, whose only contacts with a state were catalogues and goods sent through the U.S. 
mail, satisfied the nexus standard for due process.5
Author’s Note: Due Process Hurdles
There must be “a minimal connection” between the activities or taxpayer and the 
state (Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940))
There must be “a rational relationship between the incomes attributed to the State 
and the intrastate values of the enterprise” (Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin, 447 
U.S. 207 (1980))
Commerce Clause
The second applicable constitutional provision is the commerce clause which provides for 
congressional regulation of interstate commerce. The commerce clause of the Constitution 
provides that “Congress shall have the power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, 
and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.”6
The commerce clause has been interpreted as not only conferring power on the national 
government to regulate commerce but also as limiting the states’ power to interfere with 
commerce even when Congress has not acted. Under this “dormant” commerce clause 
principle, taxes that have been found to unduly burden interstate commerce have been 
declared unconstitutional. However, the crux of the commerce clause analysis is not nec-
essarily that states are prohibited from imposing any burden on interstate commerce, but 
rather whether the tax discriminates against interstate commerce either by providing a direct 
commercial advantage to local businesses or by creating multiple taxation on interstate com-
merce. In short, states can tax interstate commerce so long as they meet the four-prong test 
of Complete Auto Transit, Inc., v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
5 See Quill, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
6 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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 The general view is that state taxation may be imposed on interstate commerce, but it is 
justified only if the tax is designed so that the interstate business bears a fair share of the cost 
of the government entity whose protection it enjoys.7
In Complete Auto Transit, the Supreme Court provided a four-prong test for determin-
ing whether a state tax on interstate commerce is constitutional. A state tax will be deemed 
constitutional if
1. The tax is applied to an activity with substantial nexus with the taxing state. For sales and 
use tax purposes, substantial nexus has been defined as physical presence.8
2. The tax is fairly apportioned. The Supreme Court has stated that fair apportionment 
requires that the tax meet both an internal and external consistency test. “Internal con-
sistency is preserved when the imposition of a tax identical to the one in question by 
every other State would add no burden to interstate commerce that intrastate commerce 
would not also bear.”9 In short, if every state adopted the same test as the one before the 
court and the income tax would be no more than 100 percent, then the internal consis-
tency test is met.
  External consistency is “the economic justification for the State’s claim upon the value 
taxed, to discover whether a State’s tax reaches beyond that portion of value that is fairly 
attributable to economic activity within the taxing State.”10 In short, external consis-
tency requires that the formula or methodology used be a fair or reasonable reflection of 
how the income is earned in the state.
  Most of the debate over the fair apportionment test has been over the formulas used 
by states in apportioning and allocating the income of a multistate business.
3. The tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce. A state may not “impose a 
tax which discriminates against interstate commerce ... by providing a direct commercial 
advantage to local business.”11
4. The tax must be fairly related to services provided by the taxing state. This “fourth crite-
rion asks only that the measure of the tax be reasonably related to the taxpayer’s presence 
or activities in the State.”12 Generally, if the sale takes place in the state and is measured 
by sales price, there will be no violation of this fourth test.
It is important to note that the nexus requirements for the two constitutional hurdles, due 
process and the commerce clause, are not the same, a point emphasized by the Supreme 
Court in Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992). “[North Dakota] contends that the 
nexus requirements imposed by the Due Process and Commerce Clauses are equivalent 
 7 Complete Auto Transit, Inc., v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 
250 (1938); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940); Northwestern States Portland 
Cement Co. v. State of Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
 8 See Quill, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
 9 Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995).
10 Id.
11 Northwestern States Portland Cement, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959).
12 Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
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and that if, as we concluded above, a mail-order house that lacks a physical presence in the 
taxing State nonetheless satisfies the due process ‘minimum contacts’ test, then that corpo-
ration also meets the Commerce Clause ‘substantial nexus’ test. We disagree. Despite the 
similarity in phrasing, the nexus requirements of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses 
are not identical.”13
In summary, the due process clause requires only (1) “minimum contacts” (physical pres-
ence not necessary) and (2) a rational relationship between the income and the state. The 
commerce clause requires (1) substantial nexus, (2) nondiscrimination, (3) fair apportion-
ment, and (4) some relation to the services provided.
Let us look at an example to see how the preceding case law and rules work in practice.
For example, Crystal City Computers has one small store in Denver, Colorado, but it sells 
most of its computers and peripherals over the Internet and through catalogues. It has no 
employees, sales representatives, or facilities other than the Denver store. A farm girl from 
Kansas, Dorothy, orders one of the company’s computers over the Internet. Crystal City 
ships the computer to Dorothy by common carrier. Crystal City does not have any obliga-
tion to collect sales or use tax from Dorothy on the sale because it does not have any nexus 
with the state of Kansas. Nor does Crystal City have any obligation to file an income tax 
return with Kansas.
Would our answer be any different if Crystal City has maintenance agreements with 
several Kansas computer service repair shops that provide warranty repair in case Dorothy’s 
computer fails? Perhaps. Many states have adopted a rule asserting that warranty repair 
services provided by third-party independent contractors will create nexus for a remote 
vendor. The rule continues to be hotly debated.
Suppose Crystal City delivers the computer in its own truck rather than using a common 
carrier. Would that create nexus? If the deliveries were infrequent and sporadic, the seller 
would probably not be deemed to have created nexus. However, if the deliveries are sig-
nificant in number, most states will claim that sales tax, but not income tax, nexus has been 
created between it and the remote seller.
Suppose Crystal City had one sales person who made only two trips into Kansas during 
the past 18 months. Would the physical presence of the salesperson create a filing obligation 
on the part of Crystal City? Probably not. It is not enough physical presence.
The questions about deliveries, the extent of physical presence, and the actions of agents 
are part of the continuing debate over nexus. But before we look at those issues, let us stop 
for a moment and distinguish sales tax nexus from income tax nexus. People often confuse 
the two.
13 Quill, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
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Author’s Note: Commerce Clause Hurdles
•  The tax must be applied to an activity with substantial nexus.
•  The tax must be fairly apportioned.
•  The tax must not discriminate against interstate commerce.
•  The tax must be fairly related to the services provided by the state.
(Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977))
Sales Tax Nexus
Two key U.S. Supreme Court cases define the test for sales tax nexus: National Bellas Hess 
and Quill. In both instances the Court ruled that “physical presence” is the bright-line test 
for sales tax nexus.
National Bellas Hess was a landmark decision in the sales and use tax nexus area. In this 
1967 case, the seller was a Missouri mail-order house with no presence or activity in Illinois, 
except for catalogs and fliers that were mailed to its customers twice a year. Any products 
sold in Illinois were delivered by common carrier. Illinois required that National Bellas 
Hess register to collect sales and use tax, asserting it had nexus in the State of Illinois. Illinois 
believed that National Bellas Hess was “doing business” in the state because its “large-scale, 
systematic, continuous solicitation and exploitation is a sufficient ‘nexus’ to require Bellas 
Hess to collect” Illinois use tax. The U.S. Supreme Court held that National Bellas Hess did 
not have a filing obligation with Illinois. In fact, the Court held that a taxpayer must have 
physical presence in a state before incurring a sales or use tax filing obligation. The Court 
was sensitive to the fact that the thousands of sales taxing jurisdictions in the state posed a 
considerable impediment to interstate commerce.
The Court decided that the activities of National Bellas Hess in Illinois were strictly in 
interstate commerce. Accordingly, there was not sufficient nexus for National Bellas Hess 
to be liable to collect the Illinois use tax on sales to Illinois residents. The Court determined 
that requiring the seller to collect sales and use tax in Illinois would violate the company’s 
rights under both the due process and commerce clauses of the U.S. Constitution. In short, 
the sales were clearly a matter of interstate commerce; the company did not have any physi-
cal presence in the state and, thus, had no obligation to collect the state’s tax.
Given the significant changes in technology, including computers, fax machines, cell 
phones, and the Internet, it was no surprise that states believed the physical presence test 
to be archaic and wanted to revisit the issue. North Dakota did just that in Quill in 1992.
The Quill case was similar factually to the National Bellas Hess decision. Quill Corporation, 
a non-North Dakota business, had no physical presence and no employees in North Dakota. 
Quill sold business equipment and supplies in North Dakota only through catalogs, fliers, 
and by telephone. The post office or common carrier delivered all sales in North Dakota.
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The opinions of the lower courts involved in the Quill cases were varied. The North 
Dakota trial court found Quill indistinguishable from National Bellas Hess and, accordingly, 
ruled in favor of Quill. The North Dakota Supreme Court, however, overruled the trial 
court in favor of the state, citing that changes in the economy and the law, in essence, 
outdated National Bellas Hess. The North Dakota Supreme Court embraced an “economic 
presence” test versus a “physical presence” test and held that Quill’s economic presence 
in the state was sufficient nexus to require Quill to collect the use tax. After all, reasoned 
the court and its supporters, with fax machines, cell phones, satellite transmissions, and the 
beginning of the Internet, a company no longer had to be physically present in a state to do 
business there.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the North Dakota Supreme Court but 
agreed with it on some grounds. With respect to the due process analysis, the court held that 
a physical presence was not required. The court’s due process analysis was based on whether 
a multistate business’s contacts with a state made it reasonable to require it to defend a 
lawsuit in the state. The Supreme Court reasoned that Quill’s continuous and widespread 
activity within North Dakota was sufficient warning that its activities may subject it to the 
taxing jurisdiction of the state. It is important to note that this finding differed from the 
Court’s position in National Bellas Hess. However, the court did not completely overrule 
National Bellas Hess. Nevertheless, one of the Supreme Court justices indicated that in the 
25 years between the National Bellas Hess ruling and the Quill ruling, there were enough 
changes in law and in technology that the due process analysis of National Bellas Hess was 
no longer applicable.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that while requiring Quill to collect North Dakota’s sales 
or use tax was not a due process violation, it would still place an unconstitutional burden on 
interstate commerce. The Court found that the physical presence requirement is still a valid 
requirement under the commerce clause analysis, and, in that regard, it refused to overrule 
National Bellas Hess’s reasoning. It also reaffirmed that the Complete Auto Transit four-part 
test was an adequate test under the commerce clause. In essence, the decision maintained the 
status quo, yet sent a strong message to Congress that Congress is not only better qualified 
to resolve this issue, but that it also has the ultimate power to do so.
In summary, the Quill decision holds that a taxpayer has established nexus for sales and 
use tax under the due process clause when the taxpayer’s activity is limited to purposefully 
directing its economic activities to the state’s residents. Thus, a retailer whose only activity 
in a state is limited to the mailing of catalogs has probably created nexus for purposes of the 
due process clause. In other words, a company need not be physically present in a state to 
create a filing obligation for purposes of the due process clause.
The commerce clause, however, still offers significant protection to remote sellers. First, 
a state cannot interfere with the regulation of the national economy. Second, a state can 
only assert jurisdiction over businesses when there is “substantial nexus” with the state. The 
U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with the North Dakota Supreme Court’s assertion that the 
technological and economic business changes since National Bellas Hess would justify totally 
overruling that decision. The Court made it clear that there still must be some physical 
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 presence in a state before the commerce clause hurdle is met. An economic presence in a 
state through telephone, advertising via radio, television, fliers, and so on was not deemed 
sufficient in Quill to subject a company to a state’s taxing jurisdiction.
In brief, the question of sales tax nexus since Quill is whether or not a business has suf-
ficient physical presence in the state to constitute “substantial nexus.” If the business has 
sufficient physical presence, then it has nexus and must start collecting and remitting that 
state’s sales and use tax. If the business does not have any physical presence in the state, it 
does not have a collection obligation. So, if the only activity your business has in a state is 
through mail order, either by catalog or over the Internet, you do not have a filing obliga-
tion with that state.
The Continuing Questions About Sales  
Tax Nexus
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Quill that physical presence was to be the bright-line test 
for sales and use tax nexus. If a seller has no physical presence in the state, it cannot be re-
quired to collect tax on its sales into the state. But how much physical presence is necessary? 
In brief, the nexus debate since Quill has generally revolved around three questions:
1. How much physical presence is sufficient to create nexus?
2. Can nexus be attributed to the seller through the physical presence of the seller’s agent 
or affiliate?
3. Is there a physical presence test for income tax?
How Much Physical Presence?
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that physical presence must be more than the “slightest 
presence” to rise to a “standard of constitutional nexus.”14 For example, in Quill the Court 
held that Quill’s ownership of some floppy disks and the licensing of the accompanying soft-
ware in North Dakota did not create sales and use tax nexus in the state. The disks, while 
owned by Quill, were software used by its customers to place orders and check current 
inventories and prices.
It is difficult to say with certainty how much physical presence will create the necessary 
“substantial nexus” to satisfy the commerce clause. Prior to Quill, in Miller Bros. Co. v. Mary-
land, 347 U.S. 340 (1954), the Supreme Court ruled that occasional deliveries, in its own 
trucks by a Delaware retailer into Maryland, did not create nexus for sales and use tax. After 
Quill, the Court had an opportunity to revisit the delivery issue in Brown’s Furniture, Inc. v. 
Wagner, 171 Ill. 2d 410, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 866 (1996), but declined. The Illinois Supreme 
Court held that Brown’s Furniture had nexus in Illinois by virtue of its advertising in the 
state coupled with 942 deliveries in its own trucks over a 10-month period. Such activity 
created nexus, the court stated, because it was more than incidental, occasional, or sporadic, 
but instead “regular and frequent.” More recently, the Illinois Appellate Court ruled that 30 
furniture deliveries over a 26-month period was enough physical presence to be “substantial 
14 National Geographic Soc’y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 556 (1977).
01-Chapter 01.indd   22 10/5/11   10:23 AM
Chapter 1: Interstate Activity and Nexus
 23
nexus” for sales and use tax.15 In Maine, a company whose advertising and solicitation were 
specifically directed toward the state and that made 180 deliveries in its own trucks into 
Maine had sufficient physical presence to constitute the substantial nexus necessary to create 
a filing obligation to the state.16
State courts have also differed on whether occasional or sporadic visits by employees are 
sufficient physical presence to constitute “substantial nexus.” New York has held that visits 
by an out-of-state retailer’s employees exceeded the state’s “slightest presence” test, thereby 
creating nexus. In one case, the visits were to 19 wholesalers, four times a year, and in an-
other, there were 41 visits over a three-year period. According to the New York court, an 
out-of-state company’s presence “need not be substantial;” it need only be more than the 
“slightest presence.”17 In a holding to the contrary, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that 11 
visits by an out-of-state seller to install card readers did not create nexus because the visits 
were isolated and sporadic.18 The Arizona Court of Appeals held that a company had nexus 
with the state whose only activity during a three-year period was one visit per year by a 
salesperson coupled with 21 days of customer training.19
The physical presence need not be that of an employee or independent contractor. North 
Carolina attempted to hold a company responsible for sales, corporate income, and franchise 
taxes, whose only connection with the state is the selling and renting of VHS videotapes 
through the mail. Educational Resources, Inc. (ERI), a South Carolina company, sells and 
rents videotapes about workplace safety. Between 1990 and 1995 it made 219 sales and 906 
rentals into North Carolina totaling $201,304 and $99,521, respectively. ERI did not have 
any employees in North Carolina or any other contacts with the state except for the tapes 
that it sold and rented to North Carolina customers through the mail. The tapes rented for 
$150 to $200. Customers would keep rented tapes between five and 30 days before mailing 
them back to ERI.
The North Carolina Department of Revenue audited ERI and assessed them for sales, 
income, and franchise taxes. North Carolina argued that the presence of the rented tapes, 
which were ERI’s property, created nexus with the state. The superior court ruled in fa-
vor of ERI stating that “the Court finds and concludes that, under the Commerce Clause 
of the United States Constitution as interpreted in Quill ..., and other cases, there is not a 
“substantial nexus” justifying the state’s attempts to collect the use tax, corporate income 
tax, and franchise tax in these cases.”20 As the reader may recall, the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled in Quill that the licensing of its software in the state along with the presence of a few 
floppy disks did not constitute “substantial nexus.” Compare North Carolina’s actions with 
a recent decision in Alabama. In Alabama, an administrative law judge has ruled that an 
15 Town Crier, Inc. v. Illinois, 315 Ill. App. 3d 286, 733 N.E.2d 780 (2000).
16 John Swenson Granite v. State Tax Assessor, 685 A.2d 425 (Me. 1996).
17 Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 86 N.Y.2d 165, 654 N.E.2d 954, cert. denied, and Vermont Info. Process-
ing, Inc. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 86 N.Y.2d 165, 654 N.E.2d 954, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 989 (1995).
18 In re Appeal of Intercard, Inc., 270 Kan. 346, 14 P.3d 1111 (2000).
19 Care Computer Sys. v. Arizona, 4 P.3d 469 (Ariz. 2000).
20 Educational Resources, Inc. v. Tolson, Nos. 00CVS14723 and 14724 (N.C. Super. Ct. (Wake County) Feb. 
20, 2003).
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 out-of-state leasing company was not doing business in the state despite the fact that the 
company’s lessee was using the company’s property in the state.21
Sporadic Visits and Trade Show Nexus
The landmark case with respect to trade shows is Share International, Inc. v. Florida, 676 
So.2d 1362 (Fla. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 685 (1997). Share International was a Texas 
corporation in the business of manufacturing and distributing chiropractic supplies primarily 
through direct mail solicitation. It did not have any offices or employees in Florida. How-
ever, the company did attend a three-day seminar in Florida every year at which it displayed 
and sold some of its products. Share International registered with Florida and collected and 
remitted sales tax on the seminar sales, but not on its mail order sales. Florida argued that 
the seminar presentation and sales created the sufficient nexus with the state that obligated 
Share International to collect and remit sales tax on all of its Florida sales, including its mail 
order sales. The Florida Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Share International’s physi-
cal presence at the seminars was not sufficient to rise to the standard of substantial nexus.
In light of the Share International decision, and coupled with pressure from business and 
economic development groups, several states have backed away from asserting “trade show 
nexus.” For example, California regulations provide that out-of-state retailers may receive 
up to $10,000 in sales at up to 15 days of trade shows, seminars, or conventions without in-
curring any sales or use tax collection responsibilities.22 Connecticut’s trade show legislation 
is restricted to 14 days per year and trade show activities are limited to displays and promo-
tion. No sales are allowed.23 Minnesota also provides a similar, but more restrictive, safe 
harbor of three days over 12 months. Most states, however, do not provide such exemptions 
or safe harbors and aggressively pursue taxpayers for use tax collection with any physical 
presence in the state. For example, Alaska, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, and Ohio have 
indicated that trade show attendance for fewer than even 14 days a year may create a tax 
filing obligation. Other states, such as Illinois, have provided mixed signals. Some of Illinois’ 
early letter rulings indicated that any participation in a trade show triggered nexus. Illinois 
retracted that position in the mid-1990s but recently seemed to have reversed themselves.24 
New Mexico held in 1997 that attending a trade show triggers a filing obligation,25 as did 
Tennessee in 1996 and Texas in 2000.26 More recently, the Washington Court of Appeals 
held that two or three visits per year were sufficient to trigger a filing obligation for the 
state’s business and occupation (B&O) tax. The court added that the physical presence test 
in Quill was irrelevant because that case was limited to a sales tax, and the issue before the 
21 Union Tank Car Co. v. Alabama Dep’t of Revenue, No. Corp. 04-247 (Ala. Admin. Law Div. Jan. 11, 
2005).
22 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 18 §1684.
23 See S.B. 1232, Laws (Conn. 2005).
24 See Sales Tax Ltr. Rul. 94-0126-GIL; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-003; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-0170; Sales Tax Ltr. Rul. 
95-0089-GIL; Sales Tax Ltr. Rul. 00-0089-GIL; and Sales Tax Ltr. Rul. 01-0049-GIL.
25 Rev. Rul. 480-97-01.
26 Priv. Ltr. Rul. No. 96-16; Texas Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200006394L.
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court was a gross receipts tax.27 Furthermore, P.L. 86-272 was not applicable because the 
B&O is not an income tax, but a gross receipts tax.
The harsh result in Lamtec Corp. v. Washington, No. 83579-9 (Wash. Jan. 20, 2011), 
should be compared to a recent Utah private letter ruling that held that an out-of-state en-
tertainment company’s annual presence at a 10-day film festival did not trigger an income 
tax filing obligation with the state.28
Arguments continue between tax practitioners, revenue officials, and other commentators 
over whether or not the “substantial nexus” test for purposes of the commerce clause means 
substantial physical presence.
Printer’s Nexus
A company may trigger nexus with a state in which it contracts with a printer, particularly 
if the company stores printed material at the printer’s warehouse or makes frequent or rou-
tine visits to the printer to supervise or inspect the printed material. It may be that the visits 
would be de minimis, but the threat is real enough that many states, at the behest of local 
printers, have passed safe harbor laws exempting such activity from triggering any filing 
obligations. States that have passed such legislation include Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, 
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Some of the state provisions provide a safe harbor for both 
sales and income tax, but several states limit their provisions to only sales tax or income tax, 
but not both.
Fulfillment Centers, Public Warehouses, and Distribution Centers
Printers have not been the only industry to successfully lobby for nexus safe harbor provi-
sions. Because engaging a fulfillment center to take orders or engage in telemarketing and 
storing inventory at a public warehouse may often provide the substantial nexus to trigger a 
filing obligation, several states have passed protective legislation in these areas as well. Some 
of the states that exclude contractual arrangements with fulfillment service providers from 
nexus include Connecticut, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, and South Carolina. Unfor-
tunately, most of these states limit the safe harbor to sales tax nexus, and even among those 
states the varying qualifications, the activities covered, the time involved, and the specific 
nuances of each state’s statute make generalizations nearly impossible. Nevertheless, like 
printers nexus legislation, it is important to note that it may be available, and, therefore, 
specific state research is in order.
Servers and Websites
Advertising via the Internet through a website should be no different than advertising 
on national television or providing 1-800 numbers. Absent any other activity, it is an in-
terstate communication activity protected by the commerce clause. It should not trigger 
nexus. Nevertheless, no specific prohibition blocks states from trying to tax a company 
that maintains a website on a server in the state. The state may argue that the server itself 
27 Lamtec Corp. v. Washington, No. 83579-9 (Wash. Jan. 20, 2011).
28 See Utah Priv. Ltr. Rul. 08-013 (May 4, 2009).
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 is sufficient property to trigger nexus, or it may argue that the service provider hosting 
the website is an agent acting on behalf of the out-of-state company. As with printers and 
fulfillment centers, some states have specifically provided, either through statute or rule, 
that owning or operating an in-state server will not create nexus. That said, given the ever-
evolving technology of the Internet, states have begun to closely study the various types 
of marketing appearing online, that is eBay, Craigslist, and so on. For example, do website 
linking arrangements constitute a physical presence, local solicitation, or intangible property 
in the state? Probably not, without something more. However, the most recent develop-
ment in this area is the “Amazon tax” passed by New York in spring 2008 that requires 
online retailers, that pay commissions or other compensation to New York businesses for 
customer referrals, whether by a link on an Internet website or other manner, and that gen-
erate sales into the state over $10,000 for the past four quarters, to register with the state and 
begin collecting state and local taxes on all the retailer’s sales into the state.29 Rhode Island 
and North Carolina have passed similar legislation, and it is being considered in several other 
states. (See the section titled “State Statutory Change” in this chapter for a thorough discus-
sion of the “Amazon Wars.”)
Affiliation, Attribution, and Agency
In addition to the continuing debate over physical presence, there is a question about 
whether the physical presence of a third party will create substantial nexus for an out-of-
state taxpayer. The fact that the third party is an independent contractor may be irrelevant. 
What is at issue is the nature of the contractor’s activities. As long ago as 1960, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that independent contractors could create sales tax nexus for an out-
of-state retailer. “The test,” according to the Supreme Court, “is simply the nature and 
extent of the activities” in the state. When there is “continuous local solicitation” and the 
independent contractors are performing the same role and function as sales employees by 
establishing and maintaining a market in the state for the remote seller, the out-of-state seller 
has nexus with the state.30 Often, the key problem is in defining an agency relationship.
If a third party acts as an agent for an out-of-state seller, that agency relationship may cre-
ate nexus for the seller. Box 1-1 outlines series of cases involving high school book club sales 
as an illustration of third-party agency for an out-of-state seller.
Box 1-1: Case Examples of Third Party Agents for Out-of-State Sellers
•  Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization, 207 Cal. App. 2d 734 
(1st Dist. 1989) (Out-of-state book club is deemed to have nexus because teachers 
collected money from the schoolchildren.)
29 New York Senate Bill 6807, Chapter 57, N.Y. Laws of 2008.
30 See Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 208 (1960), and Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington Dep’t. of 
Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987).
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•  Pledger v. Troll Book Clubs Inc., 871 S.W.2d 389 (Ark. 1994) (Teachers are not agents 
for the out-of-state book seller.)
•  Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 567 N.W.2d 692 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (Taxpayer does not have nexus, because teachers, lacking the 
authority to bind Scholastic, are not agents of Scholastic.)
•  In re Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc., 920 P.2d 947 (Kan. 1996) (Kansas Supreme Court 
holds that Scholastic has nexus, because an agency relationship exists with the 
schoolteachers.)
•  Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. Commissioner, No. CV 07 4013027S, CV 07 4013028S 
(Conn. Super. Ct. April 9, 2009) (Superior court holds that while teachers certainly 
aid the taxpayer, their activities do not rise to the level of a sales force or agent and, 
thus, the taxpayer does not have a filing obligation with the state.)
In an eminently more reasonable opinion, the Connecticut Superior Court recently ruled 
that the teachers were simply not “representatives” of the book seller because they were 
not in the same class as salesmen, canvassers, or solicitors. While their administrative func-
tions were important to Scholastic, those functions did not rise to the level of a sales force.31 
Although the differing conclusions of these cases indicate the importance of a state’s specific 
interpretation of its laws on agency, the cases remain troubling because substantial nexus can 
be created by a third party in absence of a formal contract or compensation.
A secondary issue related to the use of independent contractors and the law of agency is 
whether activities unrelated to sales or solicitation will also constitute substantial nexus. For 
example, will the performance of post-sale services by independent contractors create nexus 
for an out-of-state seller? The Multistate Tax Commission’s (MTC’s) Nexus Program Bul-
letin 95-1, “Computer Company’s Provision of In-State Repair Services Creates Nexus,” 
generated considerable discussion when it was issued because it asserted that warranty repair 
services provided by third-party independent contractors created sales tax nexus for an out-
of-state seller (Remember, services are not protected by P.L. 86-272; so, arguably, warranty 
work triggers income tax nexus as well.). More than 20 states have adopted the bulletin. 
New York has held that an independent third party engaged by an out-of-state seller to 
diagnose and repair computers sold in-state by the seller created nexus for the seller.32
Dell Computer has litigated the issue of whether sales tax nexus is created by a third-party 
independent contractor performing warranty repair services in Connecticut, Louisiana, and 
New Mexico. In all three states, Dell contracts with BancTec, an independent contractor, 
to perform repairs and warranty work with respect to the company’s catalog and Internet 
computer sales. Dell won its case in Connecticut and at the district court level in Louisi-
ana.33 However, Louisiana’s Court of Appeal has rejected the district court’s decision to 
31 Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, Nos. CV 07 4013027 S and CV 07 4013028 S (Conn. 
Super. April 9, 2009).
32 TSB-A-00 (42) S (N.Y. Dep’t of Taxation & Fin. Oct. 13, 2000).
33 Dell Catalog Sales v. Comm’r, 834 A.2d 812 (Super. Ct. 2003), and Louisiana Dep’t of Revenue v. Dell 
Catalog Sales, LP, No. 456,807 (La. Dist. Ct. May 25, 2004).
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 grant summary judgment and has instructed the lower court to determine if there existed 
an agency relationship between Dell and BancTec, and whether the latter helped to estab-
lish and maintain a market for Dell’s computers in the state.34 Dell suffered another setback 
in New Mexico when the state court of appeals ruled that the company had nexus in the 
state because BancTec helped to “establish and maintain a market” in the state for Dell’s 
computers.35 In short, BancTec’s relationship with Dell was sufficient “substantial nexus” 
to subject Dell to New Mexico’s gross receipts and compensating tax. Because BancTec 
provides similar services to other computer retailers, such as Toshiba and Compaq, the case 
is being closely watched.
MTC Nexus Program Bulletin 95-1 is typical of many states’ approach to agency. In brief, 
the states are extending the agency argument from one of true agency to a “but for” argu-
ment, that is, but for some unrelated party the taxpayer couldn’t do business in the state and, 
therefore, that relationship by helping the taxpayer to create and maintain a market for its 
goods in the state is a nexus-creating activity. The use of the “but for” argument is mislead-
ing if not clearly a logical fallacy, but nevertheless difficult to contest.
With the growth in e-commerce, states have taken opposing positions on whether locat-
ing a server in the state creates more than the “slightest presence” needed to create nexus. 
States are still sorting out the nexus issues surrounding the presence of servers in managed 
hosting and co-location service providers. See, for example, Virginia’s ruling that nexus was 
not created when a company’s only connection to the state was an Internet link on a website 
maintained on a server in Virginia by the company’s partner.36
States have been routinely unsuccessful in arguing that the physical presence of an out-
of-state seller’s affiliate creates nexus for the out-of-state taxpayer. Generally, the states have 
tried to argue that the affiliate had an agency relationship with the out-of-state vendor, 
because the two shared the same business names, trademarks, and logos, engaged in cross 
advertising, or were in similar lines of business. For example, Bloomingdale’s had different 
affiliated corporate entities conducting sales in Pennsylvania, one through in-state retail 
stores, the other through mail-order catalog. Pennsylvania argued that the mail-order com-
pany had nexus because its corporate affiliate’s in-state stores sold many of the same goods, 
shared advertising campaigns, and, on two occasions, accepted merchandise returns of items 
purchased by catalog. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court found for the taxpayer, re-
jecting the state’s argument that nexus existed because of an agency relationship between the 
affiliated corporations.37 The courts in Connecticut and Ohio came to similar conclusions in 
two cases with Saks Fifth Avenue.38 The Ohio case is of particular interest because the state 
attempted to use the income tax “unitary” doctrine to assert substantial nexus for sales tax.
34 Louisiana v. Dell Int’l Inc., No. 2004 CA 1702 (Feb. 15, 2006).
35 See Dell Catalog Sales, LP. v. New Mexico, 189 P.3d 1215 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008).
36 See VA Pub. Doc. No. 05-128 (8/2/05).
37 Bloomingdale’s By Mail, Ltd. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 567 A.2d 773 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989), aff’d without 
opinion, 591 A.2d 1047 (Pa. 1991)
38 SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Bannon, 217 Conn. 220 (1990), 585 A.2d 666 (Conn. 1991); SFA Folio Col-
lections, Inc. v. Tracy, 652 N.E.2d 693 (Ohio 1995).
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In Current, Inc. v. State of Board of Equalization, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 407 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 
1994), the court held that an out-of-state mail-order company, with no nexus with Califor-
nia, was not required to collect use tax even though its parent did have nexus with the state. 
In other words, the nexus of the parent could not be attributed to the subsidiary.
California continues to be one of the state leaders in asserting nexus through agency and 
affiliation. The California State Board of Equalization (SBE) recently ruled in two separate 
hearings that an online bookseller with no physical presence in the state must collect the 
state’s use tax.
Borders Online, Inc., operates a website through which it sells primarily books, CDs, and 
DVDs. It is a separate corporate entity affiliated with the traditional “bricks and mortar” 
Borders, Inc., bookstores. Borders, Inc., bookstores routinely accepted returns from its pa-
trons regardless of whether the item was purchased at Borders, Inc.; Borders Online, LLC; 
or one of Borders’ competitors. If the item was purchased from a competitor, Borders, Inc., 
would give the purchaser store credit. If the item was purchased from Borders Online, the 
store would provide a cash refund.
The SBE determined that the refunding of cash for returned goods made Borders, Inc., 
the “authorized representative” of Borders Online. In addition, the SBE held that the re-
funding of cash for returns was a key element of the selling process and, in and of itself, 
constituted “selling” in California under California Revenue & Taxation Code §6203.39
The decision has been roundly criticized by the tax community, which has argued that 
Borders’ return policy was nothing more than good customer service rather than an action 
taken as a representative on behalf of Borders Online. Furthermore, critics say, the SBE de-
cision did not adequately address the principle articulated in Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 
207 (1960), and Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington, 483 U.S. 232 (1987), that an in-
state representative creates nexus only through actions that purposefully establish and maintain 
a market in the state for the remote seller.
One year after its ruling in Borders Online, the SBE held that the online subsidiary of 
Barnes & Noble Booksellers, Inc., (B&N) had nexus in California because B&N distrib-
uted discount coupons that could be redeemed with its online affiliate Barnes & Noble.
Com (B&N.C). As in the Borders Online decision, the SBE determined that B&N acted as 
B&N.C’s representative through their joint marketing effort whereby B&N.C paid to have 
printed coupons inserted into the shopping bags of B&N customers. The SBE rejected the 
taxpayer’s argument that the discount coupons inserted into shopper’s bags were simply 
advertising akin to coupon inserts in magazines and newspapers.40
On September 7, 2007, the California Superior Court overruled the SBE holding that 
B&N.C did not have nexus through its “brick and mortar” sister corporation, B&N. Ac-
cording to the court, B&N did not act as B&N.C’s agent or representative. Distributing 
coupons or bags with advertising logos, the court stated, was akin to somebody on the 
street corner passing out flyers or coupons. Agency requires much more, and because the 
state did not provide a useful definition of agency, the court looked to general principles. 
The essential principle of agency is that the agent must have authority to bind the principal, 
39 Borders Online, LLC v. State Bd. of Equalization, No. A105488 (Cal. App. May 31, 2005).
40 Barnes & Noble.com, No. 89872 (Cal. State Bd. Equalization, Sept. 12, 2002).
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 and B&N did not have that authority. In addition, there was no evidence that there existed 
common management or control between the two companies. For example, neither com-
pany had any common directors or officers.41 Despite the win at superior court, on May 
29, 2008, B&N agreed to a settlement with the SBE, paying $9 million of the original as-
sessment of $17.7 million. The settlement covered all taxes, penalties, and interest through 
November 1, 2005—the date B&N.C began voluntarily collecting the state’s sales and use 
taxes.
Louisiana also recently argued that B&N.C had nexus in that state as well. Unlike Cali-
fornia, however, Louisiana focused its argument on certain key facts, arguing that those facts 
alone met the substantial nexus hurdle required of states under the commerce clause.42 The 
facts included a common membership program, gift card exchange, advertising, preferential 
treatment on returns, and commissions. The federal district court found the facts either 
misplaced or insufficient to create substantial nexus. The common advertising was limited, 
and the commissions, membership program, and gift cards were common to all booksellers 
including competitors. While the return policy was a bit more generous for B&N.C than 
others, it was not sufficiently so. In brief, Louisiana’s argument was reduced to holding that 
the close corporate relationship between the companies, similar company names, and brand 
identity itself was sufficient to establish substantial nexus. The court simply disagreed.
Despite these two recent setbacks, other states continue to follow California and Loui-
siana’s lead, and in April 2005, the MTC proposed a new affiliate nexus standard entitled, 
“Proposed Model Affiliate Sales Tax Nexus Proposal.” The proposed standard provides that 
an out-of-state business has nexus with an in-state business if they (1) are “related” (mem-
bers of the same federal “controlled group,” or there exists a 50 percent ownership), and (2) 
they use “an identical or substantially similar name, tradename, trademark or goodwill to 
develop, promote, or maintain sales,” or (3) the in-state business “provides services to, or 
that inure to the benefit of, the out-of-state business related to developing, promoting, or 
maintaining the in-state market.”
Tennessee’s recent attempt to tax the activities of America Online has been stalled by the 
state’s court of appeals, which, pointing out that physical presence for nexus is fact-specific, 
has remanded the decision for further discovery.43
Instead of litigation, other states have simply passed legislation providing that companies 
are taxable in the state for sales and use tax through affiliation. Effective January 1, 2002, a 
remote seller affiliated with an Arkansas retailer will have nexus with the state for the pur-
poses of sales and use tax. The out-of-state or remote seller will have to collect and remit 
Arkansas use tax on sales into the state, if the seller is affiliated with an Arkansas retailer 
and “the vendor sells the same or substantially similar line of products ... under the same or 
41 See barnesandnoble.com, LLC. v. SBE, No. CGC-06-456465 (Calif. Super. Ct. (San Francisco County) 
Sept. 7, 2007).
42 See St. Tammany Parish Tax Collector v. barnesandnoble.com, LLC, No. 05-5695 (E.D. La. Mar. 22, 2007).
43 America Online, Inc. v. Johnson, No. 97-3786-III (Tenn. (Chancery Ct.) Mar. 13, 2001), rev’d and remand-
ed, America Online, Inc. v. Johnson, M2001-00927-COA-R#-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jul. 30, 2002).
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substantially similar business name, or the facilities or employees of the Arkansas retailer are 
used to advertise or promote sales by the vendor to Arkansas purchasers.”44
Like Arkansas, Minnesota has amended its statutes to require that an affiliated remote seller 
of an in-state retailer must collect the state’s use tax. An out-of-state retailer or remote seller 
is an affiliate of an in-state entity if “the entity uses its facilities or employees in this state to 
advertise, promote, or facilitate the establishment or maintenance of a market for sales of 
items by the retailer to purchasers in this state or for the provision of services to the retailer’s 
purchasers in this state, such as accepting returns of purchases for the retailer, providing assis-
tance in resolving customer complaints of the retailer, or providing other services.”45 Other 
states to enact attributional or affiliate nexus statutes include the following:
•  Alabama (Ala. Act. 390 [H.B. 650, effective Aug. 1, 2003])
•  Indiana (Ind. P.L. 81-2004 [H.B. 1365, effective July 1, 2004])
•  Kansas (Kan. Laws ch. 159 [H.B. 2416, effective July 1, 2003])
•  Utah (Utah Laws ch. 255 [H.B. 273, effective July 1, 2004])
Yet another approach states have taken recently to “encourage” remote sellers to charge 
and collect the state’s use tax is to require that any vendors doing business with any state 
agencies to register and collect the state’s sales and use tax. California initiated such a re-
quirement effective January 1, 2004. Other states with similar requirements include Con-
necticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Vir-
ginia. Critics have charged that the practice is illegal and a violation of the commerce clause. 
They claim that while states may have the right to establish their purchasing requirements, 
such requirements violate the Constitution when their participation in the market becomes 
an attempt to regulate the interstate market.
Federal Legislation
The MTC and state supporters continue each year to introduce the commission’s “factor 
presence” standard nexus proposal, a proposal it first introduced in 2002. In brief, the pro-
posal provides that any company whose activity in a state exceeds (1) owning $50,000 of 
property, or (2) $50,000 of payroll, or (3) $500,000 of sales has nexus for both income and 
sales tax. Under the proposal, a remote seller whose only contacts with the state are either 
through the Internet or catalog sales would have nexus in the state if those sales exceeded 
$500,000. Thus, the proposal would remove the physical presence standard established in 
Quill. While the MTC’s “factor presence” standard has failed to ever garner any support 
in the United States Congress, several states, including California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, and Washington, have adopted some version of the 
standard either through legislation or regulation. This activity by the states does not mean 
that states have given up on a congressional solution. In July 2011, Senator Dick Durbin 
(D-Ill.) introduced the Main Street Fairness Act of 2011. The bill provides that any state 
adopting the Streamline Sales Tax Project and implementing a series of simplifying provi-
sions will be allowed to require remote sellers to collect that state’s sales tax. It will come 
44 Ark. Code Ann. § 26-53-124(a)(3)(B).
45 Minn. Stat. § 297A.66(4).
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 as no surprise that the proposal is controversial among business groups, and its future is 
uncertain. Opponents of the MTC proposal continue each year to introduce their own leg-
islation. The most recent is the Business Activity Tax Simplification Act of 2011 (BATSA) 
(H.R. 1439), introduced April 8, 2011, by Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.) and others. Es-
sentially, the legislation would prohibit any state from imposing any tax (income or sales) 
unless the taxpayer had a physical presence in the state for 15 days or more during the year. 
Representative Boucher has introduced the same bill for the last five years to no effect.
The “Amazon Wars” and “Click-through Nexus”
The most recent development in sales tax nexus was ignited by legislation passed by New 
York in spring 2008 that requires online retailers, that pay commissions or other compen-
sation to New York businesses for customer referrals, whether by a link on an Internet 
website or other manner, and that generate sales into the state over $10,000 for the past four 
quarters to register with the state and begin collecting state and local taxes on all the retailer’s 
sales into the state.46 On May 8, 2008, the New York Taxpayer Services Division issued 
TSB-M-08(3)S, “New Presumption Applicable to Definition of Sales Tax Vendor,” to 
explain and illustrate the application of the new statute. (Technical Service Bulletins [TSBs] 
are issued as informational guidance only.) Exhibit 1-1 outlines the TSB in its entirety.
46 New York Senate Bill 6807, Chapter 57, N.Y. Laws of 2008.
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Exhibit 1-1: TSB-M-08(3)S, 
Technical Services Bureau, 
Taxpayer Services Division, New 
York Department of Taxation and 
Finance, May 8, 2008
New Presumption Applicable to Definition of Sales Tax Vendor
Recently enacted legislation (Chapter 57 of the Laws of 2008) amended the Tax Law to provide a pre-
sumption that certain sellers of taxable tangible personal property or services are sales tax vendors that 
are required to register for sales tax purposes and collect state and local sales taxes. The new law pro-
vides that a seller is presumed to be a vendor if the seller enters into agreements with residents of this 
state to refer customers to the seller, as described below under New rules regarding who is presumed 
to be a vendor.
Background
The term vendor includes persons who solicit business within the state through employees, independent 
contractors, agents or other representatives and, by reason thereof, make sales to persons within the 
state of tangible personal property or services that are subject to sales tax. Accordingly, if a business 
located outside New York State solicits sales of taxable tangible personal property or services through 
employees, salespersons, independent contractors, agents, or other representatives located in New 
York State, the business must register as a vendor and obtain a Certificate of Authority for New York 
State sales tax purposes. (See Tax Law Section 1101(b)(8) and Sales and Use Tax Regulations Section 
526.10(a)(3).)
For example, an out-of-state business that uses independent manufacturers’ representatives in New 
York State to sell its product in New York State is considered to be soliciting business within this 
state through the use of independent contractors or representatives. (See Sales and Use Tax Regula-
tions Section 526.10(a)(3).) Therefore, the business must register as a vendor for New York State and 
local sales tax purposes. Also, an e-commerce retailer that uses persons to act as its representatives 
in the state to solicit sales or to make and maintain a market in return for commissions, referral fees 
or other types of compensation is considered to be soliciting business within this state through the use 
of independent contractors or representatives. Therefore, the e-commerce retailer must register as a 
vendor for New York State and local sales tax purposes. However, a business is not considered a vendor 
under section 1101(b)(8) of the Tax Law merely because the business stores advertising on a server or 
other computer equipment located in New York State, or has advertising disseminated or displayed on 
the Internet. (See Tax Law Section 12 and TSB-M-97(1.1)S.)
New rules regarding who is presumed to be a vendor
The new legislation provides that a seller that makes taxable sales of tangible personal property or ser-
vices in New York State is presumed to be a vendor required to be registered for sales tax purposes and 
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 required to collect sales tax on all of its taxable sales in New York State, if both of the following condi-
tions are met:
•  The seller enters into an agreement or agreements with a New York State resident1 or residents 
under which, for a commission or other consideration, the resident representative directly or indi-
rectly refers potential customers to the seller, whether by link on an Internet website or otherwise. 
A resident representative would be indirectly referring potential customers to the seller where, for 
example, the resident representative refers potential customers to its own website, or to another 
party’s website which then directs the potential customer to the seller’s website.
•  The cumulative gross receipts from sales by the seller to customers in New York State as a result 
of referrals to the seller by all of the seller’s resident representatives under the type of contract or 
agreement described above total more than $10,000 during the preceding four quarterly sales tax 
periods. (Sales tax quarterly periods end on the last day of February, May, August, and November.)
For purposes of the presumption described above, a seller is also considered to have met the condition 
of having an agreement with a New York State resident where the seller enters into an agreement with 
a third party under which the third party, in turn, enters into an agreement with the New York resident to 
act as the seller’s representative.
In addition, an agreement to place an advertisement does not give rise to the presumption described 
above. For this purpose, placing an advertisement does not include the placement of a link on a website 
that, directly or indirectly, links to the website of a seller, where the consideration for placing the link on 
the website is based on the volume of completed sales generated by the link.
Example 1:
CAB Company (CAB) manufactures and sells specialty fitness equipment. CAB is located in Arizona, 
where it has its manufacturing plant, administrative offices and catalog call center. CAB has no retail 
outlets in New York State. Other than making sales of its products, as described below, which are deliv-
ered in New York State by common carrier trucking companies, CAB has no other connection with New 
York State.
CAB maintains a market for its products in New York State mainly by entering into agreements with 
health and fitness clubs (clubs) located throughout the state whereby the clubs refer club members to 
CAB’s fitness equipment products. When a club member purchases a product from CAB, the member’s 
club is identified and paid a commission equal to 5% of the selling price of the product. From March 1, 
2007, to February 29, 2008 (i.e., the preceding four quarterly sales tax periods), CAB’s gross receipts from 
sales made through its agreements with the clubs located in New York State totaled $38,628.
Based on the foregoing, CAB is presumed to be making sales in New York State through independent 
contractors or other representatives and required to be registered as a sales tax vendor, collect New 
York State and local sales taxes, and file the required sales tax returns.
Example 2:
XYZ Company (XYZ) is an Internet-based retailer of sporting goods specializing in downhill skiing 
equipment. XYZ is located in Vermont, where it has its administrative offices and its warehouse, which 
holds its inventory for sale. XYZ makes sales of its merchandise throughout the United States and has 
1 A New York State resident for sales tax purposes includes, but is not limited to
•  Any individual who maintains a permanent place of abode in New York State; and
•  Any corporation incorporated under the laws of New York, and any corporation, association, 
partnership or other entity doing business or maintaining a place of business, or operating a hotel, 
place of amusement or social or athletic club in New York State. (See Sales and Use Tax Regulations 
Section 526.15.)
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customers in New York State. The merchandise sold by XYZ is delivered by the U.S. Postal Service or by 
common carrier.
As part of its marketing plan, XYZ has entered into agreements with several ski clubs located in New York 
State whereby the ski clubs will maintain links to XYZ’s retail website on the clubs’ own websites. XYZ 
will pay a commission to the ski clubs based on the sales that XYZ makes that originate from these links.
From March 1, 2007, to February 29, 2008 (i.e., the preceding four quarterly sales tax periods), XYZ has 
gross receipts from sales of its merchandise based on these agreements with the New York State ski 
clubs totaling $78,390.
Based on the foregoing, XYZ is presumed to be making taxable sales in New York State by soliciting 
business in New York State through the use of independent contractors or other representatives and 
required to be registered as a sales tax vendor, collect New York State and local sales taxes, and file the 
required sales tax returns.
Example 3:
T sells a variety of small tools nationwide, over the Internet. T’s home office is in Arkansas, where its 
warehouse and administrative offices are located. Other than making sales of its products as described 
below, which are delivered to its customers in New York State by common carrier, T has no other con-
nection with New York State.
T enters into a contract with S, a service provider. Under the contract, S enters into agreements with 
New York State residents on behalf of T, whereby the New York State residents agree to refer potential 
customers to T’s website in order to purchase T’s products by placing T’s product links on their websites. 
Under the contract, S tracks sales of T’s products as a result of the referrals from the New York State 
residents’ websites. S distributes commissions to the New York State resident representatives based on 
these sales from an account maintained by S on behalf of T for this purpose.
From March 1, 2007, to February 29, 2008 (i.e., the preceding four quarterly sales tax periods), T’s gross 
receipts from sales made under its agreements with S and the New York State residents as described 
above totaled $68,000. Therefore, T is presumed to be soliciting sales in New York State through the use 
of independent contractors or other representatives and required to be registered as a sales tax vendor, 
collect New York State and local sales taxes, and file the required sales tax returns.
Example 4:
G Inc. (G) is an Internet-based retailer of gardening tools and supplies. G’s home office is in North Caro-
lina, where its warehouse and administrative offices are located. G makes sales of its products nation-
wide, including New York State, and its products are delivered to its customers by common carrier. Other 
than having customers in New York State and the agreements described below, G has no other connec-
tion with New York State.
As part of its business plan to market its products in New York State, G enters into agreements with sev-
eral garden clubs and other local organizations to place online advertisements on their websites, which, 
when clicked, lead the website user to G’s retail website. In exchange for placing G’s advertisements on 
its website, G will pay the organizations a set fee based only on the number of clicks on the link to G’s 
website, whether or not sales are made.
G’s agreement with the organizations is merely to place advertising on the organizations’ websites. 
Therefore, G is not presumed to be a vendor making taxable sales in New York State by soliciting busi-
ness in New York State through the use of independent contractors or other representatives. Therefore, 
G is not required to register for sales tax purposes.
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 Presumption that solicitation takes place may be rebutted
A seller may rebut the presumption that it is soliciting sales in New York State through resident represen-
tatives. For purposes of administering the new presumption, the Tax Department will deem the presump-
tion rebutted where the seller is able to establish that the only activity of its resident representatives in 
New York State on behalf of the seller is a link provided on the representatives’ websites to the seller’s 
website and none of the resident representatives engage in any solicitation activity in the state targeted 
at potential New York State customers on behalf of the seller.
Example 5:
This example assumes the same facts as in Example 2. In addition, at least one of the ski clubs refers 
potential customers to XYZ by distributing flyers in New York State that promote the links to XYZ on the 
ski club’s website. Therefore, XYZ is unable to rebut the presumption that it is making taxable sales in 
New York State through New York State resident representatives. XYZ is required to register for sales tax 
purposes and collect sales tax on all of its taxable sales in New York State.
Example 6:
This example also assumes the same facts as in Example. However, none of the ski clubs refer potential 
customers to XYZ through the use of flyers, newsletters, telephone calls or e-mails to club members or 
any other means of solicitation in the state targeted at potential New York State customers on behalf of 
XYZ. Therefore, XYZ may successfully rebut the presumption that it is making taxable sales in New York 
State through New York State resident representatives and XYZ is not required to register for sales tax 
purposes.
Relief for sellers covered by the presumption
For sales tax quarterly periods beginning before June 1, 2008, the Tax Department may not assess sales 
tax required to be collected, or related penalty and interest, against a business that is covered by the 
presumption discussed in this memorandum, if the business meets all of the following conditions:
•  On April 23, 2008, the business is covered by the presumption such that the business is a vendor by 
virtue of having a representative soliciting sales on its behalf in the state.
•  The business is not required to be registered for sales tax purposes and collect tax for any reason 
other than having resident representatives soliciting sales in the state as described in this memoran-
dum.
•  The business was not registered for sales tax purposes on April 23, 2008, and was not registered for 
sales tax purposes at any time between July 23, 2007 and April 23, 2008.
•  The business was not registered for sales tax purposes at the time it made the sales for which it 
failed to collect sales tax.
•  The business registers for sales tax purposes and begins to collect sales tax from its New York State 
customers by June 1, 2008.
[See Tax Law Section 1101(b)(8)(vi).]
The New York legislation is particularly significant because it says that a taxpayer need 
not have physical presence in New York to be subject to the state’s sales tax. This is clearly 
contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in both National Bellas Hess and Quill dis-
cussed previously. Thus, it was no surprise that Amazon.com and Overstock.com filed suits 
immediately after the New York law was passed challenging the legislation as invalid, illegal, 
and unconstitutional because it violated the commerce, due process, and equal protection 
clauses of the U.S. and New York constitutions. The case is currently being considered by 
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the New York courts. (Some have argued that the physical presence test is met through 
the nexus of the New York associate or affiliate with whom the remote seller has a “click-
through” contract.)
North Carolina’s “Amazon legislation” has also run into difficulties. The U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Washington ruled the North Carolina statute unconstitu-
tional because it violated the First Amendment to the extent that it required the disclosure 
of customer’s names, addresses, and other personal information. The law’s defect can be 
cured by simply requesting only the names, addresses, and general product information of 
total purchases. Thus, it is probably only a temporary setback for the state.47
The importance of New York’s legislation and the constitutional challenges it raises can-
not be over emphasized. Several other states attempted to follow New York’s lead by 
adopting similar legislation. The legislation failed in Connecticut, Maryland, and Tennessee. 
However, it passed in California, Hawaii, and Minnesota only to be vetoed by the gover-
nors of those states partly in fear that the legislation was unconstitutional. North Carolina 
and Rhode Island are the only states to have successfully passed an “Amazon tax.” As a 
consequence, both Overstock.com and Amazon.com have revoked their affiliate/associate 
programs in both states as well as New York. Nevertheless, states are continuing to emulate 
New York. Illinois just recently enacted an “Amazon bill” similar to that of New York, but 
it dropped New York’s stipulation that such relationships simply created a “presumption” 
of nexus. There is no “presumption of nexus” in the Illinois law; it just flatly states that such 
a taxpayer does have nexus—period.48
Colorado passed a variation of New York’s “Amazon tax” in 2010 that imposes only a 
reporting requirement, not a collection and payment requirement. Under the Colorado 
provision, a remote seller with no presence in Colorado must do three things:
1. Notify their customers by January 31 of each year through separate first-class mailings 
the dates and amounts of their purchases and that sales/use tax may be due on those 
purchases. The failure to comply is a penalty of $5.00 for each purchaser.
2. In addition, the retailer must file an annual statement by March 1 with the Colorado 
Department of Revenue showing the total amount purchased by its Colorado customers 
during the previous year. The failure to comply is a penalty of $10.00 for each purchaser.
3. According to the Department of Revenue, the invoice or notice to Colorado customers 
must include the following statements:
 a. The retailer is not obligated and does not collect Colorado sales tax;
 b.  The purchase is not exempted merely because it was made over the Internet or other 
remote means;
 c.  Colorado requires that the buyer file a use tax return at the end of the year reporting 
all of the purchases that were not taxed and pay the tax on those purchases;
 d.  The retailer did not collect the Colorado sales tax and is obligated to provide pur-
chaser with an end-of-year summary of purchases to assist the purchaser with filing 
their tax report;
47 Amazon.com, LLC v. Kenneth R. Lay, No. C10-664 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 25, 2010).
48 See H.B. 3659.
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  e.  Retailers that do not collect Colorado sales tax are required by law to provide the 
Colorado Department of Revenue with a report of all of a purchaser’s purchases at 
the end of the year.
Oklahoma has enacted a statute similar to Colorado’s law, and California is reportedly 
considering one as well. The Colorado version of New York’s “Amazon law” has met with 
some favor recently by state tax administrators who believe it avoids some of the consti-
tutional issues raised by the New York statute. Others believe, however, that the state tax 
administrators are entirely mistaken and that the Colorado statute raises just as much of a 
constitutional issue as does the New York law. They emphasize that it was the imposition 
and impediment on interstate commerce that was the issue in National Bellas Hess and Quill, 
more than the tax itself. They argue that the reporting requirements are as much, if not 
more, of an imposition on interstate commerce as simply collecting and remitting the tax.
But How Do You Know They Are From Pocatello?
Massachusetts recently added a new twist to the nexus wars by taking the position that a 
taxpayer with stores both in and outside the state had to collect Massachusetts sales tax on 
sales in its New Hampshire stores when it appeared that the stores were making sales to 
Massachusetts residents.49
Massachusetts has long had a problem with its residents avoiding the state’s sales tax by 
driving to New Hampshire, which does not have a sales tax, purchasing goods and bringing 
them back into Massachusetts and, of course, failing to remit use tax to the state. In fact, 
economists estimate that Massachusetts loses from $130 to $410 million annually due to this 
practice. The Town Fair case was an attempt to put a stop to this “tax evasion.”
Town Fair is a Connecticut corporation whose principal business is the sales and instal-
lation of automobile tires. The company has stores throughout New England. In 2003, 
Massachusetts audited Town Fair and determined that its three New Hampshire stores had 
sold tires to Massachusetts residents. The auditor reached this conclusion based on store in-
voices listing sales to individuals with Massachusetts addresses, telephone numbers, driver’s 
licenses, and motor vehicle plates. The Massachusetts Department of Revenue (DOR) as-
sessed Town Fair $109,000 in tax on 313 sales identified as sales to Massachusetts residents 
and that assessment was upheld by the state’s tax board.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, however, overruled the board, holding that 
the DOR had to show actual use in Massachusetts, not simply the presumption of use. De-
spite “compelling circumstantial evidence,” the mere intent to use the tires in Massachusetts 
was insufficient because the statute did not provide for such presumption. In fact, the court 
pointed to statutes in California, Nevada, and Wisconsin that provided for just such a pre-
sumption, indicating that had the Massachusetts’s statute had such language, it might have 
reached a different conclusion.
The court did not address the constitutional implications of the case, specifically whether 
a state can impose a transaction tax, that is its sales tax, on a transaction occurring outside 
49 Town Fair Tire Centers, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 911 N.E.2d 757 (2009).
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its borders or whether such an imposition violates the interstate commerce clause by creat-
ing an undue administrative burden on retailers. For example, what kind of record keeping 
would be required of a vendor and what would be deemed sufficient in reconciling conflict-
ing customer information. Suppose the car had Massachusetts plates but the customer had a 
New Hampshire driver’s license, or vice versa.
Town Fair is just the most recent example of state efforts to extend their taxing authority. 
Stay tuned.
Income Tax Nexus
While physical presence is the bright-line test for sales tax nexus, it is not determinative 
for income tax nexus. In fact, a company can have numerous employees in a state creating 
physical presence aplenty and yet not have an income tax filing obligation. That is because 
a federal law, P.L. 86-272, creates a safe harbor from income tax nexus even when there is 
physical presence.
Public Law 86-272
Due process and interstate commerce are the constitutional hurdles. But there is also a bit 
of federal legislation which adds yet another hurdle to establishing nexus, but only for income 
tax nexus. That legislation is P.L. 86-272
P.L. 86-272 states that “No state ... shall have the power to impose (an) income tax ... 
if the only business activities within such state (are) the solicitation of orders ... for sales of 
tangible personal property, which ... are sent outside the State for approval or rejection, and, 
if approved, are filled by shipment or delivery from outside the State ...” See Appendix A 
for the complete text of P.L. 86-272.
In brief, P.L. 86-272 provides a safe harbor for certain activities with respect to income 
tax nexus. Essentially, physical presence alone will create a filing obligation for sales tax. So 
if your company has employees, property, even independent contractors in a state, it is likely 
that the company will have a sales tax filing obligation to that state. Note, however, that 
under P.L. 86-272 a company can have employees busy soliciting sales in the state and not 
create nexus for income tax. In the earlier Crystal City Computers example, the company 
could hire employees to sell their computers in Kansas (in fact, the employees could live in 
Kansas) and so long as those employees restricted their activities to the solicitation of sales 
of tangible personal property, and those sales orders were sent back to Colorado for accep-
tance and fulfillment, Crystal City would not have to file income tax returns with Kansas. 
New York recently ruled that the presence of an in-state representative working out of his 
office-in-the home, and provided with a company laptop, constituted protected activities 
under P.L. 86-272.50
Please pay particular attention to the fact that P.L. 86-272 applies only to net income taxes 
and the sales of tangible personal property. Some states (for example, Pennsylvania) impose 
combined franchise taxes upon income and capital, and the taxpayer may have to pay tax 
upon either both income and capital, or the greater of the two. These states have taken 
50 See TSB-A-05(7)(C) (N.Y. Dep’t of Taxation & Fin. Apr. 4, 2005).
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 the position that P.L. 86-272 only applies to their income base not their capital base. Thus, 
a taxpayer who may have only salespeople soliciting in the state would still be required to 
pay the state’s franchise tax based on capital, but not income. The Texas Court of Appeals 
specifically ruled that the net worth component of the state’s old franchise tax did not fall 
under the safe harbor provision of P.L. 86-272.51 Texas has since replaced its corporate 
franchise tax with a modified gross receipts tax, called the Texas Margin Tax, that the Texas 
legislature specifically stated did not fall under the safe harbor provisions offered by P.L. 
86-272. Taxes measured by gross income or receipts are not covered by P.L. 86-272. As a 
consequence, Washington’s business and occupation tax and New Mexico’s gross receipts 
tax have different nexus standards. 
Please note also that P.L. 86-272 applies only to the solicitation of sales of tangible per-
sonal property. Sales of services, for example, are not protected. Thus, if Crystal City Com-
puters were to offer training seminars or computer classes in Kansas, these activities would 
not be protected and the company would have to begin filing Kansas income tax returns.
Finally, P.L. 86-272 leaves undefined what constitutes “solicitation.” The Supreme Court 
addressed the term in its decision in Wisconsin Dep’t. of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr. Co., 
112 S. Ct. 2447 (1992). Wrigley’s activities within Wisconsin included the in-state recruit-
ment, training and evaluation of sales representatives who solicited sales using company cars 
and carrying with them a stock of gum for samples, display racks, and promotional literature. 
The Court ruled these activities were protected under P.L. 86-272. The sales reps also sup-
plied gum for a charge to retailers that installed new display racks and occasionally replaced 
stale gum. Despite the fact that the replacement of stale gum only represented 0.00007 
percent of the company’s total sales in Wisconsin, the Court ruled that these activities went 
beyond solicitation. In brief, since one would have reason to replace stale gum apart from 
solicitation, it is not the volume, but the company practice itself that exceeds the safe har-
bor provisions of P.L. 86-272. The Court wrote that the demarcation between protected 
solicitation and other activities is the “clear line ... between those activities that are entirely 
ancillary to requests for purchase—those that serve no independent business function apart 
from their connection to the soliciting of orders—and those activities that the company 
would have reason to engage in anyway but chooses to allocate to its in-state sales force.” 
(See appendix C for a copy of the Wrigley case.)
The one exception to the preceding rule is as follows: “Even if engaged in exclusively to 
facilitate requests for purchases, the maintenance of an office within the State, by the com-
pany or on its behalf, would go beyond the ‘solicitation of orders.’ ” That said, for purposes 
of P.L. 86-272, the one key difference between an employee and an independent contractor 
is that the latter can have an office in the state. (See appendix B for a copy of P.L. 86-272.)
The MTC offered its interpretation and an elaboration of the term solicitation in its 
“Statement of Information Concerning Practices of Multistate Tax Commission and Sig-
natory States under Public Law 86-272” issued in January 1986. The statement has been 
revised and reissued in January 1993, July 1994, and July 2001. According to the MTC, 
the term solicitation includes (1) speech or conduct that explicitly or implicitly invites an 
51 See INOVA Diagnostics, Inc. v. Compt’r, 166 S.W.3d 394 (Tax Ct. of App. 2005).
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order and (2) activities that neither explicitly nor implicitly invite an order but are entirely 
ancillary to requests for an order. “ ‘Ancillary activities’ are those that serve no independent 
business function for the seller apart from their connection to the solicitation of orders.” If 
the seller would engage in an activity apart from soliciting orders, the activity is not ancil-
lary. Even if the activity is not ancillary, it will still qualify for immunity if it is de minimis. 
“De minimis activities are those that, when taken together, establish only a trivial connec-
tion with the taxing state.” Both the quantitative and qualitative nature of the activity will 
be considered but not its economic importance. If the activity is conducted on a regular or 
continuous basis, it will not normally be considered trivial or de minimis.
The statement provides examples of minimal activities within a state that could establish 
nexus for income tax purposes and a list of those examples can be found in box 1-2.
Box 1-2: Minimal Activities That May Trigger Nexus for Income Tax Purposes
• Repairs and maintenance;
• Collections on accounts;
• Credit investigations;
• Installation and supervision of installation;
• “Nonsolicitation” training;
• “Nonsolicitation” technical advice;
•  Handling/processing customer complaints (except mediating customer complaints 
when the sole purpose is to ingratiate sales personnel with the customer);
• Approving/accepting orders;
• Repossessing property;
• Securing deposits on sales;
• Picking up or replacing damaged or returned property;
•  Hiring, training, or supervising personnel other than those involved only in 
solicitation;
•  Using agency stock checks or any other instrument by which sales are made in the 
state by sales personnel;
•  Maintaining a sample or display room in excess of 14 days at any one location 
within the state during the tax year;
•  Carrying samples for sale, exchange, or distribution in any manner for value;
•  Owning, leasing, using, or maintaining a repair shop; parts department; warehouse; 
meeting place for directors, officers, or employees; stock of goods (other than 
samples for sales personnel or that are used entirely ancillary to solicitation); 
telephone answering service that is publicly attributed to the company or to the 
employee(s) or agent(s) of the company in their representative status; mobile 
stores; real property or fixtures of any kind; or any other office (other than a 
protected in-home office described below);
•  Consigning tangible personal property to any person;
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•  Maintaining by any employee or other representative, an office or place of business 
of any kind (other than an in-home office located within the residence of the 
employee or representative that (i) is not publicly attributed to the company or 
the employee or representative in an employee or representative capacity, and (ii) 
so long as the use of such office is limited to soliciting and receiving orders from 
customers; for transmitting orders outside the state for acceptance or rejection; or 
for such other activities that are protected under P.L. 86-272).
•  Any indication through advertising or business literature that the company or 
its employee or representative can be contacted at a specific address within the 
state, or a telephone or other public listing within the state for the company or its 
employee or representative in a representative capacity is normally considered 
an in-state office or place of business. However, the normal distribution and use 
of business cards and stationery that identify the employee’s or representative’s 
name, address, telephone and fax numbers, and affiliation with the company is not, 
itself, considered as advertising or otherwise publicly attributing an office to the 
company or its employee or representative.
•  The maintenance of any office or other place of business that does not qualify as an 
“in-home” office described above will, itself, cause the loss of protection under P.L. 
86-272. It is not relevant whether the company pays directly, indirectly, or not at all 
for the maintenance of such in-home office.
•  Entering into/selling franchises/licenses; selling tangible personal property 
pursuant to such franchise or license agreements to in-state franchisees and 
licensees; and
•  Any other non-protected, non-ancillary activity (even if such activity helps to 
increase purchases).
Activities that the MTC deems protected include the following:
•  Soliciting orders for sales by any type of advertising;
•  Carrying samples and promotional materials for display only or for distribution 
without charge or other consideration;
•  Furnishing or setting up display racks and advising customers on display of 
products without charge or other consideration;
•  Providing autos to sales personnel for use in protected activities;
•  Passing orders, inquiries, and complaints to the home office;
•  Checking customers’ inventories without charge (for re-order only);
•  Maintaining a sample or display room for 14 days or less at any one location within 
the state during the tax year;
•  Soliciting orders for sales by an in-state resident employee or representative of the 
company, provided such person does not maintain an in-state sales office or place 
of business other than a protected in-home office;
•  Missionary sales activities (i.e., the solicitation of indirect customers for the 
company’s goods. For example, a manufacturer’s solicitation of retailers to buy 
the manufacturer’s goods from the manufacturer’s wholesale customers would be 
protected if such solicitation activities are otherwise immune);
•  Recruiting, training, or evaluation of sales personnel, including the occasional use 
of homes, hotels, or similar places for meetings of sales personnel;
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•  Mediating direct customer complaints when the purpose is solely for ingratiating 
the sales personnel with the customer and facilitating requests for orders;
•  Coordinating shipment or delivery without payment and providing related 
information prior to or subsequent to placement of order; and
•  Owning, leasing, using, or maintaining personal property for use in an in-home 
office or car that is used solely for protected activities
Author’s Note: Public Law 86-272 Does Not Protect
Income tax nexus if in-state activities involve
• Leasing of tangible personal property
• Sales of services 
• Sale or lease of realty
• Sale or license of intangibles
Sales and use tax nexus
Michigan “business tax” nexus
Washington “business and occupation tax” nexus
Franchise taxes on capital or net worth (for example, Pennsylvania)
Ohio commercial activity tax
Texas Margin Tax
Physical Presence and Income Tax
As the preceding discussion indicates, a taxpayer can have physical presence in a state and 
still avoid an income tax filing obligation if that presence is protected by P.L. 86-272. How-
ever, the current debate over income tax nexus has focused, not so much on P.L. 86-272, as 
on whether a taxpayer’s economic presence in a state can create income tax nexus.
Quill made it clear that economic presence was insufficient for sales tax nexus, but the 
U.S. Supreme Court has never addressed whether there exists a physical presence require-
ment for income tax nexus. In fact, more than one state supreme court has ruled that physical 
presence is not necessary for income tax nexus. The South Carolina Supreme Court ruled 
that a Delaware holding company, whose only presence in the state was the licensing of its 
trademarks, was subject to South Carolina’s income tax. In brief, the state’s argument was 
that physical presence is unnecessary for income tax nexus, due process is satisfied by the 
“purposeful direction” of business activity, and that P.L. 86-272 does not protect the licens-
ing of intangibles, only the solicitation of the sale of tangible personal property. The South 
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 Carolina Supreme Court ruled in favor of the state and the U.S. Supreme Court denied 
certiorari.52 (See appendix D for a copy of the Geoffrey decision.)
In the past few years, there have been a significant number of state court cases involv-
ing intangible holding companies. For example, the same Geoffrey, Inc., that lost in South 
Carolina recently lost similar cases in Oklahoma and Louisiana on the same facts.53 The retail 
clothing store the Gap also lost an intangible holding company case in Louisiana.54 After a 
lower court victory in New Jersey, when the court argued that it was illogical that there 
would be a higher nexus standard (physical presence) for an indirect tax (sales) than a direct 
(income) tax, Lanco, Inc., an intangible holding company for Lane Bryant, lost on appeal 
to the New Jersey superior court, which did not find it illogical at all.55 Lanco was also in-
cluded in a North Carolina court loss with several other taxpayers that the U.S. Supreme 
Court declined to review.56 Other taxpayer losses include the following:
•  SYL, Inc. v. Comptroller
•  Crown, Cork & Seal Co. (Del.) Inc. v. Comptroller, 825 A.2d 399 (Md. 2003)
•  Kevin Associates, LLC v. Crawford, No. 03-C-0211 (Jan. 30, 2004)
•  Bridges v. Autozone Properties, 900 So.2d 784 (La. 2005)
•  Kmart Properties, Inc. v. New Mexico, 2006-NMCA-026; 21,140 (N.M. App. Ct.  
Mar. 13, 2006)
Not all the intangible holding company cases have been taxpayer losses. For example, 
review, ACME Royalty Co. and Brick Investment Co. v. Director of Revenue, 96 S.W.3d 72 
(Mo. 2002).
The decision in Lanco, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 879 A.2d 1234 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div., 2005), like the Geoffrey cases, involved an intangible holding company, a tax 
planning structure that is considered by some state tax administrators to be little more than a 
tax scam. That cannot be said, however, of West Virginia v. MBNA, 640 S.E.2d 226 (W.Va. 
2006).
MBNA America did not have any employees, property, or other physical presence in 
West Virginia. Nonetheless, the company had $8 to $10 million in gross receipts from the 
state through the issuance and servicing of credit cards. The only contacts MBNA had with 
West Virginia were through mail and telephone solicitation. Nevertheless, the West Virgin-
ia Supreme Court ruled that the bank’s “systematic and continuous business activity in [the 
State] produced significant gross receipts attributable to its West Virginia customers which 
indicate a significant economic presence sufficient to meet the substantial nexus prong of 
52 Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm’n, 437 S.E.2d 13, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 550 (1993).
53 See Geoffrey v. Tax Comm’n, 132 P.3d 632 (Okla. Ct. Civ. App. 2006), and Louisiana v. Geoffrey, Inc., No. 
2007 CA 1063 (La. Cir. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2008).
54 Louisiana Dep’t. of Revenue v. Gap (Apparel) Inc., 886 So.2d 459 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2004).
55 Lanco, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 879 A.2d 1234 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). See also Praxair 
Technology, Inc. v. Director, No. A-91-92, (N.J.S. Ct Dec. 15, 2009).
56 See A&F Trademark, Inc., et al. v. Tolson, 605 S.E.2d 187 (N.C. App. 2004), cert. denied, No. 04-1625 
(U.S. Jun. 6, 2005).
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Complete Auto.” The court reasoned that the physical presence test provided by Quill was 
inapplicable because that decision was expressly limited to sales and use tax. In addition, an 
income tax imposition, unlike that of sales and use tax, imposed little burden on interstate 
commerce. In any case, the technological changes in commerce made “the application of a 
physical presence standard ... a poor measuring stick of an entity’s true nexus with the state.” 
On March 9, 2007, MBNA filed a petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. It 
was denied on June 18, 2007.
Not surprisingly, other states have followed West Virginia’s lead in targeting financial 
institutions via economic nexus. The Indiana Tax Court recently followed the reasoning 
of the West Virginia court in ruling that MBNA had substantial nexus in the state without 
physical presence.57 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court came to the same conclu-
sion based on the same reasoning as the West Virginia and Indiana courts.58 However, the 
New Jersey Tax Court recently rebuffed the state’s attempt to adopt a “significant economic 
presence test” in determining nexus for the simple reason that it had not been adopted by 
the state legislature.59 Nevertheless, several other states, including California, Connecticut, 
Hawaii, Minnesota, and Tennessee, have indicated that they expect to adopt the “economic 
nexus” standard articulated in these recent cases. The decisions are unsettling, because given 
the basis for the courts’ holdings in West Virginia, Indiana, and Massachusetts; no reason 
exists for why such reasoning cannot be extended to any business whose presence in a state 
is limited to solicitation through the mail or over the Internet. It is no exaggeration to say 
that the implications of MBNA and Capital One Bank v. Massachusetts, 899 N.E.2d 76 (Mass. 
2009), are enormous.
Financial institutions, however, are not the only industry that has been targeted of late by 
state tax administrators. Franchising has also become a primary target. On December 30, 
2010, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that Kentucky Fried Chicken’s (KFC) licensing of 
intangibles in the state to its franchisees, was the “functional equivalent of ‘physical pres-
ence’ under Quill.” Consequently, despite having no employees, property or other presence 
in the state, KFC had to pay tax on the royalties it received from its franchisees in the state. 
The court went on to say that even if the intangibles were not the functional equivalence 
of physical presence, it didn’t really matter because Quill was limited to sales tax and inap-
plicable to income tax.60 It appears that KFC may appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court and, if 
it does, perhaps we will get an answer to whether the Court intended physical presence to 
be the bright-line nexus test for all taxes.
57 MBNA America Bank v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, No. 49T10-0506-TA-53 (Ind. Tax Ct. Oct. 20, 
2008).
58 Capital One Bank v. Massachusetts, 899 N.E.2d 76 (Mass. 2009).
59 See AccuZIP, Inc. v. Director, No. 005744-2003 (N.J. Tax Ct. Aug. 13, 2009) (unpublished).
60 KFC Corp. v. Iowa, No. 09-1032 (Iowa Dec. 30, 2010).
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 Statutory Provisions and Where to  
Go From Here
After the Quill case, which put a significant restriction on the ability of states to collect sales 
tax from out-of-state companies by confirming a physical presence requirement, many state 
statutes must be scrutinized before determining whether they must followed. At the time 
Quill was decided, approximately 35 state statutes were most likely unconstitutional because 
they required companies to register for and collect their sales and use tax if certain activities 
were conducted in their state even without a physical presence in the state.
Almost 15 years after Quill, many states still have not adjusted their statutes accordingly. 
Thus, many are still unconstitutional. Most states will address what they consider nexus-
generating activity by identifying those activities in their statutes. Generally these are found 
under a state’s definitions for being “engaged in business,” “doing business,” and so on.
Although it may be clear what activities in a state constitute sufficient contacts to create 
nexus, it is arguable whether the state statutes must be followed.
Each state statute must be analyzed and considered on its merits. Box 1-3 outlines statutes 
subjecting companies to registration for sales and use tax programs that both would be con-
stitutional and some grey areas.
Box 1-3: Activities Triggering Sales Tax Nexus and Some Gray Areas
Activities sufficient to create sales tax nexus:
•  Sales people or other employees frequent the state.
•  An office, place of business, inventory, or other physical property is located in the 
state.
•  Property is rented in a state.
Gray areas might include the following:
•  Soliciting orders via mail or soliciting orders via continuous, regular, systematic 
activities, such as through radio or television
•  Benefiting from banking, financing, debt collection, or marketing activities located 
in the state
•  Using independent contractors or authorizing a location in the state for installation, 
servicing, and repair
•  Having a related business that is in the same or similar line of business located in 
the state
•  Maintaining a franchisee or licensee in the state
These last bullet points represent areas in which there is continuing litigation, so staking 
a filing position in one of these areas must be made with caution and a clear understanding 
of the associated risks. As in most other areas of the tax laws, the state statutes should be re-
viewed and analyzed. Your specific facts should be compared with the state statute at issue. 
If the company is performing an activity that allegedly creates nexus under the state statutes, 
but that is questionable in light of the Quill or Wrigley cases or other Supreme Court cases, 
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practitioners should be further analyze the issue before informing the taxpayer that nexus 
is created by the activities in question. However, a taxpayer should be informed that under 
the state statute, nexus would be deemed present so they can be prepared for a potential 
state tax challenge and the costs associated with it. Nonetheless, a state statute that is clearly 
in violation of Quill, or some other Supreme Court decision, will often not be pressed by 
the state for fear that a taxpayer would not only win on the issue but also be entitled to 
attorney’s fees, and other court costs, which, incidentally, may provoke other taxpayers to 
sue the state. That said, given the disastrous condition of many state budgets, they are being 
increasingly aggressive in these areas. It seems clear that the goal of most state tax administra-
tors is to require any company with a customer in their state, to file returns with their state. 
Offers in Compromise
Many states provide for a formal offer-in-compromise program. Some companies may have 
had nexus for quite some time but have refrained from filing because of ignorance or mis-
understanding of the law, or have simply postponed fulfilling this obligation because of 
administrative constraints or even because they “didn’t want to bother.”
Those companies may be willing to file prospectively but fear that doing so would cause 
the taxing jurisdiction(s) to look back after receiving the application and then propose a 
substantial (if not staggering) assessment. Note that, even when activity was rather limited, 
assessments could still be very significant because the statute of limitations does not start 
running until a return is filed. Theoretically, states could go back indefinitely, although they 
usually will not do so. In addition, the assessment would include significant penalties and 
interest.
These are the ideal circumstances in which an offer-in-compromise or voluntary disclo-
sure agreement (VDA) may be appropriate. There are two primary advantages to a VDA. 
First, most states will waive penalties and some will even waive part of the interest due. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the state will limit the look-back period, usually to 
three or four years. Generally, the VDAs are proposed anonymously through the use of a 
tax professional. For effecting a satisfactory compromise, it may be best to ask an expert tax 
professional to contact the state(s) and determine whether a lump-sum settlement would be 
agreeable to bring the taxpayer current or, alternatively, whether the state might be willing 
to limit its review to just a few years (for example three to five). VDAs are particularly useful 
in those situations when the nexus determination is ambiguous or in a particularly gray area 
of the law. For companies facing possible disclosure requirements in their financial state-
ments because of Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. 48, Accounting 
for Uncertainty in Income Taxes—an interpretation of FASB Statement No. 109 a VDA can be 
very helpful by eliminating the reason and need for disclosure.
Making an offer could also be considered in conjunction with state amnesty programs. 
However, even if such a program exists, the taxpayer should act very cautiously because the 
program might specifically limit the amnesty to specified periods or types of taxes.
In addition to specific state programs, the MTC has a formal offer-in-compromise program 
through which taxpayers and their representatives can approach multiple states through a 
voluntary disclosure process. For more information see the MTC website at www.mtc.gov.
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The majority of states “piggyback” off the federal corporate income tax base. Most state 
statutes specifically begin with federal taxable income although some states limit their adop-
tion of the federal Internal Revenue Code (IRC) to a specific date. States that do not au-
tomatically follow federal taxable income must annually update their statutory adoption of 
the IRC. Requiring annual legislative adoption provides the state legislatures in those states 
an opportunity to review federal changes before adopting them. A few states are prohibited 
from automatically following changes in the federal tax code because their judiciaries have 
ruled that such a delegation of legislative authority to the federal government is unconsti-
tutional. Some states’ tax bases, such as New York’s, do not tie directly to federal taxable 
income. New York uses a taxpayer’s entire net income as the beginning point for calculat-
ing state taxable income. As a consequence, foreign source income, which is often excluded 
in other states, is part of New York’s state tax base.1
While most states begin with federal taxable income as a starting point (either line 28 or 
line 30 from the IRS Form 1120), every state has certain additions or subtractions that must 
be made before arriving at state taxable income before allocation and apportionment. Typi-
cal additions include state, local, and foreign income taxes; interest from state obligations; 
federal net operating losses (NOLs); excess depreciation; and federal NOL, capital loss, and 
charitable contribution carryovers. Typical subtractions include dividends, interest on U.S. 
obligations, state income tax refunds, wages upon which the federal jobs credit was taken, 
subpart F income, and the federal income tax.
1 See Reuters, Ltd. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 623 N.E.2d 1145 (N.Y. Oct. 12, 1993), and Matter of Schlum-
berger Ltd., No. 811620 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Apr. 13, 2000).
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Additions
Some of the more common additions to federal taxable income are discussed in the follow-
ing sections.
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance 
Reauthorization and Job Creation Act of 2010
The Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization and Job Creation Act of 2010 
(2010 Tax Relief Act) boosted bonus depreciation from 50 percent to 100 percent for 
qualified purchases made after September 8, 2010. Many states have decoupled from federal 
bonus depreciation in the past, and that tradition has been upheld with the most recent 
legislation. The District of Columbia along with the following states decoupled from 100 
percent bonus depreciation: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Iowa, Idaho, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
Some states, such as Texas and Indiana, conform to the IRC on a certain date. Whether 
these states will adopt the bonus depreciation when they update their conformity date is 
difficult to predict. In fact, it is easier to identify the states that have conformed to federal 
depreciation: Alaska, Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, 
Montana, North Dakota, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Utah, and 
West Virginia.
Many of the same states that decouple from bonus depreciation have also decoupled from 
immediate expensing under IRC § 179. There are enough exceptions, however, so that one 
cannot assume that if a state refuses to adopt one it will also reject the other. The District 
of Columbia along with the following states have decoupled from IRC § 179 of the Tax 
Relief Act of 2010: Arkansas, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Maryland, Maine, Minnesota, North Carolina, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, and Wisconsin. States that conform to the Tax Relief Act 
of 2010 IRC § 179 provisions include Alaska, Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Mississippi, 
Montana, North Dakota, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia.
Given the current fiscal crisis that many states face, it would not be surprising if some state 
legislatures that currently conform to the federal tax base decouple during the year. In any 
event, as the following text illustrates, the inconsistency of state decoupling has been a head-
ache for tax practitioners and tax software companies alike. For example, while Alabama (as 
yet) has not decoupled from the 2010 Tax Relief Act, it did decouple from the Economic 
Stimulus Act (ESA) of 2008. It is always best to periodically double check the current status 
of state conformity with bonus depreciation and immediate expensing.
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American Recovery and Reinvestment and 
Worker, Homeownership, and Business 
Assistance Acts of 2009
On February 17, 2009, President Barack Obama signed into law the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009. The ARRA was followed on November 6, 2009, 
with the Worker, Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of 2009 (WHBAA). Al-
though these acts, particularly the ARRA, provided significant financial aid to the states, 
several of the tax provisions undermined the tax base of those states that piggyback off fed-
eral taxable income. The most important of these provisions included the
A.  Extension of the first year 50 percent bonus depreciation provision of the ESA.
B.  Extension of the ESA § 179 increase to $250,000 and the phase-out cap to $800,000.
C.  Extension of the NOL carryback for businesses.
Provisions with a smaller but still negative impact on state tax bases included the tem-
porary reduction of the S corporation built-in-gain recognition period to seven years, the 
election to defer the recognition of cancellation of indebtedness income per IRC § 108(i), 
and the changes to the IRC § 382 loss limitations. Thirty-three states and the District of Co-
lumbia decoupled from the federal taxable income calculation, in full or in part, with respect 
to the ESA and, later, the ARRA bonus depreciation provisions. Those states with rolling 
conformity to the IRC may continue to conform to ARRA. However, states with fixed or 
static conformity dates must update their conformity to be consistent with the federal bonus 
depreciation changes. States that have decoupled from the 50 percent bonus depreciation, 
the IRC § 179 immediate expensing provisions, or both, include Alabama, Arkansas, Ari-
zona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, North Carolina, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Vermont, Wisconsin, and West Virginia.
It should be noted that depreciation adjustments can also affect states that otherwise do 
not piggyback off federal taxable income. For example, Texas only incorporates the IRC 
through January 1, 2007. That means that Texas does not incorporate the federal changes 
that boosted IRC § 179 to $250,000 or the federal bonus depreciation for property placed in 
service in 2008 and 2009, which means that the limit for IRC § 179 for Texas is $112,000 
for 2008 and $115,000 for 2009.
Texas also does not follow the federal amendment that extended the suspension of the 
percentage depletion limitation for oil and gas produced from marginal properties, nor does 
it include the extension for the 15-year recovery period for qualified leasehold improve-
ments and restaurant property.
As a consequence, these differences may affect your Texas return if your company takes 
the cost of goods sold deduction for the Texas Margin Tax (TMT) instead of the compensa-
tion or 30 percent deduction.
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 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004
There were at least two provisions in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 that prompted 
states to decouple from federal taxable income. The first (§ 965) is a temporary 85 percent 
deduction for dividends received from a controlled foreign corporation (CFC). Although 
it is expected that this provision will increase tax receipts by stimulating the repatriation 
of deferred foreign earnings, some state legislators immediately called for decoupling from 
the federal 85 percent deduction and instead taxing the repatriated dividends in full. The 
District of Columbia and the following states did not conform to the federal temporary 
dividends received deduction: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, 
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
and Wisconsin.
The second of the act’s provisions (§ 199), replacing the extra-territorial income (ETI) 
exclusion with a deduction for qualified production activity income (QPAI), prompted one 
state, Massachusetts, to decouple almost immediately. One of the act’s initial purposes was 
to repeal the ETI exclusion found illegal by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
replace it with something that would pass WTO muster. The act replaced the ETI with a 
phased-in deduction against net income for “domestic production activities.” The deduc-
tion began at 3 percent and increased to 9 percent (not to exceed taxable income) by 2009. 
Although the detail of how the provision works is not important for this discussion, the 
impact of the deduction on state revenues when fully in place was estimated to be as high 
as $1.3 billion. Massachusetts calculated that the deduction for QPAI would have cost the 
state $42 million. As a consequence, Massachusetts passed legislation decoupling from the 
federal production activity deduction for tax years beginning on or after January 1, 2005.2 
Other states that have decoupled from the § 199 deduction include Arkansas, California, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and 
West Virginia.
Depreciation, Depletion, and Amortization
The federal Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 (JCWAA) provided an ad-
ditional 30 percent first-year depreciation deduction for qualifying property purchased af-
ter September 10, 2001. The federal Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 
2003 (JGTRRA) increased the 30 percent allowance to 50 percent for qualifying property 
purchased after May 5, 2003. Only a dozen states have incorporated both changes to their 
statutes: Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, New Mexico, 
North Dakota, Oregon, Utah, and West Virginia.
Other states have adopted the federal accelerated depreciation methods only in part. For 
example, Florida adopted the JCWAA but not the JGTRRA, and Tennessee decoupled 
from the JCWAA but not the JGTRRA. Other states require that various percentages of the 
2 See L. 2004, c. 466 (H 5156).
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additional depreciation be added back. Nebraska requires an 85 percent add-back prorated 
over five years beginning in 2005. Arizona, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania all require add-backs at various percentages 
and prorations.
As states face increasing budget constraints, more and more of them are decoupling from 
the federal bonus depreciation rules. One unhappy consequence for the corporate taxpayer 
is increased complexity with properties having a different tax basis not only for calculating 
federal and state depreciation, but also for computing gains and losses when those properties 
are sold or otherwise disposed.
Related Party Royalty and Interest Payments
In an effort to combat the use of intellectual holding companies or passive investment com-
panies such as in the Geoffrey cases3 or in Lanco, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 879 A.2d 
1234 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005), many states have passed legislation disallowing a 
deduction for royalties or interest paid to a “related party.” Because the states acknowledge 
that many valid circumstances may exist in which such deductions are appropriate, the rules 
with respect to these add-backs are often confusing and vary from state-to-state. There is 
no substitute for checking each state’s specific rules and exceptions. That said, the District 
of Columbia and the following states have passed such add-back legislation: Alabama, Ar-
kansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missis-
sippi, New York, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
and Virginia.
The Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) has adopted a model statute addressing related 
party add-backs for intangible expenses and interest paid to a related member. The statute’s 
language echoes the language used in several of the states that have already enacted add-back 
legislation.
Intangible expenses include expenses, losses, or costs related to the acquisition, use, main-
tenance, or management of intangible property. Intangible property is defined to include 
trade names, patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets. A related member or entity 
includes component members defined in IRC § 1563(e), a 50 percent or more stockholder, 
or a corporation or affiliate that is owned 50 percent or more by the taxpayer.
The intangible and interest expenses will not have to be added back if the related party’s 
income is taxable in another jurisdiction at a rate within a certain percentage of the tax-
payer’s state rate. Other exceptions exist as well. In any case, it is clear that the model statute 
is aimed at intangible holding companies such as were found in the Geoffrey cases. (See ap-
pendix 1 at the end of this chapter for a complete copy of the MTC proposal.) Some states 
also require add-backs for management fees or rent expense, and some states have enacted 
enhanced penalties for those taxpayers failing to add back the required expenses. Finally, 
some states have provided a “subject to” exception to their add-back provisions that allows 
3 Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm’n, 437 S.E.2d 13, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 550 (1993); see Geoffrey, 
Inc. v. Tax Comm’n, 132 P.3d 632 (Okla. Ct. Civ. App. 2006); and Louisiana v. Geoffrey, Inc., No. 2007 CA 
1063 (La. Cir. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2008).
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 the expense so long as the related party is “subject to” tax in its own state on the income 
it receives. For an example and discussion of the “subject to” provision, see Beneficial New 
Jersey, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, No. 009886-2007 (N.J. Tax Ct. Aug. 31, 2010).
It will come as no surprise that the MTC’s proposed model legislation and the add-back 
legislation already passed by many states has met with serious criticism. Many commentators 
firmly believe the statutes to be unconstitutional. Unfortunately for those commentators 
and taxpayers, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals recently rejected a corporation’s attempt 
to argue that the state’s add-back statute was unconstitutional. In addition to rejecting the 
company’s constitutional pleas, the court rebuffed the taxpayer’s argument that it met the 
two exceptions provided in the statute for add-backs, specifically, that the income was tax-
able in another state and the state adjustment was “unreasonable.”4 The Alabama Supreme 
Court affirmed the appeals court decision on September 19, 2008, stating that “in light of 
that thoughtful opinion, we see no need to explicate further.”5 A petition for certiorari was 
filed with the U.S. Supreme Court on January 21, 2009, but the Court declined to review 
the decision on April 27, 2009. These cases, however, are just the first salvo in what will be 
a protracted battle for some time. Several other cases are working their way up in the courts 
on this same issue.
State and Municipal Interest Income
Many states require that federal taxable income be increased by the amount of state and 
municipal interest income that had been excluded on the federal return. At the same time, 
if there were expenses related to this income that had been disallowed for federal purposes, 
those expenses can be offset against the add-back of interest income. Be sure that you do 
not add back interest income in those states that exempt that income received on their own 
or from their political subdivisions or obligations.
A couple from Kentucky recently challenged the constitutionality of the state’s distin-
guishing between in-state and out-of-state interest income. Kentucky is one of 41 states that 
exempts from taxation interest income derived from bonds issued by the state or its subdivi-
sions, while taxing the interest income from other states’ obligations. The lower courts in 
Kentucky agreed with the taxpayers, holding that Kentucky’s taxation of other states’ bond 
interest was unconstitutional on its face because it violated the commerce clause by affording 
more favorable taxation treatment to in-state bonds than it did to out-of-state bonds. The 
U.S. Supreme Court rejected this argument in a splintered 7 to 2 decision, holding that the 
issuance of state municipal bonds was a government function not susceptible to commerce 
clause analysis. The opinion generated seven different opinions, but nevertheless held that 
Kentucky’s position had been supported in amicus brief by the other 49 states (even states 
with no income tax). The Court found that Kentucky was motivated by legitimate political 
objectives apart from economic protectionism banned by the commerce clause and that the 
state’s participation in the municipal bond market did not favor Kentucky taxpayers over 
4 See Surtees v. VFJ Ventures, Inc., No. 2060478 (Ala. Civ. App. Feb. 8, 2008).
5 VFJ Ventures, Inc. v. Surtees, No. 1070718 (Ala. Sept. 19, 2008).
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other taxpayers, but simply aided the state government in making its bonds more 
marketable.6
State Income Taxes
Just as the federal government does not allow a deduction for its own income tax, neither 
do most states allow deductions for their own income taxes. Thus, any state income taxes 
deducted on the federal return must usually be added back to arrive at state taxable income. 
Curiously enough, a few states, such as Alabama and Missouri, do allow a deduction for 
federal income taxes for financial institutions.7
Care must be taken in considering just which types of state income taxes must be added 
back. For example, some states limit their add-back to state taxes based on or measured by 
net income. As a consequence, those states tax deductions involving a franchise tax on capi-
tal may not have to be added back to federal taxable income. Franchise taxes are usually a 
tax on a company’s book value measured either by capital stock or net worth. Other states 
with a franchise tax element include New York and Pennsylvania.
Other state taxes that are not based on or measured by net income and, thus, may not 
have to be added back are Washington’s business and occupation tax (B&O), the Michigan 
Business Tax (MBT), and Ohio’s commercial activity tax (CAT). There is some debate 
about whether the new TMT is an income tax or a gross receipts tax or both. The Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) concluded that the TMT was an income tax for pur-
poses of FASB Statement No. 109, Accounting Income for Taxes. Carole Keeton Strayhorn, 
the state comptroller at the time, claimed the TMT is an income tax, but the state legislature 
inserted section 21 into H.B. 3, insisting that the new margin tax “is not an income tax and 
P. L. 86-272 does not apply to the tax.”
The confusion arises because the taxpayer has one of three options in calculating the 
tax, specifically, the taxpayer can elect to subtract the larger of (1) cost of goods sold, (2) 
compensation, or (3) 30 percent of revenue. Depending upon which election is made, the 
tax looks more or less like an income tax. In short, the confusion arises because the tax is a 
modified gross receipts tax with some deductions allowed. As a consequence, several states, 
including California, Kansas, Missouri, South Carolina, and Wisconsin, have ruled that it 
is an income tax for purposes of deduction against state income taxes. Nevertheless, many 
believe that because the tax must be paid whether a company is profitable or not, it is not an 
income tax. On July 29, 2011, a partner in the Allcat Claims Services, L.P. filed a petition 
with the Texas Supreme Court seeking a declaratory judgment on the question so perhaps 
we will find out. 
The Federal NOL
State treatment of federal NOLs falls into one of three categories. A few states simply follow 
the federal treatment allowing the federal NOL in full. Most states, however, provide for 
a separate state NOL calculation that is often computed in the same manner as the federal. 
6 Kentucky Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 127 S. Ct. 2451 (2008).
7 See also Kinney Shoe Corp. v. State, 552 N.W.2d 788 (N.D. 1996).
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 States using the first approach often start with line 30 of IRS Form 1120. States using the 
second approach usually begin with line 28 of the Form 1120. Finally, some states use a 
hybrid of the first two approaches, tying the state NOL to the existence of a federal NOL. 
Whether there is an add-back for the federal NOL is determined, in part, by whether the 
starting point is line 28 or line 30 of the Form 1120.
State variations with respect to NOLs include the years allowed for carrybacks (if any) 
and carryforwards, ceiling caps, and complications arising from consolidated versus separate 
filing and mergers and acquisitions.
The IRC allows for the carryover of net operating losses incurred in one year to another 
year. Specifically, IRC § 172 provides for a carryback of two years and a carryforward of 
20 years. The JCWAA extended the carryback for 2001 and 2002 NOLs to five years. 
Many states have already limited their carryback and carryforward provisions, and almost 
half the states have eliminated their carryback entirely. New York does not allow carry-
backs (beyond $10,000), and Pennsylvania has created its own NOL calculation completely 
independent of the federal rules. States that have eliminated their NOL carrybacks include 
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin.
The WHBAA modified the expanded NOL carryback provisions provided for by the 
ARRA. The ARRA extended the maximum NOL carryback period from two years to 
three, four, or five years for 2008 NOLs for small businesses with gross receipts of $15 mil-
lion or less. The WHBAA extends this benefit to most taxpayers and extends it to 2009 
NOLs. However, the amount of the NOL that can be carried back to the fifth tax year may 
not offset more than 50 percent of the taxpayer’s taxable income for that fifth preceding tax 
year.
Almost all the states have thus far decoupled from the federal extended three-, four-, or 
five-year carryback periods. Alaska, New York, Oklahoma, and West Virginia may be the 
only states conforming to the WHBAA’s extended carryback periods. 
States may limit a company’s carryback and carryforward not only in number of years, but 
also in the amount that may be claimed in any given year. For example, Pennsylvania caps 
net losses at $3 million, and Utah caps its carryback at $1 million.
When a company in a separate filing state is filing a federal consolidated return, taxpayers 
generally must prepare a pro forma separate return “as if” the company had filed separate, 
rather than consolidated, federal returns. As a consequence, the allowable federal NOL is 
that which would have been allowed if the members of the consolidated return had each 
filed separate returns.
Generally, a company must have been subject to a state’s tax in the year an NOL was 
incurred in order to avail itself of the state’s NOL carryover provisions. Thus, there exist 
complications for companies with NOLs that expand into other states or acquire or merge 
with other multistate companies. For example, Rocky Mountain High (RMH) has been 
doing business in Colorado for the past three years. In 2004, the company suffered a loss of 
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$12 million, which it elected to carry forward. In 2005, RMH expands its operations into 
Georgia. Georgia will not allow RMH to carry forward any of its 2004 loss against Georgia 
taxable income.
The consequences to RMH in the previous example may or may not differ when RMH 
is merged into another company. The deciding factor in some states is whether the surviving 
company from the merger generated the initial losses and was previously doing business in 
that state. For example, the Tennessee Court of Appeals has held that the surviving corpora-
tion in a merger may not use the losses generated by the company that was dissolved.8 For 
a similar decision in New Jersey see Richard’s Auto City, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 
636 A.2d 572 (N.J. App. Div. 1994), and more recently in Massachusetts, Macy’s East, Inc. 
v. Commissioner of Revenue, No. F251009 (Mass. App. Tax Bd. Nov. 5, 2002), cert. denied, 
No. 04-252 (U.S. Nov. 1, 2004). Given the complexity of these issues, they are beyond 
the scope of this guide. Box 2-1 provides an overview of addition modifications discussed 
in this chapter.
Box 2-1: Overview of Addition Modifications
Typical Addition Modifications
• Federal net operating loss
• Tax-exempt interest income
• Exempt income for federal purposes
• State income taxes
• Federal depreciation
• Gains or losses due to different tax bases
Net Operating Loss
• Calculation differences
 — Carrybacks and carryforwards
• Pre- or post-apportionment
• Impact of filing status
 — Separate
 — Consolidated
 — Mergers and acquisitions
Tax-Exempt Interest Income
• Intergovernmental immunity doctrine
 — Franchise taxes versus income taxes
• State or municipal bond interest income
 —  Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008), rev’g, 
Davis v. Kentucky Department of Revenue, 197 S.W.3d 557 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006), 
rev. denied, No. 2006-SC-105-D (Ky. Aug. 17, 2006)
8 See Little Six Corp. v. Tennessee Dep’t of Revenue, No. 01-A-01-9806-CH-00285 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 
28, 1999).
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State Income Taxes
• Michigan Business Tax (MBT)
• Ohio’s commercial activity tax (CAT)
• Texas Margin Tax (TMT)
 — Is the TMT an income tax?
• Washington’s business and occupation tax (B&O)
• Other franchise taxes
Federal Depreciation
• Worker, Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of 2009
• American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
• Economic Stimulus Act of 2008
 — Bonus depreciation
 — IRC Section 179
• American Jobs Creation Act of 2004
 — IRC Section 199
 — IRC Section 965
• Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003
• Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002
• MACRS
Related Party Addbacks
• Royalties and other intangibles
• Interest
Subtractions
Some of the more common subtractions from federal taxable income are discussed in the 
following sections.
Deduction for Federal Income Tax Paid
Only three states—Alabama, Iowa, and Missouri—report allowing a deduction for federal 
income taxes paid.9
Deduction for State Income Taxes Paid
Most states require that deductions for other state income taxes be added back (see previous 
discussion). However, several states, while requiring an add-back of their own corporate tax 
paid, will allow the deduction for other state taxes to stand. States denying a subtraction for 
their own income tax but allowing the deduction for other state income taxes include Ar-
kansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Ten-
nessee, and West Virginia. Allowable deductions may be limited to state tax “based upon 
9 Healy, John C. and Michael S. Schadewalk, eds., 2011 Multistate Corporate Tax Guide (New York: 
Commerce Clearing House).
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or measured by net income.” As a consequence, deductions for capital, net worth, or other 
franchise taxes may be disallowed if they are measured by “net income.” 
State taxes that are generally deductible include the Michigan Single Business Tax, the 
gross receipts part of the MBT, the Kentucky Limited Liability Entity Tax, the New Hamp-
shire Business Profits Tax, the Ohio CAT, the Pennsylvania Capital Stock Tax, the TMT, 
and the Washington B&O tax.
Expenses Related to Nontaxable State and 
Municipal Interest Income
(See addition modifications.)
Interest Income Earned on Federal or  
U.S. Obligations
Just as the federal government does not tax state or municipal bond interest, states do not tax 
interest earned on federal obligations. Often referred to as the intergovernmental immunity 
doctrine, the doctrine prohibits states from imposing a direct tax on net income from federal 
obligations. (The doctrine was first articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in McCulloch v. 
Maryland [1819]. Contemporary application of the doctrine is codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3124.) 
However, the doctrine does not prohibit an indirect tax levied on federal obligations. Thus, 
states such as California and New York that have a franchise tax measured by net income 
can generally tax interest income on U.S. obligations. Federal interest income, then, is a 
subtraction for those states that impose a direct tax on net income, but not for those states 
levying a franchise tax measured by net income.
Not all interest income earned on federal or U.S. obligations is considered exempt under 
the intergovernmental immunity doctrine. Income that is issued by quasipublic entities such 
as Ginnie Mae (Government National Mortgage Association), Sallie Mae (Student Loan 
Marketing Association), or Fannie Mae (Federal National Mortgage Association) can be 
taxed by states. Although the federal government guarantees the debt issued by these institu-
tions, it is not debt issued directly by the federal government. Because the debt obligation 
by the federal government is secondary and contingent, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that 
states were not prohibited from taxing the interest from that debt.10
Other entities whose interest income is often taxable and thus not a subtraction from fed-
eral taxable income include the Federal Home Loan Board, the Federal Savings and Loan 
Insurance Corporation, the Federal Land Bank, the World Bank, and the Federal Farm 
Credit Bank. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that states can tax income from 
repurchase agreements (repos), and the New York Supreme Court ruled taxable interest 
income from specific loan pool certificates backed by the Small Business Administration.11
10 See Rockford Life Ins. v. Illinois, 482 U.S. 182 (1987).
11 See Nebraska v. Lowenstein, 513 U.S. 123 (1994), and Sumitomo Trust and Banking Co. v. Comm’r, 720 
N.Y.S.2d (2001).
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 Refunds of State Income Taxes
If a state does not allow a deduction for state income taxes, it generally will not pick up as 
income any refunds of state income taxes, to the extent they are included in federal taxable 
income.
Deductions Disallowed by Federal Credits
Corporations may be entitled to a variety of federal credits on their returns for which there 
are no related state credits. When claiming the federal credit the corporation is often re-
quired to reduce the expense deduction related to the credit. For example, the research ac-
tivities credit allowed under IRC § 41 provides a 20 percent tax credit against federal taxes. 
However, a taxpayer (depending upon the election chosen by the taxpayer) must reduce its 
expense deduction by the credit used. The expense disallowed because of the federal credit 
taken is a subtraction modification to arrive at state taxable income.
Most states also offer subtractions for IRC § 78 gross-ups and subpart F income. Some-
times viewed as credit subtractions or dividend subtractions, both are modifications due to 
foreign income. When a corporation is allowed a deemed paid foreign tax credit for foreign 
taxes paid by a foreign subsidiary, its federal taxable income is increased to the extent of the 
deemed paid credit. This federal inclusion is called a “Section 78 gross-up.” Because states 
generally do not allow for such a credit, most of them provide for a subtraction modification 
to back out the included income.
States also generally allow a subtraction for any “subpart F” income. subpart F income 
arises because of federal requirements that a U.S. shareholder in a CFC include in its do-
mestic income certain deemed pro rata shares of the CFC’s income and earnings (IRC 
§§ 951–64).
Dividends Received Deduction
The purpose of the federal dividends received deduction (DRD) is to mitigate multiple 
taxation of corporate income. Problems arise in state taxation because the corporations pay-
ing the dividends, receiving the dividends, or both may not be subject to the state’s income 
tax. State modification will also depend upon the state’s starting point for federal taxable 
income. If the starting point is line 28 of Form 1120 (federal taxable income before NOLs 
and DRD), the state may allow a partial or total subtraction for any DRDs depending upon 
the state filing method (separate, consolidated, or combined). For those states starting with 
line 30 (federal taxable income after NOLs and DRD), no subtraction may be necessary. 
Nevertheless, some adjustments may have to be made due to the different federal treatment 
of domestic and foreign dividends.12
In Kraft General Foods, Inc. v. Iowa, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Iowa’s taxation 
of dividends violated the foreign commerce clause. Iowa used federal taxable income as 
its starting point but provided no modifications for DRD. As a consequence, corpora-
tions were entitled to deduct domestic dividends to the same extent for Iowa as they did 
12 See Kraft General Foods, Inc. v. Iowa, 505 U.S. 71 (1992).
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on their federal return. But, because there is no federal DRD for foreign dividends, the 
Court found that Iowa discriminated against foreign dividends over domestic dividends. It 
was “indisputable” the Court stated, that foreign dividends were treated less favorably than 
domestic dividends, making the Iowa statute an unconstitutional encroachment on the fed-
eral government’s regulation of foreign commerce. Iowa tried to justify its approach based 
on administrative convenience, but the Court held that Iowa could have retained its tie to 
federal taxable income with very little modification.
Many states have amended their statutes since Kraft, but the problem still arises in those 
states with combined reporting that claim that the combined reporting method exempts 
them from the Kraft controversy.
Because dividends are paid out of a company’s earnings and profits, it is important to ver-
ify that the dividend distributions were properly sourced given the taxpayer’s filing method, 
that is, separate, consolidated, or combined. (See chapter 3 for a discussion of filing meth-
ods.) For most states, earnings and profits are calculated on a separate company basis. As a 
consequence, a company that is apportioned income on a unitary basis may have a loss for 
earnings and profits on a separate company basis, a circumstance that may affect the inter-
company elimination of dividends on a unitary basis. The following is an example drawn 
from the California audit manual:
Corporation P and unitary subsidiary S filed a combined report for the year in which S 
was formed. S’s net income computed on a separate basis was $10,000; its apportioned 
share of the unitary business income was $50,000. S paid income taxes of $4,000. S dis-
tributed $9,000 to its parent during the taxable year. Although S’s net income exceeded 
the amount of the distribution, S’s earnings and profits were only $6,000 ($10,000 in-
come − $4,000 taxes). Therefore, only $6,000 of the distribution is considered a dividend 
subject to elimination. 
The additions and subtractions in the California example are far from complete. States 
vary significantly in their modifications to federal taxable income, and a corporation must 
examine the available modifications not only in light of that state’s specific statutes but also 
with respect to the filing method (separate, consolidated, or combined) chosen for each 
state’s specific adjustments.
California’s treatment of the DRD has been particularly notorious. Briefly put, Califor-
nia had traditionally allowed a DRD for dividends that were paid out of income subject to 
California tax. If the dividends were received from a company that did not conduct business 
in California and accordingly did not pay tax in California, no DRD was allowed. (The 
actual calculation involved deriving a percentage based on a ratio of apportioned income 
over the corporation’s earnings and profits.) The California Court of Appeals held in 2003 
that California’s position violated the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution because it 
discriminated against corporations that did not do business in California.13
The appeals court in Farmer Brothers Co. v. Franchise Tax Board, 108 Cal. App. 4th 976 
(2003), did not suggest possible remedies for California’s unconstitutional DRD. The U.S. 
13 See Farmer Bros. Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 108 Cal. App. 4th 976 (2003), rev. denied (Aug 27, 2003), cert. 
denied, (U.S. S. Ct. Feb. 23, 2004).
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 Supreme Court has provided that at least three possible remedies exist in this position: (1) 
a state could refund the taxes imposed on the discriminated victims; (2) the state could ret-
roactively impose a tax on the beneficiaries of the decision to put them on an equal footing 
with the victims; or (3) the state could enforce some combination of the preceding two 
approaches.14
The franchise tax board (FTB) decided to deny the DRD to all taxpayers, a position that 
(surprise, surprise!) was most beneficial financially for the state of California. The FTB took 
its position, in part, on the grounds that if any part of the law was unconstitutional, it all had 
to go. Arguably, the FTB’s decision was not consistent with the state legislature’s intent, 
which was that if any portion of the state’s corporation income tax is declared unconsti-
tutional, the remainder should be severed and remain in effect. Nevertheless, the FTB’s 
position was recently upheld in Abbott Laboratories v. Franchise Tax Board, 175 Cal. App. 4th 
1346 (Calif. 2009).
Although the battle may not be over, recent decisions continue to go against taxpayers. 
See, for example, River Garden Retirement Home v. Franchise Tax Board, 186 Cal. App. 4th 
922 (2010), in which the taxpayer not only lost its dividends received deduction, but was 
subject to additional penalties for failing to take advantage of California’s earlier amnesty 
program. Nevertheless, it seems likely that other cases will come along and more appeals are 
in the wings. As a consequence, taxpayers may be wise to preserve their rights by filing pro-
tective refund claims for the taxes paid on dividend income. Box 2-2 provides an overview 
of the subtraction modifications discussed in this chapter.
Box 2-2: Overview of Subtraction Modifications
Typical Subtraction Modifications
• State net operating loss 
• Interest on U.S. obligations
• Dividends received deduction
• Gains or losses due to different tax bases
• Federal income taxes
• State refund if included in federal return
• Federal credits
Tax-Exempt Interest
• Intergovernmental immunity doctrine
 — Federal and U.S. obligations
  o Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae)
  o Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae)
  o Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)
14 See Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996), and McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages and 
Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990).
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 — Farmer Bros. Co. v. Franchise Tax Board, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 390 (2003)
• Foreign dividends
 — Kraft General Foods, Inc. v. Iowa, 505 U.S. 71 (1992)
• Earnings and profits
 — Calculated on a combined, consolidated, or separate basis
• Nexus
Federal Credits
• IRC Section 41 research credit
• IRC Section 78 gross ups
• Subpart F income
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 Appendix 1: Multistate Tax  
Commission Model Statute
Multistate Tax Commission 
Model Statute Requiring the Add-back of 
Certain Intangible and Interest Expenses
As Adopted by the Full Commission, August 17, 2006 
Section 1.
(a) As used in this section, the following words shall, unless the context requires otherwise, 
have the following meanings: 
(i) “Aggregate effective rate of tax” means the sum of the effective rates of tax 
imposed by a state or U.S. possession or any combination thereof on a related member. 
(ii) "Code" means the federal Internal Revenue Code as amended and in effect for the 
taxable year. 
(iii) “Effective rate of tax” means, as to any state or U.S possession, the maximum 
statutory rate of tax imposed by the state or possession on a related member’s net income 
multiplied by the apportionment percentage, if any, applicable to the related member under 
the laws of said jurisdiction. For purposes of this definition, the effective rate of tax as to any 
state or U.S. possession is zero where the related member’s net income tax liability in said 
jurisdiction is reported on a combined or consolidated return including both the taxpayer and 
the related member where the reported transactions between the taxpayer and the related 
member are eliminated or offset. Also, for purposes of this definition, when computing the 
effective rate of tax for a jurisdiction in which a related member’s net income is eliminated or 
offset by a credit or similar adjustment that is dependent upon the related member either 
maintaining or managing intangible property or collecting interest income in that jurisdiction, 
the maximum statutory rate of tax imposed by said jurisdiction shall be decreased to reflect 
the statutory rate of tax that applies to the related member as effectively reduced by such 
credit or similar adjustment. 
 (iv) “Intangible expense” includes (1) expenses, losses and costs for, related to, or in 
connection directly or indirectly with the direct or indirect acquisition, use, maintenance or 
management, ownership, sale, exchange, or any other disposition of intangible property to the 
extent such amounts are allowed as deductions or costs in determining taxable income before 
operating loss deductions and special deductions for the taxable year under the Code; (2) 
amounts directly or indirectly allowed as deductions under section 163 of the Code for 
purposes of determining taxable income under the Code to the extent such expenses and costs 
are directly or indirectly for, related to, or in connection with the expenses, losses and costs 
referenced in (1); (3) losses related to, or incurred in connection directly or indirectly with, 
factoring transactions or discounting transactions; (4) royalty, patent, technical and copyright 
fees; (5) licensing fees; and (6) other similar expenses and costs.    
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(v) "Intangible property" includes patents, patent applications, trade names, 
trademarks, service marks, copyrights, mask works, trade secrets and similar types of 
intangible assets.   
(vi) "Related entity" means (1) a stockholder who is an individual, or a member of the 
stockholder's family set forth in section 318 of the Code if the stockholder and the members 
of the stockholder's family own, directly, indirectly, beneficially or constructively, in the 
aggregate, at least 50 per cent of the value of the taxpayer's outstanding stock; (2) a 
stockholder, or a stockholder's partnership, limited liability company, estate, trust or 
corporation, if the stockholder and the stockholder's partnerships, limited liability companies, 
estates, trusts and corporations own directly, indirectly, beneficially or constructively, in the 
aggregate, at least 50 per cent of the value of the taxpayer's outstanding stock; or (3) a 
corporation, or a party related to the corporation in a manner that would require an attribution 
of stock from the corporation to the party or from the party to the corporation under the 
attribution rules of the Code if the taxpayer owns, directly, indirectly, beneficially or 
constructively, at least 50 per cent of the value of the corporation's outstanding stock. The 
attribution rules of the Code shall apply for purposes of determining whether the ownership 
requirements of this definition have been met.   
(vii) "Related member" means a person that, with respect to the taxpayer during all or 
any portion of the taxable year, is: (1) a related entity, (2) a component member as defined in 
subsection (b) of section 1563 of the Code; (3) a person to or from whom there is attribution 
of stock ownership in accordance with subsection (e) of section 1563 of the Code; or (4) a 
person that, notwithstanding its form of organization, bears the same relationship to the 
taxpayer as a person described in (1) to (3), inclusive. 
(viii) “Valid business purpose” means one or more business purposes, other than the 
avoidance or reduction of taxation, which alone or in combination constitute the primary 
motivation for a business activity or transaction, which activity or transaction changes in a 
meaningful way, apart from tax effects, the economic position of the taxpayer.  The economic 
position of the taxpayer includes an increase in the market share of the taxpayer or the entry 
by the taxpayer into new business markets.
(b) For purposes of computing its net income under this chapter, a taxpayer shall add back 
otherwise deductible intangible expense directly or indirectly paid, accrued or incurred in 
connection with one or more direct or indirect transactions with one or more related members.   
(c)  If the related member was subject to tax in this state or another state or possession of 
the United States or a foreign nation or some combination thereof on a tax base that included 
the intangible expense paid, accrued or incurred by the taxpayer, the taxpayer shall receive a 
credit against tax due in this state in an amount equal to the higher of the tax paid by the 
related member with respect to the portion of its income representing the intangible expense 
paid, accrued or incurred by the taxpayer, or the tax that would have been paid by the related 
member with respect to that portion of its income if (1) that portion of its income had not been 
offset by expenses or losses or (2) the tax liability had not been offset by a credit or credits. 
The credit so determined shall be multiplied by the apportionment factor of the taxpayer in 
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this state. However, in no case shall the credit exceed the taxpayer’s liability in this state 
attributable to the net income taxed as a result of the adjustment required by subsection (b). 
(d)   (i)The adjustment required in subsection (b) and the credit allowed in subsection (c) 
shall not apply to the portion of the intangible expense that the taxpayer establishes by clear 
and convincing evidence meets both of the following requirements: (A) the related member 
during the same taxable year directly or indirectly paid, accrued or incurred such portion to a 
person that is not a related member, and (B) the transaction giving rise to the intangible 
expense between the taxpayer and the related member was undertaken for a valid business 
purpose.
 (ii) The adjustment required in subsection (b) and the credit allowed in subsection (c) 
shall not apply if the taxpayer establishes by clear and convincing evidence of the type and in 
the form specified by the commissioner that (A) the related member was subject to tax on its 
net income in this state or another state or possession of the United States or some 
combination thereof; (B) the tax base for said tax included the intangible expense paid, 
accrued or incurred by the taxpayer; and (C) the aggregate effective rate of tax applied to the 
related member is no less than [X%] [the statutory rate of tax applied to the taxpayer under 
this chapter minus Y percentage points].   
 (iii) The adjustment required in subsection (b) and the credit allowed in subsection (c) 
shall not apply if the taxpayer establishes by clear and convincing evidence of the type and in 
the form specified by the commissioner that (A) the intangible expense was paid, accrued or 
incurred to a related member organized under the laws of a country other than the United 
States; (B) the related member’s income from the transaction was subject to a comprehensive 
income tax treaty between such country and the United States, (C) the related member’s 
income from the transaction was taxed in such country at a tax rate at least equal to that 
imposed by this state; and (D) the intangible expense was paid, accrued or incurred pursuant 
to a transaction that was undertaken for a valid business purpose and using terms that reflect 
an arm’s length relationship.   
(iv) The adjustment required in subsection (b) and the credit allowed in subsection (c) 
shall not apply if the corporation and the commissioner agree in writing to the application or 
use of alternative adjustments or computations.  The commissioner may, in his/her discretion, 
agree to the application or use of alternative adjustments or computations when he/she 
concludes that in the absence of such agreement the income of the taxpayer would not be 
properly reflected.
(e) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit or negate the commissioner's 
authority to otherwise enter into agreements and compromises otherwise allowed by law.   
(f) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or negate the commissioner's authority to 
make adjustments under section __ [i.e., the state’s transfer pricing authority, if any].
Section 2.
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 (a) As used in this section, the following words shall, unless the context requires otherwise, 
have the following meanings:-  
(i) “Aggregate effective rate of tax” means the sum of the effective rates of tax 
imposed by a state or U.S. possession or any combination thereof on a related member. 
(ii) "Code" means the federal Internal Revenue Code as amended and in effect for the 
taxable year. 
(iii) “Effective rate of tax” means, as to any state or U.S possession, the maximum 
statutory rate of tax imposed by the state or possession on a related member’s net income 
multiplied by the apportionment percentage, if any, applicable to the related member under 
the laws of said jurisdiction. For purposes of this definition, the effective rate of tax as to any 
state or U.S. possession is zero where the related member’s net income tax liability in said 
jurisdiction is reported on a combined or consolidated return including both the taxpayer and 
the related member where the reported transactions between the taxpayer and the related 
member are eliminated or offset. Also, for purposes of this definition, when computing the 
effective rate of tax for a jurisdiction in which a related member’s net income is eliminated or 
offset by a credit or similar adjustment that is dependent upon the related member either 
maintaining or managing intangible property or collecting interest income in that jurisdiction, 
the maximum statutory rate of tax imposed by said jurisdiction shall be decreased to reflect 
the statutory rate of tax that applies to the related member as effectively reduced by such 
credit or similar adjustment. 
(iv) "Interest expense" means amounts directly or indirectly allowed as deductions 
under section 163 of the Code for purposes of determining taxable income under the Code.   
(v) "Related entity" means (1) a stockholder who is an individual, or a member of the 
stockholder's family set forth in section 318 of the Code if the stockholder and the members 
of the stockholder's family own, directly, indirectly, beneficially or constructively, in the 
aggregate, at least 50 per cent of the value of the taxpayer's outstanding stock; (2) a 
stockholder, or a stockholder's partnership, limited liability company, estate, trust or 
corporation, if the stockholder and the stockholder's partnerships, limited liability companies, 
estates, trusts and corporations own directly, indirectly, beneficially or constructively, in the 
aggregate, at least 50 per cent of the value of the taxpayer's outstanding stock; or (3) a 
corporation, or a party related to the corporation in a manner that would require an attribution 
of stock from the corporation to the party or from the party to the corporation under the 
attribution rules of the Code if the taxpayer owns, directly, indirectly, beneficially or 
constructively, at least 50 per cent of the value of the corporation's outstanding stock. The 
attribution rules of the Code shall apply for purposes of determining whether the ownership 
requirements of this definition have been met.   
(vi) "Related member" means a person that, with respect to the taxpayer during all or 
any portion of the taxable year, is: (1) a related entity, (2) a component member as defined in 
subsection (b) of section 1563 of the Code; (3) a person to or from whom there is attribution 
of stock ownership in accordance with subsection (e) of section 1563 of the Code; or (4) a 
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 person that, notwithstanding its form of organization, bears the same relationship to the 
taxpayer as a person described in (1) to (3), inclusive. 
(vii) “Valid business purpose” means one or more business purposes, other than the 
avoidance or reduction of taxation, which alone or in combination constitute the primary 
motivation for a business activity or transaction, which activity or transaction changes in a 
meaningful way, apart from tax effects, the economic position of the taxpayer.  The economic 
position of the taxpayer includes an increase in the market share of the taxpayer or the entry 
by the taxpayer into new business markets. 
(b) For purposes of computing its net income under this chapter, a taxpayer shall add back 
otherwise deductible interest paid, accrued or incurred to a related member during the taxable 
year.
(c)  If the related member was subject to tax in this state or another state or possession of 
the United States or a foreign nation or some combination thereof on a tax base that included 
the interest expense paid, accrued or incurred by the taxpayer, the taxpayer shall receive a 
credit against tax due in this state equal to the higher of the tax paid by the related member 
with respect to the portion of its income representing the interest expense paid, accrued or 
incurred by the taxpayer, or the tax that would have been paid by the related member with 
respect to that portion of its income if (1) that portion of its income had not been offset by 
expenses or losses or (2) the tax liability had not been offset by a credit or credits. The credit 
so determined shall be multiplied by the apportionment factor of the taxpayer in this state. 
However, in no case shall the credit exceed the taxpayer’s liability in this state attributable to 
the net income taxed as a result of the adjustment required by subsection (b) 
(d)  (i) The adjustment required in subsection (b) and the credit allowed in subsection (c) 
shall not apply if the taxpayer establishes by clear and convincing evidence, of the type and in 
the form determined by the commissioner, that (A) the transaction giving rise to interest 
expense between the taxpayer and the related member was undertaken for a valid business 
purpose, and (B) the interest expense was paid, accrued or incurred using terms that reflect an 
arm’s length relationship.   
(ii) The adjustment required in subsection (b) and the credit allowed in subsection (c) 
shall not apply the if taxpayer establishes by clear and convincing evidence of the type and in 
the form specified by the commissioner that (A) the related member was subject to tax on its 
net income in this state or another state or possession of the United States or some 
combination thereof; (B) the tax base for said tax included the interest expense paid, accrued 
or incurred by the taxpayer; and (C) the aggregate effective rate of tax applied to the related 
member is no less than [_X_%] [the statutory rate of tax applied to the taxpayer under this 
chapter minus _Y_ percentage points].  
(iii) The adjustment required in subsection (b) and the credit allowed in subsection (c) 
shall not apply if the taxpayer establishes by clear and convincing evidence of the type and in 
the form specified by the commissioner that (A) the interest expense is paid, accrued or 
incurred to a related member organized under the laws of a country other than the United 
States; (B) the related member’s income from the transaction is subject to a comprehensive 
income tax treaty between such country and the United States; (C) the related member’s 
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income from the transaction is taxed in such country at a tax rate at least equal to that imposed 
by this state; and (D) the interest expense was paid, accrued or incurred pursuant to a 
transaction that was undertaken for a valid business purpose and using terms that reflect an 
arm’s length relationship.  
(iv) The adjustment required in subsection (b) and the credit allowed in subsection (c) 
shall not apply if the corporation and the commissioner agree in writing to the application or 
use of alternative adjustments or computations.  The commissioner may, in his/her discretion, 
agree to the application or use of alternative adjustments or computations when he/she 
concludes that in the absence of such agreement the income of the taxpayer would not be 
properly reflected.
(e) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit or negate the commissioner's 
authority to otherwise enter into agreements and compromises otherwise allowed by law. 
(f) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or negate the commissioner's authority to 
make adjustments under section ___ [i.e., the state’s transfer pricing authority, if any].
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Introduction
If a corporation is, by itself or as a member of an affiliated group, doing business in more 
than one state, the tax practitioner must not only grapple with questions of nexus, but also 
the methodology for determining the taxpayer’s tax base. In other words, for any specific 
state, we must determine if we are filing separate company returns, a consolidated return, or 
a “combined” or “unitary” return.
Separate, Consolidated, or Combined Filing
Separate filing means just that. Each company with nexus in the state must file its own 
separate return, regardless of whether it is part of an affiliated or consolidated group. A 
number of states that allow only separate filing, that is, each and every company with nexus 
must file a separate return. It is irrelevant whether the corporation is a standalone entity or 
a member of a controlled, affiliated, or consolidated group. Those states requiring separate 
filing include Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. In these 
states, consolidated or combined filing is generally not allowed. That said, there may be a 
trend toward combined reporting. Since 2006, seven states—Massachusetts, Michigan, New 
York, Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia—have adopted combined reporting.
New York is an example of the recent move of some states toward combined filing. New 
York has traditionally been a separate filing state, but it provided for combined reporting 
when three factors were present: (1) common ownership (80 percent), (2) a unitary business 
(the companies generally had to be in the same line of business, either vertical or horizontal 
integration), and (3) that the failure to file a combined report would lead to “distortion.” 
Distortion was presumed to exist where there were “substantial” (defined as 50 percent or 
more) “intercorporate transactions” (a company’s receipts or expenses). In short, separate 
filing was the default, but combined filing was a possibility if it more accurately represented 
71
Filing Methods for Multistate 
Taxpayers
03-Chapter 03.indd   71 10/6/11   2:09 PM
72
The Adviser’s Guide to Multistate Income Taxation: Compliance and Planning Opportunities
a taxpayer’s income. Not surprisingly, there was significant disagreement over what consti-
tuted “distortion.”
In 2007, New York, as part of its budget bill, changed the law making combination 
mandatory. “[R]elated corporations ... shall make a combined report covering any related 
corporations if there are substantial intercorporate transactions among the related corpora-
tions.” In June, the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance issued a Techni-
cal Services Bureau Memorandum, TSB-M-07(6)C, “Combined Reporting for General 
Business Corporations,” that provided a 10-step procedure for identifying the affiliates to 
be included in the combined report and detailing the tests for measuring “substantial inter-
corporate transactions.” Interestingly, and somewhat confusedly, the intercompany transac-
tions are now measured, not on a company by company basis, so much as among groups of 
companies. While the details are beyond the scope of this chapter, the important point is the 
dramatic change by a leading state in moving to mandatory combined reporting.
Separate filing has both advantages and disadvantages. The most obvious disadvantage is 
that a company is prohibited from offsetting profitable subsidiaries with subsidiaries with 
losses. However, separate filing states offer advantages when a multistate taxpayer can ar-
range its legal structure to isolate high-profit margin activities in low- or no-tax states and 
its low-profit margin activities in states with higher tax rates. For example, isolating a com-
pany’s sales and marketing functions from its manufacturing activities and conducting each 
in separate companies may allow shifting of income from high- to low-tax states.
The majority of states, while allowing separate filing, will also permit consolidated filing if 
certain requirements are met. To elect consolidated filing, most states require the same stock 
ownership requirements (80 percent) as that of the federal consolidated rules.1 In addition, 
a state may require that only the affiliated entities that have nexus with the state be part of 
the consolidated return, that is, a “nexus-consolidated” return. Consolidated filing may also 
be allowed or even required when separate filing does not fairly reflect a company’s income 
or economic activities. Connecticut, Indiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee, for example, are 
generally separate filing states, but they will permit or require consolidated or combined fil-
ing when necessary to properly reflect income.
Combined reporting requires the members of a “unitary” group to calculate their tax-
able income on a combined or “unitary” basis. The combined or “unitary” reporting states 
include Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North 
Dakota, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and West Virginia.
Author’s Note: Combined Report or “Unitary” Filing
•  The unitary or combined approach ignores legal entities and geographical 
boundaries and focuses on the economic unit. 
•  It may be worldwide but more likely is “water’s edge.”
1 See Internal Revenue Code §§ 1501–05 and accompanying regulations.
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A combined report ignores the legal structure of a corporation or affiliated group in order 
to focus on the entities’ underlying economic reality. If a group of companies is interrelated 
in certain specific ways and function as one economic unit, it will be taxed as one entity and 
any legal or geographic divisions or separations will be ignored. In other words, the focus 
is on whether or not there exists a single trade or business that can be viewed as a single 
economic enterprise. It does not matter whether that single trade or business is conducted 
by various divisions of a single company, numerous subsidiaries of a parent company, or 
through a group of commonly owned or controlled corporations. Thus, even though a 
company may not have nexus with a particular state, its income and factors may be included 
in the tax base to which that state’s apportionment formula is applied. If the business meets 
the unitary tests, the requisite connections for nexus under the due process and commerce 
clauses are deemed met. If there exists a single trade or business acting as a single unit, it will 
be required to file a combined report and taxed accordingly.
Author’s Note: On Terminology
The terminology can vary from state to state. For example, most states 
distinguish between consolidated and combined returns. However, Connecticut, 
for example, uses the term “combined return” for what most states would call 
a consolidated return. It is also important to distinguish between a “combined 
report” and a “unitary return.” Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a 
“unitary return.” The unitary concept, discussed later in this chapter, is the 
underlying principle for requiring taxpayers to file a “combined report.” So be 
careful with the terminology.
The following example illustrates the basic concepts of separate, consolidated, and 
combined filing.
An Incredibly Simplified Example
Take three corporations: a parent and two wholly owned subsidiaries. The Parent files a 
federal consolidated return with its subsidiaries. The Parent and Sub One are both doing 
business in, and have nexus with, State X. Sub Two does not have any employees, property, 
or sales in State X. It is not doing business in State X and, accordingly, does not have nexus 
with the state. Each company’s income and state apportionment factors are as follows:
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Parent Y 300 40  400 10.00% 30 – –
Sub One Y 200 20  500  4.00%  8 – –
Consolidated 
Total
500 60  900  6.67% – 33 –
Sub Two N 100  0  100  0.00% – – –
Combined 
Total
600 60 1000  6.00% – – 36
* The numerator is the sum of the corporation’s payroll, property, and sales in state X and the denominator is the corporation’s 
payroll, property, and sales everywhere. The factors that will be discussed in detail in chapter 5.
Separate Filing
Parent 300 × 40/400 = 30
Sub One 200 × 20/500 =  8
Total taxable income   38
If State X allows only separate filing, the Parent and Sub One will each file a separate return, 
including only their own separate income and factors. Sub Two will not file a return in 
State X, because it is not doing business in State X and does not have nexus with the state.
Consolidated Filing
Parent and Sub One 500 × 60/900 = 33
(nexus only)
If State X allows the filing of consolidated returns, but only among companies that have 
nexus with the State, the Parent and Sub One combine their respective income and appor-
tionment factors to arrive at state taxable income. Again, because Sub Two does not have 
nexus with State X, it cannot file as part of the consolidated return.
Combined Reporting
Parent and Sub One 600 × 60/1000 = 36
If State X allows or requires combined reporting, then the income and apportionment 
factors of all the affiliated companies are summed to calculate the state taxable income for 
the Parent and Sub One. There are several key points to be noted. First, the income and 
apportionment factors of Sub Two are included in the calculation even though Sub Two 
is not doing business in State X and does not have nexus with the state. Second, combined 
reporting is not a return, per se, but a method for calculating the state taxable income of 
a “unitary” or “combined” group. Technically, State X is only taxing the Parent and Sub 
One, but it is measuring the tax base and factors of those two companies by including any 
other companies (Sub Two) that are deemed to be a part of the “unitary” group. As the 
Oregon Tax Court stated, “[I]t is important to remember that including the income of a 
nontaxable member of a unitary group does not subject that income to taxation by Oregon. 
It merely provides the base from which the taxable corporation’s share is apportioned.” 
State Department of Revenue v. Penn Independent Corp., 15 Or. Tax 68, 74 (1999). Combined 
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reporting states differ in whether, after calculating the group’s combined income, the Parent 
and Sub One will file a single return or each file separate returns.
Unitary Tax
The first thing to be said is that the term “unitary tax” is a misnomer. Unitary tax is not 
a separate tax. In the context of state income tax, the term “unitary” simply refers to the 
principle, or tests, that define the tax base to which a state can apply its formulary apportion-
ment. It is an accounting method for determining the taxable income base of a multistate 
business. Or, to put it more simply, it is a method of determining the amount to which a 
state can apply its apportionment formula. The approach was first used in the nineteenth 
century in property tax cases involving railroads and telegraphs. The issue was, to use a 
simple example, how do you measure the value of a railroad track crossing Kansas from 
Missouri to Colorado, when the whole is worth more than the sum of its parts? After all, 
the track’s worth would be severely impaired if it ended at the Missouri–Kansas border and 
started up again at the Kansas–Colorado border. In 1875, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
the value of a railroad line depended upon the entire line as a unit, pointing out that each 
mile of track alone was worthless.2
A railroad must be regarded ... as a unit ... Destroy by any means a few miles of this track 
within [a jurisdiction and] its effect upon the value of the remainder of the road is out of 
all proportion to the mere local value of the part of it destroyed. ...It may well be doubted 
whether any better mode of determining the value of that portion of the track within any 
one county has been devised than to ascertain the value of the whole road and apportion 
the value within the county by its relative length to the whole.
For example, to calculate the appropriate property tax due from the railroad property 
within its boundaries, the city of Cheyenne determined the total value of the railroad line, 
not just the few miles within its jurisdiction. The city then computed the per mile value of 
the line in Cheyenne by dividing the total value of the railroad line by the total number of 
miles of line.3 The “unit method,” as it was called in 1875, or the unitary theory, provides 
that the business activity in each state contributes to or enhances the activity of the whole 
entity and, therefore, should be included in computing an assessment. In other words, forget 
about corporate divisions, company lines, parents, and subsidiaries and disregard geographic 
boundaries; the key to understanding combined reporting is two words: “economic unit.” 
It is this existence of an “economic unit,” or unitary business, that determines whether a 
state can include income earned outside its borders in calculating through apportionment 
the taxable income and tax to which it is entitled. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
“the only reason for allowing a state to look beyond its borders when it taxes the property 
of foreign corporations is that it may get the true value of the things within it, when they 
are part of an organic system of wide extent, that gives them a value above what they would 
otherwise possess.”4
2 In re State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 608 (1875).
3 Union Pacific Ry. v. Cheyenne, 113 U.S. 516 (1884).
4 Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66, 69 (1920).
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 The Supreme Court first directly acknowledged the application of the unitary method to 
state income taxation in Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Commission, 266 U.S. 271 
(1924), when it stated,
So in the present case we are of the opinion that, as the Company carried on the unitary 
business of manufacturing and selling ale, in which its profits were earned by a series of 
transactions beginning with the manufacture in England and ending in sales in New York 
and other places—the process of manufacturing resulting in no profits until it ends in 
sales—the state was justified in attributing to New York a just proportion of the profits 
earned by the Company from such unitary business.5
In addition to determining whether or not separate accounting is appropriate, and wheth-
er the income or factors of nonnexus entities can be included in apportionable tax base, the 
unitary concept has also been used to determine whether specific items, types, or categories 
of income, such as interest income, dividend income, and capital gains, are deemed appor-
tionable business income or allocable nonbusiness income.
The combined method, also known as unitary apportionment, is based on a recognition 
that an integrated business may operate through several separately incorporated entities. In 
such case, transactions between corporations under common control may lack economic 
substance; therefore, it is necessary to consider the corporate group as a whole. This method 
combines the income of all related business entities which are engaged in the same inte-
grated or unitary business to arrive at net income base. A percentage of the net income base 
is then apportioned to the relevant taxing jurisdiction according to a formula which mea-
sures the contribution of the business activities within the taxing jurisdiction (for example, 
Colorado) to the profit of the entire unitary business. This percentage of the net income 
base is then taxed by the state.6
The relationship between the unitary concept and a combined report can be confusing. 
A combined report is an accounting method used by a state to measure the taxable income 
of a single multistate corporation that is either conducting a unitary business or a member 
of a group of multistate corporations conducting a unitary business. As a consequence, the 
combined report may include affiliates that do not have nexus with the state. “Combined 
reporting is not designed to tax the income or other tax base of the nontaxable affiliates 
although taxpayers assert that the combined method frequently has that effect. The purpose 
of the combined report is to determine the income or other tax base of the in-state taxpayer 
by viewing the taxpayer as part of the unitary business, and applying the apportionment fac-
tors of the entire unitary business to the taxable net income of the unitary business.”7 The 
unitary concept is used to determine what divisions, operations, or parts of a single corpora-
tion doing business in more than one state or which commonly owned corporations are (1) 
engaged in a unitary business, (2) the net income of that business, and (3) how to apportion 
that income.
5 See also Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
6 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. State, 749 P.2d 400, 401 (Colo. 1988).
7 J. Hellerstein & W. Hellerstein, State Taxation, ¶ 8.11[1] (3d ed. 2001).
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Unfortunately, there is little agreement among the states about what specifically consti-
tutes a unitary group. (The Multistate Tax Commission [MTC], in its efforts to promote 
state uniformity, has proposed a regulation defining a unitary business. The regulation is 
included at the end of this chapter.) The factors for defining what companies belong in 
a combined report have evolved over time and still remain unsettled. In fact, the unitary 
method, and its application, traditionally has not been defined by statute. It has been created, 
like the doctrines of economic substance and business purpose, by the courts. Thus, the best 
approach to mastering this area is to follow the evolution of combined reporting through 
the landmark cases that have defined it.
Author’s Note: Overview of Unitary Tests





• Factors of profitability test
– Functional integration
– Centralization of management
– Economies of scale
The Landmark Cases
Let us begin with a couple of the old landmark cases. While dated, these are still useful for 
understanding the history and context of the continuing disputes over the unitary method 
and combined reporting.
The Three Unities Tests
Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 111 P.2d 334 (1941), aff’d,  
315 U.S. 501 (1942)
Butler Brothers was an Illinois corporation selling wholesale dry goods and general mer-
chandise. It had wholesale distributing houses in seven states, including one in San Fran-
cisco, California. “Each of its houses in the seven states maintains stocks of goods, serves 
a separate territory, has its own sales force, handles its own sales and all solicitation, credit 
and collection arrangements ... [and] ... keeps its own books of account.” However, Butler 
Brothers did maintain a central buying division and allocated certain overhead expenses 
(executive salaries, accounting, and advertising) to each wholesale house. (Please note that 
these houses were controlled branches or divisions of Butler Brothers, not separate corpo-
rate entities.) The company filed its California return using separate accounting and reported 
a loss ($82,851) in California, while the overall company reported a profit ($1,149,677). 
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 California recomputed the company’s income using a three-factor formula averaging the 
percentage of California payroll, sales, and property to total payroll, sales, and property. Us-
ing this formula, California figured that Butler Brothers taxable income in the state was a 
profit of $93,500. In the Supreme Court’s first significant application of the unitary theory 
to an income tax case, it held two things. First, there did exist a unitary relationship among 
the branches based on “(1) unity of ownership; (2) unity of operation as evidenced by 
central purchasing, advertising, accounting and management divisions; and (3) unity of use 
in its centralized executive force and general system of operation.” Second, the use of the 
three-part formula was not on its face unconstitutional, it was “fairly calculated,” and its as-
signment of income to California “reasonably attributable” to the business done there. The 
Court acknowledged that the integrity of separate accounting need not be impeached, but 
it was up to the taxpayer to show by “clear and cogent evidence” that California’s formula 
taxed extraterritorial values “out of all appropriate proportion to the business.”
It is only if its business within this state is truly separate and distinct from its business with-
out this state, so that the segregation of income may be made clearly and accurately, that the 
separate accounting method may property be used. When, however, interstate operations 
are carried on and that portion of the corporation’s business done within the state cannot be 
clearly segregated from that done outside the state, the unit rule of assessment is employed 
as a device for allocating to the state for taxation its fair share of the taxable values of the 
taxpayer.
Observations
The Butler Brothers decision gives us our first definition of a unitary business, often called the 
“three unities” test. A business will be held to be operating a unitary business if there exists 
(1) unity of ownership, (2) unity of operation, and (3) unity of use.
Unity of ownership has generally been defined as either direct or indirect ownership of 
more than 50 percent of a corporation’s voting stock. A bright-line rule, it remains the 
clearest test in defining a unitary group. Generally, auditors examining unity of ownership 
will use not only the IRS Form 1120 and Form 851 (affiliations schedule), but also will, for 
listed companies, examine the SEC Form 10-Ks for the audit period.
While usually the simplest of the unitary tests, even the unity of ownership test can vary 
from state to state. In the first example, A corporation owns 50 percent of B corporation 
and 25 percent of C corporation. B corporation owns 50 percent of C corporation. In many 
states this would not qualify as a combined group, because in most states the ownership 
percentage has to be more than 50 percent.
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Example 1







The second example, drawn from the California audit manual, is counterintuitive, but it 
also illustrates a combined group. Entity P provides the necessary ownership to meet the 
unity of ownership test, but itself is not unitary with its subsidiaries. However, that would 
not prevent the subsidiaries from qualifying as a unitary group.
Example 2






In jurisdictions that require that a unitary group be based on an affiliated group as that is 
defined in Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 1504(a)(1), the following cannot file a com-
bined group, because Entity I is an individual, and an individual cannot be a member of an 
affiliated group under IRC § 1504(a)(1). That said, in states that do not tie their definition 
of a unitary group to IRC § 1504(a)(1), this arrangement might very well qualify as a com-
bined group.
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 Example 3




In this last example, while entities P and A may file a combined report and entities B and 
C may file a combined report, neither entity P nor A can file a combined report with either 
entity B or C, or B and C together, because of the less than 50 percent ownership between 
entities B and C. This would also be true in states, whose definition of a unitary group is 
tied to IRC § 1504(a)(1), if a partnership or limited liability company were inserted between 
entities B and C, again, because a partnership cannot be a member of an affiliated group 
under IRC § 1504(a)(1).
Example 4
P is unitary with A and B is unitary with C, but P
is not unitary with B or C
51% 49% 51%
CAP B
The difference between unity of operations and unity of use is not immediately appar-
ent. A California court has described the difference this way: “Although there is not a clear 
demarcation between what is ‘operation’ and what is ‘use,’ in general it may be said that 
the acts falling within the category of ‘operation’ are the staff functions and those within 
‘use’ are the line functions.”8 Thus, the unity of operations test will be met if corporations 
share certain staff functions, such as purchasing, advertising, personnel, legal and accounting 
services, insurance, and employee benefit plans. Box 3-1 shows examples of staff functions 
that auditors will examine.
8 Chase, Brass & Copper Co., Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 10 Cal. App. 3d 496 (Calif. 1970), cert. denied, 400 
U.S. 961 (1970).
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The staff functions must be significant. For example, a parent corporation’s preparation of 
the affiliated group’s corporate return is not an example of unity of operations. Every par-
ent corporation probably engages in this activity. Thus, it is not a distinguishing feature of a 
unitary group. Centralized or common advertising is an activity that may or may not have 
any unitary significance. For example, the use of the same advertising agency by an affiliated 
group of corporations is hardly evidence, in and of itself, of a unitary relationship. However, 
if the advertising efforts are designed to create and maintain a single corporate identity or 
brand, then the centralized advertising is a meaningful unitary element.
Unity of use looks to whether there are shared line functions such as a centralized man-
agement and “general system of operation.” In other words, unity of use is present when 
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 there is integrated executive control exercised through the implementation of the business’s 
major policies or direction. The development of vertical or horizontal business relationships 
to maximize profitability is an example of integrated executive control. An oil company that 
expands its operations from exploration and drilling through refining and distribution is an 
example of vertical integration. An oil refinery that expands by purchasing other refineries 
in the same market is an example of horizontal integration.
In practice, it is often difficult to distinguish between unity of operations and unity of 
use tests let alone determine the quantity and quality of the activities that supposedly define 
the tests. It is not enough to simply list the elements of operations and use, or to apply the 
labels indiscriminately; there must be some substance to the tests for them to mean anything.
Author’s Note: The Difference Between Unity of Operations and Unity of Use
The difference between unity of operations and unity of use is not immediately 
apparent. “Although there is not a clear demarcation between what is ‘operation’ 
and what is ‘use,’ in general it may be said that the acts falling within the 
category of ‘operation’ are the staff functions and those within ‘use’ are the line 
functions.”
Chase, Brass & Copper Co., Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board, 
10 Cal. App. 3d 496 (Calif. 1970), cert. denied, 400 US 961 (1970).
Nevertheless, Butler Brothers made it clear that a single company doing business in more 
than one state could not segregate its income geographically and file accordingly when its 
activities were unified through use and operations.
The Contribution and Dependency Tests
Edison California Stores v. McColgan, 176 P.2d 697, on reh’g, 
183 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1947)
Edison Stores took the Butler Brothers decision one step further. If anyone wondered after 
Butler Brothers whether the decision would have been different if the separate stores in the 
various states had been separate corporations, Edison answered that question with a resound-
ing no. The Edison Stores decision provided that the unitary concept, applied to a single 
company with branches in different states, can also be applied to a group of corporations 
(subsidiaries) with one parent corporation. “Thus the business is unitary regardless of the fact 
that in the Butler Brothers case there was but one corporation involved, owning as parts of the 
unitary system seven different branches in as many states, and that in the present case there is 
a parent corporation owning and controlling as units of one system fifteen different branches 
organized as corporations in as many states. No difference in principle is discernible.”
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Edison also added a new test to the three unity tests of ownership, operation, and use prof-
fered by Butler Brothers. The court wrote that “[i]f the operation of the portion of the busi-
ness done within the state is dependent upon or contributes to the operation of the business 
without the state, the operations are unitary; otherwise, if there is no such dependency, the 
business within the state may be considered to be separate.”
Observations
Edison Stores is important for illustrating that a company’s legal structure will not protect it 
from a state’s taxing powers when the company or companies act as one economic unit. 
This case represents a key step because the unitary concept is applied to an affiliated group, 
rather than just the divisions or segments of a single corporation.
Edison Stores also added a new unitary test, the contribution or dependency test. Thus, 
if the operations of a business in a state are dependent upon or contribute to the business 
operations outside the state, the business may be taxed as a single economic unit. Examples 
often cited as illustrative of dependency or contribution often overlap with the three unities 
test and include intercompany sales, loans, and line and staff activities. As with the three 
unities tests, measuring and defining what constitutes dependency and contribution in any 
distinguishable sense has been difficult.
It is not necessary that a company meet both the three unities test and the contribution 
or dependency test. The courts have confirmed that they are alternative tests and that only 
one of the two must be met.9
Factors of Profitability Test
In addition to the three unities tests and the tests of contribution and dependency, the Su-
preme Court has offered a factors of profitability test for defining a unitary group.
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Vermont, 445 U.S. 425 (1980)
In Mobil Oil, Vermont included in the state’s apportionable income the dividend income 
from Mobil’s foreign subsidiaries. Vermont added the dividend income to its tax base hold-
ing that it had a right to do so because the subsidiaries and affiliates from which the dividend 
income was received were unitary with Mobil Oil. In other words, the dividend income 
was business (apportionable) income because of the unitary relationship between the parent 
and the foreign subsidiaries.
Mobil naturally disagreed, arguing that the dividends were not subject to Vermont tax un-
der either the due process clause or the commerce clause. First, despite a unitary relationship 
there was no “minimum connection” as required by due process between Vermont, Mobil’s 
management of its investments, or the business activities of the payor corporations. Second, 
taxing the dividends “would create an unconstitutional burden of multiple taxation,” be-
cause New York, as the state of domicile, could tax the entire dividend income. Finally, 
the foreign source of the dividend income created a risk of international multiple taxation.
9 See A.M Castle & Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 36 Cal. App. 4th 1794 (Calif. 1995).
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 The Court rejected all of Mobil’s arguments, stating in a now famous line, “the linchpin 
of apportionability in the field of state income taxation is the unitary business principle.” 
Because there existed “factors of profitability” defined as “functional integration, centraliza-
tion of management, and economies of scale,” Mobil Oil was to be treated as a unitary en-
tity, thereby making the income subject to apportionment. The fact that New York could 
tax the same income was irrelevant because, in fact, it did not. And the risk of international 
multiple taxation was also irrelevant because that risk existed for all income, not just divi-
dend income.
[T]he linchpin of apportionability in the field of state income taxation is the unitary prin-
ciple ... what appellant must show, in order to establish that its dividend income is not 
subject to an apportioned tax in Vermont, is that the income was earned in the course of 
activities unrelated to the sale of petroleum products in that State ... appellant has made no 
effort to demonstrate that the foreign operations of its subsidiaries and affiliates are distinct 
in any business or economic sense from it petroleum sales activities in Vermont ... Indeed, 
all indications in the record are to the contrary, since it appears that these foreign activities 
are part of appellant’s integrated petroleum enterprise.
Finally, the Court made it clear that its decision was not all encompassing. “Where the 
business activities of the dividend payor have nothing to do with the activities of the re-
cipient in the taxing State, due process considerations might well preclude apportionability, 
because there would be no underlying unitary business.”
Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin, 447 U.S. 207 (1980)
Exxon, like Mobil Oil, involved the “state taxation of the income of a vertically integrated 
corporation doing business in several States.” Exxon divided its operations into three cat-
egories (marketing, exploration and production, and refining), accounting for each sepa-
rately. In fact, Exxon argued that the three categories themselves represented three uni-
tary businesses. The company’s only activity in Wisconsin was marketing (which produced 
losses in the state), and Exxon attempted to report only those activities to Wisconsin. The 
company believed that its separate accounting of its three activities was sufficient to justify 
separate treatment for state tax purposes. “In order to exclude certain income from the ap-
portionment formula, the company must prove that ‘the income was earned in the course 
of activities unrelated to the sale of petroleum products in the State.’ The court looks to 
the ‘underlying economic realities of a unitary business,’ and the income must derive from 
unrelated business activity, which constitutes a ‘discrete business enterprise.’ ”
Exxon apparently failed to convince the Court that sufficient distortion existed. The 
Court held that Exxon’s facts failed this test, stating that while “such evidence may be help-
ful,” it is in no sense conclusive. Instead, the Court found that Exxon was a “highly inte-
grated business which benefits from an umbrella of centralized management and controlled 
interaction.” Accordingly, “if a company is a unitary business, then a State may apply an 
apportionment formula to the taxpayer’s total income in order to obtain a ‘rough approxi-
mation’ of the corporate income that is ‘reasonably related to the activities conducted within 
the taxing State.’ ” In other words, instead of having three unitary businesses, the Court told 
Exxon that in actuality, it had three operating functions of a single unitary business.
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Author’s Note: Factors of Profitability
• Functional integration
•  Functional integration refers to transfers between, or pooling among, 
business activities that significantly affect the operation of the business 
activities. 
•  Functional integration includes, but is not limited to, transfers or pooling 
with respect to the unitary business’s products or services, technical 
information, marketing information, distribution systems, purchasing, and 
intangibles such as patents, trademarks, service marks, copyrights, trade 
secrets, know-how, formulas, and processes.
• Centralization of management
•  Centralization of management exists when directors, officers, or other 
management employees jointly participate in the management decisions 
that affect the respective business activities and that may also operate to 
the benefit of the entire economic enterprise.
• Economies of scale
•  Economies of scale refers to a relation among and between business 
activities resulting in a significant decrease in the average per unit cost of 
operational or administrative functions due to the increase in operational 
size.
Taxpayer Victories
After Mobil Oil and Exxon, some doubted that taxpayers could ever convince a court that a 
state’s assertions of a unitary group or use of an apportionment method could ever be suc-
cessfully challenged. Then, the decisions in ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho, 458 U.S. 307 (1982), 
and F.W. Woolworth Co. v. New Mexico, 458 U.S. 354 (1982) breathed new life into the 
debate.
ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho, 458 U.S. 307 (1982)
At first blush, this case looks just like another Mobil Oil case. Again, you have a nondomi-
ciliary state (this time Idaho, not Vermont) trying to include in its tax base dividends from 
foreign subsidiaries. ASARCO was a New Jersey corporation domiciled in New York. It 
mined, smelted, and refined nonferrous metals including gold, silver, copper, lead, and zinc. 
03-Chapter 03.indd   85 10/6/11   2:09 PM
86
The Adviser’s Guide to Multistate Income Taxation: Compliance and Planning Opportunities
 It operated a silver mine in Idaho, and the state attempted to include in its apportionable 
(business) income dividend, interest, and capital gain income derived from ASARCO’s 
ownership in five subsidiary corporations.
Six other wholly owned subsidiaries were included as unitary, but they were not part of 
the appeal. The appeal was limited to the inclusion of the dividend, interest, and capital 
gain income from the five subsidiaries in which ASARCO owned only a majority interest. 
This is an important point. When including the six wholly owned subsidiaries as unitary, 
Idaho pulled into the combined return both their income and payroll, property, and sales 
factors. In the five majority owned subsidiaries, however, Idaho was pulling in only the 
income, and not the factors. As a consequence, Idaho’s apportionable income increases 
without any accompanying dilution from the foreign subsidiaries factors. Many taxpayers, 
then and now, have reacted to these kinds of attempts by crying, “no taxation without factor 
representation.”
Idaho tried to argue that it was unnecessary to show that the subsidiaries were unitary with 
their parent to satisfy due process limitations. The Court rejected Idaho’s attempt stating 
that the facts as presented simply did not support a unitary relationship. “In this case ... the 
record establishes that each of the ... subsidiaries in question operated a ‘discrete business 
enterprise’ having ‘nothing to do with the activities of [ASARCO] in the taxing state.’ ” 
In other words, Mobil Oil still stands, and the dividend payor must be engaged in a unitary 
business with the dividend recipient. Further, it rejected Idaho’s attempt to change the defi-
nition of a unitary business.
Idaho’s proposal is that corporate purpose should define unitary business. It argues that 
intangible income should be considered a part of a unitary business if the intangible property 
(the share of stock) is “acquired, managed or disposed of for purposes relating or contribut-
ing to the taxpayer’s business.” Idaho asserts that “it is this integration—i.e., between the 
business use of the intangible asset (the shares of stock) and ASARCO’s mining, smelting, 
and refining business—which makes the income part of the unitary business.”
This definition of unitary business would destroy the concept. The business of a corpo-
ration requires that it earn money to continue operations and to provide a return on its 
invested capital. Consequently, all of its operations, including any investment made, in 
some sense can be said to be “for purposes related to or contributing to the [corporation’s] 
business.” When pressed to its logical limit, this conception of the “unitary business” limi-
tation becomes no limitation at all.
F.W. Woolworth Co. v. New Mexico, 458 U.S. 354 (1982)
This case was decided with ASARCO and involved the same question: Can a nondomicili-
ary state (New Mexico, this time) pull in as taxable income dividend income from foreign 
subsidiaries?
Woolworth owns retail chain stores throughout the United States. It also owned four for-
eign subsidiaries (three of them wholly owned) with stores in Germany, Canada, Mexico, 
and England. The four subsidiaries paid Woolworth approximately $40 million in divi-
dends and the question before the Court was whether or not New Mexico could tax those 
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dividends as part of the apportionable income of the U.S. parent. The Court found that the 
facts did not sustain a unitary relationship:
We conclude, on the basis of undisputed facts, that the four subsidiaries in question are 
not a part of a unitary business under the principles articulated in Mobil and Exxon, and 
today reiterated in ASARCO. Except for the type of occasional oversight—with respect 
to capital structure, major debt, and dividends—that any parent gives to an investment in 
a subsidiary, there is little or no integration of the business activities or centralization of the 
management of these five corporations. 
The important point about this case is that, like Mobil Oil, the payors of the dividend in-
come were in the same line of business as the parent, but the relationship between them was 
not unitary. While there was certainly a potential to be unitary, potentiality is not enough. 
“But the potential to operate a company as part of a unitary business is not dispositive when, 
as here, the dividend income from the subsidiaries in fact is derived from unrelated business 
activity of the subsidiaries, each of which operates a discrete business enterprise.” Instead, 
“the proper inquiry looks to ‘the underlying unity or diversity of business enterprise’ not to 
whether the nondomiciliary parent derives some economic benefit—as it virtually always 
will—from its ownership of stock in another corporation.”
There was some comment in the case that the state of New Mexico just did not do a good 
job developing its facts. Perhaps it was easier in Mobil and Exxon to find a unitary business 
because those companies were vertically integrated oil and gas companies, not retailers.
Finally, Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, William Rehnquist, and Harold Blackmun issued 
a strong dissent arguing that because the dividend income constituted passive investment in-
come it was unnecessary for the subsidiaries to be part of a unitary business with ASARCO. 
For example, even ASARCO admits that Idaho can tax the interest earned on short-term 
investments of its working capital. Then why not income from its long-term investments? 
As Justice O’Connor points out, ASARCO would certainly be quick to claim apportion-
able interest expense on its long-term investments. To be consistent, it should also claim 
the income.
Flow of Value Test and Worldwide Combination
The decision in Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983), is 
important for two things. First, it provides a fourth, and so far final, test for measuring the 
existence of a unitary business, and, second, it held that state efforts at requiring combined 
reporting did not stop at the water’s edge of the United States.
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board,  
103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983)
The Supreme Court holds that the unitary concept can be extended to include foreign 
subsidiaries in a “combined” report. California recalculated Container’s income tax on a 
“combined basis” pulling in its foreign subsidiaries (including their sales, property, and 
payroll factors). The Court found that California’s reliance on intercompany loans, “advice 
and consultation regarding manufacturing techniques,” cost accounting, agency relation-
ship in purchasing equipment, and technical service help was sufficient to support unitary 
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 treatment. “We need not decide whether any one of these factors would be sufficient as a 
constitutional matter to prove the existence of a unitary business. Taken in combination, at 
least, they clearly demonstrate that the state court reached a conclusion ‘within the realm of 
permissible judgment.’ ”
Container argued that combined reporting resulted in double taxation, prohibited the 
federal government from speaking with one voice in international taxation, and, in any 
event, California had an obligation in international tax to use the arm’s–length analysis used 
by the federal and other foreign governments. For example, Container pointed out that 
because property and labor costs in foreign countries were often lower than in the United 
States, the use of formulary apportionment utilizing those factors inevitably led to double 
taxation. The Court rejected this argument, noting that “of course, even the three-factor 
formula is necessarily imperfect. But we have seen no evidence demonstrating that the 
margin of error ... inherent in the three-factor formula is greater than the margin of error ... 
inherent in the sort of separate accounting urged upon us by appellant.” Thus, “it would be 
perverse, simply for the sake of avoiding double taxation, to require California to give up 
one allocation method that sometimes results in double taxation in favor of another alloca-
tion method that also sometimes results in double taxation.”
Observation
There are two points of note. First, worldwide combination. Second, the Court seems to 
back away from the factors of profitability tests set down in Mobil. After all, given the facts of 
the case and applying the standards of functional integration, centralization of management, 
and economies of scale, Container is arguably less unitary than ASARCO and Woolworth. In 
any case, the decision is not particularly helpful in clearing the ambiguity created between 
the Mobil and Exxon unitary holdings and the ASARCO and Woolworth nonunitary hold-
ings. The Court stated that there need not be a flow of product to have a unitary relation-
ship; a “flow of value” is sufficient. Is “flow of value” the same thing as the “factors of 
profitability?” If not, what is it?
Barclays Bank PLC and Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Franchise Tax 
Board, 115 S. Ct. 2268 (1995)
The Court revisited worldwide combination one more time over a decade later in Barclays 
Bank. In Container, the Court declined to say whether or not its application of worldwide 
combination applied also to corporations with foreign parents. The answer is yes. In Barclays 
Bank, the Court holds that the U.S. Constitution does not prohibit worldwide combined 
reporting. The Court noted that the U.S. Congress had eleven years to respond to its deci-
sion in Container and failed to do so. Thus, if the Court’s decisions frustrated foreign policy 
under the foreign commerce clause it remained for Congress to correct.
Despite this decision, most states, because of political pressure from businesses and other 
countries, have backed away from mandatory worldwide combined reporting. Instead, most 
combined reporting is limited to “water’s edge” combination. California has made world-
wide combined reporting elective since 1988, as have other states such as Idaho, Mon-
tana, North Dakota, and Utah. Other states, such as Illinois and Colorado, limit combined 
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reporting to water’s edge by prohibiting the inclusion of what is called “80/20 corpora-
tions.” 80/20 corporations are defined as companies that have 80 percent or more of their 
business activities outside of the United States. The 80 percent measurement is usually a 
combination of the company’s payroll and property factors. Alaska is the only state to re-
quire worldwide combined reporting, and even that is limited to the oil and gas industry.
Should the Unitary Business Principle  
Be Abandoned?
Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director of Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251 (1992)
Allied-Signal was the successor-in-interest to the Bendix Corporation. During the 1970s, 
Bendix had acquired 20.6 percent of the stock of ASARCO only to sell it back to ASARCO 
in 1981 for a $211.5 million dollar gain. (Yes, this is the same ASARCO as in ASARCO 
v. Idaho.) The question before the Court was whether or not New Jersey could apportion 
the gain. Both Allied-Signal and New Jersey stipulated that Bendix and ASARCO “were 
unrelated business enterprises each of whose activities had nothing to do with the other.” In 
other words, there was no unitary relationship. Applying the factors of profitability (func-
tional integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale), the Court found 
that “there is no serious contention that any of the three factors upon which we focused 
in Woolworth were present. Functional integration and economies of scale could not exist 
because ... the parties stipulated [they] were unrelated business enterprises.” Finally, “there 
was no centralization of management.” Thus, New Jersey could not tax the gain because (1) 
Bendix and ASARCO were not engaged in a unitary business, and (2) the gain was from an 
investment function and not an operational function.
Given the stipulation that the businesses were unrelated enterprises, New Jersey advanced 
a new argument, that is, “that the unitary business principle must be abandoned in its en-
tirety, arguing that a nondomiciliary State should be permitted ‘to apportion all the income 
of a separate multistate corporate taxpayer.’” The Court rejected New Jersey’s suggestion, 
pointing out that “New Jersey’s sweeping theory cannot be reconciled with the concept that 
the Constitution places limits on a State’s power to tax value earned outside of its borders.”
Perhaps responding to Justice O’Connor’s dissent in ASARCO, the Court did try to 
distinguish between short- (operational) and long-term investments and the application of 
the unitary concept. “We agree that the payee and the payor need not be engaged in the 
same unitary business as a prerequisite to apportionment in all cases. Container Corp. says as 
much. What is required ... is that the capital transaction serve an operational rather than an 
investment function.” “The existence of a unitary relation between payee and payor is one 
justification for apportionment, but not the only one.” The Court cited short-term deposits 
that form a part of working capital as an example of income that may be apportioned even 
when no unitary relationship exists. “The existence of a unitary relation between the payor 
and the payee is one means of meeting the constitutional requirement ... we did not pur-
port, however, to establish a general requirement that there be a unitary relation between 
the payor and the payee to justify apportionment, nor do we do so today.”
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 In Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Allied-Signal, she claimed that to maintain that a unitary 
relationship was the only foundation for a state to include foreign income in its apportion-
able tax base was “doctrinal foot fault.” It seems evident in Allied-Signal that the Court took 
notice of that criticism when it wrote that “taxation of investment income received from a 
nondomiciliary taxpayer’s investment in another corporation requires only that the invest-
ment income be sufficiently related to the taxpayer’s in-state business, not that the taxpayer’s 
business and the corporation in which it invests be unitary.” Thus, while the unitary busi-
ness principle may be the linchpin of apportionability, it is not the only linchpin. So just 
when we thought things were becoming clearer, they are not.
Nevertheless, if we remain confused it is not the Court’s fault. “If lower courts have 
reached divergent results in applying the unitary business principle to different factual cir-
cumstances, that is because, as we have said, any number of variations on the unitary busi-
ness theme ‘are logically consistent with the underlying principles motivating the approach,’ 
and also because the constitutional test is quite fact-sensitive.” Indeed.
Author’s Note: On Unitary Tests
Short-term out-of-state investments can be apportioned by the nondomiciliary 
state without a unitary relationship between the payor and payee, as long as the 
investments are unitary in that they serve an “operational function.”
Let us sum up the unitary tests as laid out by the U.S. Supreme Court. They 
include
•  the three unities tests: unity of ownership, operation, and use.
•  the dependency or contribution test.
•  the factors of profitability tests: functional integration, centralization of 
management, and economies of scale.
•  the flow of value test.
One commentator, Franklin C. Latcham, has observed that “the difficulty 
with such tests, however, is that they are so vague that they can have different 
meanings for different courts when applied to similar fact situations.”
MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Illinois, 553 U.S. 16 (2008)
On April 15, 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its long-awaited decision on the 
relationship of the unitary concept and the operational function or operational purpose test. 
The issue before the Court was whether Illinois could tax a portion of the $1 billion capital 
gain arising from the sale of MeadWestvaco’s (Mead) corporate division, Lexis/Nexis.10
10 MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Illinois, 553 U.S. 16 (2008).
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Mead had purchased Lexis/Nexis (then part of Data Corporation) in 1968 and, in the 
years since, Lexis-Nexis had been held by Mead as a separate corporate subsidiary, then a 
division, then a subsidiary, and then a division again when it was sold in 1994. Mead re-
ported the sale as nonbusiness income allocable to its state of domicile, Ohio. Illinois took 
the position upon audit that the gain was apportionable business income and assessed Mead 
roughly $4 million in tax and penalties.
The Cook County Circuit Court held that while Mead and Lexis-Nexis were not uni-
tary, the gain was nevertheless apportionable business income, not allocable nonbusiness 
income, because “Lexis served an operational function in Mead’s business.” The Illinois Ap-
pellate Court affirmed the lower court’s decision citing several factors for holding that Lexis 
served an operational function in Mead’s business. Specifically, the appellate court pointed 
out that, in addition to be being wholly owned, “Mead had exercised its control over Lexis 
in various ways, such as manipulating its corporate form, approving significant capital ex-
penditures, and retaining tax benefits and control over Lexis’ free cash.” Because the court 
found that the operational function test was met, it did not address whether Mead and Lexis 
were part of a unitary business. After the Illinois Supreme Court declined to hear the case, 
Mead appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which heard the case on January 16, 2008.
The Supreme Court ruled in Mead’s favor, holding that “the state courts erred in con-
sidering whether Lexis served an ‘operational purpose’ in Mead’s business after determin-
ing that Lexis and Mead were not unitary.” After tracing a history of the unitary business 
concept, the Court stated that the lower court’s reading of Allied-Signal had been mistaken. 
“Our decisions ... did not announce a new ground for the constitutional apportionment of 
extrastate values in the absence of a unitary business. Because the Appellate Court of Illinois 
interpreted those decisions to the contrary, it erred.” In fact, the Court stated, “Our refer-
ences to ‘operational function’ ... were not intended to modify the unitary business principle 
by adding a new ground for apportionment. The concept of operational function simply 
recognizes that an asset can be a part of a taxpayer’s unitary business, even if what we may 
term a ‘unitary relationship’ does not exist between the ‘payor and payee.’ ”
It seems that while the Court did not simply discard the operational function test, it 
certainly limited its scope. “Whereas here, the asset in question is another business; we 
have described the ‘hallmarks’ of a unitary relationship as functional integration, centralized 
management, and economies of scale.” In other words, once the courts had stipulated that 
a unitary relationship, based on the traditional tests, did not exist, that was sufficient for 
determining whether the gain was business or nonbusiness.
The MeadWestvaco decision will have significant ramifications for both asset and corporate 
dispositions. First, many tax advisers (author included) and tax administrators, as well as the 
Illinois Appellate Court, believed that Allied-Signal had established a separate alternative 
unitary test that involved distinguishing between operational versus investment functions. 
The MeadWestvaco Court has made it plain that that is simply not the case. In fact, that fact 
may be the most significant consequence of the MeadWestvaco decision—that the gain on 
a sale of a business, whether as an asset or stock sale, is to be determined solely by the tra-
ditional unitary tests articulated in Butler Brothers, Edison Stores, Mobil Oil, Woolworth, and 
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 Container. To that extent, the Court has added some clarity. However, because the appel-
late court, unlike the circuit court, did not address whether a unitary relationship existed, 
the Supreme Court stated the appellate court “may take up that question on remand,” and 
declined to express an opinion on whether there was indeed a unitary relationship between 
MeadWestvaco and Lexis-Nexis. In brief, the Court held that the sale of Lexis-Nexis could 
not be apportioned to Illinois based on the operational test; it is still an open question 
whether the gain could be apportioned to Illinois based on the traditional unitary tests, and 
the lower court was free to examine that issue upon remand. We may not have heard the 
last of this.
Summarizing the Cases
In Butler Brothers, the court found a single business activity of apportionable income when 
there was one corporation with multiple stores. In Edison Stores, the court found a single 
business activity of apportionable income when there were multiple corporations. In Exx-
on, the court rejected the taxpayer’s argument that it had three separate business activities 
housed in a single corporation. Instead, the court found that Exxon had a single unitary 
business activity.
The courts were then confronted with another question. Does apportionable income in-
clude intangible income such as dividends, interest, royalties, and rents? The answer, found 
in Mobil Oil, ASARCO, and Woolworth, is that if the intangible income is a part of the 
taxpayer’s unitary business activities connected to the state, it is subject to apportionment. 
When there is no unitary connection, as in Allied-Signal, the intangible income (capital 
gain) cannot be taxed. Finally, the courts were asked whether the unitary principle applied 
to foreign entities and operations, thereby becoming part of a state’s apportionable income. 
Again, the answer was yes. If there exists a unitary relationship between the in-state and out-
of-state business activities, the income is apportionable regardless of whether the taxpayer is 
a domestic (Container) or foreign (Barclays Bank) parent with subsidiaries.
In every instance, the determining focus is not company lines, geographic boundaries, 
corporate divisions, or legal entities, but whether a link exists between the state and the busi-
ness activity, or income, it seeks to tax. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Mobil Oil, “the 
linchpin of apportionability in the field of state income taxation is the unitary principle.”
Pulling It All Together
It is not unusual at this point to find oneself overwhelmed with the various interpretations, 
applications, definitions, and case law of what is, or is not, unitary.
Perhaps, it will help to focus on what it is that the various courts are trying specifically to 
define. In brief, it is this: A state can only tax the income connected to that state. In other 
words, the courts are trying to determine just what income should be apportioned among 
the states. What a state must show is that there is some link, some connection, between it 
and the business activity, or income, it seeks to tax. As the New Mexico Department of 
Revenue points out in its audit manual, “In general, a business will be considered to be uni-
tary when the operations conducted in one state benefit and are benefited by the operations 
conducted in another state and if its various parts are so interdependent and of such mutual 
benefit that they form one integral business.”
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Multistate Tax Commission
In addition to the previously mentioned cases, there is one other influential national voice 
addressing the unitary business concept, and that is the MTC. The MTC is an organization 
originally formed in 1967 by Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and 
Washington when they adopted the Multistate Tax Compact. The MTC’s function is to be 
an advocate on the part of its members by facilitating taxpayer convenience and compliance, 
performing joint audits on behalf of its members, advising legislative and administrative bod-
ies, and promoting uniformity.
Most states belong to the MTC in some form of membership, and the MTC policies often 
have a significant effect on state policy regardless of whether a state adopts any particular 
policy. The MTC released a proposed regulation in 2003 articulating the principles it be-
lieves should be used in determining the existence of a unitary business. For those states that 
have not adopted their own specific statutory unitary provisions, the proposed regulation 
is expected to, if nothing else, define the parameters of the debate over what constitutes a 
unitary business. The proposed regulation is presented here as exhibit 3-1.
03-Chapter 03.indd   93 10/6/11   2:09 PM
94
The Adviser’s Guide to Multistate Income Taxation: Compliance and Planning Opportunities
 Exhibit 3-1: Proposed Regulation 
Setting Forth Principles for 
Determining the Existence of a 
Unitary Business
I. UNITARY BUSINESS PRINCIPLE
A. The Concept of a Unitary Business. A unitary business is a single economic enterprise that is 
made up either of separate parts of a single business entity or of a commonly owned or controlled 
group of business entities that are sufficiently interdependent, integrated and interrelated through 
their activities so about provide a synergy and mutual benefit that produces a sharing or exchange of 
value among them and a significant flow of value to the separate parts. This flow of value to a business 
entity located in this state that comes from being part of a unitary business conducted both within and 
without this state is what provides the constitutional due process “definite link and minimum connec-
tion” necessary for this state to apportion business income of the unitary business, even if that income 
arises in part from activities conducted outside the state. The business income of the unitary business 
is then apportioned to this state using an apportionment percentage provided by [insert your state 
statute]. 
This sharing or exchange of value may also be described as requiring that the operation of one part 
of the business be dependent upon, or contribute to, the operation of another part of the business. 
Phrased in the disjunctive, the foregoing means that if the activities of one business either contributes 
to the activities of another business or are dependent upon the activities of another business, those 
businesses are part of a unitary business.
B. Constitutional Requirement for a Unitary Business. The sharing or exchange of value described in 
subsection (A) that defines the scope of a unitary business requires more than the mere flow of funds 
arising out of a passive investment or from the financial strength contributed by a distinct business 
undertaking that has no operational relationship to the unitary business. In this State, the unitary busi-
ness principle shall be applied to the fullest extent allowed by the U.S. Constitution. The unitary busi-
ness principle shall not be applied to result in the combination of business activities or entities under 
circumstances where, if it were adverse to the taxpayer, the combination of such activities or entities 
would not be allowed by the U.S. Constitution.
C. Separate Trades or Businesses Conducted within a Single Entity. A single entity may have more 
than one unitary business. In such cases it is necessary to determine the business, or apportionable, 
income attributable to each separate unitary business as well as its nonbusiness income, which is 
specifically allocated. The business income of each unitary business is then apportioned by a formula 
that takes into consideration the in-state and the out-of-state factors that relate to the respective 
unitary business whose income is being apportioned.
D. Unitary Business Unaffected by Formal Business Organization. A unitary business may exist within 
a single business entity or among a group of commonly owned or controlled business entities. The 
scope of what is included in a commonly owned or controlled group of business entities is set forth in 
Section V below.
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II. DETERMINATION OF A UNITARY BUSINESS
A unitary business is characterized by significant flows of value evidenced by factors such as those 
described in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Vermont, 445 U.S. 425 (1980): functional integration, centralization of 
management, and economies of scale. These factors provide evidence of whether the business activities 
operate as an integrated whole or exhibit substantial mutual interdependence. [Reserved: See regulation 
concerning passive holding companies for special rules that govern the determination of whether a pure 
or passive holding company constitutes a part of a unitary business with one or more affiliates conduct-
ing active business operations.] Facts suggesting the presence of the factors mentioned above should be 
analyzed in combination for their cumulative effect and not in isolation. 
A. Classification of Particular Business Operations. A particular business operation may be sugges-
tive of one or more of the factors mentioned above.
B. Description and Illustration of Functional Integration, Centralization of Management and Economies 
of Scale.
1. Functional integration: Functional integration refers to transfers between, or pooling among, 
business activities that significantly affect the operation of the business activities. Functional 
integration includes, but is not limited to, transfers or pooling with respect to the unitary business’s 
products or services, technical information, marketing information, distribution systems, purchasing, 
and intangibles such as patents, trademarks, service marks, copyrights, trade secrets, know-how, 
formulas, and processes. There is no specific type of functional integration that must be present. 
The following is a list of examples of business operations that can support the finding of functional 
integration. The order of the list does not establish a hierarchy of importance.
a. Sales, exchanges, or transfers (collectively “sales”) of products, services, and/or intangibles 
between business activities provide evidence of functional integration. The significance of the 
intercompany sales to the finding of functional integration will be affected by the character of 
what is sold and/or the percentage of total sales or purchases represented by the intercompany 
sales. For example, sales among business entities that are part of a vertically integrated unitary 
business are indicative of functional integration. Functional integration is not negated by the use 
of a readily determinable market price to effect the intercompany sales, because such sales can 
represent an assured market for the seller or an assured source of supply for the purchaser.
b. Common Marketing. The sharing of common marketing features among business entities is 
an indication of functional integration when such marketing results in significant mutual advan-
tage. Common marketing exists when a substantial portion of the business entities’ products, 
services, or intangibles are distributed or sold to a common customer, when the business entities 
use a common trade name or other common identification, or when the business entities seek to 
identify themselves to 124 their customers as a member of the same enterprise. The use of a com-
mon advertising agency or a commonly owned or controlled in-house advertising office does not 
by itself establish common marketing that is suggestive of functional integration. (Such activity, 
however, is relevant to determining the existence of economies of scale and/or centralization of 
management.)
c. Transfer or Pooling of Technical Information or Intellectual Property. Transfers or pooling of 
technical information or intellectual property, such as patents, copyrights, trademarks and ser-
vice marks, trade secrets, processes or formulas, know-how, research, or development, provide 
evidence of functional integration when the matter transferred is significant to the businesses’ 
operations.
d. Common Distribution System. Use of a common distribution system by the business entities, 
under which inventory control and accounting, storage, trafficking, and/or transportation are 
controlled through a common network provides evidence of functional integration.
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 e. Common Purchasing. Common purchasing of substantial quantities of products, services, or 
intangibles from the same source by the business entities, particularly where the purchasing 
results in significant cost savings or where the products, services or intangibles are not readily 
available from other sources and are significant to each entity’s operations or sales, provides 
evidence of functional integration.
f. Common or Intercompany Financing. Significant common or intercompany financing, including 
the guarantee by, or the pledging of the credit of, one or more business entities for the benefit 
of another business entity or entities provides evidence of functional integration, if the financing 
activity serves an operational purpose of both borrower and lender. Lending which serves an 
investment purpose of the lender does not necessarily provide evidence of functional integration. 
(See below for discussion of centralization of management.)
2. Centralization of Management. Centralization of management exists when directors, officers, 
and/or other management employees jointly participate in the management decisions that affect the 
respective business activities and that may also operate to the benefit of the entire economic enter-
prise. Centralization of management can exist whether the centralization is effected from a parent 
entity to a subsidiary entity, from a subsidiary entity to a parent entity, from one subsidiary entity 
to another, from one division within a single business entity to another division within a business 
entity, or from any combination of the foregoing. Centralization of management may exist even when 
day-to-day management responsibility and accountability has been decentralized, so long as the 
management has an ongoing operational role with respect to the business activities. An operational 
role can be effected 183 through mandates, consensus building, or an overall operational strategy of 
the business, or any other mechanism that establishes joint management.
a. Facts Providing Evidence of Centralization of Management. Evidence of centralization of man-
agement is provided when common officers participate in the decisions relating to the business 
operations of the different segments. Centralization of management may exist when management 
shares or applies knowledge and expertise among the parts of the business. Existence of com-
mon officers and directors, while relevant to a showing of centralization of management, does 
not alone provide evidence of centralization of management. Common officers are more likely to 
provide evidence of centralization of management than are common directors.
b. Stewardship Distinguished. Centralized efforts to fulfill stewardship oversight are not evidence 
of centralization of management. Stewardship oversight consists of those activities that any 
owner would take to review the performance of or safeguard an investment. Stewardship over-
sight is distinguished from those activities that an owner may take to enhance value by integrat-
ing one or more significant operating aspects of one business activity with the other business 
activities of the owner. For example, implementing reporting requirements or mere approval of 
capital expenditures may evidence only stewardship oversight.
3. Economies of Scale. Economies of scale refers to a relation among and between business activi-
ties resulting in a significant decrease in the average per unit cost of operational or administrative 
functions due to the increase in operational size. Economies of scale may exist from the inherent 
cost savings that arise from the presence of functional integration or centralization of management. 
The following are examples of business operations that can support the finding of economies of 
scale. The order of the list does not establish a hierarchy of importance.
a. Centralized Purchasing. Centralized purchasing designed to achieve savings due to the vol-
ume of purchases, the timing of purchases, or the interchangeability of purchased items among 
the parts of the business engaging in the purchasing provides evidence of economies of scale.
b. Centralized Administrative Functions. The performance of traditional corporate administrative 
functions, such as legal services, payroll services, pension and other employee benefit adminis-
03-Chapter 03.indd   96 10/6/11   2:09 PM
Chapter 3: Filing Methods for Multistate Taxpayers
 97
tration, in common among the parts of the business may result in some degree of economies of 
scale. A business entity that secures savings in the performance of corporate administrative ser-
vices due to its affiliation with other business entities that it would not otherwise reasonably be 
able to secure on its own because of its size, financial resources, or available market, provides 
evidence of economies of scale.
III. INFERENCES OF A UNITARY BUSINESS
A. Same Type of Business. Business activities that are in the same general line of business generally 
constitute a single unitary business, as, for example, a multistate grocery chain.
B. Steps in a Vertical Process. Business activities that are part of different steps in a vertically struc-
tured business almost always constitute a single unitary business. For example, a business engaged 
in the exploration, development, extraction, and processing of a natural resource and the subsequent 
sale of a product based upon the extracted natural resource, is engaged in a single unitary business, 
regardless of the fact that the various steps in the process are operated substantially independently of 
each other with only general supervision from the business’s executive offices.
C. Strong Centralized Management. Business activities which might otherwise be considered as part 
of more than one unitary business may constitute one unitary business when there is a strong central 
management, coupled with the existence of centralized departments for such functions as financing, 
advertising, research, or purchasing. Strong centralized management exists when a central manager 
or group of managers makes substantially all of the operational decisions of the business. For ex-
ample, some businesses conducting diverse lines of business may properly be considered as engaged 
in only one unitary business when the central executive officers are actively involved in the operations 
of the various business activities and there are centralized offices which perform for the business 
activities the normal matters which a truly independent business would perform for itself, such as 
personnel, purchasing, advertising, or financing.
IV. COMMONLY OWNED OR CONTROLLED GROUP OF BUSINESS ENTITIES
A. Separate corporations can be part of a unitary business only if they are members of a commonly 
controlled group.
B. A “commonly controlled group” means any of the following:
1. A parent corporation and any one or more corporations or chains of corporations, connected 
through stock ownership (or constructive ownership) with the parent, but only if—
a. The parent owns stock possessing more than 50 percent of the voting power of at least one 
corporation, and, if applicable,
b. Stock cumulatively representing more than 50 percent of the voting power of each of the 
corporations, except the parent, is owned by the parent, one or more corporations described in 
subparagraph (A), or one or more other corporations that satisfy the conditions of this subpara-
graph.
2. Any two or more corporations, if stock representing more than 50 percent of the voting power of 
the corporations is owned, or constructively owned, by the same person.
3. Any two or more corporations that constitute stapled entities.
a. For purposes of this paragraph, “stapled entities” means any group of two or more corpora-
tions if more than 50 percent of the ownership or beneficial ownership of the stock possessing 
voting power in each corporation consists of stapled interests.
b. Two or more interests are stapled interests if, by reason of form of ownership restrictions on 
transfer, or other terms or conditions, in connection with the transfer of one of the interests the 
other interest or interests are also transferred or required to be transferred.
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 4. Any two or more corporations, all of whose stock representing more than 50 percent of the voting 
power of the corporations is cumulatively owned (without regard to the constructive ownership 
rules of paragraph (a) of subdivision (5)) by, or for the benefit of, members of the same family. Mem-
bers of the same family are limited to an individual, his or her spouse, parents, brothers or sisters, 
grandparents, children and grandchildren, and their respective spouses.
C. If, in the application of subdivision 2, a corporation is eligible to be treated as a member of more 
than one commonly controlled group of corporations, the corporation shall elect to be treated as a 
member of only one commonly controlled group. This election shall remain in effect unless revoked 
with the approval of the [state tax agency].
Membership in a commonly controlled group shall be treated as terminated in any year, or fraction 
thereof, in which the conditions of subdivision 2 are not met, except as follows:
1. When stock of a corporation is sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of, the membership of a 
corporation in a commonly controlled group shall not be terminated, if the requirements of subdivi-
sion (2) are again met immediately after the sale, exchange, or disposition.
2. The [state tax agency] may treat the commonly controlled group as remaining in place if the 
conditions of subdivision (b) are again met within a period not to exceed two years.
D.  A taxpayer may exclude some or all corporations included in a “commonly controlled group” 
by reason of paragraph d of subdivision 2 by showing that those members of the group are not 
controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, within the meaning of the same phrase in 
Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code. For purposes of this subdivision, the term “controlled” 
includes any kind of control, direct or indirect, whether legally enforceable, and however exercis-
able or exercised.
E.  Except as otherwise provided, stock is “owned” when title to the stock 349 is directly held or if the 
stock is constructively owned.
1. An individual constructively owns stock that is owned by any of the following:
a. His or her spouse.
b. Children, including adopted children, of that individual or the individual’s spouse, who have not 
attained the age of 21 years.
c. An estate or trust, of which the individual is an executor, trustee, or grantor, to the extent that 
the estate or trust is for the benefit of that individual’s spouse or children.
2. Stock owned by a corporation, or a member of a controlled group of which the corporation is the 
parent corporation, is constructively owned by any shareholder owning stock that represents more 
than 50 percent of the voting power of the corporation.
3. Stock owned by a partnership is constructively owned by any partner, other than a limited part-
ner, in proportion to the partner’s capital interest in the partnership. For this purpose, a partnership 
is treated as owning proportionately the stock owned by any other partnership in which it has a 
tiered interest, other than as a limited 1 partner.
4. In any case where a member of a commonly controlled group, or shareholders, officers, direc-
tors, or employees of a member of a commonly controlled group, is a general partner in a limited 
partnership, stock held by the limited partnership is constructively owned by a limited partner to the 
extent of its capital interest in the limited partnership.
F. For purposes of this definition, each of the following shall apply:
1. “Corporation” means a subchapter S corporation, limited liability company, any other incorpo-
rated entity, or any entity defined or treated as a corporation pursuant to [insert your State statute].
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2. “Person” means an individual, a trust, an estate, a qualified employee benefit plan, a limited 
partnership, or a corporation.
3. “Voting power” means the power of all classes of stock entitled to vote that possess the power 
to elect the membership of the board of directors of the corporation.
4. “More than 50 percent of the voting power” means voting power sufficient to elect a majority of 
the membership of the board of directors of the corporation.
5. “Stock representing voting power” includes stock where ownership is retained but the actual 
voting power is transferred in either of the following manners:
a. For one year or less.
b. By proxy, voting trust, written shareholder agreement, or by similar device, where the transfer 
is revocable by the transferor.
G. The [state tax agency] may prescribe any regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry 
out the purposes of this section, including, but not limited to, regulations that do the following:
1. Prescribe terms and conditions relating to the election described by subdivision 3, and the revo-
cation thereof.
2. Disregard transfers of voting power not described by paragraph e of subdivision
3. Treat entities not described by paragraph b of subdivision 6 as a person.
4. Treat warrants, obligations convertible into stock, options to acquire or sell stock, and similar 
instruments as stock.
5. Treat holders of a beneficial interest in, or executor or trustee powers over, stock held by an 
estate or trust as constructively owned by the holder.
6. Prescribe rules relating to the treatment of partnership agreements which authorize a particular 
partner or partners to exercise voting power of stock held by the partnership. 
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Introduction
A company doing business in more than one state really has only three alternatives for sort-
ing out what income goes to what state. They are (1) separate filing, (2) allocation, and (3) 
apportionment. As we have seen from looking at case law, separate accounting has gone 
the way of the horse and buggy whip. That leaves allocation and apportionment, and both 
methods are used in consolidated and combined filing. Allocation refers to income that is 
specifically allocated to a particular state. Apportionment is the sourcing of income based 
upon some formula, usually a combination of the company’s payroll, property, and sales.
Current Rules
Today’s rules regarding apportionment and allocation originated in the 1950s through the 
efforts of state representatives. In 1957, these representatives, through the National Con-
ference of Commissioners, drafted the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act 
(UDITPA). The goal of UDITPA was to promote uniformity among the states in the al-
location and apportionment of multistate corporate income. Currently, some 30 states have 
adopted UDITPA in whole or in part, and even in those states that have not specifically 
adopted UDITPA, its influence is obvious. (See appendix B for a copy of UDITPA.)
Section 2 of UDITPA, which contains the legislation’s scope, provides that “any taxpayer 
having income from business activity which is taxable both within and without this state, 
other than activity as a financial organization or public utility or the rendering of purely 
personal services by an individual, shall allocate and apportion his net income as provided in 
this Act.” Thus, all taxpayers, except for individuals, banks, and public utilities, are generally 
included within UDITPA’s scope. (See appendix C found on the CD-ROM for a copy of 
UDITPA.)
Right to Apportion
Before a company determines how to apportion and allocate its income, it must first deter-
mine if it indeed has the right to apportion its income. Section 3 of UDITPA provides that 
a taxpayer has the right to apportion if it is subject to tax in more than one state.
101
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For purposes of allocation and apportionment of income under this Act, a taxpayer is 
taxable in another state if (1) in that state he is subject to a net income tax, a franchise tax 
measured by net income, a franchise tax for the privilege of doing business, or a corporate 
stock tax, or (2) that state has jurisdiction to subject this taxpayer to a net income tax re-
gardless of whether, in fact, the state does or does not.
The key point to note here is that a taxpayer need not actually have to pay a tax to an-
other state. It is sufficient that the state has the right to tax the taxpayer. For example, if my 
company is doing business in both Wyoming and Colorado, I can apportion my income 
between the two states despite the fact that Wyoming has no income tax. Because I am do-
ing business in the state, and Wyoming has the right to tax my income, it simply has decided 
not to do so. Do you have to file in every state in order to apportion income to that state? 
No. UDITPA only requires that a taxpayer be doing business “without this state.” In other 
words, I need only be subject to tax in one other state in order to apportion among all the 
states in which I have activity.
Author’s Note: Example
Griffins-R-Us is headquartered in Colorado, but it does business in Kansas and 
Oklahoma, as well as in Wyoming. Griffins need only be subject to tax in  
one of the three states other than Colorado to have the right to apportion income 
among all the states.
 
Does a company have to actually file returns in order to allocate or apportion its income? 
Not necessarily. The Massachusetts Tax Board has ruled that it is only necessary that the 
company be “subject to tax,” not that the company had actually filed.1 While it may be un-
constitutional to do so, many states hold that filing in another state where it is not required 
to file is insufficient to establish the right to apportion even if the filing was through neglect, 
ignorance, materiality, or uncertainty about filing requirements. As a practical matter, many 
auditors will not allow a company to apportion and allocate its income unless it can show it 
is filing returns in other states.2 Moreover, filings with a secretary of state, or other license 
fees, are often deemed insufficient. Fees are not taxes, and many auditors will not allow ap-
portionment unless the fee is based on net income or capital and not simply a registration 
or licensing payment. 
Business Versus Nonbusiness Income
Now that we have determined UDITPA’s scope and established the right to apportion, 
what is it that a taxpayer can apportion? The answer is “business income,” a seemingly in-
nocuous term which has prompted continuing battles between taxpayers and tax administra-
tors. UDITPA defines business income as follows:
1 See Amray, Inc. v. Comm’r, No. 119875 (Mass. App. Tax Bd. Apr. 17, 1986).
2 See, for example, Technical Assistance Advisement 95(C)1-008, Fla. Dept. of Rev., Aug. 30, 1995.
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“Business income” means income arising from transactions and activity in the regular 
course of the taxpayer’s trade or business and includes income from tangible and intangible 
property if the acquisition, management and disposition of the property constitute integral 
parts of the taxpayer’s regular trade or business operations.
Author’s Note: On Business Income
More and more states are considering everything business income.
Nonbusiness income is unhelpfully defined as all income other than business income. 
Furthermore, the Multistate Tax Commission (MTC), which has incorporated the UD-
ITPA provisions within its own compact and regulations, holds that there is a presumption 
that income is business income. “The income of a taxpayer is business income unless clearly 
classifiable as nonbusiness income.”
Why is this distinction between business and nonbusiness income significant? First, be-
cause for many states, business income is subject to apportionment among the states while 
nonbusiness income is allocable to a specific state, usually the taxpayer’s state of commercial 
domicile. Of course, not all states follow this distinction. Some states specifically allocate 
certain identified types of income and other states apportion all income.
Author’s Note: On Nonbusiness Income
Documentation, both from a paperwork and theory standpoint, is key to 
establishing something as nonbusiness income, but be sure to put your position 
together before the auditor arrives.
Two Tests or Three
Read the definition of business income again. Does the definition contain just one test for 
business income or are there two? The single-test advocates emphasize the phrase “activity 
in the regular course of a taxpayer’s trade or business” and see the balance of the paragraph as 
an elaboration of the regular activity of the business. The two-test advocates argue that the 
word “and” separates a “transactional test” from a “functional test.” That is, business income 
includes what the single-testers embrace and other income “from tangible and intangible 
property if the acquisition, management, and disposition of the property constitute integral 
parts of the taxpayer’s regular trade or business operations.”
The MTC has proposed regulations which define the two tests.
Transactional Test
“… If the transaction or activity is in the regular course of the taxpayer’s trade or business, 
part of which trade or business is conducted within [this State], the resulting income of the 
transaction or activity is business income for [this State]. Income may be business income 
even though the actual transaction or activity that gives rise to the income does not occur 
in [this State].”
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 Functional Test
Business income also includes income from tangible and intangible property, if the acquisi-
tion, management, and disposition of the property constitute integral parts of the taxpayer’s 
regular trade or business operations.
Under the functional test, business income need not be derived from transactions or ac-
tivities that are in the regular course of the taxpayer’s own particular trade or business. It is 
sufficient, if the property from which the income is derived is or was an integral, functional, 
necessary, or operative component to the taxpayer’s trade or business operations, part of 
which trade or business is or was conducted within a state.3
Most states hold that if either of the tests is satisfied, the income will be considered busi-
ness income.
An oft-quoted example illustrating the difference between the transactional and func-
tional tests is the sale of a factory. Under the transactional test, the sale would probably 
be deemed nonbusiness income. After all, selling a factory is an unusual, nonrecurring, 
extraordinary event not usually considered part of a company’s regular daily transactions in 
the course of trade or business. However, under the functional test, the gain or loss on the 
factory sale would probably be deemed business income because the factory had been used 
in the company’s regular trade or business.
The continuing disputes, then, in this area are, first, what is the distinction between busi-
ness and nonbusiness income, and, second, (a subset of the first) does the business income 
definition have one or two tests? Most states today have settled the second question either 
through litigation or legislation holding that the definition has both tests.
The question of whether California has only a transactional test or a functional test was 
decisively answered in Hoechst Celanese Corporation v. Franchise Tax Board, 22 P.3d 324 (Cal. 
2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1040 (2001). The court held that the definition of business in-
come contained both a transactional and a functional test. As mentioned, the trend among 
most states is to move toward two tests for defining business income. In the past several 
years, Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Carolina, Or-
egon, and Pennsylvania have all enacted legislation specifically broadening their definitions 
of business income.
The following example illustrates the importance of this seemingly ideological dispute 
among tax practitioners and tax administrators.
Salem Company does business in both State X and State Y. It sold one of its logging mills 
in State X for $13 million. State X believes the definition of business income contains only 
the transactional test and deems the sale to be nonbusiness income, therefore, allocating 
the entire gain to itself. After all, Salem Company is not in the business of selling its mills, 
and this is the first sale of a mill in more than 15 years. State Y, which believes there is 
both a transactional and functional test in the definition of business income, holds that the 
sale meets the functional test. State Y accordingly apportions some of the gain to itself. As 
a consequence, Salem is paying tax on more than 100 percent of the sale of the mill. The 
total sale is getting taxed by State X, and a portion of that same sale is being apportioned to 
State Y to be taxed.
3 Multistate Tax Commission Prop. Regs. IV(a)(3) and (4).
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Attempts to Define Business Versus  
Nonbusiness Income
Sometimes it is easy to determine business income, for example, the sale of inventory. The 
problem areas are in what is often called passive income. For example, interest income from 
temporary investments of working capital used to purchase additional inventory would 
probably be business income. But interest income from long-term investments isn’t so easy 
to classify.
UDITPA provides for the allocation of five types of nonbusiness income to specific states. 
They are rents, royalties, capital gains, interest, and dividends.
Section 4. Rents and royalties from real or tangible personal property, capital gains, inter-
est, dividends, or patent or copyright royalties, to the extent that they constitute non-
business income, shall be allocated as provided…
The MTC has issued regulations interpreting UDITPA to read that all “income of the 
taxpayer is business income unless clearly classifiable as nonbusiness income.” The burden 
of proof is put upon the taxpayer to show that the income is nonbusiness.
According to the MTC, what you may call the income is irrelevant. “The classification 
of income by the labels occasionally used, such as manufacturing income, compensation for 
services, sales income, interest, dividends, rents, royalties, gains, operating income, nonop-
erating income, etc., is of no aid in determining whether income is business or nonbusiness 
income.” Instead, MTC’s proposed amendments to its regulations provide that “business 
income means income of any type or class, and from any activity, that meets the relationship 
described either [as] the ‘transactional test,’ or the ‘functional test.’”
Problem Areas
Rental and Royalty Income 
The MTC regulations provide that if the property giving rise to the rental or royalty income 
is used in or incidental to the taxpayer’s trade or business (that is, included in the property 
factor), it is business income. The MTC regulations offer seven examples:
Example 1: The taxpayer operates a multistate car rental business. The income from car 
rentals is business income.
Example 2: The taxpayer is engaged in the heavy construction business in which it uses 
equipment such as cranes, tractors, and earth-moving vehicles. The taxpayer 
makes short-term leases of the equipment when particular pieces of equip-
ment are not needed on any particular project. The rental income is business 
income.
Example 3: The taxpayer operates a multistate chain of men’s clothing stores. The tax-
payer purchases a five-story office building for use in connection with its 
trade or business. It uses the street floor as one of its retail stores and the 
second and third floors for its general corporate headquarters. The remaining 
two floors are leased to others. The rental of the two floors is incidental to 
the operation of the taxpayer’s trade or business. The rental income is busi-
ness income.
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 Example 4: The taxpayer operates a multistate chain of grocery stores. It purchases as an 
investment an office building in another state with surplus funds and leases 
the entire building to others. The net rental income is not business income 
of the grocery store trade or business. Therefore, the net rental income is 
nonbusiness income.
Example 5: The taxpayer operates a multistate chain of men’s clothing stores. The tax-
payer invests in a 20-story office building and uses the street floor as one of its 
retail stores and the second floor for its general corporate headquarters. The 
remaining 18 floors are leased to others. The rental of the eighteen floors is 
not incidental to but rather is separate from the operation of the taxpayer 
trade or business. The net rental income is not business income of the cloth-
ing store trade or business. Therefore, the net rental income is nonbusiness 
income.
Example 6: The taxpayer constructed a plant for use in its multistate manufacturing busi-
ness and 20 years later the plant was closed and put up for sale. The plant was 
rented for a temporary period from the time it was closed by the taxpayer 
until it was sold 18 months later. The rental income is business income and 
the gain on the sale of the plant is business income.
Example 7: The taxpayer operates a multistate chain of grocery stores. It owned an office 
building that it occupied as its corporate headquarters. Because of inadequate 
space, taxpayer acquired a new and larger building elsewhere for its corporate 
headquarters. The old building was rented to an investment company under 
a five-year lease. Upon expiration of the lease, taxpayer sold the building 
at a gain (or loss). The net rental income received over the lease period is 
nonbusiness and the gain (or loss) on the sale of the building is nonbusiness 
income.
Examples 3 and 5 illustrate the subjective nature of defining business income. In example 
3, the rental of two floors is deemed incidental to the taxpayer’s trade or business, and the 
rental income is classified as business income. However, in example 5, the rental of 18 floors 
is deemed not incidental and, therefore, classified as nonbusiness income.
Author’s Note: On Business vs. Nonbusiness Income
At what point between the rental of 2 and 18 floors does the rental income 
transition from business to nonbusiness income?
Gains and Losses From Real or Tangible Personal 
Property Dispositions
Sales of property provide for some of the most controversial arguments between taxpayers 
and tax administrators over business and nonbusiness income. States that adhere to the one-
test interpretation of business income will not pick up a sale of property unless the taxpayer 
is regularly engaged in such sales. The two-test states find the sale to meet the functional 
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test and will pick it up as apportionable business income. As a consequence, the taxpayer is 
faced with the threat of double taxation.
The MTC states are two-test believers. “Gain or loss from the sale, exchange or other 
disposition of real property or of tangible or intangible personal property constitutes busi-
ness income if the property while owned by the taxpayer was used in the taxpayer’s trade 
or business.”
MTC examples include the following:
Example 1: In conducting its multistate manufacturing business, the taxpayer systemati-
cally replaces automobiles, machines, and other equipment used in the busi-
ness. The gains or losses resulting from those sales constitute business income.
Example 2: The taxpayer constructed a plant for use in its multistate manufacturing busi-
ness and 20 years later sold the property at a gain while it was in operation by 
the taxpayer. The gain is business income.
Example 3: Same as 2 except that the plant was closed and put up for sale but was not, 
in fact, sold until a buyer was found 18 months later. The gain is business 
income.
Example 4: Same as 2 except the plant was rented while being held for sale. The rental 
income is business income and the gain on the sale of the plant is business 
income.
Example 5: The taxpayer operates a multistate chain of grocery stores. It owned an of-
fice building which it occupied as its corporate headquarters. Because of the 
inadequate space, taxpayer acquired a new and larger building elsewhere for 
its corporate headquarters. The old building was rented to an unrelated in-
vestment company under a five-year lease. Upon expiration of the lease, 
taxpayer sold the building at a gain (or loss). The gain (or loss) on the sale is 
nonbusiness income and the rental income received over the lease period is 
nonbusiness income.
Please note that the sale of a plant held for 18 months is business income, but the sale of 
a facility owned and leased for five years is nonbusiness income.
Author’s Note: On Business vs. Nonbusiness Income
At what point between 18 months and 5 years does the sale move from being 
business to nonbusiness income?
Income from asset sales has traditionally been one of the most debated areas in distinguish-
ing business from nonbusiness income. The following are some of the more well-known 
decisions and well illustrate the scope of this ongoing area of contention:
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Iowa, 511 N.W.2d 608 (Iowa 1993)
Phillips sold a significant percentage of its assets to raise funds to purchase its own stock in 
an attempt to fend off a hostile takeover. None of the assets were located in Iowa. The court 
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 ruled that Iowa’s definition of business income had only a transactional test. The “unprec-
edented” and once-in-a-lifetime nature of the sale indicated that it was clearly not transac-
tional in nature and, thus, the gain was nonbusiness income allocated outside of Iowa. The 
Iowa legislature immediately amended the state statute to include a functional test.
Firstar Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 575 N.W.2d 835 (Minn. 1998)
A Wisconsin-based bank sold its headquarters building, and the Minnesota court ruled that 
all the gain is allocated to Wisconsin as nonbusiness income. Rather than running the jus-
tices out of town on a rail, the Minnesota legislature simply amended the statute to tax all 
the income it can constitutionally tax.
Laurel Pipeline Co. v. Commonwealth, 615 A.2d 841 (Pa. 1994)
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the Pennsylvania statute contains both a trans-
actional and functional test for determining business income. Nevertheless, the sale of a 
pipeline was nonbusiness income. The pipeline had been unused for three years, and the 
proceeds were distributed as a dividend. Because the pipeline was not an integral part of 
the business, the sale did not meet the functional test, and because the company was not 
in the business of selling pipelines, the sale did not meet the transactional test. Thus, it was 
allocable nonbusiness income. Compare Laurel Pipeline to Texaco-Cities Service Pipeline Co. 
v. McGaw, 695 N.E.2d 481 (Ill. 1998). In Texaco-Cities Service, the Illinois Supreme Court 
ruled that because the sale proceeds from the sale of pipeline were reinvested in the business, 
and because the Illinois statute had both transaction and functional tests, the sale was appor-
tionable business income. When the gain was from a complete liquidation or termination 
of the business and the proceeds distributed to the shareholders, the Illinois Supreme Court 
has ruled that the gains were nonbusiness income.4
Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks
Some states allocate intangible income from patents, copyrights, and trademarks to the tax-
payer’s commercial domicile; many more apportion the income. The MTC regulations 
offer three examples of how it believes this income should be treated:
Example 1: The taxpayer is engaged in the multistate business of manufacturing and sell-
ing industrial chemicals. In connection with that business the taxpayer ob-
tained patents on certain of its products. The taxpayer licensed the produc-
tion of the chemicals in foreign countries, in return for which the taxpayer 
receives royalties. The royalties received by the taxpayer are business income.
Example 2: The taxpayer is engaged in the music publishing business and holds copy-
rights on numerous songs. The taxpayer acquires the assets of a smaller pub-
lishing company, including music copyrights. These acquired copyrights are 
thereafter used by the taxpayer in its business. Any royalties received on these 
copyrights are business income.
4 See Blessing/White Inc. v. Zehnder, 768 N.E.2d 332 (Ill. 2002), and American States Ins. Co. v. Hamer, 816 
N.E.2d 659 (Ill. 2004).
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Example 3: Same as Example 2 except that acquired company also held the patent on a 
type of phonograph needle. The taxpayer does not manufacture or sell pho-
nographs or phonograph equipment. Any royalties received on the patent 
would be nonbusiness income.
Interest Income
UDITPA provides that interest income is business income if the underlying intangible was 
acquired, maintained, and disposed of as an integral part of the taxpayer’s trade or business. 
The MTC’s regulation reflects its consistently pro-apportionment stance. “Interest income 
is business income where the intangible with respect to which the interest received arises 
out of or was created in the regular course of the taxpayer’s trade or business operations or 
where the purpose for acquiring and holding the intangible is related to or incidental to such 
trade or business operations.”
The MTC regulations offer six examples:
Example 1: The taxpayer operates a multistate chain of department stores, selling for cash 
and on credit. Service charges, interest, or time-price differentials and the like 
are received with respect to installment sales and revolving charge accounts. 
These amounts are business income.
Example 2: The taxpayer conducts a multistate manufacturing business. During the year, 
the taxpayer receives a federal income tax refund and collects a judgment 
against a debtor of the business. Both the tax refund and the judgment bore 
interest. The interest income is business income.
Example 3: The taxpayer is engaged in a multistate manufacturing and wholesaling busi-
ness. In connection with that business, the taxpayer maintains special ac-
counts to cover such items as workmen’s compensation claims, rain and 
storm damage, machinery replacement, etc. The monies in those accounts are 
invested at interest. Similarly, the taxpayer temporarily invests funds intended 
for payment of federal, state and local tax obligations. The interest income is 
business income.
Example 4: The taxpayer is engaged in a multistate money order and traveler’s check 
business. In addition to the fees received in connection with the sale of the 
money orders and traveler’s checks, the taxpayer earns interest income by 
the investment of the funds pending their redemption. The interest income 
is business income.
Example 5: The taxpayer is engaged in a multistate manufacturing and selling business. 
The taxpayer usually has working capital and extra cash totaling $200,000, 
which it regularly invests in short-term interest bearing securities. The inter-
est income is business income.
Example 6: In January, the taxpayer sold all the stock of a subsidiary for $20,000,000. 
The funds are place in an interest-bearing account pending a decision by 
management as to how the funds are to be utilized. The interest income is 
nonbusiness income.
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 Example 6 in the previous section is an excellent example of an item that often receives 
contrary treatment by states. It is not unusual for one state to argue that the income is busi-
ness income and apportionable while another state, following the MTC’s lead, holds that 
the interest income is nonbusiness income. Several examples of different state rulings follow:
Siegel-Robert, Inc. v. Johnson, No. M2008-02228-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct.  
App. Oct. 28, 2009).
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held for the taxpayer in holding that interest income from 
Treasury securities was not apportionable business income, but allocable nonbusiness in-
come taxable to Missouri, not Tennessee. The taxpayer successfully showed that the income 
was unrelated to its Tennessee operations and served as an investment, not an operational, 
function.
W.R. Grace v. Commissioner, No. C271787 (Mass. App. Tax Bd. Apr. 6, 2009)
Keep in mind that there must be a unitary relationship or else the income cannot be appor-
tioned. The taxpayer was able to convince the Massachusetts Appellate Tax Board that divi-
dend and interest income received from affiliates was not apportionable business income, 
because no unitary relationship existed between the taxpayer and its affiliates.
Home Interiors and Gifts, Inc. v. Illinois, 741 N.E.2d 998 (2000), app. denied (Ill. 2001)
Home Interiors was a Texas corporation that had generated enough cash to not only cover 
its working capital needs but also to invest in short-term certificates of deposit, commercial 
paper, and municipal bonds while awaiting a better economic environment to expand its 
operations or business investments. The company had interest income of roughly $7.7 mil-
lion in 1989 and $11 million in 1990 that it allocated to Texas as nonbusiness income. Il-
linois auditors believed that the interest income was business income and apportioned some 
of it to that state, arguing that the funds were available for business investment and were not 
separately segregated from the company’s operational funds. The Illinois Appellate Court 
ruled in favor of Home Interiors, holding that the mere availability of the funds, as opposed 
to their use, was insufficient to render the interest business income rather than nonbusi-
ness income. The company had treated the funds as investment, not operational, funds and 
reported them as such on its financial statements. In addition, the company had paid tax to 
Texas on all of its interest income from the investments.
Appeal of Consolidated Freightways, 2000-SBE-001 (Cal. State Bd. of Equalization Sept. 2000)
Consolidated Freightways received $281 million from the sale of a subsidiary that it invested 
in short- and long-term securities while awaiting the opportunity to use the funds to expand 
its transportation business. Although it was seven years before it used the funds to acquire 
another transportation company, the fact that the company engaged in an active and ongo-
ing effort to acquire another transportation company, and that the funds were “earmarked” 
for acquisition of a specific business purchase, convinced the California State Board of 
Equalization that the interest income from the funds was business income.5
5 See also Appeal of Cullinet Software, Inc., 95-SBE-002 (Cal. State Bd. of Equalization May 4, 1995).
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Income From Stock Sales
Income from the sale of stock continues to be one of the most litigated areas in the business 
or nonbusiness income arena. Of course, the landmark case in this area is Allied-Signal, Inc. 
v. Director of Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251 (1992) (discussed in the previous chapter), in which 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that New Jersey could not tax the gain on a sale of stock be-
cause no unitary relationship existed between the entities and the gain was not from business 
operations but from nonbusiness investments. The following three decisions reflect some of 
the ongoing differences in this area of contention:
In re Chief Industries, Inc., 875 P.2d 278 (Kan. 1994)
The Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the Kansas statute contains only a transactional test, 
not a functional test. Thus, the gain on the sale of a subsidiary’s stock was nonbusiness in-
come and allocable outside of Kansas. The Kansas legislature very quickly amended the state 
statute to include a functional test.
Ex Parte Uniroyal Tire Co., 779 So.2d 227 (Ala. 2000)
The Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the sale of a partnership interest was not business 
income because the state statute had only a transactional test. The court found that the trans-
actional test does not apply to the complete termination or liquidation of a business. The 
fact that the underlying assets were used to generate business income was deemed irrelevant. 
The Alabama legislature overruled the decision in 2002 by changing the state statute.
Appeal of Crane Co., SBE Case No. 357027 (Cal. State Bd. of Equalization Nov. 2, 2009)
The California State Board of Equalization held that because the income from a stock sale 
served an operational rather than an investment function, the gain was business income 
subject to apportionment. The reader may ask themselves at this point—is Crane consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s position in the MeadWestvaco decision discussed at the end of the 
prior chapter?
Dividend Income
Dividend income has presented a conundrum ever since Mobil Oil Corp. v. Vermont, 445 
U.S. 425 (1980), and ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho, 458 U.S. 307 (1982) (see discussion in chap-
ter 3). In Mobil Oil, dividend income, because Mobil’s operations were held to be uni-
tary, was held to be business income apportionable to Vermont. In ASARCO, the Court 
held that dividend income could not be apportionable business income in the absence of a 
unitary relationship. The MTC regulations predictably provide that dividends are business 
income “where the stock with respect to which the dividends are received arises out of or 
was acquired in the regular course of the taxpayer’s trade or business operations or where 
the purpose for acquiring and holding the stock is related to or incidental to such trade or 
business operations.”
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 The MTC regulations provide six examples:
Example 1: The taxpayer operates a multistate chain of stock brokerage houses. During 
the year the taxpayer receives dividends on stock it owns. The dividends are 
business income.
Example 2: The taxpayer is engaged in a multistate manufacturing and wholesaling busi-
ness. In connection with that business, the taxpayer maintains special ac-
counts to cover such items as workmen’s compensation claims, etc. A por-
tion of the monies in those accounts is invested in interest-bearing bonds. 
The remainder is invested in various common stocks listed on national stock 
exchanges. Both the interest income and any dividends are business income.
Example 3: The taxpayer and several unrelated corporations own all of the stock of a cor-
poration whose business operations consist solely of acquiring and processing 
materials for delivery to the corporate owners. The taxpayer acquired the 
stock in order to obtain a source of supply of materials used in its manufactur-
ing business. The dividends are business income.
Example 4: The taxpayer is engaged in a multistate heavy construction business. Much of 
its construction work is performed for agencies of the federal government and 
various state governments. Under state and federal laws applicable to con-
tracts for these agencies, a contractor must have adequate bonding capacity, 
as measured by the ratio of its current assets (cash and marketable securities) 
to current liabilities. In order to maintain an adequate bonding capacity the 
taxpayer holds various stocks and interest-bearing securities. Both the interest 
income and any dividends received are business income.
Example 5: The taxpayer receives dividends from the stock of its subsidiary or affiliate 
which acts as a marketing agency for products manufactured by the taxpayer. 
The dividends are business income.
Example 6: The taxpayer is engaged in a multistate glass manufacturing business. It also 
holds a portfolio of stock and interest-bearing securities, the acquisition and 
holding of which are unrelated to the manufacturing business. The dividends 
and interest income received are nonbusiness income.
Liquidations
It is difficult to see at first how going out of business can be business income, but the func-
tional test in the definition of business income includes “the acquisition, management, and 
disposition of the property [that] constitute integral parts of the taxpayer’s regular trade or 
business operations.” The language seems to refer only to partial liquidations or the disposal 
of parts of a business’s operations rather than a complete liquidation. Several state decisions 
have indicated that complete liquidations when the funds are not reinvested but distributed 
to the shareholder’s will be treated as nonbusiness income. Nevertheless, California has 
treated complete liquidations as business income, arguing that the taxpayer has wrongly fo-
cused on the nature of the transaction rather than on the fact that the assets were an integral 
part of the business operations, thereby meeting the functional test of business income.
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Jim Beam Brands Co. v. California, 133 Cal. App. 4th 514, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 874  
(1st Dist. 2005)
Jim Beam acquired, managed, and later disposed of the stock of a subsidiary, Taylor Foods, 
and distributed the proceeds from the disposition rather than use them in its other op-
erations. Beam reported the income as nonbusiness income. The California court rejected 
Beam’s treatment, arguing that under the functional test, if an asset generated business in-
come prior to its disposition, it should also generate business income upon its disposition.
Lenox v. Tolson, 548 S.E.2d 513 (2001)
Lenox, a New Jersey company that manufactured various consumer products, sold its fine 
jewelry division and distributed the proceeds to its sole shareholder, the parent company. 
Because the jewelry division was segregated both functionally and financially from the rest 
of the company’s operations, and because the sale represented the cessation of the com-
pany’s involvement with jewelry, Lenox treated the sale as nonbusiness income. The North 
Carolina Department of Revenue disagreed with this treatment and argued instead that the 
proceeds were apportionable business income under the functional test in the definition of 
business income. Both the North Carolina Court of Appeals and the state’s supreme court 
held for the taxpayer, emphasizing that in addition to the transaction and functional tests, 
one had to look at the “totality of the circumstances” and that doing so dictated that Lenox 
was correct in treating the proceeds as nonbusiness income.
Other Income
Companies often receive income or receipts from other than sales, interest, dividends, rent, 
or royalties. The following well known cases illustrate yet again the widely divergent views 
and approaches to business and nonbusiness income issues.
Polaroid Corp. v. Offerman, 507 S.E.2d 284 (N.C. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1098 (1999)
Polaroid received millions of dollars in damages in a successful patent infringement suit. 
Was it business income? Yes, at least according to the North Carolina Supreme Court. The 
court held that North Carolina law contains both transactional and functional tests and that 
“once a corporation’s assets are found to constitute integral parts of the corporation’s regular 
trade or business, income resulting from the acquisition, management, and/or disposition 
of those assets constitutes business income regardless of how that income is received.” As a 
consequence, the damage award was treated as apportionable business income. (Note that 
this decision seems to conflict with the court’s later holding in Lenox.)
Union Carbide Corp. v. Offerman, 526 S.E.2d 167 (N.C. 2000)
The North Carolina Supreme Court found that pension plan reversion income does not 
meet the functional test of the state’s two tests for business income. The pension was not 
an integral or essential functional part of the company because Union Carbide held only a 
contingent property right to the income in the event of termination. In addition, the assets 
of the fund were not used in any transactional sense, that is, they were not used to generate 
sales, as working capital, for purchases, use in research and development, or as collateral. The 
question of how to treat pension reversion income was also addressed in Hoechst Celanese 
Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 22 P.3d 324 (Calif. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1040 (2001).
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 Pennzoil Co. v. Department of Revenue, 33 P.3d 314 (Or. 2001), cert. denied,  
535 U.S. 927 (2002). 
Texaco paid Pennzoil $3 billion in settlement for Texaco’s wrongful interference with 
Pennzoil’s attempt to acquire Getty Oil Company. The Oregon Supreme Court held that 
the income was business income under the transactional test because Pennzoil’s contract ne-
gotiations with Getty were part of its regular business and served an “operational function.”
Internal Revenue Code Section 338(h)(10)
Taxpayers and tax advisers all too often focus on the federal advantages of a particular 
transaction and fail to pay proper attention to its state income tax consequences. Making an 
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 338(h)(10) election is often one of those circumstances. 
IRC § 338 provides that parties to a corporate acquisition may elect to treat a qualified stock 
purchase “as if” it were an asset purchase, providing for the step-up in the basis of the assets 
of the acquired corporation. Although IRC § 338 provides for two ways to achieve this 
purpose, the most popular is probably a IRC § 338(h)(10) election. If the election require-
ments are met, the stock sale is disregarded for federal income tax purposes, and the pur-
chaser gets a stepped-up basis in the deemed asset sale. Because most states that piggyback 
off federal taxable income generally conform to the IRC § 338 rules, the key question at 
the state level is whether the gain from the deemed asset sale is apportionable business or 
allocable nonbusiness income.
Several recent court cases may indicate a trend that a deemed sale of assets under IRC 
§ 338(h)(10) is nonbusiness income.6 As these decisions indicate, state auditors generally 
take the position that IRC § 338 gains are business income (unless, of course, nonbusiness 
income treatment means it will all be allocated to the auditor’s state). Other than factual 
matters, the key elements in the decisions include (1) whether the state statute defining busi-
ness income has both a transactional and functional test and (2) the scope of the functional 
test (for example, does it include dispositions, liquidations, or dissolutions). Given this con-
troversy, tax practitioners entertaining a IRC § 338(h)(10) election will do well to consider 
carefully the impact of such an election on the taxpayer’s state taxes.
Partnership Interests: Business or  
Nonbusiness Income?
Partnership taxation is difficult in part because of the tension between two competing theo-
ries of a partnership’s nature. The aggregate theory of partnerships sees the partnership as 
an aggregation of its owners, each of which is a direct owner of the partnership’s assets. As 
a consequence, if the partnership is doing business in a particular state, then all the partners 
are deemed to be doing business there as well, that is, they each have nexus with the state 
and, consequently, a filing obligation in the state.
6 See, for example, ABB C-E Nuclear Power, Inc. v. Missouri, 215 S.E.3d 85 (Mo. 2007); Chambers v. Utah, 
No. 050402915 (Utah Dist. Ct. Jan. 25, 2007); and Canteen Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 854 A.2d 440 (Pa. 2004), 
but see Georgia v. Trawick Constr. No. A08A2323 (Ga. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2010).
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The entity theory of partnerships, adopted by the Revised Uniform Partnership Act 
(RUPA), places more emphasis on the partnership as an entity separate from its partners. 
Thus, the partnership is treated more like a corporation with shareholders, and just as an 
investment in a corporation does not create nexus for its shareholders in whichever state the 
corporation is doing business, the ownership of a partnership interest, in and of itself, should 
not trigger nexus in those states that have adopted RUPA.
Whether a state leans more toward an aggregate or entity approach, many states have 
adopted specific rules with regard to limited partners or members of limited liability compa-
nies, thus requiring practitioners to inquire into each state’s specific treatment.
In addition to specific treatment of limited partners, states vary in whether the business 
or nonbusiness income distinction is made at the partnership level or at the partner level. 
California, for example, makes the distinction at the partnership level.
Since the business or nonbusiness income distinction is often driven by whether there ex-
ists a unitary relationship, the latter will often determine the treatment of the partner’s share 
of the partnership income. For example, if there is a unitary relationship, many jurisdictions 
will simply roll up the partner’s share of income and factors into the rest of the partner’s 
business income and factors. If there is no unitary relationship, then the income and its fac-
tors are treated as a separate trade of business. (See the example and a copy of the California 
regulation at the end of chapter 5.)
The Hercules Cases
There is no better example of the inconsistency of treatment with respect to business in-
come, the unitary principle, and the difference between an operational and investment 
function than the cases involving Hercules, Inc., in Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, 
Utah, and Wisconsin.
Hercules was a manufacturer of polypropylene incorporated in Delaware, domiciled in 
New York, but doing business in many states. In 1983, Hercules and an unrelated Italian 
company, Montedison, each contributed their polypropylene manufacturing activities to a 
newly created entity, Himont. Hercules and Montedison each owned 50 percent of Hi-
mont. In 1987, Hercules sold its share of Himont to Montedison at a capital gain of more 
than $1.3 billion. Hercules treated the sale as nonbusiness income and, accordingly, allo-
cated the entire gain to New York, its state of domicile.
The revenue departments of Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Utah, and Wisconsin 
all believed that they too should share in taxing the $1.3 billion capital gain and, accord-
ingly, treated the sale as business income apportionable to their states. Hercules sale received 
different treatment depending upon the court.
Illinois
The Illinois appellate court held that contrary to the revenue department’s findings and the 
decision of the lower level circuit court, there was no unitary relationship, and, thus, the 
capital gain was properly allocated to New York as nonbusiness income. The court also 
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 rejected the department’s argument that the Himont investment served an operational func-
tion (as in Allied-Signal) and should be apportionable income on that basis.7
Kansas
The Kansas Board of Tax Appeals determined that because the Himont sale did not meet 
the “transaction” test, it was not business income and, thus, not apportionable to Kansas.8
Maryland
The Maryland Court of Appeals, in overturning a lower court decision, found there was 
no evidence of either a unitary relationship or that the investment served an operational 
function.9
Minnesota
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in reversing the state’s tax court, found there was “scant 
evidence of a unitary relationship between Hercules and Himont.” In addition, there was 
no evidence that the ownership of Himont served an operational rather than an investment 
function. Thus, the capital gain was not apportionable to Minnesota but properly allocated 
to New York.10
Utah
The Utah State Tax Commission ruled that the capital gain was business income appor-
tionable to the state because it found both a unitary and operational relationship between 
Hercules and Himont.11
Wisconsin
The Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission ruled that the capital gain was business income 
apportionable to the state because it found both a unitary and operational relationship be-
tween Hercules and Himont.12
In summary, given the exact same transaction, Kansas, and then upon appeal, Illinois, 
Maryland, and Minnesota, agreed with Hercules’ allocation of the capital gain to New 
York, while Utah and Wisconsin apportioned part of that gain to themselves.
Having Your Cake and Eating It Too
Given the states’ differing interpretations of business and nonbusiness income, is it appropri-
ate for a taxpayer to take conflicting positions on the same transaction in different states? In 
fact, given the states’ inconsistent positions, taxpayers routinely take inconsistent positions 
7 Hercules, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 324 Ill. App. 3d 329, 753 N.E.2d 418 (1st Dist. 2001), appeal denied, 197 
Ill. 2d 560, 763 N.E.2d 770 (2001).
8 Appeal of Hercules, Inc., No. 1998-1666-DT (Kan. 2000).
9 Hercules, Inc. v. Comptroller, 351 Md. 101, 716 A.2d 276 (1998).
10 Hercules, Inc. v. Comm’r, 575 N.W.2d 111 (Minn. 1998)
11 Hercules, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 974 P.2d 286 (Utah 1999).
12 Hercules, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Revenue, No. 94-I-1494, (Wis. Tax Appeals Comm’n Feb. 26, 1997).
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when required by state law, court findings, or both. However, when the state guidance 
is arguably ambiguous, is it appropriate for a taxpayer to treat a transaction inconsistently 
between states? That question was recently addressed by the Oregon Tax Court in Oracle v. 
Dept. of Revenue, TC-MD 070762C (Or. Tax (Magis. Div.) Feb. 11, 2010).
Oracle treated certain gains from the sale of stock and other assets as business income on 
its California return and nonbusiness income not allocable to Oregon on its Oregon return. 
The filing position benefited Oracle, which is headquartered in California. Oregon chal-
lenged Oracle’s filing position claiming that it “thwart(s) the goal of uniformity if they take 
inconsistent positions as to identical items of income in the same tax year.” In addition, the 
state department of revenue (DOR) held that the taxpayer had a duty of consistency that 
required that it disclose inconsistent positions taken on returns. The court declined to adopt 
the state’s position, pointing out that “a favorable ruling for Defendant would require the 
court to become an expert in the laws of 49 other states as they pertain to the definition of 
business and nonbusiness income, not only as set forth in the various states’ statutes, but as 
those statutes are refined and clarified by years of judicial opinions.” The court went on to 
ask, if it did adopt the DOR’s position, which state’s treatment would prevail?
For example, suppose a taxpayer reports an item of income as nonbusiness income in 
one state and business income in another, and that one of those states is Oregon. Which 
state’s reporting would govern in determining how the income should be characterized 
for purposes of Oregon’s tax? This case is a prime example. The plaintiffs reported certain 
income as business income in California and nonbusiness income in Oregon. Why should 
the plaintiffs’ characterization of the income on its California return dictate how the income 
should be reported in Oregon?
If the court were to rule favorably on the defendant’s motion, the result would be a rul-
ing mandating that the plaintiffs’ characterization of the income in another state (California) 
controls how that income is reported in Oregon for purposes of this state’s tax. An obvi-
ous question raised by that outcome is whether Oregon will accept in all cases a taxpayer’s 
characterization of an item of income in another state as controlling in Oregon, including 
situations in which the department felt that a “correct” application of the law dictated a 
contrary result.
Author’s Note: Filing Consistency for Business vs. Nonbusiness Income
Does taking such an inconsistent filing position raise an issue related to 
Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. 48, Accounting for 
Uncertainty in Income Taxes—an interpretation of FASB Statement  
No. 109?
The Supreme Court—Once Again
The landmark U.S. Supreme Court cases summarized in chapter 3 in the discussion of the 
unitary concept are equally useful in thinking about the distinctions between business and 
nonbusiness income. Given the interrelationship between the unitary concept, combined 
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 filing, and business and nonbusiness income, it is common to confuse them. The follow-
ing distinction may be used as a rule of thumb: The unitary concept generally refers to 
the relationship between entities while the business or nonbusiness income principle more 
often refers to the role a particular property, asset, or stream of income plays in the hands 
of its owner. In MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Illinois, 553 U.S. 16 (2008), the Supreme Court 
distinguished between “enterprise” unity and the operational or investment function test. 
The tests of functional integration, centralized management, and economies of scale are the 
“hallmarks” for determining whether a unitary relationship exists between enterprises. For 
example, in Mobil Oil; Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin, 447 U.S. 207 (1980); ASARCO; and F.W. 
Woolworth Co. v. New Mexico, 458 U.S. 354 (1982), the Supreme Court focused on the re-
lationship between the parents and subsidiaries. Once the relationship was determined to be 
unitary, the income was deemed business or apportionable income. Nevertheless, one can 
have business income absent a unitary relationship between businesses or enterprises. The 
unitary relationship is a sufficient but not necessary condition. As a logician might say, “A 
is a sufficient, but not necessary condition for B.” In short, the MeadWestvaco decision pro-
vides that even if there is not a unitary relationship between two separate businesses, indi-
vidual assets of a business can be treated as apportionable income if they serve an operational 
rather than investment function. You cannot use just the operational test or the investment 
function test as to determine a unitary relationship between two separate enterprises.
It was only with Allied Signal that the Court really began to explore business and non-
business income principles outside the unitary relationship. The change in focus prompted 
questions more in the order of: “Why does this company own this property and for what 
purpose?” Successfully or not, the Court tried to answer that question by distinguishing an 
operational from an investment function, that is, a business purpose from a nonbusiness pur-
pose. The former may be apportionable income; the latter perhaps not.
In contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in MeadWestvaco, the decision in Tate 
& Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v. Alabama, No. CORP. 07-162, (Ala. Adm. Law Div. Jan. 
15, 2008), is a model of clarity. In Tate & Lyle, the taxpayer realized a $345 million gain 
upon the sale of its one-third stock interest in a foreign corporation based in Belgium. The 
key issues were (1) whether Alabama could even constitutionally tax the gain and (2) if the 
state could tax the gain, whether the gain apportionable business or allocable nonbusiness 
income. In short, there was a unitary question and a business or nonbusiness income ques-
tion. Because both companies were in the business of selling cereal sweeteners and owned 
by the same holding company, the state of Alabama held that the gain was apportionable 
business income taxable to the state.
The judge found that despite the common ownership by a holding company, there was 
no unitary relationship between the two corporations.
The companies have no common directors. They separately purchase their own raw 
materials and have no shared facilities, employees, or officers. They also have separate ac-
counting, payroll, legal, and tax departments and different customer and technical service 
employees. They have separate management teams and independently manufacture, price, 
market, and sell their respective products. They sell to some of the same customers, but the 
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sales are in different geographical locations, for separately negotiated prices, and with differ-
ent terms and conditions.
In fact, “the taxpayer uses corn to manufacture its products and sells to customers in North 
America, whereas [the foreign company] uses wheat and sells to customers in Europe.”
The court went on to examine whether the stock gain was business income “under the 
transactional, functional, or operationally related tests,” and it determined that “the income 
was nonbusiness income and not apportionable to Alabama.”
The Tate & Lyle decision is a particularly helpful one for the tax practitioner. The judge 
provides a clear and useful history of the unitary principle, its application, and its relationship 
with the business or nonbusiness income tests.
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Introduction
Once we have established the right to apportion, we must turn our attention to the ap-
portionment formula and the factors within that formula. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
declined to favor one apportionment method over another. For example, the Court upheld 
Iowa’s use of a single factor (sales) in apportioning income in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. 
Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978). With Moorman, the Court has let it be known that, absent clearly 
flagrant distortion (Hans Rees’ Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, perhaps), it is not going to be in 
the business of judging the validity of various state apportionment methods.
Although there is increasing variation in state formulas, most states have adopted some 
form of the “Massachusetts formula.” (Supposedly, the drafters of Uniform Division of In-
come for Tax Purposes Act [UDITPA] used Massachusetts as an example in their drafting.) 
Historically, the “Massachusetts formula” was derived by determining the average of three 
separate factors: payroll, property, and sales.
Payroll, Property, and Sales Factors
Put simply the payroll factor is determined by comparing in-state payroll to payroll everywhere. 
The property factor is determined by comparing the average value of in-state property to the 
average value of property everywhere. The sales factor is determined by comparing in-state sales to 
sales everywhere. This three-factor approach is the basis of both the UDITPA provisions and 
Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) (with some modifications) regulations.
Each of the three factors is used in an attempt to represent fairly a business’s activity in a 
state. The payroll factor is used because it represents both the contribution of labor toward 
the creation of wealth (Adam Smith and Karl Marx, both adherents to the labor theory of 
value, would be proud.) and is a measure of the taxpayer’s physical presence in the state. 
The payroll factor includes all compensation paid to individuals, including wages and other 
taxable fringe benefits, such as meals and lodging.
121
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The property factor, like the payroll factor, represents both the contribution of property 
towards the creation of wealth (Henry George, popular nineteenth century economist who 
proposed a single tax on land, would be proud.) and the measure of business presence in 
the state. Both rented and owned properties are included in the property factor. According 
to UDITPA and MTC regulations, owned property is measured at original cost and rented 
property at eight times its annual rent. Intangible property is not included in the property 
factor.
The sales, or gross receipts, factor provides for the contribution of the market states in 
the creation of wealth. Its use balances the effect of the payroll and property factors which 
favor the states in which a company’s headquarters and manufacturing are located. Sales, 
with two exceptions, are apportioned to where the product is shipped. The two exceptions 
include (1) purchases by the United States and (2) sales into states where the taxpayer is not 
taxable. In both these instances, the sales are “thrown back” into the state of origin. Unlike 
the property factor, which does not include intangible property, the sales factor includes 
receipts from intangible property sales.
Finally, there are specific provisions in most states for the apportionment factors of certain 
industries in transportation (air, rail, ship, and truck), entertainment, and finance (banks, 
credit companies, insurance companies, and savings and loans).
Author’s Note: Fairly Represents Exception
Most states have a “fairly represents” exception to their apportionment statutes.
Because each state has its own formula and interpretations thereof, generalization is dif-
ficult. In addition, change is continual. For example, there has been a trend lately to increase 
the role of the sales factor by doubling it. Why? Because it generally lessens the tax burden 
of in-state businesses at the expense of out-of-state businesses (probably the dream of local 
politicians everywhere). Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Nebraska, 
New York, Oregon, Texas, and Wisconsin use a single factor (sales) in apportioning in-
come. There are a number of states that use the traditional three-factor formula but double-
weight the sales factor. They include Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, 
Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, 
Tennessee, Utah (by election), Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia. The states with a tra-
ditional equally weighted three-factor apportionment include Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, 
Hawaii, Kansas, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and 
Utah (unless election is made to double weight the sales factor).
Many other states also place additional weight on the sales factor. For example, Indiana is 
phasing out its property and payroll factors by 10 percent each year. By 2011, Indiana will 
be a single sales factor state. Minnesota’s factors are currently weighted at 90-5-5 percent 
(sales, property, and payroll), but it will be a single sales factor state after 2013. Pennsylva-
nia’s formula is weighted 90-5-5 percent (sales, property, and payroll).
Some states provide specific industries special weighting of the factors. For example, 
Mississippi provides a single sales factor for retailers, wholesalers, and service companies. 
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Manufacturers that sell at wholesale must use an evenly weighted three-factor formula, 
while manufacturers that sell at retail use a three-factor formula with double-weighted sales. 
(See appendix 1 at the end of the chapter for a summary of each state’s various apportion-
ment formulas and corporate tax rates.)
Our primary focus will be on the UDITPA and MTC rules and regulations.
Example 5-1
Before we begin a detailed examination of the individual factors, let us look at a 
simple example illustrating the previous discussion.
ABC Corporation does business in two states and has collected the following data 
with respect to their sales, property, and payroll. The company’s federal taxable 
income after state modifications was $1,000,000.
State X State Y Total
 Sales 12,000,000 4,000,000 16,000,000
 Property  3,000,000 2,000,000  5,000,000
 Payroll  1,200,000   800,000  2,000,000
If both states use an equally balanced three-factor apportionment, ABC’s taxable 
income is apportioned in the following manner:
 State X
 Sales (12,000,000/16,000,000) 75%  
 Property (3,000,000/5,000,000) 60%
 Payroll (1,200,000/2,000,000) 60%
 Total of factors 195%
 Divided by three (195/3) 65%
 Times taxable income × 1,000,000%
 State X taxable income $  650,000%
 State Y
 Sales (4,000,000/16,000,000) 25%
 Property (2,000,000/5,000,000) 40%
 Payroll (800,000/2,000,000) 40%
 Total of factors 105%
 Divided by three (105/3) 35%
 Times taxable income × 1,000,000%
 State Y taxable income $  350,000%
In reality, companies rarely pay tax on exactly 100 percent of their income. Because 
many states differ in how they weight their factors and the composition of the 
factors, it is highly likely that a company may pay tax on more (or less) than 100 
percent of its taxable income. For example, what if State X used only a single sales 
factor? Its factor would then be 75 percent and State Y’s would still be 35 percent, 
meaning that ABC Corporation would be paying tax on 110 percent of its income. 
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 The Payroll Factor
Let us begin with the simplest of factors—payroll. Section 13 of UDITPA defines the pay-
roll factor as “a fraction, the numerator of which is the total amount paid in this state during 
the tax period by the taxpayer for compensation, and the denominator of which is the total 
compensation paid everywhere during the tax period.”
As a practical matter compensation for the payroll factor is usually assigned to the state 
where the unemployment compensation is reported.
MTC regulations provide that in determining the amount of compensation to be in-
cluded in the payroll factor, the business’s accounting methods (cash or accrual) are to be 
followed. However, if a state requires the cash method to be used for unemployment taxes, 
then the business may use the cash method even if it otherwise uses the accrual method. 
Consequently, many states accept the IRS Form 940 and state unemployment returns to 
apportion payroll.
Payroll that is capitalized as part of a self-constructed asset is included in the payroll factor.
“Employee,” while not specifically defined in UDITPA, is usually defined as anyone 
subject to the Federal Insurance Contributions Act rules. This approach implicitly excludes 
independent contractors. That said, given the trend by companies to outsource more and 
more of their operations, there have been recent discussions regarding revising the UDITPA 
to include independent contractors in the payroll factor.
“Throwbacks,” usually associated with the sales factor, can exist with the payroll factor. 
Technically speaking, the throwback payroll rule provides that even though an employee is 
neither a resident of the state nor performing services in the state, the payroll will be thrown 
back if (a) the employee is directed or controlled from an office in the state to which he 
or she periodically returns and (b) the employer does not have nexus with the state of the 
employee’s residency. For example, a Madison, Wisconsin, company doing business only 
in Wisconsin has a sales employee who lives in Cheyenne, Wyoming, soliciting sales. (This 
activity creates nexus for sales tax purposes but not income tax purposes.) The employee 
rarely stops in at the Madison office. Wisconsin will throw back that employee’s compensa-
tion into the Wisconsin payroll factor.
Three states, Alabama, Missouri, and North Dakota, and the District of Columbia have 
payroll “throwbacks.” Payroll throwbacks are necessary, according to those states, because if 
payroll is assigned to a state where the employer does not have nexus, it does not show up 
in any state numerator and results in the creation of “nowhere” income.
Generally, the payroll factor, unlike the sales and property factors, is simple to administer. 
Two controversial areas are the treatment of executive salaries and leased employees. Some 
states want to carve out executive’s salaries for specific allocation rather than apportion-
ment, arguing that the payroll factor is otherwise distorted. New York, however, excludes 
executives’ salaries as an incentive for companies to establish themselves in New York City.
The dilemma with leased employees is which company should include them in their fac-
tor—the lessor or the lessee or both? Many states include them in both, arguing that both 
parties are using them in the state as a source of income. This is the same rationale for in-
cluding leased property in both the lessor and lessee’s property factors. 
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For employees who work in more than one state, UDITPA offers the following 
guidelines:
•  “Compensation is paid in this state if
 —  The individual’s service is performed entirely within the state; or
 —  The individual’s service is performed both within and without the state, but the 
service performed without the state is incidental to the individual’s service within 
the state; or
 —  Some of the service is performed in the state and (1) the base of operations or, 
if there is no base of operations, the place from which the service is directed or 
controlled is in the state, or (2) the base of operations or the place from which 
the service is directed or controlled is not in any state in which some part of the 
service is performed, but the individual’s residence is in this state.”
Please note that the preceding rules result in an employee’s payroll being sourced to a 
single state. While this is certainly easy from an administrative point of view, it certainly 
does not reflect today’s employment patterns when, for example, software consultants may 
work from home or move from job to job in different states.
Author’s Note: Relationship Between Payroll Factor and Nexus
When you are reviewing your payroll factor, review your nexus exposure.
Example 5-2
ABC Corporation employs a pharmaceutical salesman whose region covers the 
Rocky Mountain West, including the states of Arizona, Nevada, Idaho, Montana, 
Wyoming, Colorado, and New Mexico. The salesman works out of his home in 
Colorado but receives his directions from the company’s headquarters in Califor-
nia. The salesman’s payroll will likely be sourced to Colorado. Why? The ABC Cor-
poration cannot use California as a base of operations because the salesman never 
works in California and the salesman’s activities are spread across seven states.
The Property Factor
The property factor, along with the sales factor, is the most difficult to interpret and apply. 
The difficulties arise from problems of definition (What is property?), problems of value 
(What cost is applied to the property?), computational problems (How do you use of “aver-
ages” and moveable property?), and, finally, problems related to unusual and nonrecurring 
transactions.
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 Property Included in the Factor
UDITPA provides that “the property factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the av-
erage value of the taxpayer’s real and tangible personal property owned or rented and used 
in this state during the tax period and the denominator of which is the average value of all 
the taxpayer’s real and tangible personal property owned or rented and used during the tax 
period.”
The MTC regulations define “real and tangible personal property” as land, buildings, 
machinery, stock of goods, equipment, and other tangible property excluding cash used in 
the regular course of the taxpayer’s trade or business. Property giving rise to nonbusiness 
income is generally excluded from the factor.
MTC Regulation § 10(b) provides that property is included in the property factor if it 
is actually used or is available for or capable of being used in the regular course of the tax-
payer’s trade or business. Thus, property held in reserve or standby is included in the factor. 
Specific examples include a temporarily idle plant and raw materials reserves. Property or 
equipment qualifying as construction-in-progress during the tax period is excluded. Thus, a 
plant under construction is excluded while an idled plant is included. But see Commissioner 
of Revenue v. New England Power Co., 411 Mass. 418 (1991), in which property under con-
struction was included in the property factor of an electric power company. The property 
was included because it contributed to the company’s revenue by being a factor in setting 
the utility’s rate base.
Once in the factor, the property stays there until it is disposed. The MTC regulations pro-
vide that “property used in the regular course of the trade or business of the taxpayer shall 
remain in the property factor until its permanent withdrawal is established by an identifiable 
event such as its conversion to the production of nonbusiness income, its sale, or the lapse of 
an extended period of time (normally, five years) during which the property is held for sale.”
Section 10 of UDITPA requires that the property factor include rental property by mul-
tiplying the annual rentals by eight. Part year rent is not annualized.
MTC Regulation § 11(b)(3) defines annual rent as “the actual sum of money or other 
consideration payable, directly or indirectly, by the taxpayer for its own benefit for the use 
of the property.” Indirect consideration paid includes real estate taxes and insurance, but not 
service charges for utilities, cleaning, or security. See Nelson’s Office Supply Stores v. Commis-
sioner of Revenue, 508 N.W.2d 776 (1993), in which the court held that the taxpayer include 
its pro rata share of property taxes and utilities in its property factor.
The MTC regulations offer the following examples:
Example 1: A taxpayer, pursuant to the terms of a lease, pays a lessor $1,000 per month 
as a base rental and at the end of the year pays the lessor one percent of the 
gross sales of $400,000. The annual rent is $16,000 ($12,000 plus one percent 
of $400,000 or $4,000).
Example 2: A taxpayer, pursuant to the terms of a lease, pays the lessor $12,000 a year 
plus taxes in the amount of $2,000 and interest on a mortgage in the amount 
of $1,000. The annual rent is $15,000.
05-Chapter 05.indd   126 10/6/11   2:16 PM
Chapter 5: Apportionment Formulas and Factors
 127
Example 3: A taxpayer stores part of its inventory in a warehouse. The total charge for the 
year was $1,000 of which $700 was for the use of storage space and $300 for 
inventory insurance, handling and shipping charges, and C.O.D. collections. 
The annual rent is $700.
Leasehold improvements are included in the property factor at original cost, regardless of 
whether or not the property can be removed by the taxpayer at the end of the lease.
There is little consistency among the states in treating mobile property such as trucks, 
planes, and automobiles used in more than one state. Usually some apportionment method 
based upon miles or time is appropriate. But, see Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tax Commis-
sioner, 639 N.E.2d 27 (1994), in which the court rejected the percentage of use method and 
required all leased trucks and aircraft to be included in the Ohio property factor.
Other areas of dispute over the property factor include sourcing satellites, off-shore drill-
ing platforms and equipment, and work-in-process inventory. Be careful that your payroll 
factor does not get counted twice—once in the payroll factor and again in the property fac-
tor in manufactured equipment or construction.
Property Value
UDITPA defines a property’s value as its cost. “Property owned by the taxpayer is valued 
at its original cost. Property rented by the taxpayer is valued at eight times the net annual 
rental rate. Net annual rental rate is the annual rental rate received by the taxpayer from 
sub-rentals.”
Both UDITPA and the MTC provide that the property be valued at historical cost. Ex-
amples from the MTC regulations include:
Example 1: The taxpayer acquired a factory building in this state at a cost of $500,000 
and 18 months later expended $100,000 for major remodeling of the build-
ing. Taxpayer files its return for the current taxable year on the calendar-
year basis. Depreciation deductions in the amount of $22,000 were claimed 
on the building for its return for the current taxable year. The value of the 
building includable in the numerator and denominator of the property factor 
is $600,000 as the depreciation deduction is not taken into account in deter-
mining the value of the building for purposes of the factor.
Example 2: During the current taxable year, X Corporation merges into Y Corporation 
in a tax-free reorganization under the Internal Revenue Code. At the time 
of the merger, X Corporation owns a factory which X built five years ear-
lier at a cost of $1,000,000. X has been depreciating the factory at the rate 
of two percent per year, and its basis in X’s hands at the time of the merger 
is $900,000. Since the property is acquired by Y in a transaction in which, 
under the Internal Revenue Code, its basis in Y’s hands is the same as its basis 
in X’s, Y includes the property in Y’s property factor at X’s original cost, 
without adjustment for depreciation, i.e., $1,000,000.
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Example 3: Corporation Y acquires the assets of Corporation X in a liquidation by which 
Y is entitled to use its stock cost as the basis of the X assets under §334(b)(2) 
of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code (i.e., stock possessing 80% control is pur-
chased and liquidated within two years). Under these circumstances, Y’s cost 
of the assets is the purchase price of the X stock, prorated over the X assets.
Inventory is to be valued as it is for federal income tax purposes including any uniform 
capitalization rules applicable. If the property’s original cost is unknown, then the taxpayer 
is to use the property’s fair market value at the time it was acquired.
Computational Problems
Finally, “the average value of property shall be determined by averaging the values at the 
beginning and ending of the tax period but the tax administrator may require the averaging 
of monthly values during the tax period if reasonably required to reflect properly the average 
value of the taxpayer’s property.”
Intangible property is not included in the factor, but see Crocker Equipment Leasing, Inc. 
v. Department of Revenue, 838 P.2d 552 (Ore. 1992), in which a bank is allowed to include 
intangible property, that is, loans and leases, in its property factor, because the intangibles 
were responsible for roughly 98 percent of the bank’s income.
Some states treat inventory or property in transit at the end of the tax period as in the 
property factor of the state of destination. Some states simply delete the in-transit inventory 
from both the numerator and denominator. Many state’s provisions are silent on the mat-
ter. In Mercedes Benz of North America, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, No. Income Tax 
2813 (Md. Tax Ct. Oct. 7, 1988), the taxpayer included cars in-transit from Germany to 
Maryland in the Maryland denominator, but not the numerator. The court held that the cars 
must be either in both the numerator and denominator or neither.
See Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., discussed previously, for problems associated with comput-
ing the inclusion of mobile property.
Author’s Note: Problem Areas of The Property Factor
• Intangible property
• Idle plant, property, or equipment
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The Sales Factor
As with everything in tax law, we must begin by defining our terms. The term “sales fac-
tor” may cause more confusion than the other two factors. It is more helpful to think of the 
sales factor in terms of gross receipts because it will include not only sales from inventory, 
but interest, dividend, rental, and royalty income, as well. Keep in mind that the term is 
generally applied only to include “receipts” which generate apportionable business income.
Definitions
The UDITPA rules provide that “the sales factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the 
total sales of the taxpayer in this state during the tax period, and the denominator of which 
is the total sales of the taxpayer everywhere during this period.”
The MTC regulations add to that definition by including interest income, service and 
carrying charges, and federal and state (including sales) excise taxes. The MTC excludes 
from the sales factor receipts from an incidental or occasional sale of a fixed asset used in 
the regular course of business, insubstantial amounts of gross receipts arising from incidental 
or occasional transactions or activities, and business income from intangible property if the 
income cannot readily be attributable to any particular income-producing activity of the 
taxpayer. An example of the latter includes dividends and interest that result from the mere 
holding of the intangible property.
The California Supreme Court recently addressed one of the more controversial questions 
involving the sales factor. The question was simply this: When the statute states that gross 
receipts should be included in the sales factor, does it really mean “gross” receipts?
In one year, Microsoft’s treasury department generated $5.7 billion in gross receipts on 
short-term investments such as repurchase agreements (repos). However, the income from 
those investments only amounted to $10.7 million. Microsoft included the gross receipts in 
the denominator of its sales factor for California, which cut the company’s California in-
come tax almost in half. The California Franchise Tax Board (FTB) disallowed the portion 
of the proceeds that represented return of capital. In Microsoft Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 
the question before the California Supreme Court then was whether the sales factor should 
include the gross proceeds from short-term securities investments, or only the net return.
The FTB argued that including the gross proceeds from such investments distorted the 
sales factor and proposed an alternative formula that excluded the return of principal from 
the sales factor. Microsoft pointed out that whether it was distortive or not, the plain lan-
guage of the statute clearly stated that gross receipts were to be included in the sales factor.
The California Supreme Court determined that both parties were right. Gross receipts did 
mean gross receipts. However, the FTB was successful in arguing that, at least in this case, 
the numbers were distortive. Under California law (§ 25137), if the standard apportionment 
formula fails to “fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer’s business activity in this state,” 
the taxpayer may petition, or the FTB may require, an alternative method of calculation.
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 Given the court’s ruling, how is a taxpayer to file? Because distortion is, at least to some 
extent, in the eye of the beholder, it is clear that this controversy is not over.1 The most 
recent decision involves General Mills, which recently failed in its attempt to argue that 
futures transactions were gross receipts to be included in the sales factor. The San Francisco 
Superior Court ruled that while the sales may have been gross receipts, the inclusion dis-
torted the sales factor and justified the use of an alternative formula.2 For example, the court 
noted that in 1992 and 1996, the futures trading generated no income, but it did generate 
8 percent and 30 percent of the company’s sales respectively. Critics of the court point out 
that tying income to the sales factor is mixing apples with oranges. The first addresses the 
tax base, while the second addresses the apportionment of that tax base. If income is to be a 
measure in apportionment, then any company with losses has sales factor issues. It is unclear 
whether there will be an appeal.
The MTC responded to the question posed in Microsoft as early as 2001 by proposing that 
the definition of “gross receipts” exclude proceeds from the repayment of principal on the 
sales of intangibles such as bonds, loans, or investments in mutual funds. The MTC resolu-
tion amended MTC Regulation § IV.2(a) and was clearly an attempt to resolve whether net 
profits, or gross receipts, should be included in the sales factor. 
Problem Areas
In addition to providing some definition of sales, UDITPA addressed what have become 
perennial areas for disagreement: destination sales, dock sales, throwbacks, and sales of ser-
vices. The UDITPA rules provide that
•  Sales of tangible personal property are in this state if
 —  The property is delivered or shipped to a purchaser, other than the United States 
government, within this state regardless of the free on board point or other condi-
tions of the sales; or
 —  The property is shipped from an office, store, warehouse, factory, or other place 
of storage in this state and (1) the purchaser is the United States government or (2) 
the taxpayer is not taxable in the state of the purchaser.
•  Sales, other than sales of tangible personal property, are in this state if
 —  The income-producing activity is performed in this state; or
 —  The income-producing activity is performed both in and outside this state and a 
greater proportion of the income-producing activity is performed in this state than 
in any other state, based on the costs of performance.
1 See Microsoft Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 139 P.3d 1169 (Calif. 2006), and its companion case, General 
Motors Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 139 P.3d 1183 (Calif. 2006).
2 General Mills, Inc., et al. v. Franchise Tax Bd., No. CGC 05–439929 (Cal. Super. Ct. (San Francisco Cty.) 
November 1, 2010).
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Destination Sales
Some 40 states follow the UDITPA rule that receipts from the sale of tangible personal 
property are sourced to the state of destination. The MTC regulations add that items such as 
FOB point, risk of loss, and passage of title are not to be considered in sourcing a sale. Some 
states and courts disagree in their interpretation of the phrase “state of destination.”3 Most 
commentators believe that UDITPA and the MTC indicate that sales are properly sourced 
when delivered or shipped to the buyer in the taxing state, ignoring the fact that the buyer 
may reship the property elsewhere.
The destination rule is further complicated by its interaction with the reporting require-
ments of combined filing unitary states. The confusion is created by differences in the 
definition of the phrase “taxable in another state” as used in defining “throwback” sales in 
Section 3 of UDITPA. “For purposes of allocation and apportionment of income under this 
Act, a taxpayer is taxable in another state if …” Does the term “taxpayer” mean an indi-
vidual corporation or does it mean a unitary group?
In brief, the question is this: When determining whether you must throw back sales into 
your state numerator, do you look to each individual corporation, or do you look to the 
unitary group as a whole? (See the following discussion on throwbacks, in general.) If a state 
follows Joyce, it counts throwbacks on a separate company basis. If a state follows Finnigan, 
it counts throwbacks on a combined reporting or unitary method. The terms “Joyce state” 
and “Finnigan state” come from two court cases in California, Appeal of Joyce, Inc., No. 66-
SBE-070 (Cal. State Bd. of Equalization Nov. 23, 1966) and Appeal of Finnigan Corp. No. 
88-SBE-022 (Cal. State Bd. of Equalization Aug. 25, 1988), on reh’g, Jan. 24, 1990.
California initially followed the Joyce rule, then later switched to the Finnigan rule, then 
back to Joyce, and effective January 1, 2011, back to Finnigan.
Example 5-3
Flintstone Corporation does business in California, Illinois, and Nebraska. The cor-
poration has two subsidiaries: Fred, Inc., and Wilma, Inc. Fred has nexus only with 
California, and Wilma only has nexus with Colorado. Neither Fred nor Wilma have 
nexus, or do business, in any other state. However, Fred does have catalog and 
online sales into Colorado.
If California is following Joyce, then because Fred does not have nexus with 
Colorado, its Colorado sales will be thrown back into the California numerator. 
However, if California is following Finnigan, then because Wilma has nexus in 
Colorado and is filing a combined report with Flintstone in California, the sales are 
not thrown back into Fred’s California numerator.
3 See Dep’t of Revenue v. Parker Banana Co., 391 So.2d 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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 States with throwbacks are split on whether to apply the Joyce or the Finnigan rule. Ac-
cording to the Multistate Corporate Tax Guide,4 Finnigan states include Indiana, Kansas, Mas-
sachusetts, Utah, and Wisconsin. Joyce states include Arkansas, California (until January 1, 
2011 when it goes back to being a Finnigan state), Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Mon-
tana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, and Vermont. A New York 
appellate court recently ruled that the state could include in the numerator of a company’s 
sales factor the sales of a subsidiary that did not have nexus with the state.5 The court’s hold-
ing is not clear, and because the court did not mention either Joyce or Finnigan in its decision, 
it could be that the court was confusing unitary theory with an apportionment problem. 
Richard Pomp, a University of Connecticut law school professor, who testified for Disney, 
said that unitary theory “does not justify taking a sale made by one corporation and treating 
it as if it were made by another. The difficulty of measuring income when there are flows of 
value, which is the rationale for a combined report, has nothing to do with the difficulty of 
measuring the sales made by each corporation included in the combined report.” Neverthe-
less, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s decision.6
Dock Sales
Dock sales occur when the purchaser takes delivery of the goods at the seller’s location. 
Most states apply the general rule regarding destination sales to dock sales. Nevertheless, 
there remains enormous disparity in state’s treatment of this issue. For example, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court, in a decision defining “ultimate destination,” did not treat sales as 
Minnesota destination sales when the out-of-state customer picked the goods up in Min-
nesota and transported them back to its own state.7 For a recent contrary holding see Rohm 
and Haas Kentucky, Inc., 929 S.W.2d 741 (Ky. App. 1996).
According to the Multistate Corporate Tax Guide, states holding that dock sales be sourced 
to the state of destination include Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Geor-
gia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, 
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
The District of Columbia and the following states hold that the dock sales be sourced to the 
dock state: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, Mis-
sissippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia.
Throwback Sales
“Throwback sales” are an exception to the destination test. The throwback rules provides 
that if the seller is not taxable in the destination state, then any sales to that state are “thrown 
back” into the sales numerator of the state of origin. Throwback sales apply to (1) sales to 
the U.S. government and (2) sales into states where the seller is not taxable. For example, 
4 1 Healy, John C. and Michael S. Schadewald, Multistate Corporate Tax Guide 2010 680 (New York: 
Aspen Publishing, 2010).
5 See In the Matter of Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, No. 99719 (N.Y.S.3d March 1, 2007).
6 See In the Matter of Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. New York, 888 N.E.2d 1029 (N.Y. 2008).
7 Olympia Brewing Co. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 326 N.W. 2d 642 (Minn. 1982). So too in Pabst Brewing Co. 
v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Revenue, Wis. Cir. Ct., No. 83 CV 4387 (January 31, 1984).
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a Colorado computer retailer makes only mail-order sales into Nebraska. The retailer does 
not have nexus with Nebraska and is not subject to tax there. Consequently those Nebraska 
destination sales are thrown back into the Colorado sales numerator. (Only the Colorado 
three-factor apportionment allows for throwbacks. There are no throwbacks under Colo-
rado’s two-factor apportionment.)
The purpose of this rule, adopted by both UDITPA and MTC, is to avoid the creation of 
“nowhere” sales, that is, sales that do not show up in any state’s numerator. The throwback 
rules try to ensure that the sales factor accounts for 100 percent of a company’s sales. Natu-
rally, some states do not have a throwback rule. Examples include Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, 
Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. For an exception to the rule that sales 
to the U.S. government are thrown back, see Jim Beam Brands Co. (KBTA Order No. 
K-14942, 7/23/93).
Other states have adopted a “double throwback” rule to make certain that drop ship-
ments are accounted for in the sales factor. The classic drop shipment scenario goes like 
this. Say, for example, that you have ordered some boots from L.L. Bean.8 The boots are 
manufactured at a company in Kansas. Instead of L.L. Bean having the boots sent to its store 
in Maine and then reshipped to Colorado, it simply has the boots drop-shipped directly to 
Colorado. The double throwback provides that if L.L. Bean is not taxable in Colorado (it 
is not), the sale is thrown back into Kansas. If the company is not taxable in Kansas, the sale 
is thrown back again into Maine. Again, the function of the rule is to avoid the creation of 
“nowhere sales.”
Because the throwback rule (aside from government sales) only comes into play when a 
seller is not taxable in the destination state, the question naturally arises—how is taxability 
in the other state defined? Following UDITPA, most state statutes read that a taxpayer is 
deemed to be taxable in another state if in that state the taxpayer is subject to a net income 
tax, a franchise tax measured by net income, a franchise tax for the privilege of doing busi-
ness, or a corporate stock tax.
The Indiana Tax Court recently held that the Michigan’ Single Business Tax (SBT) met 
the definition of a franchise tax, thereby deeming the taxpayer to be subject to tax in Michi-
gan. The Indiana Department of Revenue argued that while the SBT was certainly a tax on 
the privilege of doing business, it was not a franchise tax on the privilege of doing business. 
The court rejected the revenue department’s argument holding that the SBT is indeed a 
franchise tax on the privilege of doing business in Michigan. Therefore, the taxpayer did 
not have to throw back its Michigan sales into the Indiana numerator.9 Given the move of 
several states to a gross receipts tax, such as Ohio’s commercial activity tax and the Texas 
Margin Tax, we will be sure to see more cases of this nature.
Michigan courts have held in a series of cases that sales need not be thrown back into 
Michigan. The courts held that the test was not whether or not the business is subject to tax 
8 Author’s note—I am using L.L. Bean for the simple reason that everyone knows who they are. I have no 
idea whether they drop ship their goods or not. But I do like their boots.
9 Welch Packaging Group, Inc. v. Indiana, No. 49T10-0503-TA-21 (Ind. Tax Ct. Nov. 13, 2007).
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 in the delivery state, but whether or not the taxpayer demonstrated more than a “slightest 
presence” in the delivery state.10
A variation of the throwback rule is the throwout rule. Under this rule, if the business is 
not taxable in the state of destination, the sales are thrown out of both the numerator and 
denominator of the sales factor. For a multistate business, the interplay between two states, 
one using throwbacks and the other using throwouts, can result in the business paying tax 
on more than 100 percent of its income. Montana and West Virginia use a throwout rule. 
New Jersey enacted a throwout rule in its 2002 Business Tax Reform Act. Pfizer, Inc., 
challenged New Jersey’s throwout rule and lost in 2008.11 Pfizer appealed, and its appeal 
was consolidated with Whirlpool Properties.12 The taxpayers lost on appeal, but, in the 
meantime, the New Jersey legislature has repealed its throwout rule for tax years beginning 
on or after July 1, 2010. Whirlpool and Pfizer have appealed to the New Jersey Supreme 
Court, which has agreed to hear the appeal, so affected taxpayers should file protective re-
fund claims with the state of New Jersey.
Service Sales
Receipts from sales of services, unlike sales of tangible personal property, are not sourced 
under the destination test. Instead, sales, other than sales of tangible personal property, are 
sourced by looking at the income-producing activity and measuring that activity by its cost 
of performance. Specifically, UDITPA provides that service sales are in-state sales if (1) the 
income-producing activity is performed in the state or (2) “the income-producing activity is 
performed both in and outside this state and a greater proportion of the income-producing 
activity is performed in this state than in any other state, based on costs of performance.” 
Simply put, Section 17 of UDITPA allocates sales of services to where the bulk of the 
income-producing activity takes place as measured by cost of performance.
UDITPA and MTC are not always consistent. For example, the MTC regulation for 
personal services provides that
Gross receipts for the performance of personal services are attributable to this state to the 
extent that such services are performed in this state. If services relating to a single item of 
income are performed partly within and partly without this state, the gross receipts from 
the performance of such services shall be attributable to this state only if the greater propor-
tion of such services was performed in the state, based on costs of performance. Usually, 
where services are performed partly within and partly without this state, the services per-
formed in each state will constitute a separate income producing activity; in such case the 
gross receipts from the performance of services attributable to this state shall be measured 
by the ratio which the time spent in performing the services in this state bears to the total 
time spent in performing the services everywhere.
10 See Guardian Indus. Corp. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 499 N.W.2d 349 (Mich. 1993); Howmet Corp. v. Michi-
gan, No. 87-11161-CM (Mich. Ct. Claims Jan. 1, 1989); and Magnetek Controls, Inc. v. Revenue Div., 566 
N.W.2d 219 (Mich. 1997).
11 See Pfizer, Inc. v. Director, 24 N.J. Tax 116 (May 29, 2008).
12 See also Whirlpool Prop., Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 25 N.J. Tax 519 (July 12, 2010).
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Not surprisingly, there are at least two areas in which taxpayers and tax administrators 
differ. The first is in defining the “income-producing activity” and the other is in defining 
“cost of performance.” For example, what is a travel agency’s “income-producing activity?” 
Is it the individual sale of travel packages, or is it the “operation” of bundling the packages 
together? The difference is important because the costs of performance between the two 
vary. The costs of a European travel package may include airfare, hotel accommodations, 
and ground transportation, only some of which are incurred in the United States. But the 
costs of simply bundling the packages together may very well be done in offices in the 
United States. It is probably not too difficult to guess where Massachusetts thought those 
costs, and the accompanying, income-producing activity occurred.13 Massachusetts has also 
tackled the question of whether the “income-producing activity” of a hockey team was the 
playing of individual games or the operation of the franchise as a whole. The department 
of revenue naturally argued that it was the latter because the cost of performance of each 
individual game would have sourced more income away from Massachusetts. The court 
upheld the Department’s position.14
In Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Chumley, 308 S.W.3d 350 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2009), appeal denied, Tenn. Sup. Ct (Mar. 1, 2010), Tennessee’s commissioner held that, 
despite the fact that the bulk of the cost of performance occurred outside the state, the result 
was distortive since all the advertising itself (delivery of the telephone directories) occurred 
inside Tennessee. For a similar decision, see Ameritech Publishing, Inc., v. Wisconsin, 788 
N.W.2d 383 (Wisc. Ct. App. Jun. 24, 2010).
Under UDITPA, the cost of performance (COP) is an all-or-nothing approach. If 75 
percent of the cost of performance is in State A and 25 percent in State B, the entire sale 
is sourced to State A. However, the states vary from UDITPA rules by sometimes apply-
ing a preponderance or, “greater proportion” test or a pro rata approach. For example, in a 
preponderance state, if the cost of performance is apportioned among three states when 40 
percent of the COP was in one state and 30 percent each in the other two states, the sale 
would be sourced entirely to the 40 percent state. A pro rata state would prorate the sale 
proportionately so each state would receive its applicable share. The risk, of course, is that 
in this example, the 40 percent state might put the entire sale in its numerator while one of 
the 30 percent states, being a pro rata state, would put 30 percent of the sale in its numerator. 
As a consequence, the taxpayer ends up paying tax on more than 100 percent of its income. 
As you can see, the inconsistency between the two methods presents tax traps for the un-
wary and opportunities for others. Some pro rata states include Louisiana, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, Rhode Island, and South Carolina.
The problem is compounded by the vague definition of cost of performance. In short, 
cost of performance is measured by direct costs determined in a manner consistent with 
generally accepted accounting principles and in accordance with accepted industry practices.
13 See Interface Group v. Comm’r of Revenue, 918 N.E.2d 97 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009), aff’g nos. C266670-76, 
C266680, and C266677-79, 2008 WL 4642961 (Mass. App. Tax Bd. Oct. 17, 2008), rev. denied, 456 Mass. 
1105 (2010).
14 See Boston Professional Hockey Association v. Commissioner of Revenue, 820 N.E.2d 792 (2005).
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 Direct costs generally include such things as salaries and wages, taxes, interest, and de-
preciation. Indirect costs are usually defined as all costs that are not direct costs—not much 
help there.
As mentioned previously, personal services often are singled out for specific measurement. 
The MTC rule quoted previously is often referred to as the “time-spread” method, and in 
such cases, the income from the performance of the services is usually measured by the ratio 
of time spent in the state performing the services divided by the total time spent performing 
the services everywhere.
In 2005, California issued Legal Ruling 2005-01, holding that the term “personal servic-
es” for purposes of the sales factor included the performance of any service when capital was 
not a material income-producing factor. In personal service contracts, when capital is not 
a material income-producing factor, the special time-spread rule will be used to determine 
the corporation’s costs of performance. Most importantly, the time each employee spends 
in each state will constitute a separate income-producing activity for purposes of determin-
ing the numerator of the sales factor. Finally, when capital is a material income-producing 
factor, the special time-spread rule does not apply. Instead, the standard cost of performance 
rule would assign the receipts to the state with the greatest cost of performance.
To Market, to Market
Several states are abandoning cost of performance and are moving toward a market- or 
destination-based approach to service sales. They include California (if using single sales ap-
portionment), Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, 
Ohio, Texas, and Wisconsin. Basically, the move is an effort to source sales of services in 
the same fashion as sales of goods—by destination. The belief is that this approach is more 
consistent with the rational for a sales factor, that is, that it represents the contribution of the 
market states. After all, cost of performance, particularly for services, often looks just like 
the payroll factor. Finally, one shouldn’t forget the political appeal. Market-based sourcing 
generally shifts the tax burden to out-of-state sellers over their in-state counterparts, an ap-
peal that is irresistible to most politicians.
Certain industries have always taken a market approach. In The New Yorker Magazine, Inc. 
v. Department of Revenue of State of Illinois, (Illinois Circuit Court (Cook County) Jan. 12, 
1988), advertising revenue was deemed included in the sales factor to same extent as circula-
tion revenue. See also McGraw-Hill, Inc., TAT (H)93-64(GC) (Dec. 30, 1993), in which it 
was determined that advertising revenues are sourced based on the location of subscribers.
The move toward market-based sourcing of service sales has prompted a host of questions 
and problems. For example, when sourcing based on the market, does that mean where the 
service is performed or where the benefit is received? Louisiana looks to where the service 
is performed and Maryland to where it is received. Thus, a software developer writing code 
in Louisiana for a client in Maryland may very well end up having to source the sale to the 
numerators of both states. Because sourcing service sales by market may mean where the 
service is performed (so it looks like cost of performance), where the benefit is received, or 
where the customer is located, such sourcing may be just as problematical as the traditional 
cost of performance test.
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Outsourcing and Independent Contractors
In 2007, the MTC added an amendment to its uniform regulations to include in the defini-
tion of an income-producing activity “transactions and activities performed on behalf of a 
taxpayer, such as those conducted on its behalf by an independent contractor.” The amend-
ment also includes “payments to an agent or independent contractor for the performance 
of personal services which give rise to the particular item of income.” The change by the 
MTC is recognition of the growing importance of outsourcing in both manufacturing and 
services.
California addressed the application of a similar rule in the context of a combined report 
in Legal Ruling 2006-02. In the ruling, the FTB clarified the application of the “on behalf 
of” rule when a member of a combined reporting group has a sale of other than tangible 
personal property and that member pays another member of the combined reporting group 
to perform activities related to that sale.
Specifically, the ruling excludes from a taxpayer’s income-producing activity any acts 
performed on its behalf by an independent contractor, unless the independent contractor is 
a member of the same unitary group. Payments made by one member of a combined report-
ing group to another member (that is, a subcontractor) are only counted as costs of perfor-
mance for the member if the payment reflects an arm’s–length price for the performance of 
the service. The payment will be considered a direct cost and will be used to measure the 
member’s and not the subcontractor’s costs of performance. If the member does not pay at 
an arm’s–length price, the actual costs incurred by the subcontractor may be imputed to the 
member to measure the member’s costs of performance.
Specialized Industries
Most states have special rules for specific industries such as financial organizations, con-
struction companies, and transportation companies. The MTC has issued final or proposed 
regulations on construction contractors, railroads, airlines, radio and television broadcasting, 
and trucking. These rules vary from industry to industry and are beyond the scope of this 
chapter.
On November 17, 1994, the MTC adopted model special apportionment rules for fi-
nancial institutions. The formula apportions all business income under the three-factor ap-
proach. Only interest, dividends, net gains, and other business income from investment 
assets and activities (including trading) are included in the receipts factor. Investment assets 
and activities include but are not limited to investment securities, federal funds, repurchase 
agreements (repos), swaps, futures contracts, equities, forward contracts, and foreign cur-
rency transactions. The MTC recommends adoption for tax years beginning after January 1, 
1996. The definition of what is a financial institution is left up to the states.
So far, 18 states have adopted the MTC financial apportionment and allocation rules (or 
something similar) including Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Washington. Approval by North Carolina and 
Utah is expected shortly.
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Author’s Note: Income Apportionment Consideration
Rarely do taxpayers apportion exactly 100 percent of their income due to differing 
rules and treatment of certain transactions by different taxing jurisdictions.
The “Relief Provision”
Section 18 of UDITPA is commonly referred to as the relief provision because it provides 
for modification of the formula.
If the allocation and apportionment provisions of the UDITPA do not fairly represent the 
extent of the taxpayer’s business activity in this state, the taxpayer may petition for, or the 
tax administrator may require, in respect to all or any part of the taxpayer’s business activity, 
if reasonable,
•  separate accounting,
•  the exclusion of any one or more of the factors,
•  the inclusion of one or more additional factors which will fairly represent the taxpay-
er’s business activity in the state, or
•  the employment of any other method to effectuate an equitable allocation and appor-
tionment of the taxpayer’s income.
The taxpayer may petition for relief under Section 18 of UDITPA or the tax administrator 
may require “with respect to all or any part of the taxpayer’s business activity, use of separate 
accounting, exclusion of any one or more of the factors, inclusion of one or more additional 
factors, or employment of any other method that will result in an equitable allocation and 
apportionment of the taxpayer’s income.” Because most courts provide a presumption of 
correctness on the part of the state, it is not surprising that tax administrators have been more 
successful invoking Section 18 relief than have taxpayers. See, for example, Hans Rees’ Sons, 
Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931); Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 
463 U.S. 159 (1983); and Crocker Equipment Leasing v. Department of Revenue, SC S38059 
(Or. Aug. 20, 1992). Given the long history, as illustrated by the previous cases, of taxpayers 
failing in their efforts to receive “Section 18 relief,” it was surprising to see a taxpayer, not 
only win relief, but to win relief based on combined filing in a separate-filing state.
South Carolina has traditionally been a separate-filing state and has rebuffed past attempts 
by taxpayers to file a combined report there. See NCR Corp. v. South Carolina, 402 S.E.2d 
666 (1991), and NCR Corp. v. South Carolina, 439 S.E.2d 254 (1993), often known as NCR 
I and NCR II. However, since the NCR decisions, the state had enacted into South Caro-
lina law an identical version of “Section 18 relief” at S.C. Code § 12-6-2320(A). Because 
the statute now provided for “the employment of any other method to effectuate an equita-
ble allocation and apportionment” of income, Media General Communications petitioned, 
pursuant to an audit, for the use of combined reporting. While the department of revenue 
agreed with the taxpayer that separate filing did not fairly reflect the taxpayer’s income and 
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that combined reporting did do so, the department declined to allow the taxpayer to use the 
latter method on the grounds that, as a separate-filing state, it did not have the authority to 
permit combined filing. The South Carolina Supreme Court ruled in favor of Media Gen-
eral stating that because the statute provided for “any other method,” the plain language of 
the law provided for combined filing. In addition to the language of the statute, the court 
pointed out that both parties had stipulated that combined filing more fairly reflected in-
come than separate filing, that the state had not offered any other filing methodology, and 
that the U.S. Supreme Court had recognized combined filing apportionment as an accept-
able methodology for apportioning a company’s income.15
How Much Distortion Is Enough?
Is there even enough distortion to overcome a state’s apportionment methodology? That 
was the question facing the U.S. Supreme Court in Hans Rees.16 Hans Rees was a victory 
for the taxpayer. Admittedly, there have not been many. In this case, North Carolina used 
a single factor—property—to apportion the income of a company with a manufacturing 
plant in North Carolina and its corporate offices in New York. Using its single formula, the 
state determined that 85 percent of the company’s income was taxable in North Carolina. 
Hans Rees was able to show that only 20 percent of its income came from its manufacturing 
activities in North Carolina. Apparently, the gulf between 20 percent and 85 percent was 
such that the court held for Hans Rees, stating that apportionment formulas cannot be “in-
trinsically arbitrary,” “unreasonable,” or tax extraterritorial income. “The difficulty of mak-
ing an exact apportionment is apparent and hence, when the State has adopted a method 
not intrinsically arbitrary, it will be sustained until proof is offered of an unreasonable and 
arbitrary application in particular cases.”
The Treatment of Factors in Partnerships
The key question for partnerships is whether the apportionment and allocation take place 
at the partnership or partner level. Most states require apportionment and allocation at the 
partner level. For example, if a corporation owns 30 percent of a partnership, it simply picks 
up its share of the partnership’s income and adds its 30 percent share of the partnership’s 
factors (sales, property, and payroll) to its own.
15 See Media General v. South Carolina, 694 S.E.2d 525 (2010).
16 Hans Rees’ Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 286 U.S. 123 (1931).
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Example 5-4
Corporation A had $3,000,000 in taxable income last year and does business in 
states X and Y. Its factors are as follows:
State X State Y Total
Sales 10,000,000 15,000,000 25,000,000
Property  3,000,000  4,000,000  7,000,000
Payroll    500,000    700,000  1,200,000
Corporation A owned 30 percent of Partnership B. Partnership B had $900,000 of 
taxable income and did business in states Y and Z. Its factors are as follows:
State Y State Z Total
Sales  3,000,000  1,000,000  4,000,000
Property    600,000    900,000  1,500,000
Payroll    300,000    150,000    450,000
After adding its 30 percent share of Partnership B to its own activities, Corporation 
A will have $3,270,000 in taxable income and its apportionment factors will look 
like this:
State X State Y State Z Total
Sales 10,000,000 15,900,000    300,000 26,200,000
Property  3,000,000  4,180,000    270,000  7,450,000
Payroll    500,000    790,000     45,000  1,335,000
The income for State Y, which uses an equally-weighted three-factor formula, 
would be $1,918,182, calculated as follows:
State Y Total Appt %
Sales 15,900,000 26,200,000  60.69
Property  4,180,000  7,450,000  56.11
Payroll    790,000  1,335,000  59.18
 Total 175.98
 Divided by 3 equals    58.66%
$3,270,000 × 58.66% = $1,918,182
05-Chapter 05.indd   140 10/6/11   2:16 PM
Chapter 5: Apportionment Formulas and Factors
 141
Example 5-5
If the allocation and apportionment is done at the partnership level, the corporate 
partner simply adds the partnerships’ resulting state income to the corporation’s 
income for that state.
Using the numbers in the preceding example, Corporation A’s taxable income for 
State Y would be:
State Y Total Appt %
Sales 15,000,000 25,000,000  60.00
Property  4,000,000  7,000,000  57.14
Payroll    700,000  1,200,000  58.33
 Total 175.47
 Divided by 3 equals    58.49%
$3,000,000 × 58.49% = $1,754,700
Calculation of Partnership B’s State Y income:
State Y Total Appt %
Sales  3,000,000  4,000,000  75.00
Property    600,000  1,500,000  40.00
Payroll    300,000    450,000  66.67
 Total 181.67
 Divided by 3 equals    60.56%
$900,000 × 60.56% = $545,040
Corporation A’s Total Taxable Income for State Y
From Corporation A: $1,754,700
From Partnership B:    545,040
 Total $2,299,740
The preceding example assumed that the corporation and partnership were not unitary, 
nor were there any intercompany sales between the corporation and the partnership. Natu-
rally, things become more complicated if there is a unitary relationship or intercompany 
sales. The majority of states simply do not address such issues either in their statutes, regula-
tions, rulings, or policies. These states often follow the lead of larger states, such as Califor-
nia, that do address these issues. Appendix 2 is a portion of California Regulation 25137-1, 
which contains several helpful examples of how to calculate the appropriate corporate in-
come of a partnership interest.
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 Appendix 1: Apportionment 
Formulas and Corporate Tax 
Rates by State
State Formula*
Alabama Three-factor formula; double-weighted sales
Alaska Three-factor formula
Arizona Three-factor formula; double-weighted sales; or enhanced sales factor 
formula of 80-10-10
Arkansas Three-factor formula; double-weighted sales
California Three-factor formula; double-weighted sales; single sales factor available 
upon election
Colorado Single sales factor
Connecticut Three-factor formula; double-weighted sales; single sales factor 
apportionment for nonproperty income
Delaware Three-factor formula
District of Columbia Three-factor formula
Florida Three-factor formula; double-weighted sales
Georgia Single sales factor
Hawaii Three-factor formula
Idaho Three-factor formula; double-weighted sales
Illinois Single sales factor
Indiana Single sales factor to be phased in by 2011; for 2009 three factor formula is 
90-5-5
Iowa Single sales factor
Kansas Three-factor formula
Kentucky Three-factor formula; double-weighted sales
Louisiana Generally a single sales factor but varies with industry
Maine Single sales factor
Maryland Three-factor formula; double-weighted sales; single sales factor for 
manufacturers
Massachusetts Three-factor formula; double-weighted sales
Michigan Single sales factor
Minnesota 90% Sales, 5% Property, 5% Payroll for 2011
Mississippi Generally a single sales factor but varies with industry
Missouri Three-factor formula
Montana Three-factor formula
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State Formula*
Nebraska Single sales factor
Nevada No income tax
New Hampshire Three-factor formula; double-weighted sales
New Jersey Three-factor formula; double-weighted sales
New Mexico Three-factor formula; double-weighted sales factor for manufacturers
New York Single sales factor
North Carolina Three-factor formula; double-weighted sales
North Dakota Three-factor formula
Ohio Three-factor formula; triple-weighted sales
Oklahoma Three-factor formula
Oregon Single sales factor
Pennsylvania 90% Sales, 5% Property, 5% Payroll
Rhode Island Three-factor formula
South Carolina Single sales factor
South Dakota No income tax
Tennessee Three-factor formula; double-weighted sales
Texas Single sales factor
Utah Three-factor formula; may elect to double-weight sales
Vermont Three-factor formula; double-weighted sales
Virginia Three-factor formula; double-weighted sales
Washington No income tax
West Virginia Three-factor formula; double-weighted sales
Wisconsin Single sales factor
Wyoming No income tax
* Most states have special provisions for certain industries such as airlines, contractors, publishing, transportation, television 
and radio, and financial institutions. In addition, many states (such as Minnesota) are moving towards a single sales factor. 
Other states offer special provisions tied to investment. Arizona, for example, allows for corporations making investments in 
state in excess of $1 billion, additional weighting of the sales factor. These details are beyond the scope of this chart.
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 State Corporate Income 
Tax Rate (%)
Alabama 6.5
Alaska 1.0 to 9.4
Arizona 6.968





District of Columbia 9.975
Florida 5.5
Georgia 6.0
Hawaii 4.4 to 6.4
Idaho 7.6
Illinois 7.0 for 2011
Indiana 8.5
Iowa 6.0 to 12.0
Kansas 4.0
Kentucky 4.0 to 6.0
Louisiana 4.0 to 8.0
Maine 3.5 to 8.93
Maryland 8.25
Massachusetts 8.25
Michigan 4.95 + 0.8
Minnesota 9.8
Mississippi 3.0 to 5.0
Missouri 6.25
State Corporate Income 
Tax Rate (%)
Montana 6.75
Nebraska 5.58 to 7.81
Nevada No income tax
New Hampshire 8.5
New Jersey 6.5 to 9.0
New Mexico 4.8 to 7.6
New York 7.1
North Carolina 6.9
North Dakota 1.68 to 5.15
Ohio N/A
Oklahoma 6.0




South Dakota No income tax
Tennessee 6.5
Texas 0.5 or 1.0
Utah 5.0
Vermont 6.0 to 8.5
Virginia 6.0
Washington No income tax
West Virginia 8.5
Wisconsin 7.9
Wyoming No income tax
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Appendix 2: 25137-1. 
Apportionment and Allocation  
of Partnership Income
(a) In General. 
When a taxpayer has an interest in a partnership as defined in Section 17008, Revenue and Taxation 
Code, the division of its distributive share of partnership items shall be determined in accordance with 
Chapter 10 of Part 10 of Division 2 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. The determination of the portion 
of such distributive share (constituting business and nonbusiness income) which has its source in this 
state or which is includable in the taxpayer’s business income subject to apportionment, shall be made in 
accordance with these regulations provided that the taxpayer, or the partnership, or both, have income 
from sources within and without this state. The taxpayer in computing net income for its income year 
shall include its distributive share of partnership items referred to above for any partnership year ending 
within or with the taxpayer’s income year. 
The first step is to determine which portion of the taxpayer’s income and its distributive share of the 
partnership items constitute “business income” and “nonbusiness income” under Section 25120, Rev-
enue and Taxation Code, and the regulations thereunder. The various items of nonbusiness income are 
then directly allocated to specific states pursuant to the provisions of Section 25124 to 25127, Revenue 
and Taxation Code. The taxpayer’s distributive share of partnership business income is apportioned by 
the formula set forth in subsections (f) or (g), whichever is applicable. The sum of 
(1) the items of nonbusiness income directly allocated to this state, plus 
(2) the amount of business income attributed to this state is the portion of the taxpayer’s entire net 
income which is subject to tax. 
Income arising from transactions and activity in the regular course of the partnership’s trade or busi-
ness constitutes business income. Thus, a corporate-partner’s distributive share of partnership business 
income constitutes business income to the corporate-partner, but the determination of whether the 
partnership’s activities and the activities of the corporate-partner constitutes a single trade or business 
or more than one trade or business turns on the facts in each case. If the partnership’s activities and the 
taxpayer’s activities constitute a unitary business under established standards, disregarding ownership 
requirements, the taxpayer’s share of the partnership’s trade or business shall be combined with the 
taxpayer’s trade or business as constituting a single trade or business.
Example 1: Corporation A’s distributive share of income in partnership P is 20%. Corporation A 
manufactures toys which are sold in the seven western states by partnership P. Corporation 
A’s business income for the year was $1,000,000 and partnership P’s business income for the 
same year was $800,000. The business income of Corporation A is $1,160,000 ($1,000,000 plus 
20% of $800,000).
Example 2: Corporation A’s distributive share of income in partnership P is 90%. Partnership 
P manufactures toys of which approximately 30% are sold by Corporation A in the seven 
western states. The remainder is sold to outsiders by partnership P. In addition, Corporation 
A also sells other lines of toys not manufactured by partnership P. Corporation A handles all 
financing, management, accounting, advertising, and purchasing functions for partnership 
P as well as for itself. Corporation A incurred a loss of $500,000 for the year but partnership 
P’s income was $1,000,000. The business income of Corporation A is $400,000 (90% of $1,000 = 
$900,000 less the loss of $500,000).
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 When the activities of the partnership and the taxpayer do not constitute a unitary business 
under established standards, disregarding ownership requirements, the taxpayer’s share of 
the partnership’s trade or business shall be treated as a separate trade or business of the 
taxpayer. In such a case the taxpayer is engaged in two trades or businesses.
Corporation A’s distributive share of income in partnership P is 20%. Corporation A manu-
factures and sells toys in the seven western states. Partnership P operates farms within 
and without this state. Corporation A’s income for the year is $1,000,000 and partnership P’s 
income is $800,000 for the same year. Corporation A is engaged in two trades or businesses, 
and will be required to apportion its income of $1,000,000 from its own operations to this state 
on the basis of a three factor apportionment formula. Partnership P would attribute part of its 
business income of $800,000 to this state on the basis of its own three factor apportionment 
formula. Accordingly, Corporation A would report 20% of the partnership income apportioned 
to this state plus a portion of its income from its toy manufacturing business. 
* * * * *
(f) Apportionment of business income—single trade or business. 
If the partnership’s activities and the taxpayer’s activities constitute a unitary business under established 
standards, disregarding ownership requirements, the business income or such single trade or business 
attributable to this state shall be determined by a three factor formula consisting of property, payroll and 
sales of the taxpayer and its share of the partnership’s factors for any partnership year ending within or 
with the taxpayer’s income year as follows: 
(1) Property factor. 
In general the numerator and denominator of the property factor shall be determined as set forth in 
Regulations 25129 to 25131, inclusive, and 25137(b). However, the following special rules shall apply:
(A) A portion of the partnership’s real and tangible personal property, both owned or rented and 
used during the income year in the regular course of such trade or business, to the extent of the 
taxpayer’s interest in the partnership, shall be included in the denominator of the taxpayer’s property 
factor. The value of such property located in this state shall also be included in the numerator of the 
property factor.
(B) The value of property which is rented or leased by the taxpayer to the partnership or vice versa 
shall, with respect to the taxpayer, be excluded from the property factor of the partnership or elimi-
nated to the extent of the taxpayer’s interest in the partnership, whatever the case may be, in order 
to avoid duplication.
Example 1: Corporation A’s interest in partnership P is 20%. Corporation A’s distributive 
share of partnership P’s income is included in business income of Corporation A to be 
apportioned by formula. Corporation A owns a building (original cost of $100,000) which 
is rented to partnership P for $12,000 per year. Corporation A must include the original 
cost of $100,000 for the building in its property factor. Therefore, no portion of the value 
of the rented property will be reflected in the property factor of Corporation A.
Example 2: Same facts as in Example 1 except partnership P owns the building and rents 
it to Corporation A. Corporation A will include $20,000 (20% of $100,000) in its property 
factor because of its interest in partnership P. In addition, Corporation A will take into 
account $9,600 ($12,000 less 20% thereof) of rental expense into its property factor in 
order to give weight in the property factor to the rented building used in Corporation A’s 
operation. Thus, the value of the building to be used in the property factor of Corporation 
A is $96,800 ($20,000 plus 8 × $9,600). 
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(2) Payroll factor. 
In general the numerator and denominator of the payroll factor shall be determined as set forth in 
Regulations 25132 and 25133. However, the following special rules shall apply: 
The partnership’s payroll used to produce business income, shall be included in the denominator 
of the taxpayer’s payroll factor to the extent of the taxpayer’s interest in the partnership. The amount 
of any such payroll applicable to this state shall also be included in the numerator of the taxpayer’s 
payroll factor. 
Example 1: Corporation A’s interest in partnership P is 20% and its distributive share of 
partnership P’s income is included in business income of Corporation A to be apportioned 
by formula. Corporation A’s own payroll is $1,000,000 and the payroll of partnership P 
is $800,000. Corporation A’s total payroll for purposes of the payroll factor is $1,160,000 
($1,000,000 plus 20% of $800,000). 
(3) Sales factor. 
In general the numerator and denominator of the sales factor shall be determined as set forth in Regu-
lations 25134 to 25136, inclusive, and 25137(c). However, the following special rules shall apply: 
(A) The partnership’s sales which give rise to business income, shall be included in the denominator 
of the taxpayer’s sales factor to the extent of the taxpayer’s interest in the partnership. The amount 
of such sales attributable to this state shall also be included in the numerator of the taxpayer’s sales 
factor. Intercompany sales between the partnership and the taxpayer shall be eliminated from the 
denominator and numerator of the taxpayer’s sales factor as follows: 
(i) Sales by the taxpayer to the partnership to the extent of the taxpayer’s interest in the  
partnership. 
(ii) Sales by the partnership to the taxpayer not to exceed the taxpayer’s interest in all partnership 
sales. 
(B) Notwithstanding any intercompany eliminations described in subparagraph (A) above, sales 
made to nonpartners shall be included in the denominator of the taxpayer’s sales factor in an 
amount equal to such taxpayer’s interest in the partnership. 
(C) Application of the above rules is illustrated by the following examples: 
Example 1: Corporation A’s interest in partnership P is 20%, and its distributive share 
of partnership P’s income is included in business income of Corporation A to be ap-
portioned by formula. Corporation A’s sales were $20,000,000 for the year, $5,000,000 of 
which were made to partnership P. Partnership P made sales of $10,000,000 during the 
same year, none of which were to Corporation A or the other partner(s). The denomina-
tor of Corporation A’s sales factor is $21,000,000 determined as follows: 
Sales by Corporation A $20,000,000>
Add: Corporation A’s interest (20%) in
 Partnership P’s sales 2,000,000>
Less: Corporation A’s interest (20%) in
 Corporation A’s sales to Partnership P <1,000,000>
Denominator of Sales Factor  $21,000,000>
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 Example 2: The following facts are applicable to Examples 2(a) to (c), inclusive. Corpora-
tion A’s interest in partnership P is 20% and Corporation B’s interest is 80%. The distribu-
tive share of partnership income is included in business income of Corporation A and 
Corporation B, respectively. 
(a) The sales made by Corporation A, Corporation B, and Partnership P are as follows: 
Corporation A  $20,000,000>
Corporation B  60,000,000>
Partnership P:
 To Corporation A $2,000,000
 To Corporation B 8,000,000
  $10,000,000>
The denominator of Corporation A’s sales factor is $20,000,000 determined as follows: 
Sales by Corporation A $20,000,000>
Add: Corporation A’s interest (20%) in
 Partnership P’s sales 2,000,000>
Less: Partnership P’s Sales to Corporation A <2,000,000>
Denominator of Corporation A’s sales factor $20,000,000>
The denominator of Corporation B’s sales factor is $60,000,000 determined as follows: 
Sales by Corporation B $60,000,000>
Add: Corporation B’s interest (80%) in 
 Partnership P’s sales 8,000,000>
Less: Partnership P’s sales to Corporation B <8,000,000>
 $60,000,000>
(b) The sales made by Corporation A, Corporation B, and Partnership P are as follows: 
Corporation A  $20,000,000>
Corporation B  60,000,000>
Partnership P:
 To Corporation A $1,000,000
 To Corporation B 9,000,000
  $10,000,000>
The denominator of Corporation A’s sales factor is $21,000,000 determined as follows: 
Sales by Corporation A $20,000,000>
Add: Corporation A’s interest (20%) in
 Partnership P’s sales 2,000,000>
Less: Partnership P’s sales to Corporation A <1,000,000>
Denominator of Corporation A’s sales factor $21,000,000>
The denominator of Corporation B’s sales factor is $60,000,000 determined as follows: 
Sales by Corporation B $60,000,000>
Add: Corporation B’s interest (80%) in
 Partnership P’s sales 8,000,000>
Less: Intercompany sales between Partnership P
 and Corporation B* <8,000,000>
Denominator of Corporation B’s sales factor $60,000,000>
(c) The sales made by Corporation A, Corporation B, and Partnership P are as follows: 
Corporation A $20,000,000>
Corporation B 80,000,000>
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Partnership P:
 To Corporation A $3,000,000>
 To Corporation B 6,000,000>
 To Corporation X 1,000,000>
 $10,000,000>
The denominator of Corporation A’s sales factor is $20,200,000 determined as follows: 
Sales by Corporation A $20,000,000>
Add: Corporation A’s interest in Partnership P’s
 sales to Nonpartner X Corporation
 (20% × $1,000,000) 200,000>
 Corporation A’s interest in Partnership P’s sales
  to Partners (20% × $9,000,000) 1,800,000>
Less: Intercompany sales from Partnership P to
 Corporation A* <1,800,000>
Denominator of Corporation A’s sales factor $20,200,000>
The denominator of Corporation B’s sales factor is $81,800,000 determined as follows: 
Sales by Corporation B $80,000,000>
Add: Corporation B’s interest in Partnership P’s
 sales to Nonpartner X Corporation
 (80% × $1,000,000) 800,000>
 Corporation B’s interest in Partnership P’s
  sales to Partners (80% × $9,000,000) 7,200,000>
Less: Intercompany sales from Partnership P
 to Corporation B <6,000,000>
Denominator of Corporation B’s sales factor $82,000,000>
* Not to exceed taxpayer’s interest in Partnership P’s sales.
* * * * *
(5) Common accounting period. 
If a partnership and a corporation are engaged in a unitary business and their accounting periods are 
different, if necessary, in order to avoid distortion, the income and factors of the partnership will be 
determined on the basis of the corporate partner’s accounting period. 
(g) Apportionment of business income – two or more trades or businesses. 
When the activities of the partnership and the taxpayer do not constitute a unitary business under estab-
lished standards, disregarding ownership requirements, the taxpayer’s share of the partnership’s trade or 
business shall be treated as another trade or business of the taxpayer. The determination of the amount 
of the partnership’s business income and the taxpayer’s distributive share of that income attributable to 
sources within this state shall be as follows: 
(1) If the partnership derives business income from sources within and without this state, the amount 
of business income derived from sources within this state shall be determined on the basis of a three 
factor formula of property, payroll and sales. The factors shall be determined in accordance with 
the provisions of Section 25129 to 25137, inclusive, Revenue and Taxation Code, and the regulations 
thereunder. After determining the amount of business income attributable to this state by the three 
factor formula, the taxpayer’s distributive share of such business income shall be reported as busi-
ness income from a separate business by the taxpayer. That income when added to the taxpayer’s 
other business income apportioned to this state and nonbusiness income allocable to this state is the 
taxpayer’s measure of tax for its income year.
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 Corporation A’s distributive share of income in partnership P is 20%. Partnership P derives income 
from sources within and without this state but its business is unrelated to the business of Corporation 
A. Partnership P has business income of $500,000 for the year of which 40% is apportioned to this state 
by its three factor formula of property, payroll and sales. Corporation A shall include in its measure of 
tax its income received from partnership P $40,000 ($500,000 × 40% × 20). 
(2) If the partnership derives business income from sources entirely within this state, or entirely with-
out this state, such income shall not be subject to formula apportionment. The taxpayer’s distributive 
share of such business income attributable to this state (if any) shall be added to the taxpayer’s other 
business income apportioned to this state plus nonbusiness income, if any, allocable to this state, the 
total of which is the taxpayer’s measure of tax for its income year. 
Example 1: Corporation A’s distributive share of income in partnership P is 20%. The distributive 
share of P’s business income is not an integral part of A’s trade or business so as to be consid-
ered one business. Corporation A derives business income from sources within and without this 
state. Partnership P is engaged in business wholly within this state. Corporation A’s business 
income for the year is $5,000,000 of which 50% is apportioned to this state. Partnership P has a 
loss on its operations for the same year of $500,000. Corporation A’s measure of tax is $2,400,000 
($5,000,000 × 50% = $2,500,000 × $100,000 ($500,000 × 20%)). 
Example 2: Same facts as in Example 1 except partnership P operates its business wholly 
outside this state. Corporation A’s measure of tax is $2,500,000 ($5,000,000 × 50%) as no portion of 
partnership P’s loss is attributable to this state.
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State and local taxes have, for many companies, become a much larger expense than federal 
taxes. In addition, the state and local field has become a “growth industry” with no end to 
the growth in sight, as state and local governments increasingly find their budgets strapped 
for cash. As a consequence, increased attention has been focused the past few years on 
reducing state tax liabilities.
We engage in this effort keeping in mind the oft-quoted words of Judge Learned Hand 
that “any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not 
bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic 
duty to increase one’s taxes.”1
Finally, any tax planning strategy must be considered in light of overall company objec-
tives, implementation costs, administrative complexity, practical realities, economic sub-
stance, and business purpose. In our enthusiasm to save on taxes, we often forget that busi-
nesses do not exist to minimize taxes. Reducing a company’s tax burden is only one of many 
tools used by management to achieve a company’s larger objectives.
Identifying Goals and Methodologies
General Planning Goal
Our general planning goal is to shift income from states with high taxes to those with low 
tax rates by either moving income away from those states, decreasing the apportionment 
factors in those high rate states, or capitalizing on the inconsistencies among the states in 
their treatment of the unitary concept; business or nonbusiness income; state modifications; 
payroll, property, and sales factors; and filing elections.
1 Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (1934).
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Specific Tactics
Review Your Factors
Examine the makeup and application of your apportionment factors. Can you isolate pay-
roll, property, or sales that generate nonbusiness income from business income? Once sepa-
rated, identify the allocation rules of the states in which you are doing business. Sometimes 
simple identification and separation will result in savings.
Compare, for example, the interaction of your specific sales factor with your state’s treat-
ment of such items as drop shipments, dock sales, throwbacks, throwouts, and cost-of-
performance related to service sales. Savings are sometimes possible by changing the method 
or location of shipment and delivery. Identify property which is obsolete and remove it 
from your property factor. Check to see if leasing employees in your state will lower your 
payroll factor or whether certain employees can be replaced with independent contractors. 
The latter are not included in the payroll factor. Double-check to make sure that property 
or payroll that is generating nonbusiness income is not included in your apportionment fac-
tors for business income.
The overall goal in reviewing your factors is to move either operations or highly profit-
able activities into low-tax states and operations or activities that generate losses or low-
profit margins into high-tax states. Computer spreadsheet models are particularly helpful 
in performing various “if-this-then-that” analyses. The following simple examples illustrate 
the benefits of shifting a company’s factors.
Example 6-1
High-Value, Inc., does business in two states, A and B. State A has a 10 percent 
income tax rate, and State B has a 5 percent income tax rate. Both states utilize a 
traditional three-factor formula that equally weights sales, property, and payroll. 
High-Value manufactures, stores, and distributes its products in State A. The 
operations in State B are largely limited to sales, repair, and maintenance activities. 
The company’s taxable income is $10,000,000, and its activities within the two 
states are as follows:
State A State B Total
Sales $70,000,000% $20,000,000% $90,000,000%
Property 5,000,000% 1,500,000% 6,500,000%
Payroll 3,000,000% 1,000,000% 4,000,000%
High-Value’s tax liability for both states currently totals $882,850.
State A State B
Sales factor 77.78% 22.22%
 State A ($70,000,000/$90,000,000)
 State B ($20,000,000/$90,000,000)
Property factor 76.92% 23.08%
 State A ($5,000,000/$6,500,000)
 State B ($1,500,000/$6,500,000)
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State A State B
Payroll factor 75.00% 25.00%
 State A ($3,000,000/$4,000,000)
 State B ($1,000,000/$4,000,000)
Sum of apportionment factors 229.7% 70.3%
Divided by 3  ÷ 3% ÷ 3%






Times business income $10,000,000% $10,000,000%
Equals state taxable income $ 7,657,000% $ 2,343,000%
Times state tax rate 10% 5%
State income tax $   765,700% $   117,150%
Example 6-2
If High-Value, Inc., were to move its inventory and distribution center, and research 
and development operations representing $2,000,000 in property, and $800,000 
in payroll from State A to State B, its factors and apportionment would change as 
follows:
State A State B Total
Sales $70,000,000% $20,000,000% $90,000,000%
Property 3,000,000% 3,500,000% 6,500,000%
Payroll 2,200,000% 1,800,000% 4,000,000%
State A State B
Sales factor 77.78% 22.22%
 State A ($70,000,000/$90,000,000)
 State B ($20,000,000/$90,000,000)
Property factor 46.15% 53.85%
 State A ($3,000,000/$6,500,000)
 State B ($3,500,000/$6,500,000)
Payroll factor 55.00% 45.00%
 State A ($2,200,000/$4,000,000)
 State B ($1,800,000/$4,000,000)
Sum of apportionment factors 178.93% 121.07%
Divided by 3  ÷ 3% ÷ 3%
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Example 6-2 (continued)
State A State B
Times business income $10,000,000% $10,000,000%
Equals state taxable income $ 5,964,000% $ 4,036,000%
Times state tax rate 10% 5%
State income tax $   596,400% $   201,800%
High-Value’s tax liability for both states is now $798,200, a savings of $84,650  
($882,850 – $798,200).
Given that only 12 states and the District of Columbia still use equally weighted factors in 
their apportionment formulas, it is more critical than ever to analyze a company’s operations 
in light of their impact on its apportionment factors. The following examples illustrate the 
dramatic distortion that can occur by doing business in states that double-weight the sales 
factor or those that use just sales as a single factor.
Example 6-3
High-Value, Inc., does business in two states, A and B. State A has a 10 percent 
income tax rate and State B has a 5 percent income tax rate. State A uses a single 
factor sales, and State B uses a traditional three-factor formula that equally weights 
sales, property, and payroll. High-Value manufactures, stores, and distributes its 
products in State A. The operations in State B are largely limited to sales, repair, 
and maintenance activities. The company’s taxable income is $10,000,000, and its 
activities within the two states are as follows:
State A State B Total
Sales $70,000,000% $20,000,000% $90,000,000%
Property 5,000,000% 1,500,000% 6,500,000%
Payroll 3,000,000% 1,000,000% 4,000,000%
High-Value’s tax liability for both states currently totals $894,950.
State A State B
Sales factor 77.78% 22.22%
 State A ($70,000,000/$90,000,000)
 State B ($20,000,000/$90,000,000)
Property factor N/A% 23.08%
 State A N/A
 State B ($1,500,000/$6,500,000)
Payroll factor N/A% 25.00%
 State A N/A
 State B ($1,000,000/$4,000,000)
06-Chapter 06.indd   154 10/6/11   2:18 PM
Chapter 6: Basic Ideas of Multistate Income Tax Planning
 155
State A State B
Sum of apportionment factors 77.78% 70.3%
Divided by 3 N/A% ÷ 3%






Times business income $10,000,000% $10,000,000%
Equals state taxable income $ 7,778,000% $ 2,343,000%
Times state tax rate 10% 5%
State income tax $   777,800% $   117,150%
Reversing the percentages in the previous example illustrates the dramatic impact these 
factors have on a company’s tax liability.
Example 6-4
High-Value’s tax liability for both states currently totals $623,200.
State A State B
Sales factor 22.22% 77.78%
Property factor 23.08% N/A%
Payroll factor 25.00% N/A%
Sum of apportionment factors 70.3% 77.78%
Divided by 3 ÷ 3% N/A%
Equals state apportionment percentage 23.43% 77.78%
Times business income $10,000,000% $10,000,000%
Equals state taxable income $ 2,343,000% $ 7,778,000%
Times state tax rate 10% 5%
State income tax $   234,300% $   388,900%
Review Where You Are Doing Business
Nexus usually has bad connotations. We generally think of it as something you do not want 
to create. But that is not necessarily true. By creating nexus in a lower tax rate or no tax 
state, you can decrease your total state and local tax liability. For example, if your Colorado 
company makes mail-order sales into Wyoming, send an employee up there and deliber-
ately create nexus. Doing so will allow you to apportion your income between Colorado 
and Wyoming (which, of course, has no income tax).
On the other hand, if your company is in a state in which you have limited sales activities, 
perhaps a single salesperson or small office, you may be able to break nexus with that state 
by closing the office and having the sales personnel operate out of their homes. The obvious 
rule here is to avoid nexus in high-tax states and create nexus in low-tax states.
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 Examine your state’s cost-of-performance rules for service sales. Can you reduce your in-
come by shifting costs between Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purpose Act (UDIT-
PA) (all-or-nothing test) states and those which have adopted the Multistate Tax Commis-
sion (MTC) proportional allocation method? For example, if based on cost of performance, 
service income is apportioned 30 percent to State A, 30 percent to State B, and 40 percent 
to State C, then, under UDITPA’s rules, all the income is sourced to State C. However, 
there may be non-UDITPA states that simply allocate the service income to the state where 
more than 50 percent of the cost of performance occurs. In this case, the sale would not be 
allocated to any state because no state has more than 50 percent of the cost of performance. 
Other states may source the service income to the state of the recipient. Finally, if the three 
states have adopted the MTC’s rules (MTC Regulation IV.17[B]), then the service income 
is divided among the states based upon their apportioned percentage. As a consequence, 
depending upon the states and the cost of performance measurement, some service sales may 
be counted in more than one state.
Have you checked your state’s rules on executive compensation or payroll throwbacks?
Author’s Note: Legal Considerations and Nexus
Be sure to check with your legal department before you go around creating nexus. 
There may be other business reasons, known only to your staff attorneys, for 
avoiding nexus in particular states.
Move Income From Separate Filing States Into Combined 
Reporting States
Here are three examples. First, if your company is operating in a separate filing state and it 
owns a subsidiary operating in a combined filing state, sell property to the subsidiary and 
then lease it back. Your income in the combined reporting state will, of course, not change 
because the rental income of the subsidiary is offset by the rental expense of the parent. 
Your income, however, in the separate filing state will be reduced by the lease expense and 
decreased property factor. Second, if your company is considering selling an asset with a 
large capital gain, drop the asset down into an existing subsidiary in a low- or no-tax state. 
When the subsidiary sells the asset, deem the capital gain to be allocable nonbusiness income 
to the low- or no-tax state. Or break some of the ties between the parent and subsidiary and 
deem the latter to be nonunitary. Finally, create a unitary relationship with those subsidiaries 
which have losses or net operating losses.
Review the Tax Credits Available in the States in Which You  
Are Doing Business
It sounds simple. It is. And it is often overlooked. If you are wondering whether you are 
taking advantage of all the credits and incentives a jurisdiction offers, don’t call the revenue 
department with questions, call the Department of Economic Development for that state, 
county, or city. Economic development agencies are happy to be of assistance and often 
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have gathered together in one publication brief summaries of all the tax deductions, credits, 
and incentives available. Use that publication to jump start or supplement your research into 
statutes, regulations, and cases. 
Review Your State’s Filing Elections
In addition to trying to match up for-profit divisions with loss operations, be sure to re-
view your state’s filing methods. Check to see if filing consolidated or combined reports 
will decrease your total tax bill. Make sure you are only including companies with nexus in 
“nexus-consolidated return” states and that all the proper elections have been made. Again, 
a simple step to take, but one often missed in the rush to file on time.
Unique State Provisions
The AICPA Tax Section provides an annual C Corporation Checklist for tax preparers that 
some taxpayers use as a template, a road map if you will, to identify the key areas that not 
only should be an object of tax prep review, but also a framework for building a framework 
for various tax planning projects. (See appendix E for a copy of the checklist.)
The prudent tax preparer is always aware that, given the number of states and their various 
and often inconsistent rules, there is no alternative to state-by-state research. Such research 
will often turn up unique state provisions. Some examples include the following:
•  Alabama includes in its sales factor the gross proceeds from the sale of fixed assets, 
rather than the gain or loss.
•  The Arizona consolidated return includes all the affiliated members of the federal 
consolidated return regardless of whether a member has nexus in Arizona or not.
•  Arkansas has not adopted Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 199.
•  California does not allow consolidated returns but does require combined reports of a 
unitary group.
•  California’s interest offset rule was declared unconstitutional so, when direct tracing 
of interest is not possible, the taxpayer must use a proportional method based on gross 
income or assets.
•  California taxes interest on federal and state and local bonds.
•  In sourcing throwbacks, California started as a Joyce state, then became a Finnigan state, 
and then went back to being a Joyce state. Beginning January 1, 2011, California is a 
Finnigan state again.2
•  California includes in its property factor property owned by the federal government 
but used by the taxpayer.3
2 The terms “Joyce state” and “Finnigan state” come from two court cases in California: Appeal of Joyce, 
Inc., No. 66-SBE-070 (Cal. State Bd. of Equalization Nov. 23, 1966), and Appeal of Finnigan Corp., No. 
88-SBE-022 (Cal. State Bd. of Equalization Aug. 25, 1988), on reh’g, Jan. 24, 1990. See the discussion in 
chapter 5.
3 See Appeal of Union Carbide Corp., No. 93-SBE-003 (Cal. State Bd. of Equalization Jan. 13, 1993), and 
Appeal of Union Carbide Corp., No. 84-SBE-057 (Cal. State Bd. of Equalization Apr. 5, 1984).
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 •  Colorado adopted single sales factor apportionment for all years beginning on or after 
January 1, 2009. There are no more throwbacks for government sales.
•  A group of affiliated corporations having nexus in Connecticut may elect to file a 
unitary combined report. The election is binding for five years.
•  Florida allows a federal consolidated group to elect to file a consolidated return in 
Florida. However, the parent corporation must be subject to Florida tax in the year 
the election is made.
•  Florida does not allow the elimination of intercompany sales in calculating the 
apportionment factors in a consolidated return.4
•  A Florida final return should be filed only when a taxpayer is also filing a final federal 
return. Ceasing to do business in Florida does not mean the filing of a final return.
•  Georgia has adopted the federal IRC as of January 1, 2009. As a consequence, none 
of the changes of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 or The 
Worker, Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of 2009 are applicable.
•  Georgia, Iowa, Maryland, and Minnesota source service sales, not based on cost of 
performance, but to the state in which the recipient of the services resides.
•  Idaho provides for combined reporting but not consolidated returns.
•  Unitary groups in Illinois can include S corporations and partnerships.
•  Illinois has adopted market-based sourcing for its sales factor for tax years beginning 
on or after January 1, 2009.
•  Indiana is a nexus consolidated state; that is, each member of the consolidated return 
must have nexus with Indiana.
•  Iowa does not require sales into states in which a taxpayer is not taxable to be thrown 
back into the Iowa sales numerator.
•  Effective January 1, 2008, Kansas’s definition of business income includes the func-
tional test as well as the transactional test.
•  Louisiana does not recognize S corporations. S corporations must file as C corpora-
tions. Their income, however, can be excluded from tax if the S corporation share-
holders file individual returns with the state.
•  Maryland calculates income from the sale of intangibles by using an average of the 
property and payroll factors.5
•  Maryland does not allow consolidated returns.
•  Massachusetts has adopted combined reporting.
•  Massachusetts’ throwback rule does not require that the goods be shipped from 
Massachusetts.6
•  Unitary groups must file combined reports under the Michigan Business Tax (MBT).
•  Michigan businesses with gross receipts less than $350,000 are exempt from the MBT.
•  Nevada does not have either an individual or corporate income tax. Let us move 
there.
4 Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 12C-1.0155(1)(j) (2006).
5 Md. Regs. Code tit. 03 § 04.03.08.C(d) (2006).
6 Mass. Regs. Code tit. 830 § 63.38.1(9)(c)(2) (2006).
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•  New Jersey has repealed its “throwout” rule for tax years beginning on or after July 1, 
2010.
•  New York excludes officer compensation from its payroll factor.
•  Pennsylvania provides more than one apportionment method for calculating its  
capital stock and franchise tax and corporate net income tax. Be sure to review your 
alternatives.
•  Connecticut, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, and Rhode Island value property for 
the property factor at net book value, not historical cost.
•  Texas sources intangible income to the payor’s legal domicile.7
•  Texas taxpayers with less than $300,000 in total revenue are exempt from the Texas 
Margin Tax (TMT).
•  Texas has adopted combined reporting under its TMT.
•  Taxable entities in Texas now include partnerships, S corporations, and limited liabil-
ity companies. (General partnerships with only natural persons as partners are exempt 
from the TMT.)
7 34 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 3.549(e)(3)(B), (e)(13) (2007) and §§ 3.557(e)(3)(B), (e)(13) (2007).
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Introduction
Going through an audit is, under the best of circumstances, always an adversarial process and 
not for the squeamish or weak of heart. The topics discussed in this guide are not pretty. 
Nevertheless, taxpayers and their advisers will find it useful to learn how audits get chosen, 
what auditors look for before they arrive, what they want to see once they do show up, and 
what, if anything, can be done about it.1
Audit Selection
Several things may prompt state or city taxing authorities to select a particular business for 
audit. First, and probably most frequent, is some sort of statistical modeling (kind of like 
winning a lottery, but not nearly as much fun). At the federal level, the IRS has its infamous 
statistical program—the computerized “discriminant function” (DIF) technique. The IRS 
selects returns for examination based on, for example, discrepancy with information returns, 
a history of deficiencies, random sampling, and the “questionable refund” program. Using 
DIF scores, the IRS ranks and selects returns having the greatest audit potential. With the 
IRS approach as a guide, many states and cities have fashioned their own models.
Formulas and Statistics
The process begins when taxpayers file their first sales tax or income tax return, and the 
data is entered, evaluated, and graded. Using formulas that everyone learned in college, 
but now generally have forgotten, the state or city tries to calculate which returns would 
likely produce the greatest yield on audit. Naturally, the formulas and analyses vary in 
sophistication, depending on the political jurisdiction involved. Although few people know 
exactly how these formulas are composed and applied, some uses are so common that they 
1 This material is reproduced, with the permission of the publisher, from the article by Bruce M. Nelson, 
titled “State and Local Audit Selection, Strategies, and Tactics,” that appeared in the Journal of Multistate 
Taxation and Incentives, Vol. 9, No. 2, May 1999. Published by Warren, Gorham & Lamont, an imprint 
of Thomson Reuters. Copyright © 1999 RIA Group, Thomson Reuters/WG&L. All rights reserved.
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are evident to anyone. For example, if a company is experiencing extremely rapid growth in 
sales or assets, an audit should not be a surprise. Face it—if a business is growing that quickly, 
mistakes are being made. Taxpayers know it, MBA students know it, and the government 
knows it.
Another example of statistical modeling is “trend analysis.” By aggregating returns by 
industry, state revenue departments often can use trend analysis to spot specific taxpayer 
anomalies and assign audits accordingly. The technique is particularly helpful in cash-inten-
sive businesses, such as restaurants and bars, for which trend analysis can highlight irregular 
relationships between sales, inventory, and cost of goods sold.
Prior Audits: Data from Outside Sources
Aside from the prosaic world of number crunching, several other situations may prompt 
a state to audit a particular company. Probably the most obvious is a previous audit. If the 
government found lots of mistakes, it will be back again and again until the taxpayer gets it 
right. Also consider, for example, a taxpayer’s failure to charge a customer sales tax or the 
failure to issue 1099 forms. One generally would call those mistakes. An auditor examining 
the customer and finding the erroneous invoice or information omission, however, would 
call it an audit lead. In fact, for many small to medium businesses, it is these types of errors 
that usually trigger an audit. If, for example, you fail to properly charge sales tax to one of 
your customers and your customer is audited for sales and use tax, you can be sure that your 
error will probably lead to you being audited as well.
Audits also may be prompted by routine information exchanges between government 
entities. For example, the Federal Aviation Administration regularly reports on registration 
of aircraft, and a state’s parks and recreation department may accumulate data on new boat 
registrations. (Was sales tax paid on those purchases?) Applicable regulatory agencies report 
information on licensed professionals such as CPAs, attorneys, doctors, and dentists. (One 
state found, for example, an unusually high number of income tax nonfilers among both 
attorneys and people who order vanity plates for their cars.) Also, departments of labor 
exchange wage and unemployment information, and secretaries of state provide data on 
bankruptcy filings. Counties and cities may report on the issuance of building permits. And 
last but not least, states maintain information exchange programs with the IRS. While all 
this exchange of information may sound scary, one may take some comfort in the fact that 
most large marketing and credit reporting agencies have more such information than the 
taxing authorities. Nevertheless, many state governments, like all good direct marketers, are 
beginning to buy that information.
And do not forget the proverbial “snitch.” To avoid problems, happily married taxpayers 
should try to stay that way. Also, workers may be happy as long as they are employed. If any 
irregularities exist in a business, however, the next round of downsizing just may get that 
information to the local revenue department.
In any event, there is little that one can do to prevent an audit, other than following the 
common-sense rules of filing returns accurately and promptly. Prevention planning must 
begin long before a business is selected for audit, with accurate and complete recordkeeping, 
good internal control, and a competent and knowledgeable accounting staff.
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The Pre-Audit
A taxpayer’s initial contact with an auditor may be by telephone or letter, usually one fol-
lowed by the other. In no case will an audit notice first be sent by e-mail. You should never 
be getting e-mails from revenue departments or auditors unless you have already established 
a relationship with the auditor or someone at the department. Once contacted by a revenue 
department,  the taxpayer should  take certain critical steps.
Whom to Contact
First, get the auditor’s name, phone number, and e-mail address. This action may seem ob-
vious, but it is amazing how often taxpayers fail to get this most basic information (people 
in shock are often like that).
Type of Tax: Audit Period
Second, find out precisely what taxes are under examination and for what period. For ex-
ample, is it sales tax or use tax, income tax, or franchise tax? Some states’ revenue depart-
ments encourage the examination of all state taxes (sales, use, withholding, and income 
being the most common) during one audit, thinking that this approach is more efficient (for 
example, like removing all four wisdom teeth on one visit to the dentist).
Required Documentation
Next, ask the auditor to specify exactly what records should be made available for examina-
tion. The initial answer will probably include every scrap of paper the business has. Never-
theless, any attempts to limit the scope of the audit should begin here.
Time and Place of Audit
Finally, settle on a mutually agreeable audit date and location. Generally, auditors schedule 
their examinations weeks, even months, in advance. Taxpayers also should allow plenty 
of time to prepare for the audit and to check staff scheduling and contact the company’s 
outside tax professionals. Auditors should never be allowed to examine a taxpayer’s records 
with only a day or two notice. Out-of-state auditors commonly bring “filler audits” with 
them when they travel. For example, a hard-working auditor from California on assign-
ment in Colorado may finish one examination sooner than expected and call another local 
taxpayer to try and fit in another audit at the last minute. The taxpayer should be kind but 
should decline the auditor’s invitation and suggest another, later date. Hard-working, con-
scientious auditors from out-of-state are to be admired but, perhaps, should be encouraged 
to take a little time to view the local scenery rather than show up on short notice to conduct 
the audit.
Once the audit is assigned and an appointment date established, the auditor will perform 
several pre-audit tasks, including
1. Reviewing any prior audits or department correspondence with the taxpayer.
2. Pulling a sampling of prior returns for review.
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 3. Determining all of the company’s locations and taxing jurisdictions.
4. Learning exactly what the company’s business is and how and where it is carried on.
The revenue agent should not be the only one doing pre-audit work. The taxpayer and 
its advisers should be preparing as well, performing the following tasks:
1. Review internal controls and the flow of records.
2. For an income tax audit, review your returns in light of that state’s specific rules regard-
ing state modifications, apportionment and allocation, business or nonbusiness income, 
throwback sales, and the specific makeup of the state’s apportionment factors (sales, 
property, and payroll).
3. Take some time to review the state’s current legislative activity and any recent state tax 
cases, not just for possible exposure, but also for potential refunds.
4. Be sure to scan the state’s various income tax credit provisions. Surprisingly, income tax 
credits are often overlooked in the hurry to get the return filed on time.
5. If the state has a “taxpayer bill of rights,” become familiar with the taxpayer’s audit re-
sponsibilities and protections.
6. Identify the company’s exposure (for example, gray areas of the law or weaknesses in the 
company’s accounting system).
7. Ascertain the statute of limitations for the items and the taxes under audit.
8. Finally, identify the company’s contact or liaison person to work with the auditor.
Initial Meeting and Audit Work
At the initial meeting with the auditor, review the scope of the audit and establish the com-
pany’s liaisons. It is absolutely critical to know what tax will be audited and for what period. 
Strategies to pursue during the audit should include the following:
• Controlling the flow of information
• Avoiding commitments
• Setting limits (time and distance)
• Being personable and professional
Controlling the Flow of Information
Just what can auditors look at? Probably just about anything they please. But the fact of the 
matter is that auditors always ask for more than they want or ever intend to examine. So, 
help them out—give them limits. Specifically, a “document request” form of some fashion 
should be mandatory. With such a form, the taxpayer can keep track of exactly what the 
auditor has and has not seen. This may help in understanding a position the auditor is taking. 
In addition, it may keep the auditor from requesting additional documentation for items 
that have already been substantially supported. Taxpayers are often surprised at the breadth 
and depth of an auditor’s first information request. Do not be alarmed. One of the goals of 
your first meeting with the auditor will be to determine just exactly what documentation is 
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necessary for the audit. Once the precise scope of the audit is defined, you can start eliminat-
ing unnecessary document requests. 
Finally, it is a not good idea to turn the company into a local photocopy center. If the 
auditor wants something copied, the item should be given to an appropriate, close-lipped 
clerk who will make two copies, one for the auditor and another for the taxpayer’s file.
Avoiding Commitments
Taxpayers should be very careful of entering into commitments. The key questions that 
usually arise in this regard are whether to (1) fill out nexus questionnaires, (2) agree to 
particular statistical sampling methodologies, and (3) sign statute of limitation waivers. The 
general rule is never sign anything unless absolutely necessary.
Nexus
States use nexus questionnaires to determine whether a company is doing business in their 
taxing jurisdiction. Taxpayers receiving such a questionnaire should not automatically fill 
it out. If a response is called for, do so by letter instead. If the questionnaire must be com-
pleted, do it carefully and provide supplemental information when necessary. The problem 
is that nexus questionnaires are often just a list of yes-and-no questions generally worded 
in such a way that the taxpayer cannot win (for example, “Have you stopped beating your 
dog?”). Given the complexity of the issues surrounding nexus, it is much easier to deal with 
them in an independently composed letter rather than by filling out the taxing authority’s 
standardized form. Composing your own response allows you to describe the appropriate 
facts and circumstances with the appropriate references to statutes, regulations, and case 
law that support the fact, for example, that you may have sales and use tax nexus, but not 
income tax nexus.
Sampling
When possible, taxpayers should consider cooperating with a statistical sampling approach 
rather than specifically committing to it. For example, an auditor may propose a survey 
strategy for sampling the sales factor or accounts payables and ask the taxpayer to approve 
it. The taxpayer might be better off inviting the auditor to go ahead with that plan and 
then reviewing the results to see whether the sample really was valid. That way, if some 
items or issues seem distortive, the taxpayer still has some leverage in getting the auditor to 
change the sample. Once a taxpayer signs off on the sampling methodology, however, the 
taxpayer’s leverage and options usually are gone.
Waivers
Auditors often ask taxpayers to agree to waive the statute of limitations in order to “lock in” 
the audit period (frequently four years for income tax). For example, the auditor may want 
the taxpayer to sign a waiver for a few months so that the limitations period will not expire 
before the audit is completed. Generally, such a request is reasonable, but the waiver should 
be restricted to a specific date, tax, and issue. Limiting the waiver in this manner helps limit 
the scope of the audit, in addition to encouraging the auditor not to dawdle during the 
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 examination. And let’s be frank, it encourages you as well to move forward on the audit. 
We all wish to avoid unpleasant situations, and it is sometimes too easy to keep putting 
the auditor off. But keep in mind, that no matter how capable your systems and people, 
everyone makes mistakes and, assuming there is going to be some assessment, no matter 
how small, the longer it takes to complete the audit, the more interest you will have to pay. 
Many states provide that whatever years are still open for the IRS are still open for the state.
Limits on Time and Distance
Try to get the auditor to commit to a time frame for the examination. In seeking to deter-
mine how long the audit will take, taxpayers might let the auditor know that, for example, 
they have other auditors and audits to schedule, as well as a business to run and a life to live.
Also, consider “isolating” the auditors. That is, do not let them work at a desk next to 
the company’s accounts payable clerk, one of the audit contacts, or the company president. 
Do not make it that easy for the auditor to pop her head in every five minutes or so with a 
“quick” question. Specifically identifying who the auditor is to work with on particular is-
sues, that is, their contact or liaison, is important because it assures you that the information 
provided to the auditor is done so by informed competent professionals on your staff rather 
than off-hand comments from someone who may not even work in the tax department.
Be Professional
In dealing with auditors (or even co-workers and other human beings) some interpersonal 
relationship rules should apply:
1. Be friendly, but do not be a friend. (Most of us probably have enough friends already.)
2. Do not be an enemy. (We also have enough enemies already, and hostility does not pay.)
3. Be cooperative without being a pushover. At the least, be nonconfrontational. Inevi-
tably, the taxpayer and the auditor will disagree. Thus, starting with a professional de-
meanor is always a good strategy. (Yelling and screaming may come later but, once 
started, tends to discourage compromise.)
4. Do not offer comments about fiscal reform, politics, the chances of a flat tax, or what 
you would do if you were in charge. An auditor who has been around for a while has 
heard it all. Keep the small talk limited to, for example, the weather, who won last 
week’s big game, and the latest trend in body piercing.
Closing Conference
Generally, the auditor will plan a closing conference. If not, the taxpayer should request 
one. In preparing for the closing conference, taxpayers should
1. Review the assessments and the underlying workpapers. Check for math or formula er-
rors in the worksheets. Watch out for double-counting in the calculation of the factors, 
the treatment of dock sales, throwbacks, and the composition of business and nonbusi-
ness income. Whenever possible, try to make adjustments at the audit level. It is almost 
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always easier to get something removed at the audit level before the audit is turned in for 
processing, than afterwards at appeal.
2. Identify and review with the auditor the problem areas, and make sure that the posi-
tions taken by the auditor and the reasons for them are clear. Ask for explanations of the 
adjustments and substantiation for the positions taken, including relevant statutes, regula-
tions, policy positions, case law, and so on.
3. Discuss the billing process, protest procedures, and interest rates and be sure that they are 
understood. If contemplating an appeal, this is when the process really starts. Procedural 
matters now become critical. Do not rely on the auditor or anyone else to get it right. 
Rather, get written copies of the various due dates, appeal procedures, and so on directly 
from the statutes.
4. Do not miss deadlines. When the buzzer sounds, the referee does not allow extra time 
to make that last score—and neither will the government.
5. Finally, do not expect the auditor or taxing jurisdiction to just give in. Auditors are not 
paid to be easily intimidated. Further, the courts have stated more than once that gov-
ernment should constitutionally tax all that it can, and their resources are usually larger 
than the taxpayer’s.
Conclusion
In considering all the ramifications of an audit, taxpayers and their advisers should keep 
things in perspective. Taxes and audits go back to the dawn of history. In fact, some of the 
earliest historical records in existence are written on clay tablets from the Sumerian civili-
zation that flourished in Mesopotamia more than 4,000 years ago. Most of those writings 
deal with economic matters, largely the imposition of tax on grain, barley, and hops used 
in making beer. Taxpayers should keep that in mind the next time they sit down late at 
night with a pile of tax receipts and pop open a beer. They are participating in a long and 
respected historical tradition.
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Appendix A: Public Law 86-272
Public Law 86-272, addresses the circumstances under which a multistate business may owe 
state income taxes. It was enacted as a stopgap measure on September 14, 1959. For the past 
several years, efforts to reform this law have raised issues similar to those in 1959.1
Public Law 86-272
§381. Imposition of net income tax
(a) Minimum Standards
No state or political subdivision thereof, shall have power to impose, for any taxable year 
ending after September 14, 1959, a net income tax on the income derived within such State 
by any person from interstate commerce if the only business activities within such State by 
or on behalf of such person during such taxable year are either, or both, of the following: 
(1) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State for sales 
of tangible personal property, which orders are sent outside the State for approval or 
rejection and, if approved, are filled by shipment or delivery from a point outside the 
State; and 
(2) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State in the 
name of or for the benefit of a prospective customer of such person, if orders by such 
customer to such person to enable such customer to fill orders resulting from such solici-
tation are orders described in paragraph (1).
(b)  Domestic corporations; persons domiciled in or residents  
of a State
The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the imposition of a net 
income tax by any State, or political subdivision thereof, with respect to— 
(1) any corporation which is incorporated under the laws of such State; or 
(2) any individual who, under the laws of such State, is domiciled in, or a resident, of 
such State.
(c)  Sales or solicitation of orders for sales by independent  
contractors
For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, a person shall not be considered to have en-
gaged in business activities within a State during any taxable year merely by reason of sales in 
1 For a brief history and the issues surrounding Public Law 86-272, see Annette Nellen, “The 50th An-
niversary of Public Law 86-272,” March 27, 2008, www.cpa2biz.com/Content/media/PRODUCER_
CONTENT/Newsletters/Articles_2008/CorpTax/Public_Law032708.jsp. See also her website, www.
cob.sjsu.edu/nellen_a/TaxReform/PL86-272-50thAnniversary.htm, which contains articles and links on 
the past and current (and future?) status of this law.
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such State, or the solicitation of orders for sales in such State, of tangible personal property 
on behalf of such person by one or more independent contractors, or by reason of the main-
tenance of an office in such State by one or more independent contractors whose activities 
on behalf of such person in such State consist solely of making sales, or soliciting orders for 
sales, of tangible personal property.
(d) Definitions 
For purposes of this section—
(1) the term “independent contractor” means a commission agent, broker, or other 
independent contractor who is engaged in selling, or soliciting orders for the sale of, 
tangible personal property for more than one principle and who holds himself out as 
such in the regular course of his business activities; and
(2) the term “representative” does not include an independent contractor.
§382. Assessment of net income taxes;  
limitations; collection
(a) No State, or political subdivision thereof, shall have power to assess, after September 
14, 1959, any net income tax which was imposed by such State or political subdivision, 
as the case may be, for any taxable year ending on or before such date, on the income 
derived within such State by any person from interstate commerce, if the imposition of 
such tax for a taxable year ending after such date is prohibited by section 381 of this title.
(b) the provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not be construed—
(1) to invalidate the collection, on or before September 14, 1959, of any 
net income tax imposed for a taxable year ending on or before such date, or
(2) to prohibit the collection, after September 14, 1959, of any net income 
tax which was assessed on or before such date for a taxable year ending on 
or before such date.
§383. Definition.
For purpose of this chapter, the term “net income tax” means any tax imposed on, or mea-
sured by net income.
§384. Separability of provisions.
If any provision of this chapter or the application of such provision to any person or cir-
cumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter or the application of such provision 
to persons or circumstances other than those to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected 
thereby.
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UNIFORM DIVISION OF INCOME
FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT
Drafted by the
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
and by it
APPROVED AND RECOMMENDED FOR ENACTMENT
IN ALL THE STATES
at its
ANNUAL CONFERENCE
MEETING IN ITS SIXTY-SIXTH YEAR
AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK
JULY 8 – 13, 1957
WITH PREFATORY NOTE AND COMMENTS
Approved by the American Bar Association at its Meeting at
New York, New York, July 16, 1957
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UNIFORM DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT
The Committee which acted for the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws in preparing the Uniform Division of Income for Tax
Purposes Act was as follows:
GEORGE V. POWELL, 1111 Dexter Horton Bldg., Seattle 4, Wash., Chairman.
GUY W. BOTTS, Barnett National Bank Bldg., Jacksonville, Fla.
RUPERT R. BULLIVANT, Pacific Bldg., Portland, Ore.
BARTON H. KUHNS, First National Bank Bldg., Omaha 2, Nebr.
JO. V. MORGAN, District of Columbia Tax Court, 4th & E Sts., N.W., Washington 1,
D.C.
O. H. THORMODGSGARD, University of North Dakota Law School, University, N.D.,
Chairman, Section C.
Copies of all Uniform Acts and other printed matter issued by the Conference may be obtained
from
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS
1155 East Sixtieth Street
Chicago, Illinois 60637
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UNIFORM DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT
PREFATORY NOTE
The Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act is designed for
enactment in those states which levy taxes on or measured by net income.
The need for a uniform method of division of income for tax purposes
among the several taxing jurisdictions has been recognized for many years and has
long been recommended by the Council of State Governments. There is no other
practical means of assuring that a taxpayer is not taxed on more than its net income.
At present there are various formulae for determining the amount of income to be
taxed in use by the states, and the differences in the formulae produce inequitable
results. Many states now use the three factor formulae of this Act. The problem
has been well analyzed and its historical background outlined in an article
appearing in 18 Ohio State Law Journal, page 84.
The Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act is the result of
conferences with the representatives of the Controller’s Institute of America, the
Council of State Governments and various interested individuals. It was
promulgated in 1957. The comments in the present reprinting of the Act were
revised and extended in February 1966 in order to clarify the solutions to some of
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UNIFORM DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT
[Be It Enacted . . .]
SECTION 1. As used in this Act, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) “Business income” means income arising from transactions and activity
in the regular course of the taxpayer’s trade or business and includes income from
tangible and intangible property if the acquisition, management, and disposition of
the property constitute integral parts of the taxpayer’s regular trade or business
operations.
Comment
This definition refers to “the” taxpayer’s trade or business as if he had one
business. It is not intended by this language to require a taxpayer having several
“businesses” to use the same allocation and apportionment methods for the
businesses. The language permits separate treatment of different businesses of a
single taxpayer. Section 18 clearly permits separate treatment.
Income from the disposition of property used in a trade or business of the
taxpayer is includible within the meaning of business income.
(b) “Commercial domicile” means the principal place from which the trade
or business of the taxpayer is directed or managed.
Comment
The phrase “directed or managed” is not intended to permit both the state
where the board of directors meets and the state where the company is managed to
claim the commercial domicile. The phrase “directed or managed” is intended as
two words serving the same end; not as two separate concepts.
(c) “Compensation” means wages, salaries, commissions and any other
form of remuneration paid to employees for personal services.
C-6
09-Appendix B.indd   174 10/5/11   10:58 AM




This definition is derived from the Model Unemployment Compensation
Act which has been adopted in all states.
Compensation paid to “employees” becomes important in the payroll
fraction in section 13. If a corporation is employed to provide personal services,
section 18 may be used to include compensation paid to corporations in the fraction
if exclusion of compensation paid to corporate agents fails to reflect adequately the
business activity in the state.
(d) “Financial organization” means any bank, trust company, savings bank,
[industrial bank, land bank, safe deposit company], private banker, savings and loan
association, credit union, [cooperative bank], investment company, or any type of
insurance company.
Comment
This definition and the definition of “public utility” in subsection (f) is
necessary because section 2 excludes from allocation and apportionment under this
Act, income from these two types of business activity. The exclusion is proposed
because some states have separate legislation for apportionment and allocation of
income of such taxpayers. If not, and the state proposes to change subsection (2) so
as to apply the Act to such taxpayers, this would not necessarily detract from the
uniformity objective of this Act.
(e) “Non-business income” means all income other than business income.
(f) “Public utility” means [any business entity which owns or operates for
public use any plant, equipment, property, franchise, or license for the transmission
of communications, transportation of goods or persons, or the production, storage,
transmission, sale, delivery, or furnishing of electricity, water, steam, oil, oil
products or gas].
Comment
It is expected that “public utility” will be defined to include all taxpayers
subject to the control of the state’s regulatory bodies on the theory that separate
legislation will provide for the apportionment and allocation of the income of such
taxpayers.
C-7
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See Comment to the definition of “financial organization” for purpose of
this definition. “Oil, oil products or gas” is not intended to be so restrictive as to
treat differently a public utility, if any, which transmits or produces “gas products.”
The essential point of the definition is the requirement that the business excluded
by this definition and subsection 2 be a “public utility.” Private transmission lines
and private production or storage companies are thus not excluded.
(g) “Sales” means all gross receipts of the taxpayer not allocated under
sections 4 through 8 of this Act.
Comment
This all inclusive definition of sales is intended to make apportionable all
income not allocated under sections 4 through 8. As indicated in the Comment to
subsection 1(a) income from sales or property used in trade or business is included
in apportionable income.
(h) “State” means any state of the United States, the District of Columbia,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, any territory or possession of the United States,
and any foreign country or political subdivision thereof.
SECTION 2. Any Taxpayer having income from business activity which is
taxable both within and without this state, other than activity as a financial
organization or public utility or the rendering of purely personal services by an
individual, shall allocate and apportion his net income as provided in this Act.
SECTION 3. For purposes of allocation and apportionment of income under
this Act, a taxpayer is taxable in another state if (1) in that state he is subject to a
net income tax, a franchise tax measured by net income, a franchise tax for the
privilege of doing business, or a corporate stock tax, or (2) that state has
jurisdiction to subject the taxpayer to a net income tax regardless of whether, in
fact, the state does or does not.
Comment
This section defines, for purposes of section 2, where a taxpayer is “taxable
both within and without this state.” To bring this Act into operation a taxpayer
must have income from business activity, and he must be taxable in this state, and
also in some other state.
C-8
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Two tests are used by this section to determine when a taxpayer is “taxable
in another state.” The first test is a fairly obvious one, the taxpayer is taxable in
another state if he is actually subjected to the type of taxes listed in subparagraph
(1).
The second test, in subparagraph (2) uses a “notional” or “hypothetical”
standard rather than an actual one. Thus, if a corporation has its commercial
domicile in state X, which has only a sales tax and no tax measured by net income,
but that corporation has business activity in state A, which has this apportionment
Act, state A must apportion the business income as provided in this Act so that
some of it is allocated to state X, even though as a result of the tax system of state
X a portion of the business income escapes income taxation. This is desirable in
order to treat the business of all states equally, and in order to avoid having this Act
as a factor in inducing a state to have an income tax. If it does not wish to tax
income, that is no reason for a state which does wish to tax income to attempt to
obtain more than its share of taxable income.
It should be noted that in subsection 1(h) the word “state” is defined broadly
enough to include a foreign country. This means that “taxable in another state”
within section 3 may mean a foreign country. The apportioning state, however,
need consider only whether the foreign country “could have” taxed the income
under the constitution of the United States if it had been a state.
While subparagraph (1) lists several types of taxes which might be actually
in effect in another state, the reference in subparagraph (2) only to a “net income”
tax is not intended to be more restricted in the hypothetical tax than the section is
with respect to an actual tax.
SECTION 4. Rents and royalties from real or tangible personal property,
capital gains, interest, dividends, or patent or copyright royalties, to the extent that
they constitute non-business income, shall be allocated as provided in sections 5
through 8 of this Act.
Comment
This section is the general section on “allocating” non-business income to a
state just as section 9 is the general section on apportionment of business income.
Section 2 refers to an allocation and an apportionment of “net income.” In
“allocating” nonbusiness income to a state, the states concerned with this allocation
may desire to allocate the expenses properly attributable to nonbusiness but
allocable income in the same way that income is allocated so that these expenses
will not be involved in determining net income from business activity where
C-9
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apportionment is used. Section 18 of this Code empowers the state to make this
adjustment if it wishes.
SECTION 5.
(a) Net rents and royalties from real property located in this state are
allocable to this state.
(b) Net rents and royalties from tangible personal property are allocable to
this state:
(1) if and to the extent that the property is utilized in this state, or
(2) in their entirety if the taxpayer’s commercial domicile is in this state
and the taxpayer is not organized under the laws of or taxable in the state in which
the property is utilized.
(c) The extent of utilization of tangible personal property in a state is
determined by multiplying the rents and royalties by a fraction, the numerator of
which is the number of days of physical location of the property in the state during
the rental or royalty period in the taxable year and the denominator of which is the
number of days of physical location of the property everywhere during all rental or
royalty periods in the taxable year. If the physical location of the property during
the rental or royalty period is unknown or unascertainable by the taxpayer, tangible
personal property is utilized in the state in which the property was located at the
time the rental or royalty payer obtained possession.
Comment
Rents from mobile tangible property are to be allocated in accordance with
section 5(c). This subsection apportions the rents by a fraction based on the
number of days in the state on the assumption that the rents are generally based on
time of use. If the rent itself is calculated on the basis of some factor other than
time, section 18 would permit a state to substitute a fraction based on this substitute
factor. Thus, if the rent for a drilling rig is calculated on the basis of number of feet
drilled, the “extent of utilization” in the state might also be determined on the basis
of a fraction which uses “feet drilled” rather than days in the state.
C-10
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(a) Capital gains and losses from sales of real property located in this state
are allocable to this state.
(b) Capital gains and losses from sales of tangible personal property are
allocable to this state if
(1) the property had a situs in this state at the time of the sale, or
(2) the taxpayer’s commercial domicile is in this state and the taxpayer
is not taxable in the state in which the property had a situs.
(c) Capital gains and losses from sales of intangible personal property are
allocable to this state if the taxpayer’s commercial domicile is in this state.
SECTION 7. Interest and dividends are allocable to this state if the taxpayer’s
commercial domicile is in this state.
SECTION 8.
(a) Patent and copyright royalties are allocable to this state:
(1) if and to the extent that the patent or copyright is utilized by the
payer in this state, or
(2) if and to the extent that the patent or copyright is utilized by the
payer in a state in which the taxpayer is not taxable and the taxpayer’s commercial
domicile is in this state.
(b) A patent is utilized in a state to the extent that it is employed in
production, fabrication, manufacturing, or other processing in the state or to the
extent that a patented product is produced in the state. If the basis of receipts from
patent royalties does not permit allocation to states or if the accounting procedures
do not reflect states of utilization, the patent is utilized in the state in which the
taxpayer’s commercial domicile is located.
(c) A copyright is utilized in a state to the extent that printing or other
publication originates in the state. If the basis of receipts from copyright royalties
does not permit allocation to states or if the accounting procedures do not reflect
C-11
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states of utilization, the copyright is utilized in the state in which the taxpayer’s
commercial domicile is located.
SECTION 9. All business income shall be apportioned to this state by
multiplying the income by a fraction, the numerator of which is the property factor
plus the payroll factor plus the sales factor, and the denominator of which is three.
SECTION 10. The property factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the
average value of the taxpayer’s real and tangible personal property owned or rented
and used in this state during the tax period and the denominator of which is the
average value of all the taxpayer’s real and tangible personal property owned or
rented and used during the tax period.
Comment
The property to be included in the numerator and denominator is property
producing the net income to be apportioned. If net income from property is
allocated property under sections 5 through 8 such property should be excluded in
constructing the fraction.
SECTION 11. Property owned by the taxpayer is valued at its original cost.
Property rented by the taxpayer is valued at eight times the net annual rental rate.
Net annual rental rate is the annual rental rate paid by the taxpayer less any annual
rental rate received by the taxpayer from sub-rentals.
Comment
This section is admittedly arbitrary in using original cost rather than
depreciated cost, and in valuing rented property as eight times the annual rental.
This approach is justified because the act does not impose a tax, nor prescribe the
depreciation allowable in computing the tax, but merely provides a basis for
division of the taxable income among the several states. The use of original cost
obviates any differences due to varying methods of depreciation, and has the
advantage that the basic figure is readily ascertainable from the taxpayer’s books.
No method of valuing the property would probably be universally acceptable.
In any situation where it is impossible to ascertain original cost, section 18
may be used to determine a fair value for such property. Section 18 may also be
necessary to aid in determining “net annual rental value” of tangible personal
C-12
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property where the actual rent is so related to services that the part attributable to
the object is difficult to determine.
Section 18 may also be used to determine a reasonable rental rate for this
fraction where the actual rent is zero or nominal such as may be the case where a
local government in attempting to induce an industry to come to a community
supplies the property at a nominal rental.
SECTION 12. The average value of property shall be determined by averaging
the values at the beginning and ending of the tax period but the [tax administrator]
may require the averaging of monthly values during the tax period of reasonably
required to reflect properly the average value of the taxpayer’s property.
SECTION 13. The payroll factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the
total amount paid in this state during the tax period by the taxpayer for
compensation, and the denominator of which is the total compensation paid
everywhere during the tax period.
Comment
Payroll attributable to management or maintenance or otherwise allocable to
nonbusiness property should be excluded from the fraction.
Payroll “paid” should be determined by the normal accounting methods of
the business so that if the taxpayer “accrues” such matters the payroll should be
treated as “paid” for purpose of this section.
SECTION 14. Compensation is paid in this state if:
(a) the individual’s service is performed entirely within the state; or
(b) the individual’s service is performed both within and without the state,
but the service performed without the state is incidental to the individual’s service
within the state; or
(c) some of the service is performed in the state and (1) the base of
operations or, if there is no base of operations, the place from which the service is
directed or controlled is in the state, or (2) the base of operations or the place from
which the service is directed or controlled is not in any state in which some part of
the service is performed, but the individual’s residence is in this state.
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This section is derived from the Model Unemployment Compensation Act.
This is the same figure which will be used by taxpayers for unemployment
compensation purposes.
SECTION 15. The sales factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the total
sales of the taxpayer in this state during the tax period, and the denominator of
which is the total sales of the taxpayer everywhere during the tax period.
Comment
The sales to be included in the fraction are only the sales which produce
business income. Sales which produce “capital gains” are under section 6 and are
to be allocated rather than apportioned.
“Total sales” means “total net sales” after discounts and returns.
SECTION 16. Sales of tangible personal property are in this state if:
(a) the property is delivered or shipped to a purchaser, other than the United
States government, within this state regardless of the f.o.b. point or other conditions
of the sale; or
(b) the property is shipped from an office, store, warehouse, factory, or other
place of storage in this state and (1) the purchaser is the United States government
or (2) the taxpayer is not taxable in the state of the purchaser.
Comment
The phrase “delivered or shipped to a purchaser” in this state includes
shipments, at the designation of the purchaser, to a person in this state such as
designating, while a shipment is enroute, the ultimate recipient.
Sales to the United States are treated separately. It is thought that this is
justified because sales to the United States are not necessarily attributable to a
market existing in the state to which the goods are originally shipped. This
different treatment may also be justified because, if the goods are defense or war
materials, it may be impossible to determine whether the goods ever come to rest in
the state due to use of coded delivery instructions.
C-14
09-Appendix B.indd   182 10/5/11   10:58 AM
Appendix B: Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act
 183
11
The section does not specify how sales from a subsidiary in the state to an
out-of-state parent, such as a marketing corporation who thereupon redirects the
goods back into the state, should be treated. If returns are not consolidated under
existing state tax law, it may be necessary to use section 18 to make a fair
representation of the business income in this situation.
SECTION 17. Sales, other than sales of tangible personal property, are in this
state if:
(a) the income-producing activity is performed in this state; or
(b) the income-producing activity is performed both in and outside this state
and a greater proportion of the income-producing activity is performed in this state
than in any other state, based on costs of performance.
SECTION 18. If the allocation and apportionment provisions of this Act do
not fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer’s business activity in this state, the
taxpayer may petition for or the [tax administrator] may require, in respect to all or
any part of the taxpayer’s business activity, if reasonable:
(a) separate accounting;
(b) the exclusion of any one or more of the factors;
(c) the inclusion of one or more additional factors which will fairly
represent the taxpayer’s business activity in this state; or
(d) the employment of any other method to effectuate an equitable
allocation and apportionment of the taxpayer’s income.
Comment
It is anticipated that this Act will be made a part of the income tax acts of
the several states. For that reason, this section does not spell out the procedure to
be followed in the event of a disagreement between the taxpayer and the tax
administrator. The income tax acts of each state presumably outline the procedure
to be followed.
Section 18 is intended as a broad authority, within the principle of
apportioning business income fairly among the states which have contact with the
income, to the tax administrator to vary the apportionment formula and to vary the
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system of allocation where the provisions of the Act do not fairly represent the
extent of the taxpayer’s business activity in the state. The phrases in section 18(d)
do not foreclose the use of one method for some business activity and a different
method for a different business activity. Neither does the phrase “method” limit the
administrator to substituting factors in the formula. The phrase means any other
method of fairly representing the extent of the taxpayer’s business activity in the
state.
SECTION 19. This Act shall be so construed so as to effectuate its general
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
SECTION 20. This Act may be cited as the Uniform Division of Income for
Tax Purposes Act.




SECTION 22. This Act shall take effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Petitioner v.  
WILLIAM WRIGLEY, JR., CO.
505 US 214, 112 S Ct 2447, 120 L Ed 2d 174
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Stevens, Souter, and Thom-
as, JJ., joined, and in Parts I and II of which O’Connor, J., joined. O’Connor, J., filed an 
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Blackmun, J., joined. 
F. Thomas Creeron, III argued the cause for petitioner. 
E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr. argued the cause for respondent. 
OPINION 
OPINION OF THE COURT
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Section 101(a) of Public Law 86-272, 73 Stat 555 (1959), 15 USC § 381 [15 USCS § 
381], prohibits a State from taxing the income of a corporation whose only business activi-
ties within the State consist of “solicitation of orders” for tangible goods, provided that the 
orders are sent outside the State for approval and the goods are delivered from out-of-state. 
The issue in this case is whether respondent’s activities in Wisconsin fell outside the protec-
tion of this provision. 
I 
Respondent William Wrigley, Jr., Co. is the world’s largest manufacturer of chewing gum. 
Based in Chicago, it sells gum nationwide through a marketing system that divides the 
country into districts, regions, and territories. During the relevant period (1973–1978), the 
Midwestern district included a Milwaukee region, covering most of Wisconsin and parts of 
other States, which was subdivided into several geographic territories. 
The district manager for the Midwestern district had his residence and company office 
in Illinois, and visited Wisconsin only six to nine days each year, usually for a sales meet-
ing or to call on a particularly important account. The regional manager of the Milwaukee 
region resided in Wisconsin, but Wrigley did not provide him with a company office. 
He had general responsibility for sales activities in the region, and would typically spend 
80-95% of his time working with the sales representatives in the field or contacting certain 
“key” accounts. The remainder of his time was devoted to administrative activities, includ-
ing writing and reviewing company reports, recruiting new sales representatives, making 
185
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recommendations to the district manager concerning the hiring, firing, and compensation 
of sales representatives, and evaluating their performance. He would preside at full-day sales 
strategy meetings for all regional sales representatives once or twice a year. The manager 
from 1973 to 1976, John Kroyer, generally held these meetings in the “office” he main-
tained in the basement of his home, whereas his successor, Gary Hecht, usually held them 
at a hotel or motel. (Kroyer claimed income tax deductions for this office, but Wrigley did 
not reimburse him for it, though it provided a filing cabinet.) Mr. Kroyer also intervened 
two or three times a year to help arrange a solution to credit disputes between the Chicago 
office and important local accounts. Mr. Hecht testified that he never engaged in such ac-
tivities, although Wrigley’s formal position description for regional sales manager contin-
ued to list as one of the assigned duties “[r]epresent[ing] the company on credit problems 
as necessary.” 
The sales or “field” representatives in the Milwaukee region, each of whom was assigned 
his own territory, resided in Wisconsin. They were provided with company cars, but not 
with offices. They were also furnished a stock of gum (with an average wholesale value of 
about $1000), a supply of display racks, and promotional literature. These materials were 
kept at home, except that one salesman, whose apartment was too small, rented storage 
space at about $25 per month, for which he was reimbursed by Wrigley. 
On a typical day, the sales representative would load up the company car with a supply of 
display racks and several cases of gum, and would visit accounts within his territory. In addi-
tion to handing out promotional materials and free samples, and directly requesting orders of 
Wrigley products, he would engage in a number of other activities which Wrigley asserts 
were designed to promote sales of its products. He would, for example, provide free display 
racks to retailers (perhaps several on any given day), and would seek to have these new racks, 
as well as pre-existing ones, prominently located. The new racks were usually filled from the 
retailer’s existing stock of Wrigley gum, but it would sometimes happen—perhaps once a 
month—that the retailer had no Wrigley products on hand and did not want to wait until 
they could be ordered from the wholesaler. In that event, the rack would be filled from the 
stock of gum in the salesman’s car. This gum, which would have a retail value of $15 to $20, 
was not provided without charge. The representative would issue an “agency stock check” 
to the retailer, indicating the quantity supplied; he would send a copy of this to the Chicago 
office or to the wholesaler, and the retailer would ultimately be billed (by the wholesaler) 
in the proper amount. 
When visiting a retail account, Wrigley’s sales representative would also check the re-
tailer’s stock of gum for freshness, and would replace stale gum at no cost to the retailer. 
This was a regular part of a representative’s duties, and at any given time up to 40% of the 
stock of gum in his possession would be stale gum that had been removed from retail stores. 
After accumulating a sufficient amount of stale product, the representative either would 
ship it back to Wrigley’s Chicago office or would dispose of it at a local Wisconsin landfill. 
Wrigley did not own or lease real property in Wisconsin, did not operate any manufac-
turing, training, or warehouse facility, and did not have a telephone listing or bank account. 
All Wisconsin orders were sent to Chicago for acceptance, and were filled by shipment 
10-Appendix C.indd   186 10/5/11   10:58 AM
Appendix C: Wisconsin vs. Wrigley
 187
through common carrier from outside the State. Credit and collection activities were simi-
larly handled by the Chicago office. Although Wrigley engaged in print, radio, and televi-
sion advertising in Wisconsin, the purchase and placement of that advertising was managed 
by an independent advertising agency located in Chicago. 
Wrigley had never filed tax returns or paid taxes in Wisconsin; indeed, it was not li-
censed to do business in that State. In 1980, petitioner Wisconsin Department of Revenue 
concluded that the company’s instate business activities during the years 1973-1978 had 
been sufficient to support imposition of a franchise tax, and issued a tax assessment on a 
percentage of the company’s apportionable income for those years. Wrigley objected to the 
assessment, maintaining that its Wisconsin activities were limited to “solicitation of orders” 
within the meaning of 15 USC § 381 [15 USCS § 381], and that it was therefore immune 
from Wisconsin franchise taxes. After an evidentiary hearing, the Wisconsin Tax Appeals 
Commission unanimously upheld the imposition of the tax. CCH Wis Tax Rptr ¶ 202-792 
(1986). It later reaffirmed this decision, with one commissioner dissenting, after the County 
Circuit Court vacated the original order on procedural grounds. CCH Wis Tax Rptr ¶ 202-
926 (1987). The County Circuit Court then reversed on the merits, CCH Wis Tax Rptr 
¶ 203-000 (1988), but that decision was in turn reversed by the Wisconsin Court of Ap-
peals, with one judge dissenting. 153 Wis 2d 559, 451 NW2d 444 (1989). The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, reversed yet once again, thus finally disallowing 
the Wisconsin tax. 160 Wis 2d 53, 465 NW2d 800 (1991). We granted the State’s petition 
for certiorari, 502 US _______ , 116 L Ed 2d 27, 112 S Ct 49 (1991). 
II 
In Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v Minnesota, 358 US 450, 454, 3 L Ed 2d 
421, 79 S Ct 357, 67 ALR2d 1292 (1959), we considered Minnesota’s imposition of a prop-
erly apportioned tax on the net income of an Iowa cement corporation whose “activities in 
Minnesota consisted of a regular and systematic course of solicitation of orders for the sale of 
its products, each order being subject to acceptance, filling and delivery by it from its plant 
[in Iowa].” The company’s salesmen, operating out of a three-room office in Minneapolis 
rented by their employer, solicited purchases by cement dealers and by customers of cement 
dealers. They also received complaints about goods that had been lost or damaged in ship-
ment, and forwarded these back to Iowa for further instructions. Id., at 454-455, 3 L Ed 2d 
421, 79 S Ct 357, 67 ALR2d 1292. The cement company’s contacts with Minnesota were 
otherwise very limited; it had no bank account, real property, or warehoused merchandise 
in the State. We nonetheless rejected Commerce Clause and due process challenges to the 
tax: 
“We conclude that net income from the interstate operations of a foreign corporation 
may be subjected to state taxation provided the levy is not discriminatory and is properly 
apportioned to local activities within the taxing State forming sufficient nexus to support 
the same.” Id., at 452, 3 L Ed 2d 421, 79 S Ct 357, 67 ALR2d 1292.
The opinion in Northwestern States was handed down in February 1959. Less than a 
week later, we granted a motion to dismiss (apparently on mootness grounds) the appeal of 
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 a Louisiana Supreme Court decision that had rejected due process and Commerce Clause 
challenges to the imposition of state net-income taxes based on local solicitation of orders 
that were sent out-of-state for approval and shipping. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v 
Collector of Revenue, 234 La 651, 101 So 2d 70 (1958), appeal dism’d, 359 US 28, 3 L Ed 
2d 625, 79 S Ct 602 (1959). That decision was particularly significant because, unlike the 
Iowa cement company in Northwestern States, the Kentucky liquor company in Brown-
Forman did not lease (or own) any real estate in the taxing state. Rather, its activities were 
limited to 
“the presence of ‘missionary men’ who call upon wholesale dealers [in Louisiana] and 
who, on occasion, accompany the salesmen of these wholesalers to assist them in obtain-
ing a suitable display of appellant’s merchandise at the business establishments of said 
retailers ....” 234 La, at 653-654, 101 So 2d, at 70.
Two months later, we denied certiorari in another Louisiana case upholding the imposi-
tion of state tax on the income of an out-of-state corporation that neither leased nor owned 
real property in Louisiana and whose only activities in that State “consist[ed] of the regular 
and systematic solicitation of orders for its product by fifteen salesmen.”International Shoe 
Co. v Fontenot, 236 La 279, 280, 107 So 2d 640, 640 (1958), cert denied, 359 US 984, 
3 L Ed 2d 933, 79 S Ct 943 (1959). 
Although our refusals to disturb the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decisions in Brown-For-
man and International Shoe did not themselves have any legal significance, see Hopfmann 
v Connolly, 471 US 459, 460-461, 85 L Ed 2d 469, 105 S Ct 2106 (1985); United States 
v Carver, 260 US 482, 490, 67 L Ed 361, 43 S Ct 181 (1923), our actions in those cases 
raised concerns that the broad language of Northwestern States might ultimately be read to 
suggest that a company whose only contacts with a State consisted of sending “drummers” 
or salesmen into that State could lawfully be subjected to (properly apportioned) income 
taxation based on the interstate sales those representatives generated. In Heublein, Inc. v 
South Carolina Tax Comm’n, 409 US 275, 34 L Ed 2d 472, 93 S Ct 483 (1972), we re-
viewed the history of § 381 and noted that the complaints of the business community over 
the uncertainty created by these cases were the driving force behind the enactment of § 381: 
“‘Persons engaged in interstate commerce are in doubt as to the amount of local activi-
ties within a State that will be regarded as forming a sufficient ... connectio[n] with the 
State to support the imposition of a tax on net income from interstate operations and 
‘properly apportioned’ to the State.’” Id., at 280, 34 L Ed 2d 472, 93 S Ct 483 (quoting 
S Rep No. 658, 86th Cong, 1st Sess, p 2-3 (1959)).1
Within months after our actions in these three cases, Congress responded to the con-
cerns that had been expressed by enacting Public Law 86-272, which established what the 
relevant section heading referred to as a “minimum standard” for imposition of a state net-
income tax based on solicitation of interstate sales: 
1 See also HR Rep No. 936, 86th Cong, 1st Sess, p 2 (1959) (“While it is true that the denial of certiorari is 
not a decision on the merits, and although grounds other than the preceden[t] of the Northwestern [States] 
cas[e] were advanced as a basis for sustaining the Brown-Forman and International Shoe decisions, the fact 
that a tax was successfully imposed in those cases has given strength to the apprehensions which had already 
been generated among small and moderate size businesses”).
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“No State ... shall have power to impose, for any taxable year ..., a net income tax on the 
income derived within such State by any person from interstate commerce if the only 
business activities within such State by or on behalf of such person during such taxable 
year are either, or both, of the following:
“(1) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State for 
sales of tangible personal property, which orders are sent outside the State for approval 
or rejection, and, if approved, are filled by shipment or delivery from a point outside 
the State; and
“(2) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State in 
the name of or for the benefit of a prospective customer of such person, if orders by 
such customer to such person to enable such customer to fill orders resulting from such 
solicitation are orders described in paragraph (1).”
73 Stat 555, 15 USC § 381(a) [15 USCS § 381(a)]. 
Although we have stated that § 381 was “designed to define clearly a lower limit” for the 
exercise of state taxing power, and that “Congress’ primary goal” was to provide “[c]larity 
that would remove [the] uncertainty” created by Northwestern States, see Heublein, supra, 
at 280, 34 L Ed 2d 472, 93 S Ct 483, experience has proved § 381’s “minimum standard” 
to be somewhat less than entirely clear. The primary sources of confusion, in this case as in 
others, have been two questions: (1) what is the scope of the crucial term “solicitation of 
orders”; and (2) whether there is a de minimis exception to the activity (beyond “solicita-
tion of orders”) that forfeits § 381 immunity. We address these issues in turn. 
A 
Section 381(a)(1) confers immunity from state income taxes on any company whose “only 
business activities” in that State consist of “solicitation of orders” for interstate sales. “So-
licitation,” commonly understood, means “[a]sking” for, or “enticing” to, something, see 
Black’s Law Dictionary 1393 (6th ed 1990); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
2169 (1981) (“solicit” means “to approach with a request or plea (as in selling or begging)”). 
We think it evident that in this statute the term includes, not just explicit verbal requests for 
orders, but also any speech or conduct that implicitly invites an order. Thus, for example, 
a salesman who extols the virtues of his company’s product to the retailer of a competitive 
brand is engaged in “solicitation” even if he does not come right out and ask the retailer 
to buy some. The key question in this case is whether, and to what extent, “solicitation of 
orders” covers activities that neither explicitly nor implicitly propose a sale. 
In seeking the answer to that question, we reject the proposition put forward by Wiscon-
sin and its amici that we must construe § 381 narrowly because we said in Heublein that 
“‘unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly 
changed the Federal-State balance,’” 409 US, at 281-282, 34 L Ed 2d 472, 93 S Ct 483 
(citation omitted). That principle—which we applied in Heublein to reject a suggested 
inference from § 381 that States cannot regulate solicitation in a manner that might cause 
an out-of-state company to forfeit its tax immunity—has no application in the present case. 
Because § 381 unquestionably does limit the power of States to tax companies whose only 
in-state activity is “the solicitation of orders,” our task is simply to ascertain the fair meaning 
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 of that term. FMC Corp. v Holliday, 498 US _______ , _______ - _______ , 112 L Ed 2d 
356, 111 S Ct 403 (1990). 
Wisconsin views some courts as having adopted the position that an out-of-state company 
forfeits its § 381 immunity if it engages in “any activity other than requesting the customer 
to purchase the product.” Brief for Petitioner 21; see also id., at 19, n 8 (citing Hervey v 
AMF Beaird, Inc., 250 Ark 147, 464 SW2d 557 (1971); Clairol, Inc. v Kingsley, 109 NJ 
Super 22, 262 A2d 213, aff’d, 57 NJ 199, 270 A2d 702 (1970), appeal dism’d, 402 US 902, 
28 L Ed 2d 643, 91 S Ct 1377 (1971) ).2 Arguably supporting this interpretation is subsec-
tion (c) of § 381, which expands the immunity of subsection (a) when the out-of-state seller 
does its marketing though independent contractors, to include not only solicitation of orders 
for sales, but also actual sales, and in addition “the maintenance ... of an office ... by one or 
more independent contractors whose activities ... consist solely of making sales, or soliciting 
orders for sales ....”3 The plain implication of this is that without that separate indulgence 
the maintenance of an office for the exclusive purpose of conducting the exempted solicita-
tion and sales would have provided a basis for taxation—i.e., that the phrase “solicitation of 
orders” does not embrace the maintenance of an office for the exclusive purpose of solicit-
ing orders. Of course the phrase “solicitation of orders” ought to be accorded a consistent 
meaning within the section, see Sorenson v Secretary of the Treasury, 475 US 851, 860, 
89 L Ed 2d 855, 106 S Ct 1600 (1986), and if it does not embrace maintaining an office 
for soliciting in subsection (c), it does not do so in subsection (a) either. One might argue 
that the necessity of special permission for an office establishes that the phrase “solicitation 
of orders” covers only the actual requests for purchases or, at most, the actions absolutely 
essential to making those requests. 
We think, however, that would be an unreasonable reading of the text. That the statu-
tory phrase uses the term “solicitation” in a more general sense that includes not merely 
the ultimate act of inviting an order but the entire process associated with the invitation, is 
2 Amici New Jersey, et al. contend that our summary disposition of Clairol binds us to this narrow con-
struction of § 381(a). Though Clairol is frequently cited for this construction, the opinion in the case does 
not in fact recite it. In any event, our summary disposition affirmed only the judgment below, and cannot 
be taken as adopting the reasoning of the lower court. Anderson v Celebrezze, 460 US 780, 784, n 5, 75 
L Ed 2d 547, 103 S Ct 1564 (1983); Fusari v Steinberg, 419 US 379, 391-392, 42 L Ed 2d 521, 95 S Ct 
533 (1975) (Burger, C. J., concurring). The judgment in Clairol would have been the same even under 
a broader construction of “solicitation of orders,” since the company’s in-state activities included sending 
nonsales representatives to provide customers technical assistance in the use of Clairol products, 109 NJ 
Super, at 29-30, 262 A2d, at 217. See United States Tobacco Co. v Commonwealth, 478 Pa 125, 136-
137, 386 A2d 471, 476-477, cert denied, 439 US 880, 58 L Ed 2d 193, 99 S Ct 217 (1978); Gillette Co. 
v State Tax Comm’n, 56 App Div 2d 475, 479, 393 NYS2d 186, 189 (1977), aff’d, 45 NY2d 846, 382 
NE2d 764 (1978).
3 15 USC § 381(c) [15 USCS § 381(c)] reads in its entirety as follows: 
“For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, a person shall not be considered to have engaged in 
business activities within a State during any taxable year merely by reason of sales in such State, or the so-
licitation of orders for sales in such State, of tangible personal property on behalf of such person by one or 
more independent contractors, or by reason of the maintenance, of an office in such State by one or more 
independent contractors whose activities on behalf of such person in such State consist solely of making 
sales, or soliciting orders for sales, or [sic] tangible personal property.”
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suggested by the fact that § 381 describes “the solicitation of orders” as a subcategory, not of 
in-state acts, but rather of in-state “business activities”—a term that more naturally connotes 
courses of conduct. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 22 (1981) (defining 
“activity” as “an occupation, pursuit, or recreation in which a person is active—often used 
in pl. <business activities>”). Moreover, limiting “solicitation of orders” to actual requests 
for purchases would reduce § 381(a)(1) to a nullity. (It is obviously impossible to make a re-
quest without some accompanying action, such as placing a phone call or driving a car to the 
customer’s location.) And limiting it to acts “essential” for making requests would engender 
endless uncertainty, contrary to the whole purpose of the statute. (Is it “essential” to use a 
company car, or to take a taxi, in order to conduct in-person solicitation? For that matter, 
is it “essential” to solicit in person?) It seems to us evident that “solicitation of orders” em-
braces request-related activity that is not even, strictly speaking, essential, or else it would 
not cover salesmen’s driving on the State’s roads, spending the night in the State’s hotels, 
or displaying within the State samples of their product. We hardly think the statute had in 
mind only day-trips into the taxing jurisdiction by empty-handed drummers on foot. See 
United States Tobacco Co. v Commonwealth, 478 Pa 125, 140, 386 A2d 471, 478 (“Con-
gress could hardly have intended to exempt only walking solicitors”), cert denied, 439 US 
880, 58 L Ed 2d 193, 99 S Ct 217 (1978). And finally, this extremely narrow interpretation 
of “solicitation” would cause § 381 to leave virtually unchanged the law that existed before 
its enactment. Both Brown-Forman (where the salesman assisted wholesalers in obtaining 
suitable displays for whiskey at retail stores) and International Shoe (where hotel rooms were 
used to display shoes) would be decided as they were before, upholding the taxation. 
[7a] At the other extreme, Wrigley urges that we adopt a broad interpretation of “solici-
tation” which it describes as having been adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court based 
on that court’s reading of cases in Pennsylvania and New York, see 160 Wis 2d, at 82, 465 
NW2d, at 811-812 (citing United States Tobacco Co. v Commonwealth, supra; Gillette 
Co. v State Tax Comm’n, 56 App Div 2d 475, 393 NYS2d 186 (1977), aff’d, 45 NY2d 
846, 382 NE2d 764 (1978) ). See also Indiana Dept. of Revenue v Kimberly-Clark Corp., 
275 Ind 378, 384, 416 NE2d 1264, 1268 (1981).  According to Wrigley, this would treat 
as “solicitation of orders” any activities that are “ordinary and necessary ‘business activities’ 
accompanying the solicitation process” or are “routinely associated with deploying a sales 
force to conduct the solicitation, so long as there is no office, plant, warehouse or inven-
tory in the State.” Brief for Respondent 9, 19-20; see also J. Hellerstein, State Taxation 
¶ 6.11[2], p 245 (1983) (“solicitation ought to be held to embrace other normal incidents 
of activities of salesmen” or the “customary functions of sales representatives of out-of-
state merchants”). We reject this “routinely-associated-with-solicitation” or “customarily-
performed-by-salesmen” approach, since it converts a standard embracing only a particular 
activity (“solicitation”) into a standard embracing all activities routinely conducted by those 
who engage in that particular activity (“salesmen”). If, moreover, the approach were to be 
applied (as respondent apparently intends) on an industry-by-industry basis, it would render 
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 the limitations of § 381(a) toothless, permitting “solicitation of orders” to be whatever a 
particular industry wants its salesmen to do.4 
In any case, we do not regard respondent’s proposed approach to be an accurate char-
acterization of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s opinion. The Wisconsin court construed 
“solicitation of orders” to reach only those activities that are “closely associated” with solici-
tation, industry practice being only one factor to be considered in judging the “close[ness]” 
of the connection between the challenged activity and the actual requests for orders. 160 
Wis 2d, at 82, 465 NW2d, at 811-812. The problem with that standard, it seems to us, is 
that it merely reformulates rather than answers the crucial question. “What constitutes the 
‘solicitation of orders’?” becomes “What is ‘closely related’ to a solicitation request?” This 
fails to provide the “[c]larity that would remove uncertainty” which we identified as the 
primary goal of § 381. Heublein, 409 US, at 280, 34 L Ed 2d 472, 93 S Ct 483. 
We proceed, therefore, to describe what we think the proper standard to be. Once it is 
acknowledged, as we have concluded it must be, that “solicitation of orders” covers more 
than what is strictly essential to making requests for purchases, the next (and perhaps the 
only other) clear line is the one between those activities that are entirely ancillary to requests 
for purchases—those that serve no independent business function apart from their connec-
tion to the soliciting of orders—and those activities that the company would have reason to 
4 The dissent explicitly agrees with our rejection of the “ordinary and necessary” standard advocated by 
Wrigley. Post, at _______ , 120 L Ed 2d, at 194. It then proceeds, however, to adopt that very standard. 
It states that the test should be whether a given activity is one that “reasonable buyers would consider ... 
to be a part of the solicitation itself and not a significant and independent service or component of value.” 
Post, at _______ , 120 L Ed 2d, at 194. It is obvious that those activities that a reasonable buyer would 
consider “part of the solicitation itself” rather than an “independent service” are those that are customarily 
performed in connection with solicitation. Any doubt that this is what the dissent intends is removed by its 
later elaboration of its test in the context of the facts of this case. The dissent repeatedly inquires whether an 
activity is a “normal ac[t] of courtesy from seller to buyer,” post, at _______ , 120 L Ed 2d, at 197 (emphasis 
added); whether it is a “common solicitation practic[e],” post, at _______ , 120 L Ed 2d, at 199 (emphasis 
added); and whether Wrigley “exceed[ed] the normal scope of solicitation,” post, at _______ , 120 L Ed 
2d, at 198 (emphasis added). Of course, given Wrigley’s significant share of the Wisconsin chewing gum 
market, most activities it chooses to “conduc[t] in the course of solicitation,” post, at _______ , 120 L Ed 
2d, at 200, will be viewed as a normal part of the solicitation process itself. Had Wrigley’s sales represen-
tatives routinely approved orders on the spot; or accepted payments on past-due accounts; or even made 
outright sales of gum, it is difficult to see how a reasonable buyer would have thought that was not “part of 
the solicitation itself”—it certainly has no “independent value” to him. Nothing in the text of the statute 
suggests that it was intended to confer tax immunity on whatever activities are engaged in by sales agents 
in a particular industry.
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engage in anyway but chooses to allocate to its in-state sales force.5 Cf. National Tires, Inc. v 
Lindley, 68 Ohio App 2d 71, 78-79, 426 NE2d 793, 798 (1980) (company’s activities went 
beyond solicitation to “functions more commonly related to maintaining an on-going busi-
ness”). Providing a car and a stock of free samples to salesmen is part of the “solicitation of 
orders,” because the only reason to do it is to facilitate requests for purchases. Contrariwise, 
employing salesmen to repair or service the company’s products is not part of the “solicita-
tion of orders,” since there is good reason to get that done whether or not the company 
has a sales force. Repair and servicing may help to increase purchases; but it is not ancillary 
to requesting purchases, and cannot be converted into “solicitation” by merely being assigned 
to salesmen. See, e.g., Herff Jones Co. v State Tax Comm’n, 247 Ore 404, 412, 430 P2d 
998, 1001-1002 (1967) (no § 381 immunity for sales representatives’ collection activities).6
As we have discussed earlier, the text of the statute (the “office” exception in subsection 
(c)) requires one exception to this principle: Even if engaged in exclusively to facilitate 
requests for purchases, the maintenance of an office within the State, by the company or 
on its behalf, would go beyond the “solicitation of orders.” We would not make any more 
generalized exception to our immunity standard on the basis of the “office” provision. It 
seemingly represents a judgment that a company office within a State is such a significant 
manifestation of company “presence” that, absent a specific exemption, income taxation 
should always be allowed. Jantzen, Inc. v District of Columbia, 395 A2d 29, 32 (DC 1978); 
see generally Hellerstein, supra, ¶ 6.4. 
Wisconsin urges us to hold that no post-sale activities can be included within the scope 
of covered “solicitation.” We decline to do so. Activities that take place after a sale will 
ordinarily not be entirely ancillary in the sense we have described, see, e.g., Miles Labora-
tories v Department of Revenue, 274 Ore 395, 400, 546 P2d 1081, 1083 (1976) (replacing 
damaged goods), but we are not prepared to say that will invariably be true. Moreover, the 
pre-sale/post-sale distinction is hopelessly unworkable. Even if one disregards the confusion 
that may exist concerning when a sale takes place, cf. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-401, 
1A ULA 675 (1989), manufacturers and distributors ordinarily have ongoing relationships 
5 The dissent states that ancillarity should be judged, not from the perspective of the seller, but from the 
persective of the buyer. Post, at _______ , 120 L Ed 2d, at 194 (test is whether “reasonable buyers would 
consider [the activities] to be a part of the solicitation itself”) (emphasis added); post, at _______ , 120 L Ed 
2d, at 198 (“The test I propose ... requires an objective assessment from the vantage point of a reasonable 
buyer”) (emphasis added); post, at _______ , 120 L Ed 2d, at 200 (question is whether the activities “possess 
independent value to the customer”) (emphasis added). As explained earler, see n 4, supra, this rule inevitably 
results in a whatever-the-industry-wants standard, despite the dissent’s unequivocal disavowal of such a test. 
The dissent also suggests that ancillarity should be judged by asking whether a particular challenged activ-
ity is “related to a particular sales call or to a particular sales solicitation,” post, at _______ , 120 L Ed 2d, at 
199 (emphasis added). This standard, besides being amorphous, cannot be correct. Those activities that are 
most clearly not immunized by the statute—e.g., actual sales, collection of funds—would seem to be the 
ones most closely “related” to particular acts of actual solicitation. And activities the dissent finds immunized 
in the present case—maintenance of a storage facility, and use of a home office—are extremely remote.
6 Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, post, at _______ , _______ , 120 L Ed 2d, at 197-198, 200, both 
Brown-Forman and International Shoe would have been decided differently under these principles. The 
various activities at issue in those cases (renting a room for temporary display of sample products; assisting 
wholesalers in obtaining suitable product display in retail shops) would be considered merely ancillary to 
either wholesale solicitation or downstream (consumer or retailer) solicitation.
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 that involve continuous sales, making it often impossible to determine whether a particular 
incidental activity was related to the sale that preceded it or the sale that followed it. 
B
The Wisconsin Supreme Court also held that a company does not necessarily forfeit its tax 
immunity under § 381 by performing some instate business activities that go beyond “so-
licitation of orders”; rather, it said, “[c]ourts should also analyze” whether these additional 
activities were “‘deviations from the norm’” or “de minimis activities.” 160 Wis 2d, at 82, 
465 NW2d, at 811 (citation omitted). Wisconsin asserts that the plain language of the statute 
bars this recognition of a de minimis exception, because the immunity is limited to situ-
ations where “the only business activities within [the] State” are those described, 15 USC 
§ 381 [15 USCS § 381] (emphasis added). This ignores the fact that the venerable maxim de 
minimis non curat lex (“the law cares not for trifles”) is part of the established background of 
legal principles against which all enactments are adopted, and which all enactments (absent 
contrary indication) are deemed to accept. See, e.g., Republic of Argentina v Weltover, 
Inc., 504 US_______ , _______ , 119 L Ed 2d 394, 112 S Ct _______ , (1992); Hudson v 
McMillian, 503 US _______ ,, _______ ,, 117 L Ed 2d 156, 112 S Ct 995 (1992); Ingraham 
v Wright, 430 US 651, 674, 51 L Ed 2d 711, 97 S Ct 1401 (1977); Abbott Laboratories v 
Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425 US 1, 18, 47 L Ed 2d 537, 96 S Ct 1305 (1976); 
Industrial Assn. of San Francisco v United States, 268 US 64, 84, 69 L Ed 849, 45 S Ct 503 
(1925). It would be especially unreasonable to abandon normal application of the de mini-
mis principle in construing § 381, which operates in such stark, all-or-nothing fashion: A 
company either has complete net-income tax immunity or it has none at all, even for its so-
licitation activities. Wisconsin’s reading of the statute renders a company liable for hundreds 
of thousands of dollars in taxes if one of its salesmen sells a 10¢ 34 item in-state. Finally, 
Wisconsin is wrong in asserting that application of the de minimis principle “excise[s] the 
word ‘only’ from the statute.” Brief for Petitioner 27. The word “only” places a strict limit 
upon the categories of activities that are covered by § 381, not upon their substantiality. See, 
e.g., Drackett Prods. Co. v Conrad, 370 NW2d 723, 726 (ND 1985); Kimberly Clark, 275 
Ind, at 383-384, 416 NE2d, at 1268. 
Whether a particular activity is a de minimis deviation from a prescribed standard must, of 
course, be determined with reference to the purpose of the standard. Section 381 was de-
signed to increase—beyond what Northwestern States suggested was required by the Con-
stitution—the connection that a company could have with a State before subjecting itself to 
tax. Accordingly, whether in-state activity other than “solicitation of orders” is sufficiently 
de minimis to avoid loss of the tax immunity conferred by § 381 depends upon whether that 
activity establishes a nontrivial additional connection with the taxing State. 
III 
Wisconsin asserts that at least six activities performed by Wrigley within its borders went 
beyond the “solicitation of orders”: the replacement of stale gum by sales representatives; 
the supplying of gum through “agency stock checks”; the storage of gum, racks, and 
promotional materials; the rental of space for storage; the regional manager’s recruitment, 
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training, and evaluation of employees; and the regional manager’s intervention in credit dis-
putes.7 Since none of these activities can reasonably be viewed as requests for orders covered 
by § 381, Wrigley was subject to tax unless they were either ancillary to requesting orders 
or de minimis. 
We conclude that the replacement of stale gum, the supplying of gum through “agency 
stock checks,” and the storage of gum were not ancillary. As to the first: Wrigley would 
wish to attend to the replacement of spoiled product whether or not it employed a sales 
force. Because that activity serves an independent business function quite separate from 
requesting orders, it does not qualify for § 381 immunity. Miles Laboratories, 274 Ore, at 
400, 546 P2d, at 1083. Although Wrigley argues that gum replacement was a “promotional 
necessity” designed to ensure continued sales, Brief for Respondent 31, it is not enough that 
the activity facilitate sales; it must facilitate the requesting of sales, which this did not.8
The provision of gum through “agency stock checks” presents a somewhat more com-
plicated question. It appears from the record that this activity occurred only in connection 
with the furnishing of display racks to retailers, so that it was arguably ancillary to a form 
of consumer solicitation. Section 381(a)(2) shields a manufacturer’s “missionary” request that 
an indirect customer (such as a consumer) place an order, if a successful request would ul-
timately result in an order’s being filled by a § 381 “customer” of the manufacturer, i.e., by 
the wholesaler who fills the orders of the retailer with goods shipped to the wholesaler from 
out-of-state. Cf. Gillette, 56 App Div 2d, at 482, 393 NYS2d, at 191 (“Advice to retailers 
on the art of displaying goods to the public can hardly be more thoroughly solicitation ...”). 
It might seem, therefore, that setting up gum-filled display racks, like Wrigley’s general 
advertising in Wisconsin, would be immunized by § 381(a)(2). What destroys this analysis, 
however, is the fact that Wrigley made the retailers pay for the gum, thereby providing a busi-
ness purpose for supplying the gum quite independent from the purpose of soliciting con-
sumers. Since providing the gum was not entirely ancillary to requesting purchases, it was 
7 Wisconsin has also argued that the scope of the regional managers’ activities caused their residences to be, 
“[in] economic reality,” Wrigley offices in the State. Brief for Petitioner 32. If this means that having resi-
dent salesmen without offices can sometimes be as commercially effective as having nonresident salesmen 
with offices, perhaps it is true. But it does not establish that Wrigley “maintained an office” in the sense 
necessary to come within the exception to the “entirely ancillary” standard we have announced. See supra, 
at _______ , 120 L Ed 2d, at 190. Nor does the regional managers’ occasional use of their homes for meet-
ings with salesmen, or Kroyer’s uncompensated dedication of a portion of his home basement to his own 
office. The maintenance of an office necessary to trigger the exception must be more formally attributed 
to the out-of-state company itself, or to the agents of that company in their agency capacity—as was, for 
example, the rented office in Northwestern States.
8 The dissent argues that this activity must be considered part of “solicitation” because, inter alia, it was 
“minimal,” and not “significant.” Post, at _______ , - _______ , 120 L Ed 2d, at 198-199. We disagree. 
It was not, as the dissent suggests, a practice that involved simple “acts of courtesy” that occurred only 
because a salesman happened to be on the scene and did not wish to “harm the company.” Post, at 
_______ - _______ , _______ , 120 L Ed 2d, at 197, 199. Wrigley deliberately chose to use its sales force 
to engage in regular and systematic replacement of stale product on a level that amounted to several thou-
sand dollars per year, which is a lot of chewing gum.
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 not within the scope of “solicitation of orders.”9 And because the vast majority of the gum 
stored by Wrigley in Wisconsin was used in connection with stale gum swaps and agency 
stock checks, that storage (and the indirect rental of space for that storage) was in no sense 
ancillary to “solicitation.” 
By contrast, Wrigley’s in-state recruitment, training, and evaluation of sales represen-
tatives and its use of hotels and homes for sales-related meetings served no purpose apart 
from their role in facilitating solicitation. The same must be said of the instances in which 
Wrigley’s regional sales manager contacted the Chicago office about “rather nasty” credit 
disputes involving important accounts in order to “get the account and [Wrigley’s] credit 
department communicating,” App 71, 72. It hardly appears likely that this mediating func-
tion between the customer and the central office would have been performed by some other 
employee—some company ombudsman, so to speak—if the on-location sales staff did not 
exist. The purpose of the activity, in other words, was to ingratiate the salesman with the 
customer, thereby facilitating requests for purchases. 
Finally, Wrigley argues that the various nonimmune activities, considered singly or 
together, are de minimis. In particular, Wrigley emphasizes that the gum sales through 
“agency stock checks” accounted for only 0.00007% of Wrigley’s annual Wisconsin sales, 
and in absolute terms amounted to only several hundred dollars a year. We need not decide 
whether any of the nonimmune activities was de minimis in isolation; taken together, they 
clearly are not. Wrigley’s sales representatives exchanged stale gum, as a matter of regular 
company policy, on a continuing basis, and Wrigley maintained a stock of gum worth sev-
eral thousand dollars in the State for this purpose as well as for the less frequently pursued 
(but equally unprotected) purpose of selling gum through “agency stock checks.” Although 
the relative magnitude of these activities was not large compared to Wrigley’s other opera-
tions in Wisconsin, we have little difficulty concluding that they constituted a nontrivial 
additional connection with the State. Because Wrigley’s business activities within Wiscon-
sin were not limited to those specified in § 381, the prohibition on net-income taxation 
contained in that provision was inapplicable. 
... 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin is reversed, and the case 
is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Justice O’Connor, concurring in Parts I and II, and concurring in the judgment. 
I join sections I and II of the Court’s opinion. I do not agree, however, that the replace-
ment of stale gum served an independent business function. The replacement of stale gum 
9 The dissent speculates, without any basis in the record, that Wrigley might have chosen to charge for the 
gum, not for the profit, but because giving it away would “lower the per unit cost of all goods purchased,” 
which “could create either the fact or the perception that retailers were not receiving the same price.” Post, 
at _______ - _______ , 120 L Ed 2d, at 192-199. Though Wrigley’s motive for choosing to make a profit 
on these items seems to us irrelevant in any event, we cannot avoid observing how unlikely it is that this 
was the reason Wrigley did not include free gum in its (per-unit-cost-distorting) free racks, although it 
did, as the record shows, regularly give away other (presumably per-unit-cost-distorting) free gum. Wrigley 
itself did not have the temerity to make this argument.
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by the sales representatives was part of ensuring the product was available to the public in 
a form that may be purchased. Making sure that one’s product is available and properly 
displayed serves no independent business function apart from requesting purchases; one 
cannot offer a product for sale if it is not available. I agree, however, that the storage of gum 
in the State and the use of agency stock checks were not ancillary to solicitation and were 
not de minimis. On that basis, I would hold that Wrigley’s income is subject to taxation 
by Wisconsin. 
Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Kennedy, with whom The Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun join, dissenting. 
Congress prohibits the States from imposing taxes on income derived from “business 
activities” in interstate commerce and limited to the “solicitation of orders” under certain 
conditions. 15 USC § 381(a) [15 USCS § 381(a)]. The question we face is whether Wrig-
ley has this important tax immunity for its business activities in the State of Wisconsin. I 
agree with the Court that the statutory phrase “solicitation of orders” is but a subset of the 
phrase “business activities.” Ibid.; ante, at _______ - _______ , 120 L Ed 2d, at 187-188. I 
submit with all respect, though, that the Court does not allow its own analysis to take the 
proper course. The Court instead devises a test that excludes business activities with a close 
relation to the solicitation of orders, activities that advance the purpose of the statute and 
its immunity. 
The Court is correct, in my view, to reject the two polar arguments urged upon us: one, 
that ordinary and necessary business activities surrounding the solicitation of orders are part 
of the exempt solicitation itself; and the other, that the only exempt activities are those es-
sential to the sale. Id., at _______ , _______ , 120 L Ed 2d, at 186, 188. Having done so, 
however, the Court exits a promising avenue of analysis and adopts a test with little rela-
tion to the practicalities of solicitation. The Court’s rule will yield results most difficult to 
justify or explain. My submission is that the two polarities suggest the proper analysis and 
that the controlling standard lies between. It is difficult to formulate a complete test in one 
case, but the general rule ought to be that the statute exempts business activities performed 
in connection with solicitation if reasonable buyers would consider them to be a part of 
the solicitation itself and not a significant and independent service or component of value. 
I begin with the statute. Section 381(a) provides as follows: 
“No State, or political subdivision thereof, shall have power to impose, for any taxable 
year ending after September 14, 1959, a net income tax on the income derived within 
such State by any person from interstate commerce if the only business activities within 
such State by or on behalf of such person during such taxable year are either, or both, 
of the following:
“(1) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State for 
sales of tangible personal property, which orders are sent outside the State for approval 
or rejection, and, if approved, are filled by shipment or delivery from a point outside 
the State; and
“(2) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State in 
the name of or for the benefit of a prospective customer of such person, if orders by 
such customer to such person to enable such customer to fill orders resulting from such 
solicitation are orders described in paragraph (1).”
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 15 USC § 381(a) [15 USCS § 381(a)]. 
The key phrases, as recognized by the Court, are “business activities” and “solicitation of 
orders.” Ante, at _______ - _______ , 120 L Ed 2d, at 187-188. By using “solicitation of 
orders” to define a subset of “business activities,” the text suggests that the immunity to be 
conferred encompasses more than a specific request for a purchase; it includes the process 
of solicitation, as distinguished from manufacturing, warehousing, or distribution. Congress 
could have written § 381(a) to exempt “acts” of “solicitation” or “solicitation of orders,” 
but it did not. The decision to use the phrase “business activities,” while not unambiguous, 
suggests that the statute must be read to accord with the practical realities of interstate sales 
solicitations, which, after all, Congress acted to protect. 
The textual implication I find draws support from legal and historical context. Even those 
who approach legislative history with much trepidation must acknowledge that the statute 
was a response to three specific court decisions: Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. 
v Minnesota, 358 US 450, 3 L Ed 2d 421, 79 S Ct 357, 67 ALR2d 1292 (1959),Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v Fontenot, 236 La 279, 107 So 2d 640 (1958), cert denied, 359 US 984, 
3 L Ed 2d 933, 79 S Ct 943 (1959), and Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v Collector of 
Revenue, 234 La 651, 101 So 2d 70 (1958), appeal dism’d, cert denied, 359 US 28, 3 L Ed 
2d 625, 79 S Ct 602 (1959). S Rep No. 658, 86th Cong, 1st Sess, 2-3 (1959) (hereinafter S 
Rep); HR Rep No. 936, 86th Cong, 1st Sess, 1-2 (1959) (hereinafter HR Rep). See ante, 
at _______ - _______ , 120 L Ed 2d, at 183-185, and n 1. These decisions departed from 
what had been perceived as a well-settled rule, stated in Norton Co. v Illinois Dept. of Rev-
enue, 340 US 534, 95 L Ed 517, 71 S Ct 377 (1951), that solicitation in interstate commerce 
was protected from taxation in the State where the solicitation took place. 
“Where a corporation chooses to stay at home in all respects except to send abroad advertis-
ing or drummers to solicit orders which are sent directly to the home office for acceptance, 
filling, and delivery back to the buyer, it is obvious that the State of the buyer has no lo-
cal grip on the seller. Unless some local incident occurs sufficient to bring the transaction 
within its taxing power, the vendor is not taxable.” Id., at 537, 95 L Ed 517, 71 S Ct 377.
Firm expectations within the business community were built upon the rule as restated 
in Norton. Companies engaging in interstate commerce conformed their activities to the 
limits our cases seemed to have endorsed. To be sure, the decision to stay at home might 
have derived in some respects from independent business concerns. The expense and com-
mitment of an in-state sales office, for example, might have informed a decision to send 
salesmen into a State without further staff support. Some interstate operations, though, 
carried the unmistakable mark of a legal rather than business justification. The technical 
requirement that orders be approved at the home office, unless approval required judgment 
or expertise (for example, if the order depended on an ancillary decision to give credit or to 
name an official retailer), was no doubt the product of the legal rule. 
These settled expectations were upset in 1959, their continuing vitality put in doubt 
by Northwestern States, International Shoe, and Brown-Forman. In Northwestern States, 
the Court upheld state income taxation against two companies whose in-state operations 
included a sales staff and sales office. 358 US, at 454-455, 3 L Ed 2d 421, 79 S Ct 357, 
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67 ALR2d 1292. Our disposition was consistent with prior law, since both companies 
maintained offices within the taxing State. Ibid. But the Court’s opinion was broader than 
the holding itself and marked a departure from prior law. 
“We conclude that net income from the interstate operations of a foreign corporation 
may be subject to state taxation provided the levy is not discriminatory and is properly 
apportioned to local activities within the taxing State forming sufficient nexus to support 
the same.” Id., at 452, 3 L Ed 2d 421, 79 S Ct 357, 67 ALR2d 1292.
In the absence of case law giving meaning to “sufficient nexus,” the Court’s use of this 
indeterminate phrase created concern and apprehension in the business community. S Rep, 
at 2-4; HR Rep, at 1. Apprehension increased after our denial of certiorari in International 
Shoe and Brown-Forman, where the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the taxation of 
companies whose business activities within the State were limited to solicitation by sales-
people. S Rep, at 3; HR Rep, at 2. The concern stemmed not only from the prospect for 
tax liability in an increasing number of States but also from the uncertainty of its amount 
and apportionment, the burdens of compliance, a lack of uniformity under state law, the 
withdrawal of small businesses from States where the cost and complexity of compliance 
would be great, and the extent of liability for back taxes. S Rep, at 2-4. 
As first drafted by the Senate Finance Committee, § 381(a) would have addressed the de-
cisions in Northwestern States, International Shoe, and Brown-Forman. S Rep, at 2-3; HR 
Rep, at 3; 105 Cong Rec 16378, 16934 (1959). The Committee recommended a bill defin-
ing “business activities” in three subsections, with one subsection corresponding to the facts 
in each of the three cases. S 2524, 86th Cong, 1st Sess (1959). Before the bill was enacted, 
however, the Senate rejected the third of these subsections, corresponding to Northwest-
ern States, which would have extended protection to companies with in-state sales offices. 
105 Cong Rec 16469-16477 (1959) (Senate debate on an amendment proposed by Sen. 
Talmadge (Ga)). But the other two subsections, those dealing with the state-court decisions 
in International Shoe and Brown-Forman, were retained. Id., at 16367, 16376, 16471, 
16934; HR Rep No., at 3. Thus, while Northwestern States provided the first impetus for 
the enactment of § 381(a), it does not explain the statute in its final form. By contrast, the 
history of enactment makes clear that § 381(a) exempts from state income taxation at least 
those business activities at issue in International Shoe and Brown-Forman. These cases must 
inform any attempt to give meaning to § 381(a). 
International Shoe manufactured shoes in St. Louis, Missouri. Its only activity within the 
State of Louisiana consisted of regular and systematic solicitation by 15 salespeople. No of-
fice or warehouse was maintained inside Louisiana, and orders were accepted and shipped 
from outside the State. The salespeople carried product samples, drove in company-owned 
automobiles, and rented hotel rooms or rooms of public buildings in order to make displays. 
International Shoe, 236 La, at 280, 107 So 2d, at 640; Hartman, “Solicitation” and “Deliv-
ery” Under Public Law 86-272: An Uncharted Course, 29 Vand L Rev 353, 358 (1976). 
Brown-Forman distilled and packaged whiskey in Louisville, Kentucky, for sale in Louisi-
ana and elsewhere. It solicited orders in Louisiana with the assistance of an in-state sales staff. 
All orders were approved and shipped from outside the State. There was no in-state office 
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 of any kind. Brown-Forman salespeople performed two functions: they solicited orders 
from wholesalers, who were direct customers of Brown-Forman; and they accompanied the 
wholesalers’ own sales force on visits to retailers, who were solicited by the wholesalers. The 
Brown-Forman salespeople did not solicit orders at all when visiting retailers, nor could they 
sell direct to them. They did assist in arranging suitable displays of the distiller’s merchandise 
in the retail establishments. Brown-Forman, 234 La, at 653-654, 101 So 2d, at 70. 
The activities in International Shoe and Brown-Forman extended beyond specific acts of 
entreaty; they included merchandising and display, as well as other simple acts of courtesy 
from buyer to seller, such as arranging product displays and calling on the customer of a 
customer. The activities considered in International Shoe and Brown-Forman are by no 
means exceptional. Checking inventories, displaying products, replacing stale product, and 
verifying credit are all normal acts of courtesy from seller to buyer. J. Hellerstein, 1 State 
Taxation: Corporate Income and Franchise Taxes ¶ 6.11[2], p 245 (1983). A salesperson 
cannot solicit orders with any degree of effectiveness if he is constrained from performing 
small acts of courtesy. Note, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Public Law 86-272, 
46 Va L Rev 297, 315 (1960). 
The business activities of Wrigley within Wisconsin have substantial parallels to those 
considered in International Shoe and Brown-Forman. Wrigley has no manufacturing facil-
ity in the State. It maintains no offices or warehouses there. The only product it owns in 
the State is the small amount necessary for its salespeople to call upon their accounts. All 
orders solicited by its salespeople are approved or rejected outside of the State. All orders 
are shipped from outside of the State. Other activities, such as intervening in credit disputes, 
hiring salespeople, or holding sales meetings in hotel rooms, do not exceed the scope of 
§ 381(a); I agree with the Court that these too are the business activities of solicitation. Ante, 
at_______ - _______ , 120 L Ed 2d, at 193; App 10-13. 
The Department of Revenue, in an apparent concession of the point, does not contend 
that the business activities of Wrigley exceed the normal scope of solicitation; instead the 
Department relies on a distinction between business activities undertaken before and after 
the sale. Brief for Petitioner 18, 21. Under the Department’s submission, acts leading to the 
sale are within the statutory safe-harbor, while any act following the sale is beyond it. Ibid. I 
agree with the Court, as well as with the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, that this distinction 
is unworkable in the context of a continuing business relation with many repeat sales. Ante, 
at _______ - _______ , 120 L Ed 2d, at 190; App to Pet for Cert A-41. 
As the Court indicates, the case really turns upon our assessment of two practices: replac-
ing stale product and providing gum in display racks. Ante, at _______ , 120 L Ed 2d, at 
192. If the retailers relied on the Wrigley sales force to replace all stale product and that 
service was itself significant, say on the magnitude of routine deliveries of fresh bread, then 
a separate service would seem to be involved. But my understanding of the record is that 
replacement of stale gum took place only during the course of regular solicitation. App 27-
28, 41, 58, 117-118. There was no contract to perform this service. There is no indication 
in the record that this was the only method dealers relied upon to remove stale product. It 
is not plausible to believe that by enacting § 381(a) Congress insisted that every sales repre-
sentative in every industry would be prohibited from doing just what Wrigley did. 
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Acceptance of the stale gum replacement does not allow industry practices to replace 
objective statutory inquiry. The existence of a contract to perform this service, or an indica-
tion in the record that this service provided an independent component of significant value, 
would alter the case’s disposition, regardless of the seller’s intentions. The test I propose does 
not depend on the sellers’ intentions or motives whatsoever; rather it requires an objec-
tive assessment from the vantage point of a reasonable buyer. If a reasonable buyer would 
consider the replacement of stale gum to provide significant independent value, then this 
service would subject Wrigley to taxation. The majority appears to concede the point in 
part when it observes Wrigley replaced stale gum free of charge, ante, at _______ , n 9, 
120 L Ed 2d, at 192-193, which provides a strong indication that the replacement of stale 
gum is valuable to Wrigley, not its customers, as an assurance of quality given in the course 
of an ongoing solicitation. 
I agree with the Court’s approach, which is to provide guidance by some general rule 
that is faithful to the precise language of the statute. But it ought not to do so without 
recognition of some of the most essential aspects of solicitation techniques. No responsible 
company would expect its sales force to decline giving minimal assistance to a retailer in 
replacing damaged or stale product. In enacting § 381(a), Congress recognized the impor-
tance of interstate solicitation to the strength of our national economy. The statute must not 
to be interpreted to repeal the rules of good sales techniques or to forbid common solicita-
tion practices under the threat of forfeiting this important tax exemption. Congress acted to 
protect interstate solicitation, not to mandate inefficiency. 
Even accepting the majority’s test on its own terms, the business activities which the 
Court finds to be within the safe harbor of the federal statute are less ancillary to a real sales 
solicitation than are the activities it condemns. The credit adjustment techniques and the 
training sessions the Court approves are not related to a particular sales call or to a particu-
lar sales solicitation, but the condemned display and replacement practices are. I do not 
understand why the Court thinks that a credit dispute over an old transaction, handled by 
telephone weeks or months later is exempt because it “ingratiate[s] the salesman with the 
customer, thereby facilitating requests for purchases,” ante, at _______ , 120 L Ed 2d, at 
193, but that this same process of ingratiation does not occur when a salesman who is on the 
spot to solicit an order refuses to harm the company by leaving the customer with bad prod-
uct on the shelf. If there were any distinction between the two, I should think we would 
approve the replacement and condemn the credit adjustment. The majority fails to address 
this anomaly under its test, responding instead that my observation of it suggests ambiguity 
in my own. Id., at _______ , n 5, 120 L Ed 2d, at 189. In my view, both the gum replace-
ment and credit adjustment are within the scope of solicitation. 
I would agree with the Court that the furnishing of racks with gum that is sold to the cus-
tomer presents a problem of a different order, id., at _______ , 120 L Ed 2d, at 192, but here 
too I think it adds no independent value apart from the solicitation itself. To begin with, I 
think it rather well accepted that the setting up of display racks and the giving of advice on 
sales presentation is central to the salesperson’s role in cultivating customers. There are dan-
gers for the manufacturer, however, if the salesperson spends the time to set up a display and 
then stocks it with free goods, because this could create either the fact or the perception that 
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 retailers were not receiving the same price. Free goods lower the per unit cost of all goods 
purchased. The simplest policy to avoid this problem is to charge for the goods displayed, 
and that is what occurred here. Moreover, I cannot ignore, as the Court appears to do, that 
a minuscule amount of gum, no more than 0.00007% (seven one-hundred thousands of one 
percent) of Wrigley’s in-state sales, was stocked into display racks in this fashion. Brief for 
Respondent 5; App to Pet for Cert A-43. Indeed, the testimony is that Wrigley salespeople 
would stock these display racks out of their own supply of samples only as a matter of last 
resort, in instances where the retailer possessed an inadequate supply of gum and could not 
await delivery in the normal course. 
“Q Well, I take it that if you put in the stand and it was a new stand, you took the gum 
out of your vehicle and transferred it to him there; is that correct?
“A No, I would not say that’s correct.
“Q Well, did you ever stock new stands from your vehicle?
“A I would say possibly on some—on a few occasions.
“Q And how many few occasions were there during your tenure as a field representa-
tive in 1978?
“A Boy. I would just be guessing. Maybe a dozen times.
“Q And just what would—what all happened in that circumstance that you wound up 
putting in a new stand and taking the gum out of your vehicle and transferring it to the 
retailer?
“A Well, like I said, primarily I wanted to get a stand in and then he wanted to get that 
order through his wholesaler; but if he couldn’t wait, if he said my wholesaler was just 
in yesterday or something or he was not going to be in for a week, he didn’t want a 
stand sitting around, so we would then fill it and then bill the wholesaler....” App 37-38.
Under the circumstances described here, I fail to see why the stocking of a gum display 
does not “ingratiate the salesman with the customer, thereby facilitating requests for pur-
chases,” ante, at _______ , 120 L Ed 2d, at 193, as is required under the rule formulated 
by the Court. The small amount of gum involved in stocking a display rack, no more than 
$15-20 worth, belies any speculation, id., at _______ , n 9, 120 L Ed 2d, at 192-193, that 
Wrigley was driven by a profit motive in charging customers for this gum. App 38. 
The Court pursues a laudable effort to state a workable rule, but in the attempt condemns 
business activities that are bound to solicitation and do not possess independent value to the 
customer apart from what often accompanies a successful solicitation. The business activities 
of Wrigley in Wisconsin, just as those considered in International Shoe and Brown-For-
man, are the solicitation of orders. The swapping of stale gum and the infrequent stocking 
of fresh gum into new displays are not services that Wrigley was under contract to perform; 
they are not activities that can be said to have provided their own component of significant 
value; rather they are activities conducted in the course of solicitation and whose legal ef-
fect should be the same. My examination of the language of the statute, considered in the 
context of its enactment, demonstrates that the concerns to which § 381(a) was directed, 
and for which its language was drafted, are misapprehended by the Court’s decision today. 
I would affirm the judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
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South Carolina Supreme Court, 437 SE2d 13, cert denied, 114 S.Ct. 550 (1993). 
Geoffrey, Inc., a foreign corporation, appeals from a ruling that requires it to pay South 
Carolina income tax and business license fees. We affirm.
I. FACTS
Geoffrey is a wholly-owned, second-tier subsidiary of Toys R Us, Inc. (Toys R Us) incor-
porated in Delaware with its principal offices in that state. It has no employees or offices in 
South Carolina and owns no tangible property here.
In 1984, Geoffrey became the owner of several valuable trademarks and trade names, in-
cluding “Toys R Us.” Later that year, Geoffrey executed a License Agreement (Agreement) 
that allows Toys R Us to use the “Toys R Us” trade name, as well as other trademarks and 
trade names, in all states except New York, Texas, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New 
Jersey. The Agreement further grants Toys R Us a right to use Geoffrey’s merchandising 
skills, techniques, and “know-how” in connection with marketing, promotion, advertising, 
and sale of products covered by the Agreement.
As consideration for the licenses granted by the Agreement, Geoffrey receives a royalty of 
one percent “of the net sales by [Toys R Us], or any of its affiliated, associated, or subsid-
iary companies, of the Licensed Products sold or the Licensed Services rendered under the 
Licensed Mark.” Toys R Us reports the aggregate sales of all stores to Geoffrey in a single 
figure on a monthly basis. The royalty payment is made annually via wire transfer from a 
Toys R Us account in Pennsylvania to a Geoffrey account in New York.1
Toys R Us began doing business in South Carolina in 1985 and has since then made 
royalty payments to Geoffrey based on South Carolina sales. In 1986 and 1987, Toys R Us 
deducted the royalty payments made to Geoffrey from its South Carolina taxable income. 
The South Carolina Tax Commission (Commission) initially disallowed the deduction, but 
later took the position that Toys R Us was entitled to the deduction and that Geoffrey was 
required to pay South Carolina income tax on the royalty income. The Commission also 
held that Geoffrey was required to pay the South Carolina corporate license fee.
1 The net effect of this corporate structure has been the production of “nowhere’ ‘income that escapes all 
state income taxation. See Rosen, Use of a Delaware Holding Company to Save State Income Taxes, 20 Tax 
Adviser 180 (1989). One commentator has recognized such income as the “product of a divide and con-
quer strategy that some members of the corporate world have exercised effectively for decades.” Corrigan, 
Interstate Corporate Income Taxation—Recent Revolutions and a Modern Response, 29 Vand. L. Rev. 423, 429 
(1976). The strategy’s effectiveness is unquestionable. In 1990, Geoffrey without any full-time employees, 
had an income of approximately $55 million and paid no income taxes to any state.
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Geoffrey paid the taxes under protest and filed this action for a refund, claiming, among 
other things, that it did not do business in South Carolina and that it did not have a sufficient 
nexus with South Carolina for its royalty income to be taxable here. The trial judge upheld 
the Commission’s assessment of taxes against Geoffrey. Geoffrey appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
S.C. Code Ann. §12-7-230 (Supp. 1992), pursuant to which both foreign and domestic 
corporations are taxed, provides:
[E]xcept as otherwise provided, every foreign corporation transacting, conducting, do-
ing business, or having an income within the jurisdiction of this State, whether or not 
the corporation is engaged in or the income derived from intrastate, interstate, or for-
eign commerce, shall make a return and shall pay annually an income tax equivalent to 
five percent of a proportion of its entire net income to be determined as provided in 
this chapter. The term “transacting”, “conducting”, or “doing business”, as used in this 
section, includes the engaging in or the transacting of any activity in this State for the 
purpose of financial profit or gain.
Section 12-7-230 levies a tax on the income of foreign corporations “transacting, con-
ducting, doing business, or having an income within the jurisdiction of this State,” which 
“includes,” but is not limited to, “the engaging in or the transacting of any activity in this 
State for the purpose of financial profit or gain.” We construe this language as extending to 
the limits of the constitution South Carolina’s authority to tax foreign corporations. Here, 
Geoffrey contends that the Due Process Clause, U.S. Const. amend, XIV, §1, and the 
Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 3, prohibit the taxation of its royalty income 
by South Carolina. We disagree.
A. DUE PROCESS
The Due Process Clause requires “some definite link, some minimum connection, between 
a State and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax,” and that the “income at-
tributed to the state for tax purposes must be rationally related to values connected with the 
taxing State.” Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, U.S., 112 S.Ct. 1904, 1909-10, 119 L.Ed.2d 91, 
102 (1992). Geoffrey argues that the Commission has failed to satisfy both of these require-
ments. We disagree.
The nexus requirement of the Due Process Clause can be satisfied even where the cor-
poration has no physical presence in the taxing state if the corporation has purposefully 
directed its activity at the state’s economic forum. Quill, U.S. at 112 S.Ct. at 1909-10, 119 
L.Ed.2d at 104. Geoffrey asserts that it has not purposefully directed its activities toward 
South Carolina. To support its position, Geoffrey points out that Toys R Us had no South 
Carolina stores when it entered into the Agreement and urges, therefore, that Toys R Us’s 
subsequent expansion into South Carolina was unilateral activity that cannot create the 
minimum connection between Geoffrey and South Carolina required by due process.
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In our view, Geoffrey has not been unwillingly brought into contact with South Carolina 
through the unilateral activity of an independent party. Geoffrey’s business is the owner-
ship, licensing, and management of trademarks, trade names, and franchises. By electing 
to license its trademarks and trade names for use by Toys R Us in many states, Geoffrey 
contemplated and purposefully sought the benefit of economic contact with those states. 
Geoffrey has been aware of, consented to, and benefited from Toys R Us’s use of Geoffrey 
intangibles in South Carolina. Moreover, Geoffrey had the ability to control its contact with 
South Carolina by prohibiting the use of its intangibles here as it did with other states. We 
reject Geoffrey claim that it has not purposefully directed its activities toward South Caro-
lina’s economic forum and hold that by licensing intangibles for use in South Carolina and 
receiving income in exchange for their use, Geoffrey has the “minimum connection” with 
this State that is required by due process. See American Dairy Queen Corp. v. Taxation and 
Revenue Dep’t, 93 N.M. 743, 605 P.2d 251 (1979); Aamco Transmissions, Inc. v. Taxation and 
Revenue Dep’t, 93 N.M. 389, 600 P.2d 841, cert. denied, 93 N.M. 205, 598 P.2d 1165 (1979).
In addition to our finding that Geoffrey purposefully directed its activities toward South 
Carolina, we find that the “minimum connection” required by due process also is satisfied 
by the presence of Geoffrey intangible property in this State. Geoffrey’s Secretary, a certi-
fied public accountant, agreed during cross examination that sales by Toys R Us in South 
Carolina create an account receivable for Geoffrey. In addition, the trial judge found that 
Geoffrey had a franchise in South Carolina.2 That the presence of these intangibles is suf-
ficient to sustain a tax is settled law. In Virginia v. Imperial Coal Sales Co., Inc, 293 U.S. 
15, 20, 55 S.Ct. 12, 14, 79 L.Ed. 171, 175 (1934), the United States Supreme Court stated:
It is not the character of the property that makes it subject to such a tax, but the fact 
that the property has a situs within the state and that the owner should give appropriate 
support to the government that protects it. That duty is not less when the property is 
intangible than when it is tangible. Nor are we able to perceive any sound reason for 
holding that the owner must have real estate or tangible property within the state in 
order to subject its intangible property within the state to taxation.3 
Geoffrey asserts that under the doctrine of mobilia sequuntur personam, the situs of its intan-
gibles is its corporate headquarters in Delaware, not South Carolina. However, in Mobil Oil 
Corp. v. Comm’r of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425, 100 S.Ct. 1223, 63 L.Ed.2d 510 (1980), 
the United States Supreme Court rejected the view that the constitution requires taxation 
2 “In its simplest terms, a franchise is a license from the owner of a trademark or trade name permit-
ting another to sell a product or service under that name or mark. More broadly stated, a `franchise’ has 
evolved into an elaborate agreement under which the franchisee undertakes to conduct a business or sell 
a product or service in accordance with methods and procedures prescribed by the franchisor, and the 
franchisor undertakes to assist the franchisee through advertising, promotion, and other advisory services.” 
Black’s Law Dictionary 592 (5th ed. 1979). Geoffrey has not challenged the trial judge’s finding that the 
Agreement created a franchise.
3 Although the tax at issue in Imperial Coal was an ad valorem property tax imposed upon the accounts 
receivable of a Virginia corporation, we do not find that fact distinguishing. Authority to tax the property 
extends to income produced by the property. “That [a state] may tax the land but not the crop, the tree 
but not the fruit, the mine or well but not the product, the business but not the profit derived from it is 
wholly inadmissible.” Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 49-50, 40 S.Ct. 221, 225, 64 L.Ed. 445 (1920).
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 of intangibles by allocation to a single situs, finding no adequate justification for preferring 
that rule over taxation by apportionment. The High Court concluded that:
[a]lthough a fictionalized situs of intangible property sometimes has been invoked to 
avoid multiple taxation of ownership, there is nothing talismanic about the concepts 
of “business situs” or “commercial domicile” that automatically renders those concepts 
applicable when taxation of income from intangibles is at issue. The Court has observed 
that the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam, upon which these fictions of situs are based, 
“states a rule without disclosing the reasons for it.” . . . The Court has also recognized 
that “the reason for a single place of taxation no longer obtains” when the taxpayer’s 
activities with respect to the intangible property involve relations with more than one 
jurisdiction. . . . Even for property or franchise taxes, apportionment of intangible values 
is not unknown. . . . Moreover, cases upholding allocation to a single situs for property 
tax purposes have distinguished income tax situations where the apportionment prin-
ciple prevails. (Citations omitted).
Id. at 445, 100 S.Ct. at 1235, 63 L.Ed.2d at 525-26. See also Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 
298 U.S. 193, 56 S.Ct. 773, 80 L.Ed. 1143 (1936) (intangibles may acquire a situs for taxa-
tion other than at the domicile of the owner if they have become integral parts of some local 
business); Southern Express Co. v. Spigener, 118 S.C. 413, 110 S.E. 403 (1920) (the situs of 
intangible property is within this State if the right afforded by it is exercised here); Dexter, 
Taxation of Income from Intangibles of Multistate-Multinational Corporations, 29 Vand. L. Rev. 
401 (1976); J. Hellerstein & W. Hellerstein, State Taxation, Para. 9.08-.09 (2d ed. 1992). We 
reject Geoffrey’s claim that its intangible assets are located exclusively in Delaware. Accord-
ingly, we find that Geoffrey’s purposeful direction of activity toward South Carolina as well 
as its possessing intangible property here provide a definite link between South Carolina and 
the income derived by Geoffrey from the use of its trademarks and trade names in this State.
We also find that the second prong of Quill test has been met. Contrary to Geoffrey’s as-
sertion, South Carolina has conferred benefits upon Geoffrey to which the challenged tax 
is rationally related. As the United States Supreme Court recognized in Curry v. McCanless, 
307 U.S. 357, 365-66, 59 S.Ct. 900, 905, 83 L.Ed. 1339, 1347 (1939):
Very different considerations, both theoretical and practical, apply to the taxation of 
intangibles, that is, rights which are not related to physical things. Such rights are but re-
lationships between persons, natural or corporate, which the law recognizes by attaching 
to them certain sanctions enforceable in courts. The power of government over them 
and the protection which it gives them cannot be exerted through control of a physi-
cal thing. They can be made effective only through control over and protection afforded to those 
persons whose relationships are the origin of the rights. . . . Obviously, as sources of actual or 
potential wealth—which is an appropriate measure of any tax imposed on ownership or 
its exercise—they cannot be dissociated from the persons from whose relationships they are derived. 
(Citations omitted). (Emphasis added).
The real source of Geoffrey’s income is not a paper agreement, but South Carolina’s Toys 
R Us customers. Cf. Avco Financial Services Consumer Discount Co. v. Director, Division of 
Taxation, 100 N.J. 27, 494 A.2d 788 (1985). By providing an orderly society in which Toys 
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R Us conducts business, South Carolina has made it possible for Geoffrey to earn income 
pursuant to the royalty agreement. See, e.g., Allied Signal v. Comm’r of Finance, 79 N.Y.2d, 
588 N.E.2d 731, 580 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1991) (benefits afforded to an in-state corporation 
inure to non-resident shareholders). That Geoffrey has received protection, benefits, and 
opportunities from South Carolina is manifested by the fact that it earns income in this state. 
Accord Aamco, 93 N.M. at 393, 600 P.2d at 845 (quoting Besser Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 
74 N.M. 377, 394 P.2d 141 (1964)). That the tax is rationally related to these protections, 
benefits, and opportunities is evidenced by the fact that the State seeks to tax only that por-
tion of Geoffrey’s income generated within its borders. Based on the foregoing reasons, we 
hold that the Due Process Clause does not prohibit South Carolina’s taxation of Geoffrey’s 
royalty income.
B. Commerce Clause
A tax will survive challenge under the Commerce Clause so long as it 1) is applied to an 
activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, 2) is fairly apportioned, 3) does not 
discriminate against interstate commerce, and 4) is fairly related to the services provided by 
the State. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279, 97 S.Ct. 1076, 1079, 61 
L.Ed.2d 326, 331 (1977). Relying on Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 
U.S. 753, 87 S.Ct. 1389, 18 L.Ed.2d 505 (1967), Geoffrey contends that it does not have a 
substantial nexus with South Carolina because it is not physically present in this state. In our 
view, Geoffrey’s reliance on the physical presence requirement of Bellas Hess is misplaced.4 
It is well settled that the taxpayer need not have a tangible, physical presence in a state 
for income to be taxable there. The presence of intangible property alone is sufficient to 
establish nexus. American Dairy Queen, 93 N.M. at 747, 605 P.2d at 255. See also Int’l Har-
vester Co. v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435, 441-442, 64 S.Ct. 1060, 1063-64, 
88 L.Ed. 1373, 1379 (1944) (a state may tax such part of the income of a non-resident as is 
fairly attributable either to property located in the state or to events or transactions which, 
occurring there, are within the protection of the state and entitled to the numerous other 
benefits which its confers); J. Hellerstein & W. Hellerstein, supra, at 6.08 (any corporation 
that regularly exploits the markets of a state should be subject to its jurisdiction to impose 
an income tax even though not physically present). A taxpayer who is domiciled in one 
state but carries on business in another is subject to taxation measured by the value of the 
intangibles used in his business. Curry, 307 U.S. at 368, 59 S.Ct. at 906, 83 L.Ed. at 1348. 
We hold that by licensing intangibles for use in this State and deriving income from their 
use here, Geoffrey has a “substantial nexus” with South Carolina.5 
4 The U.S. Supreme Court recently revisited the physical presence requirement of Bellas Hess and, while 
reaffirming its vitality as to sales and use taxes, noted that the physical presence requirement had not been 
extended to other types of taxes. Quill, U.S. at 112 S.Ct. at 1914, 119 L.Ed.2d at 108.
5 Further discussion of the remaining requirements of the Commerce Clause is unnecessary. Our Due 
Process analysis of the benefits conferred upon Geoffrey applies with equal force here and need not be re-
peated. Moreover, Geoffrey raised no constitutional claim that the challenged tax is not fairly apportioned 
or discriminates against interstate commerce.
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 Geoffrey finally contends that even if it is subject to South Carolina income tax, all of its 
royalty income would be allocated or apportioned to Delaware pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. 
§§12-7-1120(5) or 12-7-1140 (1977 and Supp. 1992). These statutes are inapplicable to the 
income received by Geoffrey Section 12-7-1120(5) allocates gains or losses from the sale 
of intangible personal property not connected with the business of the taxpayer, other than 
any intangible personal property held for sale to customers in the regular course of business. 
Section 12-7-1140 apportions the income of taxpayers whose principal business in this state 
is (a) manufacturing or any form of collecting, buying, assembling or processing goods and 
materials within this State, or (b) selling, distributing or dealing in tangible personal property 
within this State.
In conclusion, we hold that the taxation of Geoffrey’s royalty income pursuant to sec-
tion 12-7-230 is not prohibited by the Due Process Clause or the Commerce Clause of the 
United States Constitution. Our finding that Geoffrey may be taxed pursuant to section 12-
7-230 settles the question whether Geoffrey must pay the corporate license fee. All corpora-
tions subject to section 12-7-230 are required to do so. See S.C. Code Ann. §§12-19-20, 
12-19-70 (1977 & Supp. 1992). The order of the trial judge is
AFFIRMED.
Chandler, Finney, Toal and Moore, JJ., concur.
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STATE C CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURN CHECKLIST 
2010 
 
  Page 1 of 7 
  2010 AICPA, Inc. Page Completed  
Client Name and Number:_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 








100) GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
   
101) For state tax forms, instructions, tax codes, cases, regulations, rulings, 
procedures, etc., refer to the AICPA’s Internet web page at 
www.aicpa.org/yellow/index.htm. 
 
102) For comprehensive charts and lists of various items and requirements 
(e.g., tax rates, filing dates, extensions, estimated taxes, exemptions, 
reports, limitation periods, NOL deductions, etc.), refer to a state tax 
reporter service or the Federation of Tax Administrator’s Internet web 





























103) Obtain information concerning state tax audits and correspondence. 
 
________ ______ ______________ 
104) If a federal audit has been settled, consider notifying state(s).  Many 
states impose penalties or deny otherwise available refunds if the state 
is not notified or an amended return is not filed within a specified 














105) Determine if the client has sufficient connection with any other state 
that may require an income, franchise or privilege tax return. (Note 
that requirements for filing a franchise or privilege tax return may 
differ from requirements for filing an income tax return.) If multistate, 

















106) Consult the Unique Considerations for State Business Tax Returns 
(also in this AICPA Tax Practice Guides and Checklists publication 
package) for common problems and unique tax issues for each state 
tax return to be prepared.  Also consult the various Nexus, 
Allocation/Apportionment and State NOL Issues Practice Guides in 
this AICPA Tax Practice Guides and Checklists publication package 
for further information relevant to the checklist question #111 and 


























107) Obtain and review information related to state statutory, regulatory, 
judicial, administrative changes or amnesty programs since the filing 
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109) Consider the impact of any acquisitions, divestitures and reorganiza-








110) Determine if the operations of a division have changed substantially 
during the year, including a sale or transfer of a major portion of the 











111) Determine with the client the proper filing status (separate, unitary, 
combined, or consolidated) for multicompany entities. (Note election 











112) Determine if the impact of intercompany transactions (e.g. elimina-
tions, deferred intercompany transactions, state specific disallowances 
of certain expenses, etc.) have been properly accounted for in the 














113) Determine if the state has tax shelter disclosure requirements and if 
additional steps are necessary to properly identify and disclose any 
reportable transactions. Several states have adopted tax shelter 














114) Consider if disaster relief provisions apply. 
 
________ ______ _____________ 
200) INCOME 
 
   
201) If the state uses income on the federal return as a starting point, either 
before or after the net operating loss deduction or special deduction, 











202) Determine if federally exempt (e.g., municipal) interest and dividends 
are subject to add back. (Note possible offset of direct and/or 











203) Determine each state’s tax-exempt interest and dividends for possible 
subtraction (e.g., home state interest if all states’ interest was added 
back in checklist section #202). (Note possible offset of direct and/or 














204) Determine the interest and dividends from U.S. government 
obligations for possible subtraction. (Note possible offset of direct 











205) Check for any other income taxable on the state return that was not 








206) Check for any income taxable on the federal return that may not be 
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300) DEDUCTIONS 
 
   
301) Determine any differences between federal and state deductions (e.g., 
state tax deduction, dividend received deduction, depreciation, 
intercompany interest, intangibles or management expenses, treatment 














302) Determine any differences between federal and state carryovers (e.g., 








303) Determine the state’s treatment of 30% and 50% additional first-year 
depreciation prior to 2005 and the state’s treatment of 50% bonus 















304) Determine state treatment of current year asset items for §179 and 








305) Determine the state’s treatment of the deduction for qualified 








306) Determine if the state has a disallowance provision for inter-company 
interest expenses, intangible expenses and/or management fees. (Note, 
if yes, review the various exceptions provided by the state to 
determine if the taxpayer’s facts related to the intercompany 
transactions will meet an exception to the addback and therefore, will 



















    
400) TAX COMPUTATION AND CREDITS 
 
   
401) Determine any state alternative minimum tax or alternative tax. 
 
________ ______ ______________ 
402) Compute any applicable tax credits (e.g., investment, jobs, enterprise, 








403) Compute any credit recapture. 
 
________ ______ ______________ 
404) Confirm amounts and dates of any state and local estimated tax 
deposits/payments (including withholding) for the year, prior year 











405) Prepare estimated tax vouchers. 
 
________ ______ ______________ 







________ ______ ______________ 
F-5
12-Appendix E.indd   212 10/5/11   10:59 AM
Appendix E: State C Corporation Income Tax Return Checklist 2010
 213








  Page 5 of 7 
  2010 AICPA, Inc. Page Completed  
500) MULTISTATE ISSUES 
 
   
501) Determine in which states a multistate corporation is required to file 
income or franchise tax returns. Consult the AICPA Nexus, 
Allocation/Apportionment and State NOL Issues Practice Guides for 
guidance and for an overview of nexus and details on ordering the 

















502) Consult the Nexus, Allocation/Apportionment and State NOL Issues 
Practice Guides (also in this AICPA Tax Practice Guides and 
Checklists publication package) for information on multistate 














503) If the corporation is not taxable in more than one state, determine if 








504) Determine the available methods of dividing the income tax base of a 
multistate corporation for all states for which returns are required 
(e.g., separate accounting, specific allocation, formulary apportion-














505) If separate accounting method is available and is a beneficial option, 








506)  Determine the need to distinguish between business income and 








507) If the corporation has income subject to specific allocation:  
 
   
 .1) Identify income subject to specific allocation. 
 
________ ______ ______________ 
 .2) Determine treatment of expenses directly or indirectly related to 
allocated income. (These are generally added back or netted 











508) Determine if the state in which you are filing requires or permits 
unitary, combined or consolidated reporting and which test(s) applies. 
 


















510) Determine the total income that is to be apportioned. 
 
________ ______ ______________ 
511) Determine each state’s apportionment formula for business income: 
 
   
 .1) Check if any of the states’ formulas differ from the standard 
three-factor formula (e.g., double weighted sales factor, a formula 
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 .2) Check the various states’ rules that establish: 
 
   
 .a) Which items are included in the factors, 
 
________ ______ ______________ 
 .b) The timing of entry and removal from the factors, 
 
________ ______ ______________ 
 .c) The evaluation of items included in the factors, 
 
________ ______ ______________ 
 .d) How revenue items are sourced to a particular state (e.g., 
sales of services vs. sales of tangible personal property) and 











 .e) Which property is included in the factor and how it is 












512) Determine the amounts to be included in the property factor and check 
the various states’ rules concerning the use of cost or adjusted book 











513) Determine the amounts to be included in the payroll factor and check 
the various states’ rules for treatment of special classes of compensa-
tion such as compensation of corporate officers, commissions and 














514) Determine the amounts to be included in the sales factor considering 
each state’s rules concerning “throwback” sales.  
 
515) Determine if state has adopted “throwout” rule in computing the 
denominator of the sales factor. 
 
516) If in a unitary combined return setting, consider the state’s position on 


























517) Reconcile the denominator of the sales factor to the amount of sales 
reported on the federal return. 
 
518) Determine the availability of like-kind exchange nonrecognition 

















600) STATE NOL ISSUES 
 
   
601) Determine each state’s rules concerning calculation of net operating 








602) Determine each state’s starting point for calculation of a NOL, such as 
federal taxable income with or without NOL modification, or federal 
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603) For multistate returns: 
 
   
 .1) Determine each state’s effect on the NOL and the amount of 
carryback or carryforward due to state modifications, 











 .2) Determine if the corporation filed a state return in the year the 








 .3) Determine if NOL carryforwards and carrybacks use the appor-













604) For affiliated groups of corporations filing a consolidated return: 
 
   









 .2) Check for state requirements concerning separate return filing 








605) If combined corporate reporting is allowed or required by a state, 
check if combined or separate method is used for calculating the NOL 











606) Check on the treatment of any NOL carryovers if a corporation has 








607) Consult the Nexus, Allocation/Apportionment and State NOL Issues 
Practice Guides (also in this AICPA Tax Practice Guides and 
Checklists publication package) for an explanation of state net 














700) OTHER  
 
   
701) Confirm due date of tax return or extension request. 
 











703) Identify planning opportunities (e.g., economic incentives) for 








704) Identify and report any out of jurisdiction purchases for use tax. 
 
________ ______ ______________ 
705) Advise the client of their exposure to other business tax programs 
(e.g., sales, gross receipts, license, employment, inventory, property, 
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706) Consider preparing a workpaper schedule for the file concerning state 
items to track, carryforward items, and any matters of future concern. 
 
707) Check NAUPA Internet web page at www.unclaimed.org to 
determine if client is owed any unclaimed property. 
 
708) Consider disclosure requirements for written tax advice.  (See 
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401(k) plan. A qualified retirement plan to which contributions from salary are made from 
pre-tax dollars.
accelerated depreciation. Computation of depreciation to provide greater deductions in 
earlier years of equipment and other business or investment property.
accounting method. Rules applied in determining when and how to report income and 
expenses on tax returns.
accrual method. Method of accounting that reports income when it is earned, disregard-
ing when it may be received, and expense when it is incurred, disregarding when it is actu-
ally paid.
acquisition debt. Mortgage taken to buy, hold, or substantially improve main or second 
home that serves as security.
active participation. Rental real estate activity involving property management at a level 
that permits deduction of losses.
adjusted basis. Basis in property increased by some expenses (for example, by capital im-
provements) or decreased by some tax benefit (for example, by depreciation).
adjusted gross income (AGI). Gross income minus above-the-line deductions (that is, 
deductions other than itemized deductions, the standard deduction, and personal and de-
pendency exemptions).
alimony. Payments for the support or maintenance of one’s spouse pursuant to a judicial 
decree or written agreement related to divorce or separation.
alternative minimum tax (AMT). System comparing the tax results with and without 
the benefit of tax preference items for the purpose of preventing tax avoidance.
amortization. Write-off of an intangible asset’s cost over a number of years.
applicable federal rate. An interest rate determined by reference to the average market 
yield on U.S. government obligations. Used in Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 7872 to 
determine the treatment of loans with below-market interest rates. 
at-risk rules. Limits on tax losses to business activities in which an individual taxpayer has 
an economic stake.
backup withholding. Withholding at a rate of 31 percent on interest or dividend pay-
ments by a payor that has not received required taxpayer identification number information.
bad debt. Uncollectible debt deductible as an ordinary loss if associated with a business and 
otherwise deductible as short-term capital loss.
basis. Amount determined to by a taxpayer’s investment in property for purposes of deter-
mining gain or loss on the sale of property or in computing depreciation.
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cafeteria plan. Written plan allowing employees to choose among two or more benefits 
(consisting of cash and qualified benefits) and to pay for the benefits with pretax dollars. 
Must conform to IRC § 125 requirements. 
capital asset. Investments (for example, stocks, bonds, and mutual funds) and personal 
property (for example, home).
capital gain or loss. Profit (net of losses) on the sale or exchange of a capital asset or IRC 
§ 1231 property, subject to favorable tax rates, and loss on such sales or exchanges (net of 
gains) deductible against $3,000 of ordinary income.
capitalization. Addition of cost or expense to the basis of property.
carryovers (carryforwards) and carrybacks. Tax deductions and credits not fully used 
in one year and chargeable against prior or future tax years.
conservation reserve program. A voluntary program for soil, water, and wildlife conser-
vation; wetland establishment; and restoration and reforestation, administered by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture. 
credit. Amount subtracted from income tax liability.
deduction. Expense subtracted in computing adjusted gross income.
defined benefit plan. Qualified retirement plan basing annual contributions on targeted 
benefit amounts.
defined contribution plan. Qualified retirement plan with annual contributions based on 
a percentage of compensation.
depletion. Deduction for the extent a natural resource is used.
depreciation. Proportionate deduction based on the cost of business or investment prop-
erty with a useful life (or recovery period) greater than one year.
earned income. Wages, bonuses, vacation pay, and other remuneration, including self-
employment income, for services rendered.
earned income credit. Refundable credit available to low-income individuals.
employee stock ownership plan. Defined contribution plan that is a stock bonus plan or 
a combined stock bonus and money purchase plan designed to invest primarily in qualifying 
employer securities. 
estimated tax. Quarterly payments of income tax liability by individuals, corporations, 
trusts, and estates.
exemption. A deduction against net income based on taxpayer status (that is, single, head 
of household, married filing jointly or separately, trusts, and estates.
fair market value. The price that would be agreed upon by a willing seller and willing 
buyer, established by markets for publicly traded stocks or determined by appraisal.
fiscal year. A 12-month taxable period ending on any date other than December 31.
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foreign tax. Income tax paid to a foreign country and deductible or creditable, at the tax-
payer’s election, against U.S. income tax.
gift. Transfer of money or property without expectation of anything in return and exclud-
able from income by the recipient. A gift may still be affected by the unified estate and gift 
transfer tax applicable to the gift’s maker.
goodwill. A business asset, intangible in nature, adding a value beyond the business’s tan-
gible assets.
gross income. Income from any and all sources, after any exclusions and before any de-
ductions are taken into consideration.  
half-year convention. A depreciation rule assuming property other than real estate is 
placed in service in the middle of the tax year.
head-of-household. An unmarried individual who provides and maintains a household 
for a qualifying dependent and therefore is subject to distinct tax rates.
health savings account. A trust operated exclusively for purposes of paying qualified 
medical expenses of the account beneficiary and, thus, providing for deductible contribu-
tions, tax-deferred earnings, and exclusion of tax on any monies withdrawn for medical 
purposes.
holding period. The period of time a taxpayer holds onto property, therefore affecting tax 
treatment on its disposition.
imputed interest. Income deemed attributable to deferred-payment transfers, such as be-
low-market loans, for which no interest or unrealistically low interest is charged.
incentive stock option. An option to purchase stock in connection with an individual’s 
employment, which defers tax liability until all of the stock acquired by means of the option 
is sold or exchanged.
income in respect of a decedent. Income earned by a person but not paid until after his 
or her death.
independent contractor. A self-employed individual whose work method or time is not 
controlled by an employer.
indexing. Adjustments in deductions, credits, exemptions and exclusions, plan contribu-
tions, AGI limits, and so on, to reflect annual inflation figures.
individual retirement account (IRA). Tax-exempt trust created or organized in the 
United States for the exclusive benefit of an individual or the individual’s beneficiaries. 
information returns. Statements of income and other items recognizable for tax purposes 
provided to the IRS and the taxpayer. Form W-2 and forms in the 1099 series, as well as 
Schedules K-1, are the prominent examples.
installment method. Tax accounting method for reporting gain on a sale over the period 
of tax years during which payments are made, that is, over the payment period specified in 
an installment sale agreement.
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 intangible property. Items such as patents, copyrights, and goodwill.
inventory. Goods held for sale to customers, including materials used in the production of 
those goods.
involuntary conversion. A forced disposition (for example, casualty, theft, or condemna-
tion) for which deferral of gain may be available.
jeopardy. For tax purposes, a determination that payment of a tax deficiency may be as-
sessed immediately as the most viable means of ensuring its payment.
Keogh plan. A qualified retirement plan available to self-employed persons.
key employee. Officers, employees, and officers defined by the IRC for purposes of de-
termining whether a plan is “top heavy.”
kiddie tax. Application of parents’ maximum tax rate to unearned income of their child 
under age 18.
lien. A charge upon property after a tax assessment has been made and until tax liability is 
satisfied.
like-kind exchange. Tax-free exchange of business or investment property for property 
that is similar or related in service or use.
listed property. Items subject to special restrictions on depreciation (for example, cars, 
computers, and cell phones).
lump-sum distribution. Distribution of an individual’s entire interest in a qualified retire-
ment plan within one tax year.
marginal tax rate. The highest tax bracket applicable to an individual’s income.
material participation. The measurement of an individual’s involvement in business op-
erations for purposes of the passive activity loss rules.
mid-month convention. Assumption, for purposes of computing depreciation, that all 
real property is placed in service in the middle of the month.
mid-quarter convention. Assumption, for purposes of computing depreciation, that all 
property other than real property is placed in service in the middle of the quarter, when the 
basis of property placed in service in the final quarter exceeds a statutory percentage of the 
basis of all property placed in service during the year.
minimum distribution. A retirement plan distribution, based on life expectancies, that an 
individual must take after age 70½ in order to avoid tax penalties.
minimum funding requirements. Associated with defined benefit plans and certain 
other plans, such as money purchase plans, assuring the plan has enough assets to satisfy its 
current, and anticipated liabilities. 
miscellaneous itemized deduction. Deductions for certain expenses (for example, un-
reimursed employee expenses) limited to only the amount by which they exceed 2 percent 
of GI.
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money purchase plan. Defined contribution plan in which the contributions by the 
employer are mandatory and established other than by reference to the employer’s profits. 
net operating loss. A business or casualty loss for which amounts exceeding the allowable 
deduction in the current tax year may be carried back two years to reduce previous tax li-
ability and forward 20 years to cover any remaining unused loss deduction.
nonresident alien. An individual who is neither a citizen nor a resident of the United 
States and who is taxed on income effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business.
original issue discount. The excess of face value over issue price set by a purchase 
agreement.
passive activity loss. Losses allowable only to the extent of income derived each year (that 
is, by means of carryover) from rental property or business activities in which the taxpayer 
does not materially participate.
pass-through entities. Partnerships, limited liability corporations, limited liability partner-
ships, S corporations, and trusts and estates whose income or loss is reported by the partner, 
member, shareholder, or beneficiary.
personal holding company. A corporation, usually closely held, that exists to hold in-
vestments such as stocks, bonds, or personal service contracts and to time distributions of 
income in a manner that limits the owner(s) tax liability.
qualified Subchapter S trust. A trust that qualifies specific requirements for eligibility as 
an S corporation shareholder.
real estate investment trust. A form of investment in which a trust holds real estate or 
mortgages and distributes income, in whole or in part, to the beneficiaries (that is, investors).
real estate mortgage investment conduit. Treated as a partnership, investors purchase 
interests in this entity which holds a fixed pool of mortgages.
realized gain or loss. The difference between property’s basis and the amount received 
upon its sale or exchange.
recapture. The amount of a prior deduction or credit recognized as income or affecting its 
characterization (capital gain versus ordinary income) when the property giving rise to the 
deduction or credit is disposed of.
recognized gain or loss. The amount of realized gain or loss that must be included in 
taxable income.
regulated investment company. A corporation serving as a mutual fund that acts as 
investment agents for shareholders and customarily dealing in government and corporate 
securities.
reorganization. Restructuring of corporations under specific IRC rules, resulting in non-
recognition of gain.
resident alien. An individual who is a permanent resident, has substantial presence, or, 
under specific election rules is taxed as a U.S. citizen.
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 Roth IRA. Form of individual retirement account that produces, subject to holding period 
requirements, nontaxable earnings.
S corporation. A corporation that, upon satisfying requirements concerning its ownership, 
may elect to act as a pass-through entity.
saver’s credit. Term commonly used to describe IRC § 25B credit for qualified contribu-
tions to a retirement plan or via elective deferrals. 
Section 1231 property. Depreciable business property eligible for capital gains treatment.
Section 1244 stock. Closely held stock whose sale may produce an ordinary, rather than 
capital, loss (subject to caps).
split-dollar life insurance. Arrangement between an employer and employee under 
which the life insurance policy benefits are contractually split, and the costs (premiums) are 
also split. 
statutory employee. An insurance agent or other specified worker who is subject to social 
security taxes on wages but eligible to claim deductions available to the self-employed.
stock bonus plan. A plan established and maintained to provide benefits similar to those 
of a profit-sharing plan, except the benefits must be distributable in stock of the employer 
company.
tax preference items. Tax benefits deemed includable for purposes of the alternative 
minimum tax.
tax shelter. A tax-favored investment, typically in the form of a partnership or joint ven-
ture, that is subject to scrutiny as tax-avoidance device.
tentative tax. Income tax liability before taking into account certain credits, and AMT li-
ability reduced regular tax liability.
transportation expense. The cost of transportation from one point to another.
travel expense. Transportation, meals, and lodging costs incurred away from home and for 
trade or business purposes.
unearned income. Income from investments (that is, interest, dividends, and capital gains).
uniform capitalization rules. Rules requiring capitalization of property used in a busi-
ness or income-producing activity (for example, items used in producing inventory) and to 
certain property acquired for resale.
unrelated business income. Exempt organization income produced by activities beyond 
the organization’s exempt purposes and therefore taxable.
wash sale. Sale of securities preceded or followed within 30 days by a purchase of substan-
tially identical securities. Recognition of any loss on the sale is disallowed.
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